Characterization of Multi-Channel Denial-of-Service and Full-Scale Denial-of-Service

Abstract

Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) are pervasive in critical infrastructures such as power grids, transportation networks, and industrial control processes. Ensuring their reliable operation is crucial, particularly in the presence of unforeseen failures and malicious external attacks. This thesis addresses the problem of resilient control for CPSs equipped with multiple sensors, where the communication channels of both sides of the control structure are susceptible to Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks. To systematically handle such disruptions in a multi-sensor framework, the DoS are categorized into two types: Multi-Channel DoS (MCDoS) and Full-Scale DoS (FSDoS). The thesis focuses on the characterization of MCDoS and FSDoS, and proposes a resilient control strategy that guarantees system stability despite the presence of such attacks.