

# **OVERCOMING METAPHYSICS: A HEIDEGGERIAN APPROACH TO THE TRUTH OF BEING**

A Thesis Submitted  
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements  
For the Award of the Degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

*BY*

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


**Department of Humanities and Social Sciences,  
INDIAN INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, GUWAHATI  
781 039, INDIA**

July 2013



*Dedicated to  
My beloved parents*



***It would be possible to describe everything  
Scientifically, but it would make no sense;  
It would be without meaning, as if you described a Beethoven  
Symphony as a variation of wave pressure.***

Albert Einstein



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## DECLARATION

I, hereby declare that the Thesis entitled, “*Overcoming Metaphysics: A Heideggerian Approach to the Truth of Being,*” is a research work carried out by me in the Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, Indian Institute of Technology, Guwahati, under the supervision of Prof. Archana Barua for the award of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. This work has not been submitted elsewhere for award of any degree.

July 01, 2013  
IIT, Guwahati.

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## CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the work contained in the thesis entitled, “*Overcoming Metaphysics: A Heideggerian Approach to the Truth of Being*,” by Mr. Vanlaltanpuia, a Research Scholar of the Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, Indian Institute of Technology, Guwahati, for the award of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, has been carried out under my supervision and that this work has not been submitted elsewhere for the award of any degree.

July 01, 2013  
IIT, Guwahati

Prof. Archana Barua  
Supervisor

## *Abstract*

In contrast to Husserl's pure phenomenology, Heidegger proposes hermeneutic phenomenology, which proceeds by means of interpretation. Heidegger notes that traditional understanding of Being, guided by the notion of substance, is inseparable from the idea of presence. This Heidegger identifies as a metaphysical way of identifying an immovable mover or an eternal and never changing dimension of time that can otherwise be measured as clock time. Overcoming this metaphysical thinking lies the dimension of Being that is also essentially related with temporality. What is this essential dynamic temporal dimension of time that characterizes the ontological dimension of Being? How far is Being determined by time? Being and time, says Heidegger, determine each other reciprocally. Human being as a being, as *Da-sein*, is not the master of its own origin but finds itself as already an existing fact, i.e., immersed in its original situation of mundaneness in dependence on other beings as thrown into the world to existence. *Da-sein* is a being to death or a being to nothing. Man alienates himself from his authentic existence as being-to-death and acts in an inauthentic way. Man is not the ruler but guardian of Being and his way of being is bound up with destiny of Being.

The thesis, *Overcoming Metaphysics: A Heideggerian Approach to the Truth of Being*, makes an attempt at exploring Heideggerian quest for the ontic and the ontological dimensions of Being in light of his deconstruction of the metaphysical tradition of philosophy.

## Acknowledgment

I take this privilege to acknowledge all those who have helped me in completing my thesis works. At the outset, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to the Indian Institute of Technology, Guwahati, particularly the Department of Humanities and Social Sciences for providing me an opportunity to pursue my Research Works as a sponsored regular category, because of which, I have been entitled to access all the facilities offered by the Institute, which I did use in the most beneficial ways. It was the faculties of the Philosophy – Prof. Archana Barua (the then Head of Department) and Dr.V.Prabhu, who along with the other faculties in the Department, formally have inducted me to the program, of course, after going through the proper entrance procedure of the institute, for which my utmost thanks they deserved it. I thank, Dr.V.Prabhu for arranging my preliminary works - Course Works in the shorter, yet, under the provision of the PhD program of the Institute, which enabled me to enter straightforwardly to the thesis works of mine without wasting much time in the peripheral works other than the core subject.

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As life itself is colored by certain ups and downs that applies to me during my stay at the Institute. When I passed through all those different circumstances, there is somebody who

wholeheartedly understands my positions. It is none other than my loving parents, the greatest gifts I ever received from God, who cherished me, comforted me and always safeguarded me with their prayers throughout the course of my study, and without it, I am sure, I would not have completed my works. It was certainly because of their prayers, I could overcome the overwhelming problems that loomed around me during my stay at IITG. They laughed with me in a cheerful circumstance, and wept, yet remained protective when I was down with certain problems. Such a support I received from them which made me strong and stands firm in this highly academic endeavor. I thank God once again for my loving parents, whose immense support is my all in all.

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**Vanlaltanpuia**  
**Author**

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**INTRODUCING MARTIN HEIDEGGER AND HIS CRITIQUE OF  
TRADITIONAL METAPHYSICS**

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**INTRODUCTION**

**(PART – 1)**

**1.0. Background of the Study**

This thesis makes an attempt at examining Martin Heidegger's critique of traditional metaphysics and his quest for the phenomenological and ontological disclosure of Being. The true motivation for writing a thesis on Heidegger's critique of metaphysics came from my interest in traditional philosophical writings in metaphysics, which became a part of my philosophy curriculum since the time I was introduced to the subject, and then this new turn on the subject by contemporary philosophers, right from Derrida to Levinas, Heidegger, Nietzsche - on how "Metaphysics" seems to have become a pejorative term, something like "what's been wrong with philosophy hitherto." Martin Heidegger's work on metaphysics appeared interesting to me since Heidegger had a novel way of tracing his critique of metaphysics to the question of the meaning of Being. The terms "science" and "philosophy" have thus undergone radical changes in meaning since the seventeenth century keeping scope for reconsideration of the relation between metaphysics and other disciplines.

Heidegger, like many others besides him, has remained critique of the metaphysical concept of the self that is devoid of sociality, history and inter-subjectivity. While both Hegel and Heidegger remained critiques of Modernity's foundation on "substance metaphysics," Hegel followed a path of *dialectical speculative*, and became a system builder in "speculative philosophy," Heidegger detached himself from the metaphysical tradition with his new project for re-vitalizing the phenomenological and ontological dimension of the question of

Being. Similarly, both Heidegger and Derrida seek to deconstruct this lingering presence of a metaphysical substance although Heideggerian approach is more a re-construction of a more fundamental ontological tradition of Being that he sought to recover from the forgotten tradition of the early Greek thinkers. Interestingly enough, identifying the wrongs of traditional ways of doing philosophy with its preference for “substance metaphysics,” thereby identifying it with “metaphysics of consciousness,” Heidegger’s critique of Metaphysics is also a corollary of his critical estimate of our obsession with technology in our contemporary time. Heidegger believes that the two are intimately connected.

After an initial introduction to Heidegger and his critique of the “metaphysical turn of philosophy,” the thesis re-visits Heidegger’s version of hermeneutical phenomenology in order to establish Heidegger’s distinctive place within the phenomenological school of Edmund Husserl by way of making a comparative study of these two ways of doing phenomenology, the Husserlian way of phenomenology as paving way for philosophy as a rigorous science and Heidegger’s hermeneutical disclosures of the ontology of Being. For Husserl, the subject-matter of phenomenology is consciousness and its *noematic* structures that is essentially “intentional” in nature. For Heidegger of *Being and Time*, the subject-matter of phenomenology is “Da-sein” or, what comes to the same thing, “the understanding of Being as Being.”

Making an effort at technical definitions of the terms used by Heidegger, the thesis begins its probe into Heidegger’s exploration of the meaning of Being what he now stylistically defines as “the technological disclosure of Being in the contemporary age and its effects,” also as “Dasein as being-in-the-world,” and the like. The thesis thus enters into an in depth study of Heideggerian deconstruction of the metaphysical tradition of philosophy that indirectly leads to a deeper quest for an alternate paradigm for philosophical discourse centering round an ontological and phenomenological meaning of Being.

In this background what follows is an overview of the research problem, namely, **“Overcoming Metaphysics: A Heideggerian Approach to the Truth of Being.”**

## **1.1. Martin Heidegger: A Life and Its Philosophical Interpretation**

Martin Heidegger is widely acknowledged to be one of the most original and important philosophers of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, while remaining one of the most controversial one. He is the hidden master of modern thought, or a scholar who is considered by many as the greatest thinker of the twentieth century. It is no exaggeration to say that Heidegger's work touches the deepest, usually unconsidered assumptions of all work of thought, forming a reassessment of the drive to knowledge itself. As such in the second half of the twentieth century it was often Heidegger's direct or indirect influence that the traditional view that intellectual and scientific inquiry, the search for truth, is inherently disinterested, or even critical of un-wanted forms of authority, gave way to arguments that the drive to know is often compromised by elements of domination and control (Clark, 2002, p. 1). What is worth mentioning about Heidegger, is his style of works mostly carried out in the most praxis way unlike philosophy's usual way of abstract speculation. Hence it does have lots to do in the realms of modernity and in technological and scientific realms, where philosophy is thought of as almost nothing to do in the present world of science and technology.

Heidegger's thinking is both a profound one and a radical critique of the fundamental assumptions of modernity. As such his thinking aligns him with those who "see modernity instead as a movement of ethic and class domination, European imperialism, anthropocentrism, the destruction of nature, the dis-solution of community and tradition, the rise of alienation, the death of individuality in bureaucracy. Although the term post-dates him, Heidegger is also a major thinker of 'globalization'" (Clark, 2002).

Heidegger's effect has been to release a sense of fragility of the grounds of human thought, art and culture generally, an effect reinforced by the influence of Heidegger's most famous contemporary follower, Jacques Derrida. Gadamer, once a student of Marin Heidegger writes on his teacher as having "the determination of a thinker who saw the present and the past, the future and the Greeks as a totality" (Gadamer, 1994, p. 114).

Even in the domain of Arts, Heidegger's influence has been massive and incalculable on questions of poetic language, the nature of interpretation, the place of art and the crisis endured by the modern artists. Lastly, Heidegger understood his thought as a *Denkweg* (path of thought) and compared this road to *Holzwege* (forest trails), which may lead to nowhere (Philipse, 1999, p. preface xv).

The Life of Martin Heidegger can be summed up into the following biographical fragments:

### **1.1.1. From Messkirch to Freiburg: (1889 – 1909)**

Martin Heidegger was born on September 26, 1889, in Messkirch in the Baden – Wurttemberg region of modest Village origins, south of West Germany. He was the first child of a relatively poor Catholic couple – Friedrich Heidegger (1851 – 1924) and Johanna Kempf Heidegger (1858 – 1927), who had lived through the hard times of Bismarck's *Kulturkampf*. He had a sister, Mariele, and a brother, Fritz, who survives him in Messkirch. The family is always known to have led a simple life in a small town on the eastern edge of the Black Forest, which Heidegger is deeply attached with (Sheehan, 2010, p. 3).

Heidegger's early formal education took place at the local public schools in Messkirch, till the age of thirteen (until 1903). Being born in a Catholic family, he was urged to study Catholic priesthood for which he was sent to the Jesuit secondary school at Konstanz, where he spent three years there i.e. (1903–1906). He then entered to the Jesuit Bertholds – Gymnasium in Freiburg (1906–1909) and stayed there for another three years. It is a reminder for all that those six years of secondary school were momentous in the formation of the young thinker. It enhanced young Martin an opportunity to understand philosophy and consequently a way that paved the way to develop his own philosophy. Those were the times, he tells as, when “I acquired everything that was to be of lasting value” (Sheehan, 2010, p. 4). In fact, this was the time when he was in touch for the first time with the languages of Greek, Latin, the time he discovered Friedrich Hölderlin, and perhaps most important of all, his first encounter with his abiding question of the meaning of Being.

More specifically, it was the time when he received a book of Brentano's *On the Manifold Senses of Being in Aristotle* as his 18<sup>th</sup> Birthday present that directly influenced him to get involved in the issue of Being. Heidegger repeatedly characterized this work as "my first guide through Greek philosophy in my secondary school days," as "the rod and staff" of my first awkward attempts to penetrate into philosophy," and as "the first philosophical text through which I worked my way, again and again from 1907 on" (Sheehan, 2010, p. 4).

### **1.1.2. Life at Freiburg (1909 -1916): From Student to Lecturer**

As remarked, in the year 1909, after his secondary education, the twenty-year-old Heidegger entered the novitiate of the German Province of the Jesuits at Feldkirch, Austria. But after staying there for two weeks, he could not pursue his studies and was finally dismissed on the ground of bad health. Thereupon he entered the archdiocesan Seminary at Freiburg, and simultaneously Matriculated at the Albert Ludwig University in Freiburg (Sheehan, 2010, p. 4). His one and a half year experiences in Freiburg University were used to study Theology and partly Philosophy, until he abandoned entirely the idea of becoming a catholic priest and left the seminary.

In October 1911 he studied Mathematics under the influence of Prof. Heinrich Rickert. After leaving Jesuit Novitiate, he continued his studies at the Freiburg University with a concentration on philosophy until the summer of 1913. On July 26, 1913, at the age of 23, Heidegger received the doctorate in philosophy with a dissertation entitled, "The Doctrine of Judgment in Psychologism," under the directorship of Arthur Schneider.

A few weeks later, member of the Philosophy faculty, particularly philosophy professor Arthur Schneider, and history professor Heinrich Finke, began grooming the promising young scholar, then 23 years of age, to take over Freiburg University's Chair of Catholic Philosophy. A grant from the Catholic Church was arranged to tide Heidegger over for two years while he wrote the requisite "Qualifying Dissertation" (*Habilitationsschrift*) that would win him a license to teach at the University as a *Privatdozent*, or unsalaried lecturer (Guignon, 1993, p. 73).

From this semester at Freiburg University, Heidegger began reading with little enough success, Edmund Husserl's *Logical Investigations*. And this is the point of drawing Heidegger towards a phenomenological study in a more rigorous way, for he understands phenomenology to be an important philosophical tool or parameter, although his way of reading it is not a study of consciousness as Husserl did, but rather *aletheia*<sup>1</sup> as in Greek. Coincidentally his turn toward the phenomenology of Husserl became more intense when Edmund Husserl, then at Gottingen, received an appointment to take over the chair of non-Catholic philosophy at Freiburg University on February 9, 1916. Thereafter, his rapport with Husserl was known in such a way that whenever Heidegger's philosophy is spelt out, the name of Husserl is inevitable.

Apart from his university life at Freiburg, in August, 1914, with the outbreak of World War I, Heidegger was known to have enlisted in the military but was dismissed on October 9, 1914, again this time for health reason. Again coming back to Freiburg University and worked with the control board of the post office from 1915 – 1917, a post that enabled him complete his work on *Dun's Scotus' Doctrine of Categories and meaning*, a license to teach within the German university system (Sheehan, 2010, p. 6).

### **1.1.3. The Parting of Ways with Catholicism**

It appeared that between June 1916 and March 1917, Heidegger underwent the personal and philosophical conversion that culminated in his abandonment of dogmatic Catholicism. There seemed several factors which led to his abandonment of Catholicism, perhaps the most notable ones include:

- The disappointment towards the Catholic Church authority over their decision about the Catholic chair at Freiburg. Earlier, in order to occupy the chair, Heidegger was asked by the Church authority to contribute a work meant to use for the scholastic philosophy as well as for the spiritual battle of life, which Heidegger had completed before the final decision was made.

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<sup>1</sup> *Aletheia* is a Greek word variously translated as "uncloseness," "unconcealment," "disclosure," or "truth."

However, even after successfully completing his dissertation on medieval philosophy and even after being told several times that he was the inside favorite for Freiburg University's chair of Catholic philosophy, it came as a great shock, or rather bitter disappointment when Heidegger was never given the post. In June 1916, the post is given to Josef Geysler, a neo-scholastic Professor from the University of Munster (Guignon, 1993, p. 75). This turned out to be the most probable point that led to Heidegger's turn away from Catholicism.

- Heidegger's encounter with Edmund Husserl, who had come to Freiburg University in April 1916 to take over the chair of non-catholic philosophy. Husserl, who called himself a "free Christian" and a "non-dogmatic Protestant," had tremendous impact over the life of Heidegger. Husserl's notion that Catholicism had deprived of free philosophical inquiry, which later on came to the attention of young Heidegger. Heidegger's radical Catholic faith has been shattered and turned himself into a free thinker which Husserl did not notice until his student, Heinrich Ochsner told him that Heidegger is changed.
- Nietzsche in his critique of Heidegger affirmed the psychological grounds for Heidegger's abandonment of Catholicism saying that Protestantism is an ideal position where Heidegger can crucify Catholicism which nailed him several times in his teaching and scholastic career in the early times. Of course, Heidegger had been rejected many times by Catholic Church, all the incidents of which would be difficult to erase them all.

#### **1.1.4. The Marburg Period: (1923 – 1928)**

In 1923, Heidegger was nominated to the position of *Extraordinarius* – an extraordinary professorship in philosophy at the University of Marburg, vacated by Nicolai Hartmann's removal to Cologne. In fact, this nomination happened in return to Heidegger's original form of *Sein Und Zeit* emerged as a 6000 words speech delivered before the Theologians' Society of Marburg under the title, "*The concept of Time*" on Friday July 25, 1924. Being a young promising philosopher, Heidegger was appointed against the post in 1923, but on condition that he must publish something immediately. Following this, during the spring

vacation, January 29 till April 30, 1926, Heidegger pulled together the lecture notes of “*the History of the Concept of Time*,” into the first 240 pages of *Sein Und Zeit*, had them printed with Husserl’s help, and sent two copies of the page proofs to the appropriate ministry in Berlin (Sheehan, 2010, p. 15).

During his stay in Marburg University, he found some notable colleagues whom he cherished them for the later development of his philosophy. Among those includes Rudolf Bultmann, Nicolai Hartmann, and Paul Natorp. He also had a now famous scholars, students like Hans-Georg Gadammer, Hannah Arendt, Karl Lowith, Gerhard Hruger, Leo Strauss, Jacob Klein, Gunther Anders and Hans Jonas. During his stay in this university he began his lecture by making a critique of Aristotle’s question of being and also extended the concept of subject to different dimensions.<sup>2</sup>

### **1.1.5. His Rectorate in Freiburg and Nazi Involvement**

Despite his earlier acquaintance with Freiburg University, Heidegger made a memorable come back in 1928 at Freiburg University. In spite of a counter-offer by Marburg University and the later offer given by Humboldt University of Berlin, Heidegger remained at Freiburg University for the rest of his life. In fact, the retirement of his master- Edmund Husserl brought a call back to the University of Freiburg where he had begun and would end his philosophical career.

On November 5, 1928, Heidegger entered Freiburg, this time not as *Privatdozent*, but as the successor of Husserl – the chair of non-catholic philosophy professor. When he returned back to Freiburg, he was greeted by the applause of an overflow crowd of 280 students. He was thirty-nine years old, at the height of his powers, and the brightest star of German Phenomenology. Like his remarkable experience at Marburg, Heidegger began to have great students like Charles Malik, Herbert Marcuse, and Ernst Nolte, Emmanuel Levinas – the then student, is also known to have attended the now famous 1929 *Davos* debate between Ernst Cassirer and Heidegger.

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<sup>2</sup> [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Martin\\_Heidegger](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Martin_Heidegger), retrieved on 11, 12, 2012

On April 21, 1933, Heidegger was elected Rector of the University. Soon after, on May 3, Heidegger made a very serious commitment of being officially joining the National Socialist German Workers' (Nazi) party. And it is certainly because of his infamous official involvement with Nazi movement, he turned himself out to be one of the most controversial philosophers of all time. In fact, it was such a vivid decision which made the whole world surprised to an extent that could not forgive him retrospectively even. His inaugural address as rector of the university on May 27, 1933, addressed his support for Nazi cause as he firmly acknowledged its leader Adolf Hitler as the savior of German and the world at large. Following this, during his tenure as rector he produced a number of speeches in the Nazi cause, such as for example, "declaration of support for Hitler and the National Socialist State," delivered in November, 1933. During this time one may think that it placed the great prestige of his scholarly reputation at the service of National Socialism. But surprisingly enough, he soon became disillusioned with Nazism in practice, though not entirely of its motivating force which he claimed to be the philosophical base of Nazism as it could have been, and he resigned the Rectorship in April 1934, but still remained as a permanent member of the Nazi party until 1945, when the World War-II ended.

#### **1.1.6. The Man and his Philosophy: A Partial Political Fascination and Nazism**

Scholars of Heidegger often made a claim that although, Heidegger was officially involved in National Socialism, but it has nothing to do with his philosophy. But there are at least three compelling reasons for examining possible links between Nazism and Heidegger's philosophy: The first reason is that on 22<sup>nd</sup> April 1933, six years after the publication of *Sein Und Zeit*, Heidegger became rector of Freiburg University, and that, having entered the National Socialist Party with great pomp on the first of May, he was instrumental in the *Gleichschaltung* (forcing into the party line) of the University by the Nazi regime, which had seized power on 30 January, 1933 (Philipse, 1999, p. 247). Many of Heidegger's pupils have depicted the episode of the rectorate as an isolated intrusion of political reality in Heidegger's apolitical life, an intrusion unconnected to Heidegger's philosophy. Many claimed that Heidegger had philosophical motives for becoming a rector at this crucial

moment of German history. His rectoral address argued that the German University had to be transformed on the basis of philosophy, in order to educate the leaders and guardians of the destiny of the German *volk*. As such he wanted to make use of his rectorate in Freiburg University also as the means to fulfill his desire, meaning to have a deeper connection in terms of feeding the needs of the then growing National Socialist movement or Nazi as commonly understood.

Nurturing, and strengthening of the towering personality of the German *Fuhrer* appeared to be the task of Heidegger. He saw heroic glory in Hitler as the destined leader of a humiliated and defeated nation. He wrote to the staff and faculties of the Freiburg University on 20 December, 1933: “The individual wherever he stands, does not count; what count only is the destiny (*Schicksal*) of our people (*unseres Volkes*) in their state” (Philipse, 1999, p. 248). If totalitarian view explains the fact that Heidegger was not bothered by the creation of concentration camps and the elimination of Jews from German academia in 1933, there are ample grounds for investigating the relations between Nazism and his philosophy.

The second point is, although Heidegger himself claimed that as a rector he never participated in political meetings and had had no personal or political contacts with party officials, including Hitler, his telegram sent to Hitler about the tactics of the *Gleichschaltung* on 20 May, 1933 proved that he undoubtedly supported the ideology of Nazism. In the telegram, he approved the semi military training of students and on 3 November 1933, he urged on the German students a blind loyalty to Hitler and a readiness to sacrifice. Not only this, he supported before the public Hitler’s decision to leave the League of Nations on 11 November, 1933; and he denounced the outstanding chemist, Staudinger on 10 February, 1934 (Philipse, 1999, p. 248).

There was also another evidence that even after Heidegger quits his official involvement in the National Socialist Party in February 1934, he began to be involved in a project for a National Socialist academy of teacher in August 1934 where he was claimed to have destroyed the careers of his Catholic pupils Gustav Siewerth and Max Muller in 1938 on the ground that they did not favor the National Socialist state, and says that a Catholic could not

ever be a real philosopher. Despite his deviation from the main Nazi ideology since 1934, he remained considered as a party member and champion of National Socialism till 1945 that may be confirmed from his lecture on the historical uniqueness of National Socialism in 1942 (Philipse, 1999, p. 248).

The third reason of Heidegger's inevitable rapport with Nazism, holds the most serious one; in fact, imperative. Even after the World War II, when Heidegger was known to have completely washed off his hands from the Nazi, he never apologized for the support he made in such an extremely militant rhetoric way. He never officially and unambiguously retracted these and other philosophical views, which makes him co-responsible for the horrors of Nazi Germany. "As Herbert Marcuse wrote to Heidegger on 28 August, 1947: "Heidegger neither before nor after 1945 took back in public his Nazi doctrines of 1933... He never condemned publicly any of the crimes committed by the National Socialist regime" (Philipse, 1999, p. 252).

To the surprise of all, Heidegger rather replied Marcuse in such a way as if his Nazi involvement was not worse than what the allied countries had done to the East of Germany, which means in particular the decision to lapse East Germany to Poland after the war. But the plausible response to this again is how could Heidegger compare the genocide of the million and billion Jews to the forced migration and incidental murder of the East Germans? His only silence on his involvement in the Nazi regime after the war, cannot justify how he owed seriously / unseriously his involvement with Nazism. However, he soon came out of its spell in 1934. His soft corner for Nazism is possible to be traced in many of his academic lectures after the war ended.

But one thing for sure is that his philosophy has nothing to do with his official involvement in the Nazism. Though, he initially tried to make use of it for the guidance of the leaders and for the general people to follow, but he was found unaccustomed so far as the drastic, horrific and hostile actions of the Nazi Party is concerned. Of course like Plato, Heidegger believed that philosophers have a deeper grasp of reality for which they should play important role in steering the nation, but his philosophy of Being which is nothing but the

unique, primordial harmonious and meaningful settings of the world realized in Dasein, cannot match the once blooming Nazism with its violent motives.

Heidegger suggests in the pamphlet published in 1983 that he renounced his adherence to National Socialism in the spring of 1934. However, according to Karl Lowith, “Heidegger expressed his loyalty to Hitler during a conversation in Rome in 1936, and agreed that his political involvement was based on his philosophy, especially on his notion of historicity” (Philipse, 1999, p. preface xiv).

His involvement with the Nazi left an uneradicatable scar in the minds of the people around the world, but one thing for sure is that even scholars who invested their philosophical career in Heidegger may not be eager to defile his name on the ground that his philosophy of being made the entry of new-epoch in the history of philosophy. A personal life is what is mostly set apart from one’s thought or philosophy. Although, there is a spectrum of possible relations between Heidegger’s philosophy and the Nazi ideology, but his later philosophy, as developed from 1935, should be seen as a reaction against and implicit criticism of National Socialism.

Admittedly, despite similarities between Heidegger and Hitler, Heidegger in any case would not fully surrender his philosophy to the work of Hitler or the extension of his regime. Rather his involvement with Nazism targeted the way to show or guide political leader including Hitler in the best possible ways. And most of all, Heidegger’s parallelism does not imply the conclusion that his relentless pursuit of Being was centrally related to Nazism. Without an analysis of Heidegger’s philosophy as a whole, we can never conclude that his question of Being is centrally related to Nazism, instead of being peripherally related.

### **1.1.7. Heidegger in the Post-War Period**

When the devastated world War-II was finally over in 1945, the French Military in the late 1946 debarred that Heidegger should be forbidden from teaching or interfering in any university activities because of his official involvement with the Nazi movement. It so

happened that he was banned from participating in any of the official academic deliberations. And the same denazification judgment against him continued until March, 1949, when he was eventually pronounced as a “*Mitläufer*” meaning “one who runs along with” i.e. in a better English translation “Bandwagon effect” or “Herd instinct,” which stands for the notion that people often do and believe things merely because it is so commonly believed earlier. His earlier commitment of joining the Nazi movement resulted him into a bitter treatment in the post-war period. Even then, while suspended from teaching, he could isolate himself from all criticisms by his single minded pursuit of his own philosophical mission dealing a solitary life at the self-built small wooden hut at Todtnauberg. Taking moral refuge at idols of Hölderlin and Friedrich Nietzsche he learned from a solitary thinker with mystical tendency of silence and loneliness. The following inspirational lines from his poem are worth quoting:

*“To think is to confine yourself to a single thought that one day stands still like a star in the world’s sky”* (Moran, 2000, p. 195).

However, with the ban lifted over, he resumed his position to teach at Freiburg University in the winter semester of 1950 – 51. He was then granted emeritus status and began to teach regularly from 1951 until 1958. Heidegger spent most of his time, especially of his later period at his vacation home at Todtnauberg, on the edge of the Black Forest. The secluded areas of a cool, quiet and green environment offered him peace of mind and enriched his philosophical concentrations. Finally, after completing his philosophical mission, Heidegger died on May 26, 1976, and was buried in the Messkirch cemetery.

A complex and a compelling figure, Martin Heidegger, a “passionate thinker,” as Hannah Arendt recalls him as one who could “bring thinking to life,” a popular teacher who could pull a large number of student admirers and followers around him, including some of the most decisive ones of the later time including Gadamer, Levinas, Herbert Marcuse, Hannah Arendt, Karl Lowith and others, who could evoke irresistible interest in the questioning minds of young lowers like Derrida, could also lay guidelines for what could be the phenomenological expressed: solitariness and silence as it is to be actually lived and thought

about. Dermot Moran sums up: “Heidegger’s bombastic mode of expression, whereby he sought to express insights in a manner which escaped the distorting effects of traditional philosophical terminology, has been ridiculed by philosophers who advocate clarity and exactness, for example, Rodolf Carnap and A.J. Ayer. Even Gilbert Ryle, who appreciated aspects of Heidegger’s account of the self, thought that his phenomenology would end up in a “self-ruinous subjectivism,” or in a “windy mysticism.” Yet, when he wanted to, Heidegger himself could write with astonishing clarity and simplicity and with penetrating insight” (Moran, 2000, p. 192).

### **1.1.8. Personal life**

On 21, March, 1917, Heidegger married Elfride Petri in a Catholic ceremony officiated by Father Engelbert Krebs at Freiburg Cathedral, and in a Protestant ceremony in the presence of Elfride’s parents a week later. It was of course, a confessionally “mixed” marriage – Elfride Petri was a Lutheran and Martin Heidegger a Catholic. They had two sons – Jorg Heidegger, born in 1919, and Hermann, born in 1920.

Heidegger is known to have had extramarital affairs with Hannah Arendt and Elisabeth Blochman, both students of his. Arendt was a Jewish, and Blochman is the child of Dr. Heinrich Blochman and Anna nee Sachs, a German- Jewish-middle-class family.

Heidegger spent much time at his vacation home at Todtnauberg, on the edge of the Black Forest, where he was deeply in touch with the natural surrounds of Black Forest. Almost all of his scholastic – philosophical writings are written here. The secluded site provided him the best environment to engage in philosophical thoughts.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> See [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Martin\\_Heidegger](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Martin_Heidegger) retrieved on 12.03.2013

## (PART – 2)

### 1.2.1. Introduction to Heidegger's Critique of Metaphysics

To Heidegger, the entire history of philosophy is trapped in the paradigm of “Metaphysics,” that is, the tradition which overemphasized upon reason as the ultimate form of understanding, and accordingly underestimated the bodily existence as something secondary or something that does not matter at all in the quest for knowledge. As such, Heidegger calls for the need of re-reading the history of philosophy that long rooted in the Greek philosophy by re-awakening the question of Being – the origin of metaphysics, according to him.

By going to the pre-Socratic beginning of Western thought, he wanted to repeat the early Greek experience of Being, so that the West could turn away from the dead end of nihilism and begin anew. For Heidegger, Metaphysics is the misunderstanding of the meaning of Being propagated in Western philosophy, a tradition he hoped to radically re-think. Although the term “metaphysics,” is taken from the title of one of Aristotle's treatises, Aristotle himself never called the treatise by that name; the name was conferred by later thinkers. Aristotle called the discipline at work in the treatise “first philosophy” or theology and the knowledge that is the aim of the discipline, wisdom, which we might now characterize as metaphysical. When we look into the history of metaphysics, we find philosophy's faith in reason and its faith in the ultimate rationality of the world. We find a world which is intelligible within existing categories, conforms to the laws of logic, and is ultimately explainable. In this usage, philosophy is interchangeable with Western "rationality" or what Heidegger calls "metaphysics." In a wider but subtle way, reality may include everything that is and has been (throughout the course of phenomena) whether or not it is observable or comprehensible. A still further consistent view includes everything that has existed, exists, or will exist, a part from the knower mind, or even more broadly, what is only apparent in the world. This he terms as “Metaphysics of consciousness,” a tradition in which there occurs forgetfulness of Being in its substance oriented speculation and “ousiological reduction.”

Criticizing the tradition of Western philosophy, which he regarded as nihilistic, for, as he claimed, the question of Being as such was obliterated in it, Heidegger also stressed the nihilism of modern technological culture. His critique of traditional metaphysics and his opposition to positivism and technological world domination has been embraced by leading theorists of post modernity (Derrida, Foucault, and Leotard).

### **1.2.2. The Onto-Theological Dimension of Metaphysics and Its Critique**

Heidegger's rejection of the concepts of "subjectivity" and "objectivity" and the logic of binary opposition in favor of historical and cultural construction of concepts while simultaneously advocating the necessity of a temporal and immanent apprehension of them is noticed. Instead of resisting the admission of this paradox in the search for understanding, Heidegger requires that we embrace it through an active process of elucidation he called the "Hermeneutic Circle." In this vein, he asserted that it was the task of contemporary philosophy to recover the original question of (or 'openness to') Da-sein (translated as Being or being-in-the-World) present in the pre-Socratic philosophers but normalized, neutered and standardized since Plato. Closer in spirit is postmodern critiques of metaphysics, ontology, epistemology, and ethics and its denial of a fixed, universal reality.

Broadly speaking the critique of metaphysics understood within the context of narrative takes place within a Western culture constituted as the entwined parallel journey of two dominant linear narratives - the biblical text and metaphysics. On one hand, the Judeo-Christian biblical narrative precedes and writes history as the word of God. It is a linear narrative beginning with Genesis and culminating in the Last Judgment. As such the temporal world is a broken world, condemned to sin and desire, finding redemption only in a turn away from flesh to the spirit. This visual narrative dominates the history of painting and images up to modernity.

While Nietzsche and Heidegger did not use the term "narrative," their emphasis on re-establishing temporality into ontology and epistemology also entails certain upsets to the traditional notion of narrative as a stable structure, as a vessel which contains time.

Philosophy as metaphysics breaks from the Greek pre-archaic sense of cyclical time and enacts a secular version of the same impulse to work within a linear path moving from origin to “*telos*,” where the transcendent unified principle serves as cause, origin and foundation of the world of multiplicity.

Heidegger calls this metaphysics an onto-theology. What begins in the writings of Plato and Aristotle reaches its climax in the dialectical journey of the Hegelian Absolute Spirit, which though circular culminates in a closed system. And yet the return to pre-Socratic conceptions of *Being and Time* can never be a return to origin, it is a new place one arrives at, one in which words like “Socrates” and “metaphysics” bear a meaning that they didn't have on the last turn. Heidegger attempts to question the limitations of the Western philosophical tradition and open a space for thinking outside of it.

### **1.2.3. The Turn to Pre-Socratics: Parmenides and Heraclitus**

At the beginning of this tradition he places the pre-Socratics, in particular Anaximander, Parmenides, and Heraclitus. In the fragments of these thinkers he finds both the foreshadowing of the tradition's development and a source for thought which would avoid the confines of this later development-associated with nihilism and the technological domination of the earth by experiencing anew its initial unfolding. To be sure, Heidegger also delved into the pre-Socratic and mythical thinking of Heraclitus and Parmenides, and there are mythical and even mystical motifs in his own philosophical discourse. This does not mean, however, that he adopted an irrationalist stand, but rather that he was trying to enlarge the concept of rationalism, which had been contracting in modern times, and to bridge domains that had become incommensurable. Turning to the pre-Socratic thinkers – in this case Parmenides and Heraclitus, Heidegger retrieves a notion of philosophical thinking supposedly more original than that of the tradition beginning with Plato and Aristotle, for whom thinking was adapted to “seeing” and “seeing” was equated to “Being.”

#### **1.2.4. Phenomenology, Ontology and “The Metaphysics of Consciousness”**

Phenomenology basically entails the study of human’s experience and of the ways things present themselves to us in and through such experience (Sokolowski, 2000). It endeavors to know thing as such, as exactly as it is. It also entails the study of phenomena in the sense of “the ways in which things appears to us in different forms of conscious experience.” Edmund Husserl, the father of phenomenology (although Husserl himself had developed his idea of phenomenology from the works and lectures of his teacher, philosopher and psychologist - Franz Brentano) believed that phenomenology could able to provide a firm basis for all human knowledge, including scientific knowledge, and thus hoped to establish philosophy as a “rigorous science” of measureable perception (Smith & woodruff, 1995, p. 45). By “Phenomenology” Husserl meant the science of consciousness and its objects. It is primarily concerned with the systematic reflection on and analysis of the structures of consciousness, and the phenomena which appear in acts of consciousness. To be more specific, his notion of “intentionality” (also known as aboutness), the notion that consciousness is always consciousness of something is what awakens Heidegger in his fundamental ontology.

Husserlian phenomenology seeks to describe the structural analysis of consciousness, as opposed to an account of its causal origin in brain or elsewhere. And it is felt by him best suited to study consciousness precisely as it is experienced, not other way of metaphysical abstraction. As such the objects of consciousness too, can be characterized precisely as they are apparently given in experience. Hence Husserl’s slogan: “To the things themselves,” is meaningful only by referring to consciousness in the experience of things. However, the objects experienced in consciousness and with different ways of relating to the objects possible via intentionality (Smith & woodruff, 1995, p. 9).

For Heidegger, being-in-the-world or ontology precedes essence, since critical idealism and the phenomenological reduction fails to grasp Being - the essential whatness and existence of a thing. Heidegger seeks to free phenomenology from the logical prejudice of theory in radicalizing phenomenology by returning to concrete existence.

Heidegger's phenomenology, in place of intuition, privileges corporeality, embodiment, or being-in-the-world. This radicalizes Husserl's theory of intentionality in returning to the things themselves and performing a reverse bracketing. He saw it as another trend of metaphysical turn of philosophy that has prioritized metaphysics of consciousness. Wanting to put rather Being in place for its being dynamic and pervading nature. Gradually Heidegger distanced himself from Husserlian phenomenology.

### **1.2.5. Toward a Hermeneutical Turn of the truth of Being**

"Man is not the Lord of beings. Man is the shepherd of Being. Man loses nothing in this "less"; rather, he gains in that he attains the truth of Being. He gains the essential poverty of the shepherd, whose dignity consists in being called by Being itself into the preservation of Being's truth" (Heidegger M. , Letter on Humanism, 2011, p. 167).

Heidegger argues that metaphysics needs to be overcome and in place and truth needs to be rethought as *aletheia*, the unconcealment of Being. However, this so called overcoming of metaphysics becomes repetition of metaphysics in every sense as it designates metaphysics as something to be overcome than destroyed. It thus proceeds entirely within its terms rather than proceeding to new territory. Heidegger's destruction of metaphysics is hence, a repetition of it. The task of philosophy is now to overcome metaphysics, taking the question of Being as our clue, for Heidegger's interest is moving beyond the mere metaphysical assertions about philosophy to move into ontology. This is a more primordial grasp of Being and the essence of Dasein as temporality and being-towards-death as well as the hermeneutics of facticity and an awareness of Dasein's comportment to the world as worldhood, which relates Dasein to objects as equipment and ready-to-hand rather than present-at-hand (Heidegger M. , 2008, p. 67).

As a student of Husserl, Heidegger felt that Phenomenology means "that which appears," or which lets the phenomena "show itself from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself," was the only method by which to do ontology, the study of Being (Figal, 2010, p. 36).

### **1.2.6. Dasein (being-there)**

In *Being and Time*, Heidegger argued that, to understand Being, one must first understand the human kind of being, Dasein (being-there), the kind of being who asks the question of Being. To even ask the question, remarks Heidegger, implies that at some level the answer is already understood. And the concealing-revealing presencing of Being is Dasein. However, contrary to Husserl's Transcendental Phenomenology, Heidegger argues that ontology as phenomenology must necessarily be hermeneutic, or interpretive. For Heidegger, truth or *aletheia* is always both concealing and revealing. When one interpretation is opened up, other interpretations are necessarily closed off. In this sense, ontology is always provisional.

### **1.2.7. Heidegger's Hermeneutical Phenomenology**

The first man particularly known for the so called Hermeneutics was Schleiermacher (1768 – 1834) who liberalizes hermeneutics, confined only to sacred texts into all human texts and modes of communication, by distinguishing the grammatical interpretation and psychological interpretation. He added that as every problem of interpretation is a problem of understanding, hermeneutics is the ideal means of avoiding misunderstandings. Dilthey broadened the scope even more by relating interpretation to all historical objectifications. According to him, a genuine and clear understanding (of everything) can be had from the outer manifestations of human action and productively to explore their inner or inherent meaning. His approach has a resemblance with the approach of Husserl where he says that expression converts experience into meaning. Heidegger, Gadamer, and Ricoeur are the foremost representatives of the movement of hermeneutic phenomenology. Phenomenology becomes hermeneutical when its method is taken to be interpretive (rather than purely descriptive as in transcendental phenomenology). This orientation is evident in the work of Heidegger who argues that all description is always already interpretation. Every form of human awareness is interpretive. Especially in Heidegger's later work he increasingly introduces poetry and art as expressive works for interpreting the nature of truth, language, thinking, dwelling, and being. Otherwise, the Being is revealed exclusively in terms of its transparency and instrumentality as something always in "standing reserve," to be used only

as a resource. Defining technology as the enframing destining spirit of this age, Being is expected to be revealed as technology in this age.

### **1.2.8. Technological Enframing of Being: Technology as Metaphysics**

Heidegger uses the word technology in many ways. Historically, he is referring to the mass mechanization which began in the eighteenth century and cites concrete examples such as hydroelectric power plants, radar stations, and jet aircrafts. This is a matter of using external instruments as a means to an end. In addition, Heidegger uses technology to define a mode of thinking, and a way of revealing. This definition of technology is not limited to external machines we use, but has roots in a way of thinking which goes back to the ancient Greeks. The essence of technology is essentially a way of revealing the totality of beings. As a way of revealing it is pervasive in Heidegger's life (and even more so, in ours), so much so that we cannot choose to avoid technology. The advent of technology is something determined and destined long before the beginning of the technological revolution in the eighteenth century. For Heidegger, technology is a method for calling forth and transforming the stock of reality according to our will. Technology facilitates a control over reality, rather than openness to experiencing it.

Martin Heidegger's philosophy of technology stems directly from his ontology. Interestingly, Heidegger's notion of technology, as the enframing destining spirit of this age, is a revelation of Being itself as technology itself in this age of science and technology. Heidegger's critique of technology, as "enframing" is a critique of the way that technology "allows" Being to show itself, in a distorted, instrumentally-rational form.

### **1.2.9. Major Influences on Heidegger: The Formative Period**

It was Heidegger, who restored the great philosophical texts of the past to their original expressive power, and used them accordingly in his ontological – phenomenological investigation of Being. And it was he "who advocated a specific existential attitude in *Sein Und Zeit*, and whose work is deeply rooted in the *Lebensphilosophie* (philosophy of life) of

Kierkegaard, Dilthey, and Nietzsche, according to which one's philosophical convictions express one's life as it is shaped by physiological, historical, political, religions, or social conditions" (Philipse, 1999, p. preface xiii).

Heidegger's thought weaves together many different historical strands. He draws on St. Paul, the Pre-socratics, Aristotle, Aquinas, Duns Scotus, Meister Eckhart, Kant, Hegel, Schelling, Schleiermacher, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Dilthey, Bergson, Husserl and Scheler, and he does so in order to formulate an alternative to the assumptions that make up the tradition extending from Plato to Descartes to contemporary scientific naturalism (Guignon, 1993, p. 2).

His thought has contributed to Phenomenology (Marleau-Ponty), Existentialism (Sartre, Ortega Y Gasset), Hermeneutics (Gadamer, Ricoeur), Political theory (Hannah Arendt, the early Marcuse), Psychotherapy theory (Medard Boss, Ludwig Binswanger, Rollo May), Theology (Rudolph Bultmann, Paul Tillich), as well as current postmodern and new pragmatist trends (Guignon, 1993, p. 2).

### **1.2.9(i). Aristotle's influence**

The originality or the idea of Heidegger's ontologizing of metaphysics with the Being question cannot be traced back to Heidegger himself, for it was long and rigorously thought of by Aristotle following the early Greek thinkers like Parmenides, Heraclitus and of his master Plato. In fact, it was Aristotle who speculated the task of metaphysics as finding the Being *qua* Being or Being understood as Being.

For Aristotle, metaphysics is all about some one thing and there is a single thing. This is the question, "what is being?" (*ti to on*; *on* means "Being," that which is). Its primary concern is basically of answering the question what is being? At the opening of the metaphysics (or sets of books) he argues that being a human we wanted to ask this question. The inquiry which looks into the most fundamental realities, a part from our day to day sense perception, is embedded in us, which distinguishes us from animals and the lower level existences

which are thought to have lived only at the level of sense perception. For he has in mind a particular characteristic of being human: “to be human is to be subject to puzzlement (*aporia*) about particular puzzles and problems (*aporiai*)” (Politis, 2004, p. 7). This is not, of course the only thing that is characteristic of being human. But these puzzles are metaphysical that is why we are looking for an answer of being. He called the human desire to know such higher knowledge as ‘*aitiai*’ or the scientific knowledge as ‘*episteme*’ and the animal desire as ‘*to eidenai*’ or aesthesis respectively. Therefore, in general Aristotle argues that it is simply because we are human and by virtue of which developed in us the search for science and explanatory knowledge (*episteme*). He also argues that such explanatory knowledge requires us to know the essence of things, and hence raising of the question – what is being, directly takes us into the verification of the fundamental principle of things.

When Heidegger undertook the task of answering the question – what is Being? Aristotle eventually offers an answer that acknowledges the possibility of Metaphysics for bestowing genuine answer. To him, the question; what is Being; is about Being, not about the noun “being” or the verb “to be.” It is all about what it is for something “to be,” but not about “what it is for us to think” or “say of something that it is.” The knowledge dimension is such that it never envisioned the disclosure or manifestation of reality, rather finding out solely the most basic entity which underlies all other existences. By raising the question – ‘what is Being’? And ‘what is it for something to be’? Aristotle evidently thinks that we are asking “beings (*onta*) – things that are.” It means we are already aware of being, stood as the ground of things for their existences. For he said that beings are directly apparent to us and present to us, they are all around us and make up the world which we inhabit. He took it for granted that it stood as the underlying ground of existences of thing. If that be so, what is more important and more meaningful to which he inclined was raising of the question, “what it is for something to be?” For it addresses as explanation of why something that is, is. He argues that this question asks for the essence of being, and for an explanatory account of the essence of Being. Aristotle says that he wants to investigate being *qua* being, by which he means that he wants to investigate beings, and to investigate them simply in so far as they are beings, i.e. things that are. But this is precisely to investigate what it is for something to be – the essence of being. Hence, Metaphysics for Aristotle is not so much the search for a

complete and general description of what there is; it is rather the search for an explanation of why something that is, or in virtue of what something that is, is.

To satisfy certain *aporia* (puzzlement) or *aporiai* (particular puzzles and problems), embedded in human and about the possibility of metaphysics, Aristotle introduces the notion of Primary Being, and he makes the distinction between being in general and Primary Being. He so introduced this distinction in order to address the basic question of metaphysics, “what is being?” as he could understand the risks of understanding being in general or simply by distinguishing it externally or internally. But at the same time, he was also aware of the possibility of making a distinction of beings simply in virtue of themselves (i.e. primary beings) and the things that are beings in virtue of their relation to those things (i.e. non primary beings). This division makes a refinement of our thought to grasp the idea of most primal and the underlying ground of Being. For something to be a Primary Being is for it to be a being, something that is, simply in virtue of itself and not in virtue of its relation to other beings; whereas for something to be a non primary being is for it to be a being only in virtue of its relation to other things, namely a Primary Being. Hence, Aristotle concludes that by raising the question- what is Primary Being, we can directly address the most fundamental question of metaphysics.<sup>4</sup> And it is known that different thinkers from different opinions answer this question. For example materialists argue that it is above all the basic material elements of physical bodies, such as the elements of fire, water and earth. The Platonists argue that “it is eternal beings that are distinct from the sense-perceptible and physical things – the forms (*eide*). Following these thinkers Aristotle considers *prote ousia* – substance – ‘that which lies under’ – *hupokeimenon*, as the primary beings. Hence, the whole of his method or his metaphysical query is culminated in the *ousiological* reduction” (Sadler, 1996, pp. 46-58).

Heidegger’s indebtedness to Aristotle is found in his own admission. He claims that it is a reading of Brentano’s discussion of the different senses of Being in Aristotle that initially sets him as his philosophical path (Keller, 1999, p. 84). Although Heidegger was critic of Husserl’s main aim of the theory of categorical intuition to provide an account of how we

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<sup>4</sup> See (Politis, 2004), Pages 5 - 10

can have knowledge of abstract objects, but he could see that Husserl's categorical intuition is a breakthrough to "see directly" with it "Being" and "Truth" as well. He thus started reading Husserl through the eyes of Aristotle. Heidegger believed that Husserl has truly recovered the Greek and more particularly Aristotelian notion of Truth as *aletheia*, which for Heidegger is "disclosure."

Heidegger was impressed by Aristotelian question of being, and he undertook a tremendous study on it. And his very idea of asking about being may be traced back via Aristotle to Parmenides. Heidegger claimed to have revived the question of being, the question he said has been forgotten by all the metaphysical traditions extending from Plato to Descartes. Due to his dissatisfaction with the way the answer is bestowed in the form of *ousiological* reduction, he began to develop his notion of being instead.

Since there will be further discussion on Heidegger's interpretation of Aristotle in the following chapter on Heidegger's critique of traditional metaphysics, this is simply a brief introduction of Aristotelian impact on Heidegger's philosophical and phenomenological development that also biased his reading of Husserl's phenomenology to some extent.

### **1.2.9(ii). Brentano's Influence on Heidegger**

There is no better position to begin with the analysis of Heidegger's thought (*Denkweg*) than to pin point a single event that took place in 1907, the year of Heidegger's birthday. It was the year when Dr. Conrad Grober, the later archbishop of Freiburg, who was born in Messkirch like Heidegger and had been rector of the Konradihaus in Konstanz where young Martin Heidegger lived during his time at the Gymnasium, gave Heidegger a copy of Franz Brentano's dissertation, *On the manifold Sense of Being in Aristotle*. This stirs up Heidegger to raise the question of being with new zeal. This undoubtedly became the beginning of Heidegger's philosophical journey that began with Brentano and of course with Aristotle.

Brentano's dissertation precisely was all about an attempt to solve the traditional interpretative problems of Aristotle's doctrine of being. It endeavored to recapture the

manner of how Aristotle put forth the question of Being – the most fundamental question he claimed, a philosopher should investigate. Being, in the Aristotelian way, is the most universal and the most fundamental to thought. Therefore, philosophy is and should be defined as the study of Being as such (*to on hei on*), which establishes the first principle of the sciences, according to Aristotle. But Brentano argued in his dissertation that this unique question does admit of a multiplicity of answers, following the explanation of Aristotle that being is defined in many ways. According to Brentano, instead of concluding Being in many ways, cannot one aim at *Being* in a single way? Brentano ends up with the dissatisfaction of Aristotle claiming he bothers more on the peripheral question than giving a direct answer to Being.

It seems that, Heidegger learned from Brentano's dissertation that the philosopher has to answer one and only one question, the question of Being. Furthermore, he learned that his questions more fundamental than the problems of the special sciences, and that, in fact, it is the most fundamental question a human being can ask. Like Brentano who pointed out the inconsistency of Aristotle, who but left the question of Being unfinished / not in accomplished manner of philosophizing it, Heidegger was dissatisfied with Aristotle's solution to the problem of Being and he raised the question anew in his own way.

Heidegger expressed in "*mein weg in die phanomenologic*" (My way into phenomenology) how Brentano's dissertation motivated his philosophical journey by taking up the issue of being. Like Brentano who went on asking Aristotle the question, Heidegger asked the question in a similar manner to Brentano saying, "If being is said in many ways, what then is the leading and fundamental meaning What does 'to be' mean?" (Philipse, 1999, p. 5) Following this, Heidegger argues that although, Aristotle did emphasize the different possible meanings of Being, but he missed the crucial point of how transcendental Being became what determines entities with all their meanings, but by being itself nothing. But Heidegger raised the question of Being in the same fashion with Aristotle: It aims at discovering one fundamental sense that underlies the other senses of "to be." More specifically, Heidegger is assessed with Aristotle in holding the idea that the transcendental Being is and must be what always comes first in the ladder of existence / hierarchy of

existence. But Heidegger deviates himself from this fashion that this transcendental Being is not an entity that Aristotle holds, rather nothing. In short, Heidegger's attempt to rekindle the question of Being in the Aristotelian form has its root in the reading of Brentano's dissertation. Without him, Heidegger's philosophy of Being would not have appeared.

### **1.2.9(iii). The influence of Catholic philosophers: Carl Braig and others**

Although, Heidegger's relationship with Catholicism became complicated in the later period of his life, but it was during his early Freiburg stay, that it became colored by the influence of the Catholic scholars in his philosophical thought. In fact, during his first two years at the University, Catholic thinkers had exerted great influence on Heidegger. Notable among them are Maurice Blodel, Henry Dumery, and the French spiritualist Ravaisson. But during those first two years at the University the influence of Carl Braig, Catholic theologian of the Tübingen school, seems to have been most pronounced, especially through his treatise, "*On Being: an Outline of Ontology*." Besides offering Heidegger an extensive access to the philosophical texts of the tradition and an introduction to the concept of the onto-theological structure of metaphysics, the work seems to have started him on the path of searching out the etymology of fundamental concepts (Sheehan, 2010, p. 5).

Rather than Edmund Husserl, it was Carl Braig's German speculative Theology that deepened Heidegger's study of Being in Aristotle; Braig's anti-modernist's philosophy position attached Heidegger. And it was Carl Braig, who introduced German idealism to Heidegger. With his influence Heidegger learnt Schelling and Hegel during his stay in Freiburg University. It was during these University years that Heidegger was drawn toward existentialist philosophy, particularly of Kierkegaard's. He then began to study scholars like Nietzsche, Dilthey, Dostoevsky, Rilke, Trakl, whose philosophies he made use of it in his though path in the later periods, especially in the field of hermeneutics, arts, and mysticism.

### **1.2.9(iv). Friedrich Schleiermacher: Hermeneutics**

A German theologian, philosopher, and Biblical scholar who became influential in the evolution of higher criticism with the methodology called 'hermeneutics' did have enormous influence in Heidegger's philosophy. In fact, his approach of philosophizing forms part of the foundation of the modern field of hermeneutics. As a methodology, hermeneutics basically stands for a scientific or systematic interpretation of things, especially texts in the areas of literature, religion and law. Traditionally, it stands out as widely defined discipline of interpretation theory, covering the entire framework of the interpretive process, such as written, verbal, and non verbal communication.

It was Schleiermacher, who unlike the Biblical hermeneutics narrowed down to the realm of Sacred Texts interpretation alone, explored the nature of understanding in relation not just to the problem of deciphering Sacred Texts, but to all human texts and every modes of communication, the same of which is copied by Heidegger, provided it is used in his own style of doing. Philosophical hermeneutics is what Heidegger is concerned with as the system itself that has undergone different changes in the course of the history. In the 20<sup>th</sup> Century onward, it took a Heideggerian turn toward existential understanding than sheer philosophical interpretation. It's been employed in Heidegger in such a way to dig the different layers of existential components of Dasein's facticity or being-in-the-world. This was treated more as a direct, non-mediated and thus in a sense more authentic way of being in the world than simply as a way of knowing. In Heidegger, it appeared as a system of interpretation of text directly or indirectly linked with its contexts. Hence it is employed in his philosophy to investigate the being of Dasein in its everydayness or being-in-the-world. This system since Schleiermacher has a vital role in Heidegger's turn to Ontological Phenomenology.

### **1.2.9(v). Soren Kierkegaard: Existentialism**

Soren Kierkegaard, a Danish existentialist philosopher, exerted greatest influence on Heidegger's own existentialist concepts. Apparently it was Kierkegaard, who pulled

Heidegger towards existentialism. The existential issue rigorously taken up in Heidegger's *Ontological Phenomenology* is more or less the shadow of Kierkegaard. Heidegger's concept of anxiety (*Angst*) and mortality particularly draws on Kierkegaard and are indebted to the way in which the later lays out the importance of our subjective relation to truth, human's existence in the face of death, the temporality of existence, and the importance of passionate affirmation of one's individual being-in-the-world.

As remarked in 1909, Heidegger entered the archdiocesan Seminary at Freiburg, where the spiritual directors were also Jesuits, and simultaneously matriculated at the Albert Ludwig University in Freiburg. From the 'Fall' of 1909 he left the Seminary with a mind to wash off Catholicism, and to abandon entirely the idea of becoming a priest, but to devote himself more on studies on philosophy. It was during these university years that he discovered Kierkegaard and many philosophers more, whose philosophies have made great impact on Heidegger.

### **1.2.9(vi). Wilhelm Dilthey: Modern Hermeneutics**

A German historian, psychologist, sociologist and hermeneutic philosopher who held Hegel's chair in philosophy at the University of Berlin inspires Heidegger in the field of hermeneutics. Heidegger's hermeneutical transformation of phenomenology and his early project of developing a hermeneutics of factual life was partially influenced by his reading of the works of Wilhelm Dilthey such as – *Introduction to the Human Sciences* in 1883, and his Essay on *The rise of Hermeneutics* in 1900. He was best known for the distinction he made between the natural and human sciences through his hermeneutical doctrines. The primary task of the natural science he says is to arrive at a law-based empirical explanation, whereas the human science is characterized by the understanding of human and historical life. The human sciences he says are different in being normative in nature. The final phase of Dilthey's philosophy manifested in his essay–*The rise of Hermeneutics* reveals that he makes a hermeneutically connecting link between philosophy and history. History he says can be reliable only if it is possible to raise the understanding of what is singular to the level of universal validity that is always of philosophical.

His approach has a resemblance with the approach of Husserl where he says that expression converts experience into meaning. For when we express something, its validity is subject to public verification for it threw open a wide room for understanding it. For him every saying is an expression. Heidegger, eventually found that his new method of ontologizing phenomenology will best be understood and systematized by inducing hermeneutics of Dilthey, and hence implemented it for an important tool of his philosophy.

### **1.2.9(vii). Edmund Husserl: the way to Phenomenology**

The analysis of Heidegger's philosophy would be incomplete without prior examination of Husserl's Phenomenology, especially before Heidegger took "the turn" in his thought. Despite differences the core of his teaching had its foundational roots in Husserl's Transcendental Subjectivity, although Husserl himself had derived the inspiration to his idea of phenomenology from the works and lectures of his teacher, philosopher and psychologist - Franz Brentano. Heidegger borrowed from Husserl the idea of "*Logical Isness*" from the Freiburg University with the intention of finding clue to what constitutes Being of beings in Aristotle. He saw in Husserl's quest for truth and objectivity a glimpse of Aristotelian Neo-Thomist Realism, and so particularly from Husserl he could derive the impressive idea of "Categorical Intuition."

Heidegger's interest in Husserl arose since his early student years at the Freiburg University by reading his famous "Logical Investigation." Incidentally, it so happened that Heidegger became the senior Assistant of Husserl, the then rector of Freiburg University. For all these attachments and connections his indebtedness to Husserl is so great, that his masterpiece – *Being and Time* is dedicated to Husserl with a sheer acknowledgment in it that without Husserl's Phenomenology his own investigation would not have been possible, irrespective of the fact that their interpretation differed.

By "phenomenology" Husserl meant the science of consciousness and its objects. It is primarily concerned with the systematic reflection on and analysis of the structures of consciousness, and the phenomena which appear in acts of consciousness. He believed that

Phenomenology could provide a firm basis for all human knowledge, including scientific knowledge, and thus hoped to establish philosophy as a “rigorous science” of measureable perception (Smith, 1995, p. 45). Phenomenology thus seeks to describe the structural analysis of consciousness, as opposed to an account of its causal origin in brain or elsewhere. As such the objects of consciousness too, can be characterized precisely as they are apparently given in experience. Husserl’s slogan: “Back to the things themselves” (Guignon, 1993, pp. 141-169), is meaningful only by referring to consciousness in the experience of things, however, the objects as experienced in consciousness, since different ways of relating to the objects is possible only via intentionality. Husserl himself officially denied the science of conscious experience, and especially of intentional experience. He acknowledges that consciousness is pure rational, mental activity, and developed a theory of the essential structure of consciousness in terms of the parts and moments of our mental acts.

To elaborate further, after the publication of his main work – the *Logische untersuchungen* (Logical Investigation), Husserl developed an idea that consciousness must be studied from the first-person point of view (Smith, 1995, p. 11). And to do it one would have to distinguish between an act of consciousness and the phenomena at which it is directed (the objects as intended). This is what he called the phenomenological reduction or *epoche* (literally abstention) (Smith, 1995, p. 11), where he bracketed or abstained from positing the existence of, the natural world around him. In fact, he says that knowledge of essences would only be possible only by bracketing all assumptions about the existence of an external world. It puts aside the background presupposition that there exists a world independent of our experience. In the words of Formal and Transcendental Logic, “The whole of Phenomenology is nothing more than the self examination on the part of transcendental subjectivity... the ultimate grounding of all truth is a branch of the universal self-examination that, when carried through radically, is absolute. In other words, it is a self-examination...which leads me to the grasping of my absolute self, my transcendental ego” (Guignon, 1993, p. 148).

What is most closely associated with Husserl's Phenomenology is "intentionality." It is basically of the teaching that every act of consciousness, we perform, every experience we have, is intentional. It is intentional in the sense of being directed towards an object. Consciousness is consciousness of something of an experience of something or other. All our awareness is directed toward objects. For an instance, if I see, I see some visual object, if I imagine, my imagining presents an imaginary objects. For him, to describe things as we experience them from the first-person point of view is to describe also the forms of consciousness in which we experience objects, their mode of being given. In this sense through the *epoche*, all objects become reduced to their experienceable properties, and all objects are equal in the eyes of consciousness. Hence, Husserl's method of *epoche* stood not only for the purposes of phenomenological description and analysis of consciousness but also, according to a usual simple way of interpretation – to ground a foundational epistemology and idealist metaphysics. For Husserl himself asserts that it is exclusively consciousness (or conscious subjectivity, the pure ego) that has absolute Being; all other forms of Being are such as to depend on consciousness for their existence.

Husserl's Phenomenology precisely is of the rebel against psychologism and physicalism, the then existed philosophies of his time. A clear demarcation that was made in Descartes' rationalism between mind and body may be a good example of it. His Phenomenology, rooted in the notion of intentionality, represents an alternative to the representational theory of consciousness which holds that it is impossible to apprehend reality directly; rather it is available only through perceptions of reality which is a representation via the mind. However, he countered that consciousness is not "in" the mind but rather conscious of something (the intentional object) other than itself, whether the object is a substance or a figment of imagination, which overall indicates that phenomenology he intended was the method which relies on the description of phenomena as they are given to consciousness, in their immediacy. The objects, Husserl says are constituted for consciousness in many different ways or level of experiences through for instance, perception, volition, memory, retention, identification, etc.

Though forging his own path in phenomenology, Heidegger, in common with many other students of Husserl, rejected Cartesianism and Transcendental Idealism. Resisting Husserl's view of phenomenology as a rigorous science and with an inclination toward the views of Scheller, Bergson, Jaspers, Heidegger shared the latter's observations that concrete human existence is not captured by science or not in scientific terms. Linking Husserl's enquiry in Categorical intuition and discussion of truth, with the problem of Being as explained in Brentano and Aristotle, Heidegger found that the Categorical Intuition showed the way to read manifold means of Being (Moran, 2000, p. 201). Heidegger admits that Husserl gave him the eyes with which he could see the phenomena, as Phenomenology enabled him to understand Dasein in the lived dimension of experience. For Heidegger, phenomenology pre-dates in Aristotle and the Greek understanding of phenomenon and *logos*, Truth as *aletheia*, unveiling and thus letting what is or be seen show itself. With his fusion of Phenomenology with Hermeneutics he opts for interpreting them as for him description itself leads to interpretation.

Although in Ideas, Husserl had already located many notions like one bodily activity along with the mode of interpretation as involved in every intentional act. But Heidegger gives Husserl's account of practical intentionality an entirely new shape by connecting it to the tradition of hermeneutics. Agreeing with Husserl that intentionality is a definite characteristic of lived experience, Heidegger emphasized on the practical, embodied nature of these experience. Dasein is always caught up in a world against and into which it is thrown; human being is essentially a being in the world. Heidegger remains critical of theoretical attitude of philosophy of his predecessors including Aristotle and also his mentor Edmund Husserl.

Heidegger argues that Husserl saw intentionality as a structure of consciousness but it should be a study of how Being is related to its "being intended." In *Being and Time*, Heidegger drops all Husserl's crucial concepts like consciousness, objectivity, noema-noesis, transcendental ego, reduction and ontological phenomenology by ontologically founding the essential ontological structures of Being-in-the-world. Although, their paths

differed, Heidegger considers his work as phenomenological and acknowledged Husserl's Phenomenology that opens his way to philosophy.

### **1.2.9(Viii). Nietzsche's Influence on Heidegger**

Since 1933, Heidegger became deeply inspired by Nietzsche, who proclaimed that moribund Christianity as well as Marxist Communism is the incomplete forms of nihilism. After a close examination of Heidegger's philosophy, one can see that the Being question is intertwined with nihilistic idea of Nietzsche. Even his surprising involvement with Nazism can indirectly be traced to the influence of Nietzsche. For Nietzsche holds that the fundamental nature of all entities is will to power, and he postulated that everything exists in the manner of an eternal recurrence of the same. Based on this metaphysical stance, Nietzsche developed his philosophical position as a counterattack against what he called "nihilism." By "nihilism," Nietzsche meant both an existential attitude and a historical process. As an attitude, it is the conviction that human life is worthless and without values. And as historical, western culture inspired by Christian Metaphysics is nihilistic in nature. And because of this active nihilism, based on the doctrine of the will to power, its cultural phenomenon is of a gradual devaluation of the highest values, the origin of which Nietzsche claimed are Platonism and Christianity that he combated a lot. He argued against Platonism because it advocates values originate from a transcendent and perfect source, God or the idea of the god. "A transcendent and eternal being was postulated as the standard of value for our mortal and transitory life on earth" (Philipse, 1999, p. 280). Christianity, according to Nietzsche is also of the same breed to Platonism, discarding the life on earth in the hope of seeing a better or perfect value in the transcendence of God. But in reality the values that were allegedly derived from a higher, transcendent reality did in fact originate from low and mean motives: the power instincts of slaves and the weak against the strong. The notion of suprasensible reality over the sensible world as such, resulted out of the corrupted minds of the underlying classes, which in the whole process devalue highest values.

Heidegger was impressed by Nietzsche's "will to power," and this impression led him to his official involvement with Nazism in 1933. Because akin to Nietzsche's – the conception that

moribund Christianity and the Communist are incomplete forms of nihilism, Nazism which appeared as a countermovement to incomplete nihilism appeared attractive and quite acceptable for Heidegger, especially in a circumstance when ‘the new epoch of the Being’s unconcealment’ mingled with his philosophical concept of historicism of Being. This occasion for historical unconcealment of Being kept room for seeing in the towering personality of Hitler the historical disclosure of the Being in a historical Dasein. The appearance of Hitler with his mission to annihilate the western nihilistic idea originated from Christianity is identified by Heidegger as Being’s disclosure in a new epoch of history. A letter to his friend Elisabeth Blochmann on 30 March, 1933 about the hidden mission confirms the truth. In the letter Heidegger cited, the events of the time – that is Hitler’s revolution, inspired him with a “rare power of concentration,” and they reinforced his will and conviction to work in the service of a great task. He even writes, “In order to build a world grounded on the *volk*, one had to expose oneself to Being itself in a new way, and had to confront both the antispirit of the Communist world and the moribund spirit of Christianity” (Philipse, 1999, p. 276). However, as remarked, Heidegger’s enthusiasm for Nazism led to the disastrous rectorate, for it caused him the “thorn in his flesh,” which even remains as an uneradicatable scar in his life. Most of all, what is unfortunate is the revolution of 1933 had never been carried out on the fundamental, philosophical level that Heidegger had envisaged.

What matters most regarding the influence of Nietzsche over Heidegger is the point that drives him advocates a Postmonotheist stance. According to the postmonotheist theme, the history of Metaphysics is a history of fundamental stances that Being sent (*schicken*) to us as our destiny (*Ge-schick*). But in the act of disclosing beings, Being conceals itself. This is why the most fundamental question of Being is forgotten in Metaphysics. Out of many possible links between Heidegger and Nietzsche, the notable points are:

1. It was Nietzsche’s philosophy or rather Heidegger’s interpretation of Nietzsche’s philosophy which pushed Heidegger towards actual Nazism.
2. Nietzsche’s philosophy seemed to have paved the way for Heidegger’s later postmonotheist thought on death of god as the “death of the Christian God.”

### 1.2.9(ix). Hölderlin's Poetry

Friedrich Hölderlin (1770 – 1843), A German lyric poet, commonly associated with the artistic movement known as 'Romanticism', who was also a contemporary and friend of German idealist philosophers, Hegel and Schelling, whose poetry widely recognized today as one of the highest points of German literature had tremendous influence on Heidegger, particularly in his later philosophy. Hölderlin earned his fame with the writing of his epistolary novel *Hyperion*, first published in 1797 (Volume I) and 1799 (Volume II), written in hymnic style, that has great influence especially among the continental philosophers. As Hölderlin was a poet-thinker who wrote mostly on poetic theory and philosophical matters, the exegesis of some of his more difficult poems has given rise to profound philosophical speculation by thinkers as divergent as Martin Heidegger, Jacques Derrida, Foucault and Theodor Adorno.<sup>5</sup>

Heidegger's interest in Hölderlin's poetry can be traced back to 1934 – the time he was in the Jesuit secondary school at Konstanz, and the Jesuit Berthold - Gymnasium at Freiburg. Friedrich Hölderlin's poetry had a tremendous influence on Heidegger which led him say "truth as revealing" (*aletheia*). It awakens Heidegger to conceive of truth in the form of revealing, as the poet in his poem reveals nature as lovely as it is; nature as such, being as such is determined. Hölderlin's influence had a direct impact especially from the time when Heidegger took the "turn" (*Kehre*) in his philosophy.

Heidegger's main interest, no doubt, was fundamental ontology or the study of Being as he called. In *Being and Time*, he described that the fundamental concern of his task is to access being (*sein*) by means of phenomenological analysis of human existence (*Dasein*) – or just "being-there" in respect to its temporal and historical character, which is the only site from where the investigation of being can be carried out (his initial consideration). After the change of his thinking (the Turn) however, Heidegger placed an emphasis on language as the vehicle through which the question of Being can be unfolded. He then turned towards

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<sup>5</sup> See [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Friedrich\\_Holderlin](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Friedrich_Holderlin), retrieved on 20.05.2013

the exegesis of historical texts, especially of the Pre-Socratics, Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche, and Hölderlin. His turn towards the Hölderlin's poetry was the fact that out of many possible disclosures of Being through different horizons, a poetic-revealing of being, equalized with the Greek revealing – "*aletheia*," is the most original and primordial but the deepest and the truest form of revealing, is found in Hölderlin's poetry. Though, a precise, rational or logical understanding of Being via "the facticity of Dasein" or everydayness is emphasized in the early phase, but more than Heidegger later on clarified with the influence of Hölderlin that the poetic form of revealing is genuine in which the language of being is heard. Instead of rationalizing Being, we let Being say its own nature in this form of revealing.

Not only Hölderlin, Heidegger also meditated on George Trakl's, Stefan Georges's, Goethe's and Rilke's poems. The question is why does a thinker put poetry into the center of his meditations? We should remind ourselves that after the 'turn' in order to unveil Being, it is language than Dasein that gives deeper insight. For Heidegger language is a world-establishing power. The original language is the language of poetry he considered. In "*Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry*," Heidegger refers to poetry as an "*unsprache*," an "original language" (Heidegger, *Elucidation of Holderlin's Poetry*, 2010, p. 204). He does so because he believes that poetry, Hölderlin's in particular, provides us with language felicitously attuned to the originary speaking of language, that is, the truth of Being and our relation to its disclosures (and concealments).

The influence of Hölderlin's poetry clearly marks Heidegger in order to think through a particular subjects as well as the synthesis of his fragmented thoughts as is clear in *Building Dwelling*, and also in *What are Poets For?* Heidegger's definition of the world as the necessary interplay of the fourfold – the earth, the sky, the mortals, and the divinity, the realization of which makes an authentic individual life, is apparently the influence of Hölderlin (the issue of the fourfold is elaborately discussed in the later chapters). Akin to Hölderlin, Heidegger goes on saying that poetically man dwells, meaning how the world fits together, the appropriating of mortals to divinities, earth and sky, things to place and functions – how all is rightly measured out – the possibility of which can come only when man lives as a poet. For a poet is one who, looking to the sky, sees in its manifestness the

self-concealment of “the unknown God,” building the unknown to come to man to help him dwell. Heidegger cites from a late poem by Hölderlin:

*“In lovely blueness blooms the steeple with metal roof...Poetically man dwells...”*  
(Heidegger M. , Poetry, Language, Thought, 2001, p. 211).

According to Heidegger, modernity is the epoch inspired by metaphysics of mostly characterized by the oblivion of Being. Conversely, we are the people being abandoned by Being. Hence, the modern technologies, our sense of dwelling the world, are no longer in orientation with Being, therefore, biased. In his task of rebuilding by reviving Being to its position, Heidegger invoked a poetic thinking in which the concealment – unconcealment of Being is purely recognized. Thus for Heidegger, Hölderlin is one who points the way out of abandonment by Being. His poetry has a head start over thinking because it reaches our farthest into the future.

Phillipe Lacoue – Labarthe interprets Heidegger’s use of Hölderlin’s as the attempt “to take the step beyond rigorous questioning or beyond the more announcements of an ‘other thinking,’ and to sketch the first lines of this ‘other thinking’” (Eldred, 2012).

### **1.2.9(x). Rilke: (1875 – 1926)**

Rainer Maria Rilke, a Bohemian-Austrian poet and novelist, widely recognized as one of the most lyrically intense German –language poet, whose works inherently are “mystical” have had great influence on Heidegger. Rilke, whose works mostly on ineffable communion, solitude, and prolonged anxiety – all the existential concerns, paved the way for Heidegger in his move towards mysticism in the later period of his thought-path.<sup>6</sup>

After the turn, Heidegger was drawn towards “mysticism” via language for he understands that instead of taking up the investigation of being from the “facticity” of Dasein, it is worth revealing Being from our calmness, out of the domain of our will. The mystical element of

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<sup>6</sup> See [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rainer\\_Maria\\_Rilke](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rainer_Maria_Rilke), retrieved on 22.03.2013

Heidegger is also colored by Meister Eckhart – the famous Christian mystic of the Middle Ages. Eckhart’s notion of the nudity of the soul, detachment from the bodily activities, and the ineffable union with Godhead, together provides Heidegger enormous sources to emphasize the self-disclosure of Being.

### **1.2.9(xi). Neo-Kantianism**

Neo-Kantianism, basically understood as revival of Kantianism in German Universities that begun in 1860, also influenced the Phenomenology of Edmund Husserl and of the early works of Martin Heidegger. More specifically, Heidegger’s interest in Neo-Kantianism can be narrowed down to the philosophies of Heinrich Rickert (1863 – 1936), one of the leading Neo-Kantians, and Nicolai Hartmann, a senior to Heidegger in Marburg University. In fact, Martin Heidegger started out his academic career as Rickert’s assistant, graduated with him and then wrote his habilitation thesis under Rickert. Nicolai Hartmann (1882 – 1951), originally a Marburg Neo-Kantian, studying under Hermann Cohen and Paul Natorp, whose philosophy is described as a variety of existentialism or critical realism, is also known to have influenced the early philosophy of Heidegger.<sup>7</sup>

Neo-Kantianism were reluctant to entertain any new “question of Being.” Being true to the spirit of their mentor, they were against metaphysical rationalism and new version of irrationalism. Even though, they wished to reform Kant, and broaden the scope of transcendental reflection to include the realities considered by the cultural-historical sciences alongside those of the natural-sciences, claimed to be the authentic Kantians, primarily oriented to epistemological and scientific methodological problems, the only “question of Being” was the question of knowability: Being could be nothing but objective knowable being, the being of “appearance” and not at all the being of an unknowable Thing-in-itself (Sadler, 1996, p. 4). This draws Heidegger towards a conception of Being in its experiential dimension, which he said is found in the everydayness of Dasein’s being. So that Being cannot simply be reduced to something ‘Indefinable’ but possible to see rather in

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<sup>7</sup> See <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neo-Kantianism>, retrieved on 14.04.2013

its disclosure in the temporality, historicity of Dasein's being. Neo-Kantian widened the eye of Heidegger to conceive it differently.

Apart from what is discussed as the main influences on Heidegger in his developing of Fundamental Ontology, there are some other thinkers or systems which are credited to have influenced Heidegger. Among those includes some eastern thoughts like Zen Buddhism and Taoism. In fact, the two themes in Heidegger seem to have a definite Taoist flavor such as the Way (*Weg*) and releasement (*Gelassenheit*) (Stambaugh, 1992, p. 79). Of course Heidegger himself is known to have had quite a number of times interactions with leading Japanese intellectuals, including members of the Kyoto school, notably Hajime Tanabe and Kuki Shuzo. According to the Japanese scholar, Tomonubu Imamichi, the concept of Dasein was inspired by Okakura Kakuzo's concept of *das-in-der-welt-sein* (being-in-the-world) expressed in the book of *Tea* to describe Zhuangzu's philosophy, which Imamichi's teacher had offered to Heidegger in 1919, although Heidegger remain silent on this.<sup>8</sup>

Lastly, regarding how far Heidegger is known to have influenced by Indian Philosophy, particularly the Vedanta philosophy, there are different opinion Heidegger himself mentions Indian philosophy a couple of times in his writing, but only to point out that it is not "philosophy" proper, a term which ought to be reserved for the uniquely Greek form, mode, and concern of thought. His connection with the Indian thought may be traced more specifically in the discussion between him and Eugen Fink on *fragment 26 of Heraclitus*, regarding the nature of sleep, where Heidegger remarks, "For Indians the state of sleep is the highest life" (Parker, 1992).

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<sup>8</sup> See Yasuo Yuasa: The Encounter of Modern Japanese Philosophy with Heidegger, in Heidegger and Asian-Thought Motial Banarsidas Publishers (1992)

**AN ATTEMPT AT UNDERSTANDING HEIDEGGER'S CRITIQUE OF THE  
"METAPHYSICAL TRADITION OF PHILOSOPHY" AND ITS  
ONTO-THEOLOGICAL DIMENSION**

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**2.0. Re-Visiting Heideggerian Critique of the Metaphysical Tradition of  
Philosophy**

Heidegger's *Being and Time* begins a new era of philosophy. With his inauguration of a new "battle of giants over Being," that subsides the earlier debates of Idealism – Realism, and the like, with the prime focus on the Being<sup>1</sup> question, "a new battle among giants" now centers round another key question; whether Being (*Sein*) is thought in its difference from 'beings' (*das Seiende*). This he finds it not at all addressed in what he identifies as the metaphysical tradition of philosophy, that continues from Plato to Nietzsche and still later.

Why Martin Heidegger has to struggle with the metaphysical tradition of philosophy while his central focus was the question of Being? Why Heidegger has to identify Aristotle as the originator of the metaphysical tradition of philosophy and of onto-theological philosophy which Heidegger sought to destructure? In order to understand Heidegger's critique of Metaphysics we have to begin with Aristotle; and prior to Aristotle with Plato who saw that an intellectual "battle of giants" was fought over the "Being-question." Plato introduces the Being question in a dialogue between the *Aetetus* and the *Stranger from Elea* in his "*Sophist*" thus: "Do we know what we mean when we speak about non-being or that which is not? Do we know what we mean when we speak about Being or that which is? Is there a difference between Being and what there is; that is, the entities which exist?" (Plato, 2006, p. 244a). *The Stranger from Elea* shares his perplexity about what once seemed to them most familiar and obvious is now no longer so. The unquestioned familiarity of there "is" and "is not" has been shattered once and for all by the bold and paradoxical statements of "Father

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<sup>1</sup> Capital 'B' is used here to indicate the ontological Being.  
Accordingly, the same style is used in the entire Thesis.

Parmenides,” that is by his thesis that only Being is, that non-being is not, and that there is no becoming and change (Halbfass, 1992, p. 1).

## **2.1. Toward a Paradigm Shift from Metaphysics to Fundamental Ontology: Identification of the Metaphysical Paradigm of Philosophy**

For Heidegger, the entire history of western philosophy since early Greeks was trapped within the metaphysical tradition in some manner. His lifelong endeavor of addressing the philosophical question of *the meaning of Being*, and to answer it ontologically, in the widest possible sense, occasionally suffered set back because of the metaphysical way of understanding and addressing such questions. Since then, identifying philosophical quest as a dispassionate search for knowledge that separates the knower from the known and also disrobes the lived dimension of meaning of Being of beings, philosophy made a turn toward substance metaphysics and it thus continues its glorious tradition of knowledge quest for a detached observer. Heidegger remarks: “the moment we detach ourselves and step back to try to get an impartial, objective view of things, the world goes dead for us – things lose the meaningfulness definitive of their being in the everyday life-world. This whole misrepresentation of reality,” Heidegger says, “is contained in a single, but difficult word: metaphysics.” He claims: “metaphysics is the essence of contemporary ‘nihilism,’ the ultimate ground of the ‘destitution’ of modernity, of that is to say, its ‘oblivion of being’” (Young, 2002, p. 26). It deprived the whole philosophical speculations in realizing the truth of reality. Under such misrepresentation, metaphysics is that mode of disclosure, which transcends the beings of our world in the way in which the visual field transcends that which shows up within it. The concern is of transcendental which looks for the “Being of beings.” But what is unfortunate, Heidegger says, “is that the very ‘Being’ (of thing) is forgotten and is left untouched in the earlier contemplations.” (Young, 2002, p. 26)

Heidegger’s masterpiece *Being and Time* (1927), one of the most influential works in philosophy, paved ways to take a breath of fresh air to the afore-mentioned traditional philosophical contemplation of reality. Heidegger’s paradigm shift made a way out of a particular way of understanding the nature of reality, an outlook that arose at the dawn of

Western history of philosophy, which again led to the concealment of the whole metaphysical trends, or outlook, which may also be defined as “substance ontology.” This is how the ultimate reality remained that which underlies properties, the underlying substratum of a thing, that which stands continuously present throughout all changes. Such contemplations, such as Aristotle’s Primary Substance, Plato’s notion of the Forms, Descartes’ notion of God, Kant’s *Noumena*, Leibnitz’s *Monadology*, etc, are good examples of this trend.

Understanding the basic problem as that of substance metaphysics will make an attempt at understanding what Heidegger has detected as the error of the metaphysical tradition that reduced Being to a metaphysical substance. An attempt will be made to understand how Heidegger proposed a new philosophical project of exploring meaning of Being in his *Hermeneutical Phenomenology* as the guideline for the new project.

## **2.2. Heidegger’s Critique of the “Metaphysical Tradition of Philosophy”**

Heidegger’s intended a critique and thereby, a destructuring of the tradition of metaphysics in order to introduce a new trend of questioning “Being of beings,” changed the entire philosophical face, no matter how far he might have succeeded in it. But what is crucial is the paradigm shift that was made replacing the metaphysical to the ontological one. But unlike the earlier attempts made by others in this ontological dimension of philosophizing, Heidegger’s new development constituted a new way of approaching the problem of Being, at least by opening up the ground or horizon through which he found its accessibility. What then is the Being that he found so consistent to overturn the existing philosophical interrogations? What is Metaphysics and what is meant by “Philosophy as metaphysical?” Let us clarify these concepts first.

Before we understand Heidegger’s critique of the metaphysical tradition of philosophy let us be clear about the etymological meanings of the terms: metaphysics, critiques of metaphysics and Heideggerian critique of “Philosophy as metaphysical.”

The word “metaphysics” derives from the Greek *meta ta physika* (literally, “after the things of nature”), an expression used by Hellenistic and later commentators to refer to Aristotle’s untitled group of texts that we still call the metaphysics (Edwards, 1972). Etymologically, the term metaphysics mean “theory of reality.”

A central branch of metaphysics is ontology, the investigation into the basic categories of Being, and its accessibility. Generally, Metaphysics endeavors to answer two basic questions in the broadest possible way:

1. “What is there?”
2. “What really is it like?”

The first concerns a metaphysical insight into “what there is” and is a first order inquiry. The second is to understand “what we are doing when we do metaphysics.” It is an enquiry into the first order enquiry. It enquires into the roots of metaphysical insight. As the questions concerned are ontological in nature, we come across different philosophical trends including Indian philosophy that endeavor to explain it in their respective systems of thought.

In the models of metaphysics in the western traditions, divisions can be broadly made under two metaphysical heads of Speculative and Non-Speculative traditions (Sharma & Shukla, 2008, pp. 12-13). Speculative metaphysics begins with certain absolute presuppositions and tries to deduce and explain the entire world out of them. Under this, there is a hypothetical identification of the Absolute, thought to be unshaken, immutable and most basic out of which the entire metaphysical speculation is sought to be deduced. Speculative metaphysics can be further subdivided into transcendent and immanent as it is clearly represented in the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle’s notion of *Actus purus*. On the other hand, non-speculative metaphysics is generally conceived of as critical and descriptive pursuits. It is called “critical” as it continuously makes an attempt at examining the absolute presuppositions of Speculative metaphysics in the light of common sense experience and scientific observation. It endeavors to explain the world through rational categories or structure of thoughts. Thus we find that metaphysics is not one unitary homogenous discipline but a broader concept for divergent series of disciplines. Plato’s theory of Forms,

Kantian division of *phenomena* and *noumena*, Strawsonian understanding of Descriptive metaphysics are the renowned metaphysical variations that fall under the above mentioned different models of the so-called metaphysical traditions. However, these categorizations of metaphysics are not exhaustive and final but only indications of diverse philosophical trends that come under the so-called broad school of metaphysics (Sharma & Shukla, 2008, p. 13).

Besides the Greek skeptics, the tendency to eliminate metaphysics can be seen in the philosophy of David Hume, Immanuel Kant and finally in the school of Logical Positivism among many others. The Logical Positivists condemn metaphysics on the ground of being illogical, unverifiable, unempirical and inauthentic. Despite its critiques, philosophy as metaphysics defined reality in terms of substance, subject, etc. The word “substance” in a non-philosophical parlance usually signifies an ordinary stuff like chair, table, book, etc. However, in a philosophical contemplation, substance, which is reserved for a technical term, signifies the most fundamental stuff of reality. Substance is seen as the base, locus where all the qualities inherit.

While critics of metaphysics are many, from Hume, Kant, Logical Positivists to Husserl and Heidegger, others who sought to it are: Immanuel Kant with his transcendental and immanent metaphysics, Strawson with the scheme of descriptive metaphysics, etc. Some traces of subjectivity oriented metaphysics can be traced in Edmund Husserl’s Transcendental Phenomenology and Sartre’s Existential Ontology, Davidson, Putnam and others, as well as Collingwood and Taylor, sought to revive alternate models of it. As mentioned earlier, among the notable critics of metaphysics, we have the Logical Positivists who condemn metaphysics as speculative, meaningless and mere emotive ejaculations which remain unverifiable and unverified.

But in order to understand distinctive metaphysics we have to re-visit the metaphysical tradition from Plato onward. At a later time we will have to see what Heidegger has to say about the Pre-Socratic early Greek tradition of philosophy as well. For the time being let us re-visit Heidegger’s understanding of Plato and his philosophy of Ideas and Forms. But we must be prepared to have his typical Aristotelian way of looking at Plato and the entire metaphysical tradition.

According to Mark Sinclair, for Heidegger, his phenomenological interpretation of Aristotle has remained so integral to all his thinking that not only his critique of the metaphysical tradition of philosophy but his all other interpretations of philosophy are colored by Aristotelian focus. Heidegger's writings on philosophies of Leibnitz, Kant, Hegel, and others are influenced by his interpretation of Aristotle's philosophy. Heidegger's opposition to Kantian and neo-Kantian interpretation of epistemic structures of the transcendental epistemic subject with his preference for life-related structures of beings, made him a critique of substance metaphysics. He looked for interpreting Kant's epistemology from the perspective of ontology of Being and historicity. Heidegger's renewed input in Aristotle in order to destructure the traditional content of Ontology is also motivated by his desire to advance an untraditional reading of Aristotle and of Plato, to explicate that what Plato had baptized as Greek thinking with a new name "Philosophy" is fundamentally different from the way how Greeks had perceived it originally.

### **2.3. Heidegger and the Greek Tradition**

Heidegger's Aristotelizations of Plato and of the whole metaphysical tradition and of Platonism, Neo-Platonism, along with his treatment of the Pre-Socratics, is evident from the fact that he does not really develop an independent attitude to Plato save the one interpreted from his own interpretation of Aristotle. "If Heidegger says on occasion that 'all Metaphysics is Platonism,' it is an Aristotelianized Plato that he has in mind, with 'idea' meaning the same as 'ousia' in Aristotle" (Sadler, 1996, p. 30).

We have seen that Plato raises the question of Being in the "Sophist" in order to know "whether there is a unified meaning of Being," that accrues to all beings. It seems Heidegger was aware of Plato's struggle with the problem since he used this passage in the Sophist as his point of departure in *Being and Time*. We may sum up that Heidegger's relation with Plato is in fact, his way of understanding the Aristotelian Plato and an independent voice of Plato, in this regard, is difficult to know. To quote Sebastian Alackpally: "Whatever Plato may have thought about the "unity of being," it was the Aristotelian doctrine of a manifold

meaning of being that came to dominate the history of western metaphysics, while the question of being still occupied a certain position in the investigations of Plato and Aristotle, it was later forgotten. Hence, Heidegger seems himself forced to reawaken an understanding of the question of the meaning of being. And he takes up the question of what expression “being” (*Sciend*) actually means in his master work *Being and Time*” (Alackpally, 2002, pp. 108-109). So in this background, what is the significance of Plato and of Aristotle in this tradition?

### **2.3.1. Plato (428 BC – 348 BC)**

Plato’s theory of Forms or theory of Ideas, asserts that non-material abstract – Forms, and not the material world of change known to us through sensation, possess the highest and most fundamental kind of reality. He held that the world of “Form” is transcendent to our own world (the world of substance) and is the essential basis of reality. Forms are the most pure of all things. Form is a-spatial (transcendence to space) and a-temporal (transcendence to time). A- temporal means that it does not exist within anytime period; rather it provides the formal basis of time. It exists transcendent to time altogether. Forms do not have spatial dimensions and thus no orientation in space, nor do they have any location. They are non-physical but they are not in the mind. Forms are eternal, unchanging objects, each with a unique nature, which we grasp with our minds but not with our senses. The form of beauty, for example is eternal and unqualified by anyone else. This alone is supposed to explain the beauty of things we experience in the world around us.

Plato states that his theory of Forms is so consistent that it helps one to contemplate reality in its utmost sense. When we find that things of our daily life remain changing assuming different forms and figures, a leaf which was dark green yesterday became brown today due to the heat of the sun or whatever else may be. In the same way a boy may be five feet tall now who was two inches shorter some months ago. But according to Plato, color green itself cannot become the color brown; the height of four feet itself cannot become five feet. It always remains the same; green color is always green; brown as brown, so on and so forth. However, a change is always a change from one state to another or a change from something

'A' to something else 'B,' where 'A' and 'B' cannot themselves be things that change. In the normal epistemological doctrine as well, to be a thing means essentially to be at certain point of time and somewhere in space. Space and time are the determining factors of the existing thing in time. However, Plato says that his notion of form is not determined by time, as it is a timeless truth. For example, the statements that, "Socrates was born in such and such era"; "the pyramids still exist today," if true or false, it remains so forever, no matter what it becomes through the ages. The form of Socrates or of Pyramid remains the same even though the reality is no longer there to be found. As Socrates names a perceptible object here, so justice, equality, unity and similarity name intellectually apprehensible a-temporal objects. Furthermore, apart from sensation, the human mind or soul can get non-sensible contact with the ideal and eternal objects of the transcendental world (Edwards P. , 1967, pp. 322-322).

In the following generation, Plato's great disciple and critic Aristotle refers to the Being question as an old question that still perplexes one. In order to address such questions Aristotle postulates "a science which investigates Being as Being, and what belongs to it according to its own nature" (Cohen, Aristotle's Metaphysics, 2000). This special science, which he named "First Philosophy," an all comprehensive science, came to be known as ontology, a "science of being in general or in so far as it is being." In his system it was the foremost part of "Metaphysics" (a term not used by Aristotle) and it was distinguished from "Theology," the science of the highest being.

Following Heidegger we will have to re-visit the early Greek philosophical tradition by re-visiting Aristotle so that what Heidegger claims for, to restore the Phenomenological exploration of Being in the very same tradition, we may now begin our quest with Pre-Socratic philosophers and with their distinctive way of philosophizing. Was it just metaphysical or something difficult in nature, as claimed by Heidegger?

Prior to that, we will have to take a fresh look at Aristotle and his way of defining "First Philosophy" which later came to be known as Metaphysics.

### 2.3.2. Aristotle (384BC–322BC): From Substance Metaphysics to the Onto-Theological Dimension

Aristotle described the subject matter of metaphysics in a variety of ways: as “first philosophy,” or “the study of Being *qua* Being,” or wisdom, or “Theology.” in which Being or ultimate reality is of primary concern. He says that “all men suppose what is called wisdom (*sophis*) to deal with the first causes (*aitia*) and the principles (*archai*) of things” (Politis, 2004, p. 2/4). And it is these causes and principles (that he proposes to study in this work), which are clearly the subject matter of what he calls “First Philosophy.” His notion of reality can best be understood by referring to his earlier work, the *Categories*. The *Categories* begins with a strikingly general and exhaustive account of the things there are (*ta onta*) beings. According to this account, Being is divided into ten distinct categories. These include substance, quantity, quality, and relation, among others. Of these categories of Being, it is the first – substance, to which Aristotle gives a privileged position of being prior to all other categories for a thing to be called as “real.” Substance is unique in being independent of things; all other items in the categories are depended on substances. They themselves alone do not possess reality apart from substances.

*“The first philosophy (Metaphysics) is universal and it exclusively concerned with primary substance... And here we will have the science to study that which is just as that which is, both in its essence and in the properties which just as a thing that is, it has. The entire preoccupation of the physicist is with things that contain within themselves a principle of movement and rest. And to seek for this is to seek for the second kind of principle that from which comes the beginning of the change”* (Aristotle, 350B.C.E in (Ross, 1994-2000).

All of Aristotle’s metaphysical contemplations were articulated into fourteen books of unequal length and complexity. The first book ‘Alpha’ is introduction: it articulates the notion of a science of the first principles or causes of things, and it offers a partial history of the subject. The second book, ‘Little Alpha’ too is an introduction, which is of methodological in content. The third book ‘Beta’ is of long sequence of puzzles or *aporiai*,

where the whole work turned out to be programmatic rather than definitive. Book ‘*Gamma*’ appears to deal with the subject matter of metaphysics itself: it characterizes something which it calls ‘the science of being *qua* being’ – and it then engaged in a discussion of the principle of non-contradiction. The next book, ‘*Delta*’ is all about philosophical lexicon. It describes some 40 philosophical terms, in terms of meanings and senses. Book ‘*Epsilon*’ is almost the repetition of ‘being *qua* being,’ and also passes some remarks on truth. Book ‘*Zeta*,’ ‘*Eta*’ and ‘*Theta*’ collectively form the core of the *Metaphysics*. They all discuss the same topic of substance: its identification, its relation to matter and form, to actuality and potentiality, to change and generations. The next book ‘*Iota*’ concerns itself with the notions of unity (oneness) and identity. Book ‘*Kappa*’ turned out to be a replication and of a resume of *Gamma*, *Delta*, and *Epsilon* on the subject matter of physics. The book ‘*Lambda*’ discusses the notion of beings and of first principles: it also deals with Theology which prompts him believe in “*Unmoved Movers*,” which again is contemplated as the supreme entities in this universe. Finally, the book ‘*Mu*’ and ‘*Nu*’ inclined to the study of mathematics, discussing in particular the ontological status of numbers (Barnes J. , 1995, pp. 66-67).

In the book *Z* of the *metaphysics* Aristotle takes up the matter of substance, where he began by reiterating and refining some of what he already stated, that “Being is said in many ways, and that the primary sense of Being is the sense in which substances are Being.” The primary of substance leads Aristotle to say that the age-old question “what is Being?” is just the question “what is substance?” Here, Aristotle goes on saying that substance being most fundamental alone is real and independent. All other qualities and other properties were accidents belonging to substances. However, for Aristotelian, there were many different kinds of substances, each specified by a particular substantial form – humans by the form of humanity and so on.

In the Aristotelian system, substances are thought to be visible and tangible entities, accessible to the senses, even though it took a higher form of intellect or intuition to work out the nature of each substance. The next issue taken up by Aristotle was, what is it to be a substance? Here, he is concerning with the criteria by which a substance is entitled to call as a substance. What are the essential qualifications to be of substance? He then, listed four

possible candidates for being the substance of something – essence, universal, genus and the subject. It may be summarized their needful presence in it as –if chalk is a substance, then the substance of chalk must be –

1. The essence of chalk
2. Universally predicated of chalk
3. A genus that chalk belongs to
4. A subject of which chalk is predicated.

A subject, Aristotle tell us is “that of which everything else is predicated, while it is itself not predicated of anything else.” Aristotle suggested different qualifications, among those, essence; universal, genus, and subjects are what is more emphasized and what is reckoned to be essential for a substance to be as substance.

Substance as essence is very complex but meaningful, needed to approach it systematically. ‘Essence’ is the Standard English translation of Aristotle’s curious phrase “*to ti en einai*,” literally “the what it was to be” for a thing. He sometimes used it in a shorter phrase “*to it esti*,” literally the “what it is,” for approximately the same idea (Politis, 2004, p. 51). In his systematic approach to substance, Aristotle links the notion of essence to that of definition (*lorismos*) – a description is an account (*logos*) that signifies an essence, and he also links certain kind of predication. “What belongs to a thing in respect of itself belongs to it in its essence (*en toi ti esti*).” He reiterates these ideas in Z.4: “there is an essence of just those things whose *logos* is a definition”, “the essence of a thing is what it is said to be in respect of itself” (Barnes J. , 1995, pp. 66-67). Essence with its definitional implication does not entail the meaning of the word, but the thing itself as what it is to be. For an instance, the definition of tiger does not tell us the meaning of the word ‘tiger’; rather it tells us what it is to be a tiger, what a tiger is said to be in respect of itself.

At this point the contemplation turned out to have appeared a close connection between the essence of a substance and its species, and this might convey one to suppose that Aristotle is identifying the substance of a thing with its species. However, such an identification would be a mistake, for the word *eidos* which meant *species* in the logical works has acquired a

new meaning in the *hylomorphic* context, where it meant ‘form’(contrasted with matter) rather than species. When substance of a thing is analyzed up to its most ultimate principle or reality what are only left is form and matter. For the four causes which are of the means of knowing a thing can be reduced broadly to Form and Matter. All the three causes of efficient, formal, and final are really one and Aristotle calls this as the form of the thing in which lies potentialities or actualities or becoming to some other entities. Apart from this, the material cause cannot be reduced to any kind of cause. It is for the form to manifest in different dimensions.


By “Matter,” Aristotle understands that which has no shape, no quality of any type and kind. It is neither red nor green, neither heavy nor light, neither rough nor smooth. It appears as if nothing. But it cannot be nothing nor non-being, for after all it is something which has to be molded by the form into nature, organism and man, into certain shapes and figures of physical matter, life and conscious being. Primal matter has no Form, but it gives way to all things by the Form. Hence, Form is the real thing about anything we see in the world. However, form by itself is nothing. What exists is formed matter, i.e. matter and form together inseparably. Matter by itself has no form. It is ultimately formless, principle less, purposeless, as if nothing. But it is not non-being, for it becomes anything by the generating principle of form. It has the potentiality of becoming different figures and shapes. It is actuality of what is governed by the principle of form.

The essence of such a *hylomorphic* compound is evidently its form, not its matter. As Aristotle says, “by Form, I mean the essence of each thing, and its primary substance,” and “when I speak of substance without matter I mean the essence” (Cohen, Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, 2000). It is the Form of a substance that makes it the kind of thing that it is, and hence it is Form that satisfies the condition initially required for being the substance of something.

Substance is essence if only in a primary sense of being the locus of a thing. For substances in Aristotle have logical priority in the sense that items in other categories – qualities, quantities, and so forth – are predicable of them whereas substances are always subjects. They themselves are not predicated of anything else. Things in its primary and secondary

sense are mentioned here to shadow that the primacy entails the locus or totality of things that inheres in itself, whereas the secondary are those qualities that comes only after referring the things itself. Without referring to it their existences cannot be verified. Aristotle goes on arguing that if something is primary and spoken of in respect of itself, it is one and the same as essence. Therefore, essence is what defines substance as it is, without referring to anything else. However, there are certain “accidental unity” or qualities that also partially explains things, but not in its primacy or locus of a thing, it made us fall into a wrong interpretation. Man for an instance, is not described by his color, structure, figure, smiles, talk, but by his universal manhood which is of his essence. Such an accidental unity does not specify the “what it is” of any Primary Being, and so cannot be an essence of the primary kind. Only species of a genus have an essence, in the primary sense. Man is a species, and so there is an essence of man; but black man, pale man, etc is not a species.

Hence, Aristotle’s notion of Reality can be shown in a pyramidal scheme of picture (Masih, 1994, p. 103).



In *Zeta.17*, Aristotle proposes a new point of departure in his effort to say what sort of a thing substance is. His new idea is that a substance is a principle and a cause of being. At this point he comes to realize the importance of the four causes which collectively works together so as to form a thing in what they are. It can be used even to trace out the most primary and ultimate entity. When we analyze cause one after another, in the end there must be a cause of everything which moves everything without itself being moved, i.e. the Unmoved Mover (*actus purus*). It is the end of the process of the chain of causality. According to Aristotle, knowing means knowing through causes. Science is considered to be the highest knowledge, for being the purest knowledge of causes. However, metaphysics for

Aristotle is more scientific for its concern is wisdom. It is concerned with the first and most universal cause. It wants to know the final cause of all things. Therefore, Aristotle, right from the beginning, aimed at the teleological explanation of the universe.

#### **2.4. Onto -Theology and Philosophy**

While Aristotle's phrase "*on hei on*," "Being as Being," is as suggestive as it is ambiguous, what the first philosophy intends to clarify, is an investigation of "Being" as such and in general, the "divine essence," or "substance" – of theology, is not clear and this is how later Heidegger would identify Aristotle's metaphysics and the philosophical tradition inspired by metaphysics as "Onto-theological" in nature. While the Onto-theology inspired the philosophy of Plotinus and the tradition of neo-Platonism, to a metaphysics of "emanation" that postulates different levels of Reality and finally all contradiction to be resolved in the 'One' (*to hen*), the ultimate goal of mystical realization, all other theistic philosophers of Christianity, Judaism, and Islam adopts and transform the tradition of Plato, Aristotle and Plotinus. Aristotle became the recognized master of high scholasticism. Thomas Aquinas in particular achieves complete integration of Ontology and Theology in the doctrine of "*analogia entis*," the "analogy" of divine and dependent being (Halbfass, 1992, p. 4).

As we have seen in our previous analysis, for Aristotle the primary meaning of Being is substance (*ousia*) that remains constantly present – although time changes everything. Ontology of presence has its legitimate scopes as "an ontology of the world in which every Dasein is," that is, it illuminates the present-at-hand entities within this world. In Latin, Aristotle's *ousia* is redeemed as *essentia* and *substantia*. Meister Eckhart and Christian Wolff are among the most important contributors to the German ontological vocabulary. Catholicism, since the 13<sup>th</sup> century, had continued studying Aristotle, asking being question, re-learning modern interpretation of Aristotle from Hegel onward and thus Catholicism continued with Thomas Aquinas's Aristotelian interpretation of Being.

## 2.5. Heidegger's critique of Metaphysics as Onto -Theology

Catholicism, since the 13<sup>th</sup> Century, had continued studying Aristotle, asking Being question also re-learning modern interpretation of Aristotle from Hegel. Heidegger now intervenes the scene with his critique of Aristotelian Metaphysical philosophy and its identification in Onto-Theology, but at the same time he was hopeful of a true, phenomenological disclosure of Fundamental Ontology of Being also using Aristotle's hidden and unexplained dimension of philosophy. Ted Sadler raises this question: "Did Heidegger stand for a new Aristotle? Is it possible that Heidegger rediscovered in Aristotle the genuine question of Being, the question which had been forgotten by scholasticism as well as by, modern philosophy?" (Sadler, 1996, p. 13).

Sadler continues: "Furthermore, it is well known that in virtually all his writings from *Being and Time* onwards, Heidegger sees Aristotelian Ontology as precisely the foundation of the whole metaphysical tradition of *Seinsvergessenheit*" (Sadler, 1996, p. 7).

It is an interesting question to be raised: "Why is the obsession with the Being question and since when?" Sadler comments that scholars opine that it was during his transition period from Catholic theologian to the philosopher in him that he re-viewed the Being question. The Being question as formulated in modern Thomism, is thoroughly a theological question and since Aquinas had defended Aristotle's equation of First Philosophy and Theology, it retained its theological character. Aristotle facilitated the ambitious connection of the question of God and of Being in the 6<sup>th</sup> book of the metaphysics. Some other commentators of Heidegger's interprets of Aristotle, including his student – philosopher Gadamer, talk about how Heidegger was attracted to another side of Aristotle; something quite different from the metaphysical doctrines of "Being *qua* Being," that it was Aristotle's practical philosophy, (philosophy as praxis) that Heidegger found fruitful. what is made crucial in this regard is to what extent Heidegger was influenced by the protestant spirit of Luther after having broken with Catholicism?

## 2.6. At the Completion of the Metaphysical Tradition: Heidegger's Phenomenological Interpretation of Aristotle and of the Greek Tradition

Looking forward to a deeper interpretation of Aristotle, Heidegger went beyond Hegel and sought to interpret Aristotle in the background of Husserlian Phenomenology and his own hermeneutical and ontological interpretation of it. Ted Sadler notes that since 1924–25 (Marburg Sophist Lecture) Heidegger opposed his Being question from Aristotelian focus on “Being *qua* Being” and in virtually all his writings Heidegger sees Aristotelian ontology as the foundation of the whole metaphysical tradition of philosophy. It was also the influence of Luther in his post-Catholic phase that still imbibed the spirit of Christianity, somehow akin to unofficial Protestantism. During this phase of Heidegger's critical dialogue with official Catholicism that his opposition to Aristotelian Metaphysics became more pronounced. To quote Ted Sadler: “Through an interpretation of passages Galatians and I&II Thessalonians, Heidegger discovered a non-Greek, non-metaphysical, non-Aristotelian ‘*Kairological*’ experience of time behind the Pauline understanding of God, it is especially significant that Heidegger not only attributes an understanding of this ‘primordial Christian’ temporality to Luther, but links it with Luther's condemnation of Aristotelianism. For likewise, through a non-Aristotelian conception of time, will Heidegger go on to define his own distinctive Seinsfrage?” (Sadler, 1996, pp. 14-15).

Heidegger did not oppose Christian faith as such, but Greek metaphysics, as he sought to restore primordial Christian life experience. He sought to restore the lived dimension of life, facticity, experience, including experience of faith and religiosity, phenomenologically. He just sought to restore primordial Christian life experience over and above its metaphysical leanings. “Was Heidegger pursuing ontological question which remained neutral in respect of Theology? In the 1920 / 21 lectures, the ontologization of Pauline Theology was plain: to the question ‘What is the Pauline experience of life?’ Heidegger replied, “*Kairological* temporality.” From a strict theological standpoint, the substitution of life for God in Heidegger's question was unacceptable. But not only did the theology of his time, which through Rudolf Bultmann was becoming aware of Heidegger's Biblical interpretations, tolerated Heidegger's philosophical (though idiosyncratic) vocabulary and his stated

independence from theology, but after the publication of *Being and Time*, it adopted much for both his existential analysis and his criticism of metaphysical Ontology. During the years 1922-25, the *Seinsfrage* (which takes the title only in 1924), is progressively removed from any explicit criticism of Christianity” (Sadler, 1996, p. 16) “Why *Being and Time* was not objectionable to Christianity? Was he, like Kant and Hegel, a disguised theologian?” Sadler wonders (Sadler, 1996, p. 16).

Looking for phenomenological restoration of Fundamental Ontology Heidegger now re-discovered the early Greeks.

Heidegger’s reading of the Pre-Socratics was inspired by his attempt to retrieve a meaning that is prior to its Platonic and Aristotelian sense of philosophy as metaphysics of substance. Heidegger quotes Heraclitus saying: “Nature loves to hide herself, or indicating the hidden and unveiled dimension of truth as *aletheia*. Interpreting the Greek term ‘*phusis*’ as emerging into presence,’ ‘the invisible harmonies by which beings are.” Mark Sinclair comments: “...on Heidegger’s reading this is why Heraclitus thinks beings as fire. Fire here is not to be thought, as Aristotle would have it in accounting for the thought of his predecessors, as an element or material ‘substrate’” (Sinclair, 2007, pp. 144-145).

## **2.7. The Early Greek Thinking**

Heidegger’s task of the phenomenological exploration of Being in a lived context or the experiential dimension, had its roots in the Greek thought right from the beginning, for which a re-visiting of this connection is necessary. To quote Sadler: “An interest in everydayness goes back a long way in the history of philosophy, right back to the pre-Socratics. Heraclitus charged the majority of human beings with a kind of ‘forgetting’ of the *logos*, while Parmenides included in his philosophical poem some teachings on common opinion as the ‘way of falsity’” (Sadler, 1996, p. 39).

Thus, it is worth-pointing out the two contrasted theories of Parmenides and Heraclitus and we may begin our quest with the paradoxical statements of “Father Parmenides” that is by his thesis that only Being is, that non-being is not, and that there is no becoming and change.

### **2.7.1. Parmenides (514 BC)**

Parmenides, in his search for the way of truth holds that reality is One, Eternal and Indestructible. He observed that the phenomenal world hangs just around and perishes. The world of sensible things is always a world of becoming. However, he goes on clarifying that these plurality and changes are furnished by our illusory senses. Reality, for him, is permanent, eternal and unchangeable and the rest is unreal.

### **2.7.2. Heraclitus (535 - 475 B.C)**

Heraclitus, a contemporary of Parmenides, has advocated a contrasted view that reality is change, flux and becoming. Everything is in a constant flux. He says that what we consider real and unchanging in day to day life like rivers; mountains, etc, are all characterized by constant flux and becoming. Since, all is flow and becoming one cannot remain in a permanent state. No one can step into the same river twice, for when a man enters into a river, and then he meets one stream of water and the next moment the first stream passes away, yielding to a newer stream of water. In the same way no one can bathe with the same water, as it is characterized by a process of constant changing. A man whom we know can never remain the same for even two moments. As he is inherently conditioned by blood-stream changes and also the mental stream, he remains changed each moment. This system has a resemblance with the Buddhist' doctrine of momentariness.

Thus the world is continuous becoming and becoming is the unity of opposites. For him, no air or water is the primordial stuff, which remains firm in the midst of changes. The process of change itself alone is real and is best symbolized by fire, since fire is ever-changing, and keeps changing every moment (Long, 1999).

To claim that while Aristotle establishes ontology of metaphysics, his thought exceeds the tradition that he founds, is to show that 'destruction' is not only a negation of the part but an attempt at unearthing original experiences out of which Greek ontological and philosophical conceptuality emerged. With his phenomenological interpretation of Greek thinking, with reduction, construction, along with destruction of the metaphysical tradition, these three as different but interrelated moments of the 'method and idea of phenomenology, Heidegger seeks to restructure and to restore it into "Fundamental Ontology." For Heidegger: "...construction in philosophy is necessarily destruction, that is to say, a deconstruction of the traditional carried out in a historical recursion to the tradition" (Sinclair, 2007, pp. 7-8). With this in mind, he now sets to destruction of metaphysics, a process which ended with Nietzsche's reversal of Platonic theory of Form into a metaphysical will to power.

The end of philosophy is thus a completion of metaphysics that with Nietzsche's reversal of Platonism, all the essential possibilities of metaphysics have been exhausted. According to Heidegger, metaphysics gradually dissolves into the empirical and technological sciences in a scientific study of human and it thus carries forward the task of global determination. "The end of philosophy is the triumph of a manipulable arrangement of science – technology and social order" (Swazo, 2002, p. 35). For Heidegger too, "metaphysics overcome does not disappear." But this task of violent interpretation of the texts and of destruction showed the strength of Heidegger's destructive phase of metaphysics as follows.

## **2.8. The Tradition Continues**

Heidegger's Fundamental Ontology seeks to restore Greek ontology more originally than the Greeks. This leads to a hermeneutical –historical interpretation of Aristotle despite the fact that others, Descartes, Kant, Hegel, all claimed to make advances in philosophy even their attempts were to be interpreted metaphysically. In order to restore Fundamental Ontology, the lived dimension of faith, experience, and life, he needs to destruct the metaphysical paradigm that continued its legacy.

The second part of the *Being and Time* proposed to carry out the task of destroying the history of Ontology that remained unpublished. The way, Rene Descartes proposed to demolish everything completely and start again from the foundation, although it ended in the edifice constructed at the site of its demolition. Could Heidegger renew the fresh question of Being by completely destroying the official ontology to be replaced by the roots of a more ancient and fundamental ontology and thereby demolishing the metaphysical trend? For Heidegger, overcoming is not as act of discarding, as it is still an attempt at criticizing substance metaphysics as evident in the philosophy of Rene Descartes that took recourse to a type of substantive soul. Kant posited a necessary unity of apperception, and an “I think” that must accompany all experiences. Even in his mentor, Edmund Husserl, it retained the centrality of the “ego pole.” From all these Heidegger now departs since these are nourished by a Categorical understanding of Being as presence at hand, a non-fundamental ontology of its kind.

### **2.8.1. Rene Descartes (1596 – 1650)**

Rene Descartes, a French philosopher, who was later known as the father of modern western philosophy endeavored himself in the search for metaphysical reality. Like his predecessors, he too acknowledges the ultimate reality, i.e. substance. However, to make his metaphysics more controversial and for which Spinoza particularly criticized it, he advocated two separate substances of body and mind and thus became a Cartesian dualist. He defines substance, “that which is in itself and is conceived through itself, i.e. the conception of which does not need the conception of another thing in order to its formation or existence” (Masih, 1994, p. 225). By substance he understands that which so exists that it needs no other things in order to exist. Strikingly speaking then, there is only one substance namely God, for He alone exists in Himself and through Himself and does not involve the existence of anything else. His divinity is inherited by each individual human being to be their subtle essences or real identities, which are the determining factors of the reasoning faculty of each individual. Therefore, after employing his methodic doubt or universal doubt, he went on proving the undeniable fact of his identity as essentially a thinking being. He therefore, comes out with a famous maxim: “I think therefore I exist,” or “*Cogito ergo sum,*” which

indicates that my consciousness is the means of revealing myself as something existing (Masih, 1994, p. 202). By existing here means to be in the likeness of God.

Following this, what Descartes tried to show is that besides God, there are two relative substances, namely mind and body. Each exists without the support of the other, but interacts with each other. They are the two independent realities; and the two deserve to be called as substance. So long as the phenomenal world exists or the whole humanity itself is concerned, the two realities cannot be denied to be part and parcel of it. The essence of mind is thinking and the essence of body is extension. In his metaphysical abstraction, Descartes one by one takes away all that is not essential in thinking and discards them till he comes to consciousness. Similarly, in knowing extension one need not refer to consciousness. Consciousness and extension, mind and body, are independent of one another and do not involve each other's existence. As such there are two independent substances – mind and body.

However, mind and body are called the two relative substances, yet they depended on God for their existences. But the possible question is how the two contrasted notions, together can form the harmonious world or human being? Descartes' answer to this is that both of them interact with one another in the pineal gland – the finest chamber of the brain, where all animal spirits are eliminated there.

Not only that Heidegger identified Cartesian position as metaphysical he also remained a critic of it throughout. Heidegger's *The Age of the World picture* leads him to define technology in terms of "*Ge-stell*," that being obtains its meaning as an object before a knowing subject. The root cause of the substance-subject centric metaphysical tradition of philosophy is also traced back to the Cartesian conception of certainty of the '*cogito*' in which a human being emerges as a subject that project the world before as an object. The Aristotelian '*ousia*,' substance, a substance that produces, gets culmination in Descartes' contemplator and a disembodied thinker subject that calculates nature simply as a material extension, as shown in the famous example of Descartes' in a piece of wax removed from its use.

### 2.8.2. Benedict De Spinoza (1632 – 1677)

Spinoza, a rationalist philosopher, following Descartes had advocated a monistic philosophy. He begins with the unity of all that exists. As such he starts with something from which everything can be shown to follow necessarily. This something he calls substance, which following Descartes he defines, “that which is in itself and is conceived through itself, i.e. the conception of which does not need the conception of another thing in order to its formation” (Masih, 1994, p. 225). However, the difference is that Descartes’ description of mind and body as two relative substances is bitterly criticized by him. To him, the phrase “dependent substances,” is contradiction in terms. A substance he says cannot and should not depend on anything else, as is clear from the definition itself. There should be only one substance. He goes on saying that if there were more than one substance, there is a tendency that they would limit each other, and thus would take away their self-sufficiencies. This one substance, he calls God whom he defines as a “Being absolutely infinite” (Masih, 1994, p. 225), that is substance consisting in infinite attributes each of which express eternal and infinite essences.

However, by infinite he understands that which is uniquely individual, for substance can be conceived only by referring itself. In a normal pattern, knowing a thing or understanding is possible only through comparison or qualifications. Unless it is being qualified by something or qualities, no knowledge of it is attained, for there is nothing to be compared of which knowledge is bound to be possessed. A teacher for an instance, is known through his capabilities, quality of teaching, punctuality, sincerity, etc, a yellow rose may be described by its color – yellow, which again is applicable to all yellow roses and so on. But in the case of the Absolute or Infinite, which Spinoza is concerned with, all the qualifications, are limiting its consistency. We cannot say that the substance is moral or intellectual, for these terms limit Him. If God is moral, then He cannot be immoral. Thus, Spinoza points out that “*every determination is negation*” (Masih, 1994, p. 225). For as soon as we determine or qualify substance by describing it we limit it. Similarly, any description of what substance is, indirectly tells us what it is not.

Spinoza had logically defined substance that it cannot but be Infinite, since if it were finite it would bound to be limited by something else. Substance must be self-determined, self-contained, eternal or non-eternal, which nothing can affect or modify it. He calls it '*causa sui*,' for everything follows from substance in the same way in which all the angles of a triangle are together equal to two right angles follows from the definition of a triangle. Hence, by calling it *causa sui*, Spinoza means that the reality is a self-explanatory, all-inclusive, inter-related whole.

Finally, the issue relating to the substance – God, being the cause of manifold appearances of the world, is needed to be speculated. Here, Spinoza consistently advocates maintaining monism, but denied the concept of a creator God. He further asserts that the term 'creation' pre-supposes that there was a time when there was no world and there would be a time when there would be no world, despite the facts that substance is eternal or non-temporal. As the substance is self-contained and is infinite, so it has an infinite number of attributes. His famous way is to call this *Natura-Naturata*, i.e. *sum-total of all that exists* (Masih, 1994, p. 228). By attribute it means which intellect perceives as constituting the essence of substance. The so-called relative substances – mind and body of Descartes is rather among the infinite attributes of God.

### **2.8.3. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibnitz (1646 – 1716)**

Besides Aristotle, there could be none who could be called as an encyclopedic genius except Leibnitz. Following the two rationalist philosophers – Descartes and Spinoza, he took the challenge of describing or conceiving Reality, but in the form of spiritual pluralism. Initially he had been impressed by the unity of which Spinoza emphasized it earlier. However, to his contrary he did so at the cost of variety and the individuality of things (*Pantheism*). He therefore, began with the opposite notion of pluralism by raising the question of 'what must be the nature of parts which can in some way contain or express the whole within itself?' he defined reality in the form of substance to show that each part of a thing is deserved or consistent to call real.

He writes as –

*“Reality cannot be found except in one single source, because of the interconnection of all things with one another... I maintain also that substances, whether material or immaterial, cannot be conceived in their bare essence without any activity, activity being of the essence of substance in general”* (Leibnitz, 1670).

Resembling Spinoza, he too re-iterated Descartes’ definition of substance, which is in itself and conceived through itself, i.e. the existence of anything else. He further states that this type of definition would have a logical consequence of leading to the dangerous pantheism of Spinoza. However, reality should be a combination of tremendous immaterial substances. He says that Descartes was right in acknowledging the role of the self and in fact should have established a reality on the pattern of the self. He therefore, retains the mind of Descartes but discarded his notion of matter, saying that it is always divisible and cannot lead to something which is simple, basic elementary and indivisible reality. But the Descartes’ mind, he says, has a fallacy and further needed to have a modification in order that it may serve to explain the variety of experience. For there are cases where mind itself become so vague, indistinct at a subconscious mental processes, which a description of Descartes philosophy cannot accommodate. Hence, Leibnitz widened the scope of mind, still clinging to it, to show that the ultimate substance should be explained in terms of mind which includes the unconscious states as well.

The next issue which bothers Leibnitz is that, since, the notion of mind sounds very monotonous for which instead he already advocated pluralism to be more particular about what really the mind is made of. To do so, he initially was drawn towards Democritus – an early Greek philosopher who advocated that material atoms which formed a constituent body of things are real. But he soon realized that atoms cannot be real on the ground that it, being extended can never be theoretically indivisible. However, small they may be but still they can be divisible and may be split up with powerful, minute and delicate instruments assistance. And all the qualities in it – hardness, similarity, etc, cannot be authenticated for the substance to have appeared as different level of existences.

Thus, Leibniz finally submits that the real elements must be spiritual units called monads. There are infinite monads but each of them is as real as the single substance of Spinoza. Being a real unit, each monad contains the whole infinity of existence. It is the whole universe itself potentially. Each monad is a world in miniature, a macrocosm in microcosm. Whatever possibility is embedded in it, which means it is the ground of every potentiality. The infinite number of monads is qualitatively unlike; therefore, no two monads are alike. They are found to have a hierarchical order of existence, so as to form of multiplicity of existence. But the question is how the infinite number of unlike monads come together to be the subtle essence of existence? His answer is that the harmony among the monads is pre-established by God. He has so arranged the series of monads in their hierarchical order that the change in one is preceded and followed in other monads harmoniously.

#### **2.8.4. A Critique of Kant's Transcendental Deduction**

As the philosophical thought of Immanuel Kant marks the division between the two main periods in the history of modern philosophy, it holds an important position in reconciling the two as well as paving the way for a new system of thought apart from the traditional conception of Metaphysics. No doubt it may retrospectively thought to be of the major or last great attempt to solve the metaphysical problems which overwhelmed or occupied philosophers till the 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> century. In fact, movements as diverse as Speculative Idealism, Logical Positivism, Phenomenology, and Pragmatism all have their foundational roots for their system buildings in the so-called 'Copernican Revolution' of Kant's critical philosophy. He changed the very meaning of "Metaphysics" or "First Philosophy" from the first-order study of the way human inquiry itself makes possible its access to whatever subject matter it studies. As such, having focused more on Heidegger's Dasein and his new approach of ontologizing metaphysics, Heidegger seriously felt the need of identifying his metaphysical stance where he could distance himself from the so-called critical philosophy of Immanuel Kant.

An attempt here is particularly made to show that Kant's Metaphysics which is of unique in nature as compared to the earlier ones, which contemplated metaphysics other than substance-ontology (*Ousiological* reduction since Aristotle), is however, insufficient or rather committed a fallacy (most probably by being a subject-centric in nature) in the spectacle of Martin Heidegger. Therefore the analysis of the two theories, which shows their own metaphysical stances, no matter how diverse or contrasted it may be, is our concern here. Kant defines his mature work as critical philosophy, meaning that he offers critical analyses of the capacities and limitations of human mental powers or faculties. His method in *critique* is transcendental, meaning that he both deduces and analyses what must be the case if humans have the knowledge, morality or aesthetic judgment that they do. He asks which sort of faculties humans must have as conditions of possibility for such understanding and judgment. Freedom of relation between human mental faculties and freedom for individuals to legislate for themselves are the underlying conditions of possibility of knowledge and morality, so that legitimating of human freedom is a central aim of his philosophical critique.

Despite his new approach to philosophy for which he dubbed the word "transcendental," Kant conceived the foundation of natural sciences, as well as the rational attempt to address the most universal concerns of humanity, as the province of a special and fundamental science – the science of metaphysics. However, its novelty is that he understood Metaphysics in epistemological terms. For he understands that nature is what is known through experience, and metaphysics as a science he adds, is not supposed to be determined by a set of objects with which it deals but by the a priori epistemic status of its principles. And he thus intends to establish metaphysics on a basis that might ensure its legitimacy. The aim of his *critique* is to transform metaphysics from a "random groping" into a genuine science, by limiting to its proper sphere and grounding it on a rationally well-conceived method. By being letting grounding on a natural science, he is aware that empirical sciences themselves require metaphysical grounding because they must employ certain concepts and principles that cannot be of empirical origin and cannot be justified by appeal to any experience. For instance, mathematical concepts are independent of experience yet their application to the natural world is essential to certain disciplines like physics. But truly

mathematical proposition are a priori, not based on experience, while modern science is apparently depended on it.

Nevertheless, for Kant, metaphysics is the science of synthetic a priori cognitions through concepts. For all the so-called traditional metaphysical problems, such as foundation of science and those that concern the supernatural questions of whether “God exist?” “The soul is immortal,” “substance stands firm despite all changes in quantity,” etc, are grounded in the claims of synthetic a priori knowledge. They are of metaphysical propositions because of the cognition of them, hence, for Kant, one must aspire to synthetic a priori knowledge of them. While tackling the two extreme opposite theories of empiricism and rationalism, Kant’s central metaphysical question is being reduced down to the possibility of synthetic a priori judgment. Although, his answer to the question is complicated, but it clearly figures out the possibility of synthetic a priori claims, like those from geometry and the natural sciences because of the structure of the mind that knows them. Kant’s crucial insight here is that an experience through the sensation is only possible if alone the mind provides a systematic structuring of its representations. This (estimated) structuring is below the level of, or logically prior to, the mental representations which the earlier theories instigated. What may be noted the methodological innovation of Kant was to employ a transcendental argument to prove synthetic a priori claims, which includes the necessary structure of knowledge on the basis of an incontrovertible mental act? He argues that the mind provides a formal structuring that allows for the conjoining of concepts into judgment, but structuring itself, he says, has no content. The mind only possesses “a priori templates” for judgment, not a priori judgment as Descartes reckoned. It is devoid of content until interactions with the world actuate these formal constraints. For he understands that there are objects that exist in space and time outside the mind, which is neither provable by a priori or a posteriori methods, is also a necessary condition of the possibility of being aware of one’s own existence. Without the presupposition of the matter permanently occupying space and time, there cannot be an awareness of existence. In that sense, the very existence (of us) that we all aware, is determined by something permanent outside of us to distinguish ourselves from. We are aware of ourselves as existing; therefore, there is something permanent outside of us. The idea behind this is that the mind plays an active role in structuring reality, but to some extent only. He thus assumed that all of our cognition must conform to objects. Unlike

Locke, who views that mental content is given to the mind by the objects in the world. Their properties migrate into the mind, revealing the true picture of objects; he affirms the mind's function in determining the objects. Hence, Kant left a famous quote on this regards –

“Thoughts without content (are) empty, and intuitions without concepts (are) blind.”  
(Kant I. , 2005, p. 31)

What is an issue or intentions behind the reflection was showing how the synthetic a priori knowledge leads to a more systematized way of studying metaphysics. In fact, this is the point which entitled Kant's theory as 'Copernican revolution' and the most influential contribution to metaphysics. It is apparently of the abandonment of the quest to try to know the worlds in itself (as earlier metaphysics did), rather acknowledging the subtle nature of things, which apart from our understanding (of it) still retain the way it is. It also indicated that our faculties with which to perceive and experience are constructed such that we experienced it only in a given way not beyond that. There is something left behind besides our understanding of matter. He demonstrated this with a thought experiment showing that we cannot meaningfully conceive of an object that exists outside of time and has no spatial components. Therefore, Kant says, metaphysics must not try to talk about what exists, but instead about what is perceived, and how it is perceived (through the mind - the knower).

This way of speculation or insight compel Kant to have a distinction between phenomena and *noumena* – *phenomena* being that which can be experienced, and *noumena* being things that are beyond the possibility of experience or things in themselves. Kant go on to add that nothing can be truly experienced or else we would experience the *noumena* itself. The *phenomena* are only the representation of the object, but not the object itself, nothing more.

*“The things we intuit are not in themselves what we intuit them as being...as appearances; they cannot exist in themselves, but only in us.”* (Kant, 2003, p. A 42)

Kant termed his critical philosophy 'Transcendental Idealism,' which claimed that phenomena depend upon the cognitions of sensibility, space and time, which again is not equivalent to mind-dependence like the case of Berkeley's Idealism. Kant's epistemic

strategy was to distinguish the realm of experience from that which transcended experience, what was usually called “metaphysics.”

### **2.8.5. Heidegger and Kant on Overcoming Metaphysics**

Heidegger brackets the assumption that there is such a thing known as a mind or consciousness, something immediately presented to itself in the process of knowing, which must definitely be taken into account of reality. Heidegger formulates Being as the horizon of the disclosure of the reality, in which there is an inter-play of different disclosing agencies. Our inquiry, Heidegger says, must begin from the “Existentiell” (concrete, specific, local) sense we have of ourselves as caught up in the midst of a practical life-world. Thus in his own distinctive way of interpreting Kant, Heidegger differed from another Kantian scholar, Ernst Cassirer.

Ernst Cassirer’s attempt at remaining faithful to the texts of Immanuel Kant, as is evident in the now famous 1929 Davos (Switzerland) debate with Martin Heidegger, showing where the irreconcilable stands between these two interpretations of Kant lies, it appears that Heidegger’s reading of Kant focuses primarily on the notion of imagination. He states that the central part of Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason* is occupied by the role of imagination which serves as the bridge between sensible existence, on the one side, and the syntheses of understanding and unifying Idealism of reason on the other. This may simply be cited as a dialogue between the knower and the known. Heidegger challenged Kant’s commitment to the enlightenment ideal of the centrality of regulating power of reason. As his way of reading Kant is from the bottom up, where understanding of finite sensibility is *terminus a quo* and *terminus ad quem*, Heidegger argues that Kant’s *critique* is an ontology rooted in the finitude of Dasein as the historical Being. In fact, for Heidegger, reason is a derivative construct whose original sense must be discovered in the existential structures of Dasein.

Aiming at destruction of metaphysical thinking, Heidegger’s Kantian interpretation, also his early interpretation of Aristotle was motivated by the urge to do violence to the text to set free its deeper philosophical core. This thus leads to two different readings of Kant, one

coming from Martin Heidegger from his critical position on metaphysical tradition of philosophy, and the other, that of Cassirer, a Kantian scholar great repute. Heidegger reads Kant from the perspective of phenomenal restoration of Being.

Cassirer on the other hand reads Kant's *Critique* from the top down, from its *terminus ad quem* in reason's ideal of unity for understanding and the means to open up the dialectical distinction between the appearances and the things-in-themselves as exactly as Kant himself had interpreted in his *Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics*. What defines Kant's project in the *Critique* is not Ontology but Epistemology, the theory of knowledge. For Cassirer, reason is the '*raison d'être*' of humanity as a rational animal, the guiding and unifying consciousness presiding over all meaning formations. These differences in reading of Kant apparently will have consequences for the conception of humanism and metaphysics in the later development.

While Kant conceived human being to be constituted by the pure form of rationality, Heidegger's Dasein has no such pre-given-inherent-rational structure. Dasein's essence is *Existenz*, which is an issue for it. Heidegger's critique of onto-theology distances him from any kind of reconciliation of faith or reason; in Kant and also in Hegel. Despite these differences Heidegger is indebted to his interpretation of Kant as *Being and Time* stands in the transcendental tradition inaugurated by Kant with the difference that Kant enquires into the structures of subjectivity, which Heidegger enquires into the temporality of Dasein as the condition for the possibility of understanding.

It would not be of much repetition to state that Heidegger always thought his metaphysics of Dasein as the retrieval (*Wiederholung*) of an unsolved problem in Aristotle, i.e. the new speculation in which, Heidegger found the unity of the ontological and theological questions. However, it was not his task to solve first philosophy's "remarkable doubling" or even to reconcile it into a unity. Heidegger's task was rather to 'illuminate the grounds for the apparent disunity and the manner in which both determinations belong together as the leading problem of First Philosophy of Being (Jaran, Heidegger's Project of a Metaphysics of Dasein, 2010, p. 212). Through his metaphysics of Dasein, Heidegger tried to investigate more radically the traditional metaphysical problems. And in such a process of investigation,

besides the same old ontological problems, he opened a realm of questioning of beingness of beings. By opening up of a new realm of questioning of Being indicates setting of the ground or horizons where Being germinated or can be attributed, in order to understand its wholeness. For an instance, his initial plan of the systematic part of *Sein Und Zeit's* Fundamental Ontology consisted of two essential sections: an interpretation of Dasein in terms of temporality and an explication of time as the transcendental horizon of the question of Being. This is to show that Heidegger interpreted Being in terms of setting of grounds like temporality, transcendental horizons – through which Being can be accessed. It is directly felt the need to approaching Being via Being not the other way round. Heidegger thus characterized his modified version of Fundamental Ontology as a new answer to the basic problem of philosophy that re-analyzed and re-appeared the avid metaphysical research of Aristotle.

So Heidegger's task in *Being and Time* was to lead us back to the very basic presupposition of this metaphysical tradition and to think more originally than making effort at understanding philosophy, metaphysically and conceptually. So, to look back beyond the tradition is to overcome the metaphysical tradition itself.

Thus overcoming is not an act of discarding it. Heidegger writes in his 1964 essay, *The end of Philosophy and the task of Thinking*: “what is meant by the talk about the end of philosophy (*erde der philosophie*)? We understand the end of something all too easily in the negative sense as a mere stopping, as the lack of continuation, perhaps even as decline and impotence. In contrast, what we say about the end of philosophy means the completion of metaphysics (*die Vollendung der metaphysic*)” (Krell & Paul, 1978, p. 374).

#### **2.8.6. Hegel (1770 – 1831)**

The greatest of all amongst the German Idealists was Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, who methodologically constructed synoptic and comprehensive views of thought about the world. Like Immanuel Kant, who emphasized on showing how some fundamental unity underlies the confusing multiplicity of experimental contents, Hegel took a deeper probing

of making Absolute consciousness, the key source of ultimate connections among all other things. Above all these, Hegel held that reality must be rational, so that its ultimate structure is revealed in the structure of our thought. For he understands that everything that is thinkable especially apparent contradictions must be resolvable under the common concept of reason. He thus advocates the Absolute Idealism as his notion of reality (Edwards P. , 1967, pp. 435-436).

Resembling or even more than Aristotle and the Stoic philosophy, Hegel contented that the study of logic after all is or should be an investigation into the fundamental structure of reality itself, which is always negotiable via a dialectical method. Kant in his earlier argument has stated that speculating about one general description of the world automatically leads to the contemplation of the opposite. But Hegel did not suppose this and made a further supposition that the two concepts so held in opposition can always be united by a shift to some higher level of thought. He therefore goes on saying that the human mind inevitably moves from thesis to antithesis and the thesis again for a new opposition to be transcended by yet a higher level, continuing in a series of intellectual achievements.

Being for an instance is a basic concept where his dialectics may be applicable. The moment we thought of it or come to picture, the mind is naturally led to the thought of 'nothing' as its opposite; but these two notions are not really contradictory, since both may be unified under the more sophisticated and comprehensive notion of becoming. The thesis may be of a reverse way, having been automatically followed antithesis so as to possess synthesis after all. In this way certain series of thesis, antithesis and synthesis keeps on moving until it reaches a state of perfection or Absolute spirit, where there is no further evolvment (Friedrich, 2005).

On the grandest scale of conceivability, all of thought is comprised by the thesis, idea, whose natural antithesis is nature, the otherness of the known considered independently of its relation to the knower; and the grand synthesis of the two is Spirit, the self-knowing, self-actualizing totality of all that is namely, the Absolute itself. This embodies Hegel's fundamental convictions that reality is wholly rational and that whatever is rational must be real. Human thought is merely one portion of the becoming of Absolute spirit, which is

(through us) thinking and creating itself as it goes. Even this development, as Hegel described it in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, is best understood as the triadic transition from subjective to objective and finally to Absolute spirit.

As we can see, we have surveyed so far a long list of philosophers, who showed interest insolving the issue of reality since the time of early Greek thinkers. Nevertheless, those philosophical endeavors may all be put under the so-called traditional metaphysics. Till the time of Hegel, reality is reckoned to exist outside of the third dimensional space-time continuum. However, with the arrival of Martin Heidegger and with his diagnosis of Ontologico-metaphysical trend, the contemplation on the same issue has shown a new face where there is a merge of the object-subject centric philosophical trends. Heidegger identified similar metaphysical trend in the philosophy of Hegel.


Ben Vedder makes interesting observations about Heidegger's reading of western philosophy as metaphysical and onto-theological also in Hegel and German idealism. According to him the connection between ontology and theology, which determines philosophy as ontotheology, becomes explicit again in German idealism. Heidegger finds a clear expression of this in Hegel. To quote Vedder: "For philosophy, too, has no other object than God – and thus is essentially rational theology – and service to God in its continual service to truth" (Vedder, 2010, p. 224). In Hegel according to Heidegger, ontology becomes the subjectively grounded interpretation of Being, in such a way that the actual entity (sciendes) is the absolute '*theos*'. It is the Being (*sein*) of the absolute that all entities are determined.

### **2.8.7. Nietzsche (1884 – 1900)**

Heidegger refers to the entire history of Western thinking as metaphysical centering on substance and its metaphysical determinations that has prevailed in the Greek *hen* of Parmenides, the Platonic / Aristotelian *logos*. Aristotle's *energia* and *actualitas*, the *monad* of Leibnitz, Kant's transcendental made possible of objectivity, Hegel's dialectically mediated of Absolute Spirit, Marx's historical process of production and Nietzsche's will to

power (Warnek, 2010, pp. 163-164). Heidegger's later philosophy turns away from Nietzsche's will to power that made him critical of it especially in his post-war period. He writes: "For Nietzsche, will to power is the ultimate '*factum*' to which we come. What seems certain to Nietzsche, is questionable to us" (Davis, 2010, p. 170).

While according to Nietzsche, will to power is the all and be all, for Heidegger, it is a fall from authenticity from other possible modes of Being. At the death of God, at Being's self-concealment, it is nihilism that pervades us, and according to Heidegger, in Nietzsche, the modern Metaphysics and its will to power is completed. It is technologisation and it is the completion of Metaphysics. Heidegger thus completes his destruction of metaphysics. After destruction he looks for reconstruction. It is technologization of metaphysics. Heidegger continues his critique of metaphysical tradition of philosophy in the philosophy of technology and of Nietzsche. The next chapter is an explanation of this in details.



**CULMINATION OF METAPHYSICAL TRADITION OF PHILOSOPHY  
IN THE AGE OF TECHNOLOGICAL NIHILISM: NIETZSCHE,  
“WILL TO POWER” AND A HEIDEGGERIAN CRITIQUE**

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**3.0. Continuation and Culmination of the Metaphysical Tradition in the  
Age of Technology: Nietzsche and the “Will to Power”**

Timothy Clark observes, Heidegger traces in course of philosophy and European civilization’s basic sense of things since Greece is an intensification and hardening of “theoreticism,” the drive towards technical and objectifying modes of knowledge and, with it, the oblivion of any more primordial or more reverential kind of existence: “the familiar and well-known has become boundless, and nothing is any longer able to withstand the business of knowing, since technical mastery over things bears itself without limit” (Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 2008, p. 147). This culminates in the globalized, technological civilization that Heidegger saw as a threat to the very essence of humanity. “The limitless domination of modern technology in every corner of this planet is only the late consequence of a very old technical interpretation of the world, the interpretation that is usually called metaphysics” (Clark, 2002, p. 30). Michael Zimmerman coins this phrase as of “productionist metaphysics,” the “hidden anthropocentrism of Western thought,” because of its acknowledged projection of instrumentalist or technological modes of thinking upon the cosmos as a whole.

**3.1. The technological disclosure of Being and the question concerning the  
essence of Technology: A Heideggerian probe**

In the ordinary sense of essence it is clear that technology is a human activity and a means to an end. Now one can say of this activity and its products that they profoundly influence every area of human life so that it is not surprising that people call this age the age of

technology. One may think that technology is entirely beneficial to mankind or, more sensibly, that it brings both benefits and harms. One may reflect that although it is a human activity it is one which is beyond the control of individuals, perhaps even of the human race. And this may lead one even to demonize technology. But this is not what interests Heidegger. There is a sense in which, for Heidegger, technology is the supreme danger to man. The *essence* of technology, in the Heideggerian sense, is the supreme danger because it prevents us from having a proper understanding of our own being. The essence of technology, in the sense of the understanding of Being which makes it possible, is such as to exclude other ways of understanding Being, for instance, those involved in creating and engaging with works of art.

This way of understanding Being of beings robs the manifoldness of Being. It is not just understanding Being, but understanding Being *in manifold ways* which makes us human. Here Heidegger would see the danger that happens to the Being of Dasein. Dasein being disclosed as technical where only the technological disclosure of Dasein at the risk of ignoring or rather allowing no scope for developing or “letting it be revealed” as a distinct phenomena. Dasein also as a “poet” for an example. All these variations, even contradictions are needed. A machine is limited that it cannot change its essence. If it is steel or metallic we can give it another form, but the extent to which steel can be transformed into how many other forms. Not beyond that. Water is transformed into steam, and into ice but not into a wood piece, for example. So machine will have its formulae, its mannerisms and that is the way it is expected to change and act. But Dasein understands its limitations which is lacking in machine. Dasein incorporates its possibilities what it can be at all, also its limitations of what it cannot be.

To question the essence of technology is to question how technology as a phenomenon is enduring and present. The inauthentic mode of technological revelation as enframing is to see that, “the revealing that rules in modern technology is a challenging (*Herausfordern*)” (Heidegger, *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays*, 1977, p. 14). We challenge nature’s boundary ... we challenge nature (instead of enhance) in the name of technology. *Herausfordern* is formed by a verb root *fordern* (which means to summon, to

demand, to challenge) and two adverbial prefixes: *her-*(hither) and *aus-*(out). No single element can be omitted if we are to grasp the full meaning. Thus, according to Heidegger, as a mode of revealing, challenging means 'to come forth by challenge or demand'; this is a matter of putting to nature the unreasonable demand that it supply energy that can be extracted and stored. This contrasts sharply with that of nature whose revealing is *physis*. "*Physis* is also the arising of something from itself, a bringing-forth or *poiesis*" (Heidegger, *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays*, 1977, p. 10), as with the blossoming or fading of a flower according to the season. But in contrast, if a flower is cultivated and preserved in a greenhouse artificially, this is an excessive demand upon nature, hence, is revealing by challenge. The revealing of the ancient technology is basically within the realm of natural presenting, as for instance, the energy of the wind is revealed by an old windmill which is left entirely to the wind and does not unlock energy from the wind in order to store it. In modern technology, however, a tract of land is challenged to bring forth coal and ore, which in turn is to yield energy. Even agriculture today is a mechanized food industry; the field has come under another kind of ordering.

Second, Heidegger points out, this challenging that brings forth the energy of nature is an expediting. That is, what is revealed is directed towards something else, i.e., toward the maximum yield at the minimum expense. For instance, digging coal is not only for uncovering it but for using the energy, which is challenged to turn the wheels that keep a factory running. This determines the basic characteristic of the things revealed in modern technology: "Everywhere everything is ordered to stand by, to be immediately at hand, indeed to stand there just so that it may be on call for a further ordering. Whatever is ordered about in this way has its own standing, namely standing in reserve (*Bestand*)" (Heidegger, *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays*, 1977, p. 17). Standing in reserve is a different kind of being from that of object. Where an object is revealed mainly in human knowing what is standing in reserve is called to come forth in challenging and expediting. Its determination is according to its being a key link in the interlocking beings revealed in modern technology. In the age of modern technology, almost everything is standing in reserve which is a more essential determination than that of object. An airliner standing on the runway when seen as a sheer object conceals what and how it is; only when it is put into

the air is it revealed as an airliner. On the runway every one of its constituent parts is standing-reserve; they are on call and ready to take off. Heidegger maintains further that in the age of modern technology not only artificial products stand in reserve, but even nature changes and is no longer an object as previously.

For example, to build a hydropower station on the Rhine River is much different than building a wooden bridge there. In the former case, the Rhine River is put into the interlocking process of modern technology as a waterpower resource. The difference is obvious if compared with the poem of Hölderlin entitled *The Rhine River*. The Rhine River as natural landscape may be unchangeable, but in what sense is it now a landscape when it is on call for inspection by a tour group sent there by the vacation industry? Heidegger concludes: Whatever stands by in the sense of standing in reserve no longer stands over against us as object; the object disappears into the objectlessness of standing in reserve. Modern technology is a process in which everything is ordered, set into the interlocking context as a key link. Just as from the unfolding of the mountains we can see a mountain range or chain (*gebirg*) and from a person's feeling, style etc., his disposition (*gemut*), so from the context of interlocking shown by standing-reserve we can see its direction or trend, called by Heidegger "enframing" (*ge-stell*). Enframing describes the mode of revealing which challenges, orders and determines the standing in reserve: "The essence of modern technology lies in enframing" (Heidegger, *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays*, 1977, pp. 16-25).

### **3.2. The Human Situation: Standing in Reserve as Alienation**

What is the situation of man in the age of modern technology? Generally speaking, the theory of alienation discloses a situation in which man betrays his own essence. Hegel takes man as a link in the absolute spirit so that the alienation of the man is the alienation of self consciousness. As Marxism grasps the essence of human being in the light of its social relationship, the alienation of man lies in productive activity giving birth to the theory of alienated labor. Later when he philosophizes on the problem of technology, he maintains that man's standing in reserve is the essence of modern technology. This theory of alienation

might be called alienated technology, though he never mentions the word alienation here (Xuanmeng, 1998)

Heidegger sees man as being for the most part in his inauthenticity, not only because he already is his facticity in the world, but also because for the most part he would choose his way "to be" not according to his own possibilities, but as merely "to be," following others. As each one lives in the world together with the others, in choosing one's way one cannot but care about others or the mode of Being-with. Fearing being isolated, one chooses a way of existence like that of the others; the popular way of existence is a strong temptation in which each one would tranquilize himself. In this way the human becomes "they," but in so acting loses his or her own possibility to be. This is a universal phenomenon in daily life and one can hardly transcend this existentiality even when one thinks one is pursuing a character or personality of one's own. Such inauthentic existentiality conceals *Dasein's* possibility or essence. When *Dasein* is tranquilized and 'understands' everything, it compares itself with everything, and drifts towards alienation (*Entfremdung*) in which its own most proper potentiality-for-Being is hidden. Falling into being-in-the-world is not only tempting and tranquilizing, but at the same time alienating. In these terms in the age of modern technology man obviously is in the situation of alienation for he does not decide the goal of modern technology. Superficially, man conceives, designs, and expedites the development of modern technology, but more basically the essence of modern technology lies in a mode of revealing as 'Enframing'; modern technology develops according to its own ordering or challenging. As Heidegger writes, "Man can indeed conceive, fashion, and carry through this or that in one way or another. But man does not control the unconcealment itself in which at any given time the real shows itself or withdraws. One not only can one not control the way of revealing, but is oneself the standing in reserve in the context of interlocking modern technology. It seems that the human begins the process of technology, but actually he is challenged or ordered to exploit the energies of nature from the very beginning. "If man is challenged, ordered, to do this, then does not man himself belong even more originally than nature within the standing in reserve?" (Heidegger, 1977, p. 18).

Heidegger points out that the current talk about human resources or the supply of patients for a clinic is evidence of this. Another example is that while the forester who measures a field of timber to all appearances walks the same forest path in the same way as did his grandfather; today he is driven by the profit-making of the lumber industry. He is subordinated to the necessity for cellulose, which in turn is challenged by the need for paper to be delivered to newspapers and magazines. The latter set public opinion, so that a set configuration of opinion becomes available on demand. This case shows how today even people in a traditional way of life are put into the context of modern technology, not to mention people now entering new professions of modern technology. Of course, there is some difference between man and other entities in this interlocking context. Man is standing in reserve, but not sheerly so, for man is the first to be challenged in the ordering of technology and indeed is also “a way of revealing.” But again, “the unconcealment itself within which the order unfolds is never a human handwork” (Heidegger, *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays*, 1977, p. 19). According to Heidegger’s *Being and Time* alienation is a situation in which man forgets his own possibility to be, but tarries and dwells in his inauthenticity. And, since in modern technology man is standing in reserve he must be in a situation of alienation. It is no exaggeration to say that in modern technology man is in a situation of alienation. In modern technology, man does find many advantages. It is a means to improve the living standard; it strengthens the power to control nature; and it is taken even as a way to freedom. But as Heidegger indicates, as man behaves according to the way which modern technology reveals, he blocks other possible ways of existence. Before man grasps technology, he already has been grasped by it.

Can man be said to be fully free when he enters the essence of modern technology? Heidegger wonders. Indeed the more modern technology develops, the more difficult it becomes for individuals to live an average life without technological means for lack of the necessary training. Is not then the individual’s existence threatened in an age when modern technology holds sway? The average age when individuals begin their technological training is moved ever earlier, due to the ever more complex context of technology. Even the creating of fine arts could be substituted by the technological practice. Since technology has a relation with destiny, we must consider the situation of man in the age of technology. First

of all, regarding the relationship between man and destiny Heidegger says that Man is rather “thrown” from Being itself into the truth of Being, so that existing in this fashion he might guard the truth of Being, in order that beings might appear in the light of Being as the beings they are. Man is the shepherd of Being. Because enframing, which is the essence of modern technology, lies in destiny, everything seems to be all right for man in the age of modern technology, for that is the technological destiny of man. However, as challenging and ordering, enframing blocks the other possible ways of revealing, especially when it holds sway; otherwise, as the guard of destiny, “man might be admitted more, sooner and ever more primally to the essence of that which is unconcealed and to its unconcealment, in order to experience as his essence his need of belonging to revealing” (Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 2008).

Heidegger points out another phenomenon which is also a danger to man, namely, that it is of the essence of modern technology that man seems to become the lord of the earth because here the revealing as such is blocked, the impression prevails that everything man encounters exists only as his own construct. This leads to a final delusion: It seems as though man everywhere and always encounters only himself. Since man is the center of everything, man becomes god like in a sense that only man and his ideas / technological controlling exists. In a sense nature no more remains natural, man does not allow it to exist the way it should. Human will transform it into an artifact. Why we need a real flower, a real tree, a bamboo, or a pine or any other tree for that matter? We can replace it by artificial ones produced with science and technology as our tool. There will be a factory for artificial tree making, and for bamboo making, as we might also have a factory for baby making and baby designing, with blue eyes, and putting necessary genes into its body so that the designed baby will fulfill his/her parent’s unfulfilled wish to be a perfect athlete themselves. In this technological disclosure of being all other possibilities of a baby turning out to be something else, something other than an athlete, is ruled out. In a sense everywhere around us, there is no “real other,” it is “only me and my constructs, and my own hidden agenda and its designs.” Technology is thus instrumental in helping me to actualize all my dreams, even the absurd ones. Now, in this age of technological nihilism, nothing is impossible.

Modernity makes progress in this regard with *Ge-stell* (in terms of standing-reserve) overshadowing such disclosures, and depriving us of seeing the “in-itselfness” of beings, and *poiesis* – the disclosure of things in its most original way. It rather appears to us partially in terms of their being-for-us. *Ge-stell* fails us to see the “whatness,” “objectness,” and the “in-itselfness” of beings. Above all, *Ge-stell* in its worst but also ultimate influence to us is, it acts as the reason for us to be violent and uncaring as opposed to gentle, careful, harmonious relation to beings. It deprives us of the reason to stand in such a benevolent and safeguarding ways. In the earlier ages the way things showed up was in the form of resources as well as something else. However, modernity fails to see something of things besides their resourcefulness, as a result of which the whole process became violent in nature. It drives out the “thingness” of things. Violence, violation or setting-upon is the ultimate way of describing modern technology, which is more than a mere harm or damage. And the point of difference is what is needed to be understood. Heidegger tells that violation is essential harm, harm to the ‘essence’ of something in terms of *quidditas* or “whatness.” Violation is, in one way or another and to one degree to another, preventing something being what it is. Example of which may be that a virgin forest is violated when preventing herself from maintaining ecological balance – its own nature. The same example may also be given as when a woman finds herself in a position merely to satisfy sexual thirst of someone, rather than being a wife of the same.

### **3.3. Objectlessness or Uniform Distancelessness**

In order to attain a better grasp of what Heidegger attempts to reveal in *Question Concerning Technology*, it helps to concentrate on something that has come up more than once in our investigation: the phenomenon of objectlessness, or the no-longer-standing-over-against-us characteristics of the object within the technological sphere of enframing. Needless to mention that when found objectless-ness there also found distanceless-ness. Following this Heidegger said on the issue of distance that all distances in space and time are shrinking. In other words, the existing parameter on space and time has undergone changes with modernity. Man now reaches overnight, by plane, places which formerly took weeks and months to travel. The germination and growth of plants, which remained hidden

throughout the seasons, is now exhibited publicly in a minute on film; man puts the longest distances behind him in the shortest time. He puts the greatest distances behind himself and thus puts everything before himself at the shortest range. Yet the frantic abolition of all distances brings no nearness...short distance is not in itself nearness...nor is great distance remoteness.

What Heidegger wanted to show from the technological advancement with regard to eradication of distance that the abolition of the two distances is that things that decides the distances no longer stands over against us object, no longer selfstandingness, and thus no distance from us in any measure, be it near or far. Everything gets lumped together into uniform distancelessness, which also mean everything is equally near and equally far – mere positions on a space-time grid. To ask the question of far and near presupposes the existence of things for parameter. But with the abolition of distance, the nature of thing has been concealed and thus forgotten. Uniform distancelessness is the result of treating everything in terms of standing-reserve. In a state of standing reserve man, instead of respecting the thingliness of things, exalts himself as “Lord of the earth,” and try to have a mastery over beings including distance. Objectlessness or distancelessness nevertheless is the two symptoms out of various possible readings of setting-upon in enframing.

The danger of technology is that it blocks such concealing-unconcealing nature of things. In *Being and Time* Heidegger called this letting be seen of being Phenomenology. *Being and Time* looks forward to 'Fundamental Ontology' (fundamental because the ontology beyond metaphysical realm) through the ontological structures of the being of Dasein. In this absurd sense of technological disclosure of Being the being of everything is to be modelled on that of human beings. Heidegger sees the danger of the technological age which he defines as the 'challenging (*Herausfordern*) that sets upon (*stellt*) man to order (*bestellen*) the actual as standing-reserve (*Bestand*)' contrary to that 'as it shows itself' (*wie es sich zeigt*). The 'phenomenon' of Heidegger's phenomenology as he defined it in the Introduction to *Being and Time* is 'that which shows itself'.

This is the fate of metaphysics, the triumph of the manipulable arrangement of scientific – technological world and of a social order proper to this world. Heidegger would look forward to an end of this metaphysical philosophy. “The end of philosophy proves the triumph of scientific technological world, the beginning of the world civilization based upon western European thinking” (Critchley, 2005, p. 80). “Sometimes it seems as if modern humanity is rushing headlong toward this goal of producing itself technologically” (Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 2008, p. 197). This is a “nihilism,” the drive that human thinking, impossibly or emptily, justifies itself with reference only to its own procedures, resting on values only of its own positing. If humanity achieves this, it will have exploded itself (Clark, 2002, p. 12). Hubert Dreyfuss has drawn on Heideggerian thinking to make fundamental criticism of projects in Artificial Intelligence (AI) as future representatives of intelligent human behavior by modeling it on a computer. Clark comments; “The important point for us here is not computer science *per se* but the way in which assumptions in AI are a supremely clear example and a putting to the test of crucial features of the 2,500 year philosophical tradition that Heidegger attacks (what he terms ‘western metaphysics’), a tradition he saw as culminating in cybernetics and information theory” (Clark, 2002, p. 12).

Within the essential unity of western destiny that beginning with Socrates and Plato, later philosophers and scientists have assumed to have a rationally grounded knowledge defining reality in terms of universally applicable concepts and precise logical relations, huge shifts could still be recognized. “...The world in its crucial features ‘is’ in a different way for an ancient Greek, for a mediaeval monk and for a modern westerner. What each sees and understands in the simplest object such as a river will differ, for the world. The whole sense of being human – in relation to which the river appears, will differ drastically between one epoch and another” (Clark, 2002, pp. 28-29).

Each epoch is dominated by fundamental assumptions about things. Heidegger’s deconstruction of these epochs means the de-stabilizing of their givenness or self evidence and the present epoch, the modern age of technology, is manifested as the nihilistic phase of this ‘metaphysics of presence’. Nietzsche remains one of its prime spokesmen with his pronouncement of; “God is dead” and “will to power” (Heidegger, *The Question*

Concerning Technology and Other Essays, 1977, p. 70). Heidegger's analysis of nihilism strove to be even more comprehensive than Nietzsche's. For Heidegger, it is productionist metaphysics, the basis of Western life and thought that is nihilistic. Contemporary nihilism is only the most overt manifestation of an anthropocentric, exploitative thinking that has been entrenching itself for over two thousand years. Nietzsche's doctrine of the super man, far from being some kind of answer to nihilism, is an instance of it. It renders explicit the destructive tendency of western thought to conceive the world merely in terms that serve to enhance the apparent power and mastery of the thinker (Clark, 2002, p. 29).

Heidegger's critique of substantialist metaphysics that understands Being in terms of presence-at-hand, is as follows. To quote Hans Ruin: "... *In Being and Time*, the critique of substance ontology takes as its starting point not the Greek 'technical' sense of Being, but rather the modern, Cartesian construction of the meaning of Being as pure extension in space. This understanding of Being presupposes a distanced perspective that contemplates nature simply as a calculable material extension, as is shown in the famous example of Descartes's *Meditation* on a piece of Wax as an extended thing removed from its context of use" (Ruin, 2010, pp. 186-187).

#### **3.4. Heideggerian Deconstruction of Epochal Disclosure of Being in the Technological Nihilism of Modern Age**

Heidegger finds a support for his point of view from the origin of Greek culture. He writes that the Greek term for technology is *techné*, "the term not only for the activities and skills of the craftsman, but also for the fine arts. *Techné* is a matter of bringing-forth, *poiesis*; it is something poetic. "From earliest times until Plato, the word *techné* was linked with the term *epistéme*: both being names for knowing in the broadest sense: to be entirely at home in something, to understand and be expert in it. Such knowing provides an opening, and as such is a revealing. "Thus what is decisive in *techné* does not lie at all in making and manipulating, nor in using of means, but rather in the aforementioned revealing. As revealing, not as manufacturing, *techné* is a bringing-forth as convenient.

Now Heidegger seeks to de-construct this tradition by addressing the essence of technology in a new way. How and in what manner Heidegger will attempt at denying it is the concern of the subsequent chapters and its prime concern for Being quest. We find that Heideggerian de-construction of the metaphysical tradition of philosophy is not just a complete rejection of that what appears to be the ultimate reality though the language in which it is sought to be defined is not metaphysical. Thus we come across the following observations in Timothy Clark: “In directing his life’s work against nihilism, Heidegger’s thinking attempts to uncover a more fundamental, pre-reflective non-appropriative relation to Being. This he saw at work in the kind of knowledge of things shown by traditional craftsmen, such as in a carpenter’s deep, non-theoretical understanding of wood, or in the life of peasants or finally to a degree, in art and poetry” (Clark, 2002, p. 12). Although this diagnosis of the culmination of nihilistic phase of metaphysics in the philosophy of Nietzsche and in modern technology may appear as a kind of total resentment and rejection of modernity, Heidegger’s point is that it also contains new possibility. Quoting from Hölderlin’s *Patmos*, “But where danger is, grows the saving power also” (Heidegger, *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays*, 1977, p. 42). Heidegger looks forward to a non-representative kind of meditative thinking of Being as it is disclosed in his clarified meaning of the term *Ge-stell*, that could convey the true meaning of the Greek *techné*. With the words of Hans Ruin: “...Once, he says, *techné* also meant the bringing forth of the true into the beautiful. To what is hopeful in technology belongs this possibility of bringing it back to a sense of poetic disclosure, first carried forward in the arts, which were also known by the Greeks as *techne*...” (Ruin, 2010, pp. 193-194).

That way only Dasein can critically reflect on the sense and significance of the increased technologisation of the world in modernity. Heidegger introduced the word “*Ge-stell*” (enframing) to understand it. The essence of technology, in the Heideggerian sense of the understanding of Being which makes it possible, is what he calls *das Ge-stell* (enframing). Suffice it to say enframing is not an activity in any ordinary sense nor is it itself something technological. It is a way of understanding being or what Heidegger also calls a way of revealing (*Entbergen*). The essence of technology, *Ge-stell*, is a way of revealing

(disclosing, uncovering, bringing out of concealment) of what is (*Seiendes* or *das Seiende*) as *Bestand* (standing-reserve). What lets things show themselves is the understanding of Being. Getting Being to show itself in its manifoldedness, letting it be seen, the way it shows itself is the task of philosophy.

Heidegger understands by essence in this context is the understanding of being which makes technology possible. The essence of technology, in the Heideggerian sense of the understanding of Being which makes it possible, is what he calls *das Ge-stell*, enframing. Suffice it to say enframing is not an activity in any ordinary sense nor is it itself something technological. It is a way of understanding Being or what Heidegger also calls a way of revealing (*Entbergen*). The essence of technology, *Ge-stell*, is a way of revealing (disclosing, uncovering, bringing out of concealment) of what is (*Seiendes* or *das Seiende*) as *Bestand* (standing-reserve). It is a distinctive feature of Heidegger's philosophy that all ways of having to do with things, all modes of comportment to entities, and not just perception and observation, let things show themselves in some way. But what lets things show themselves is what normally does not show itself. What lets things show themselves is the understanding of Being. Getting Being to show itself, letting it be seen, is the task of philosophy.

Heidegger is concerned with the *essence (Wesen)* of technology and he explains it as follows. Now just as the essence of "tree" is "not itself a tree that can be encountered among all the other trees," so the essence of technology is not itself something technological. This would be true even if Heidegger's understanding of *Wesen* were the standard one according to which it means *what* something is its what-ness. What a tree is, is not itself a tree. But what Heidegger understands by essence in this context is the understanding of Being which makes technology possible. In the ordinary sense of essence it is clear that technology is a human activity and a means to an end. By specifying what kind of activity it is and what kind of ends it realizes and by what means one would have given its essence. Now, one can say of this activity and its products that they profoundly influence every area of human life so that it is not surprising that people call this age the "Age of Technology." To focus not upon "what Technology is," but rather to think how the phenomenon of technology comes to

presence and endures, which is to grasp the essence of technology by its origin and procedure, i.e., a generic manner.

In *Being and Time* where he points out that even in ontology which has universal beings or categories as its objects one should raise first of all the question of the meaning of Being. This is the so-called “ontological priority of the question of Being.” There Heidegger brought out the primordial meaning of Being, which long had been forgotten. To deal with beings on this ground is to uncover the various ways in which the beings reveal Being. Hence, Heidegger’s discussion of the essence of technology is a concrete use of “the ontological priority of the question of Being.” Here the particular being is technology and to work out the essence of technology is to uncover the way in which technology reveals Being.

### **3.5. Continuation and Culmination of the Metaphysical Tradition in the Age of Technology: Nietzsche and the “Will to Power”: Heidegger’s Reading of Nietzsche**

According to the post monotheist theme, the history of metaphysics is a history of fundamental stances that Being sent (*Schicken*) to us as our destiny (*Ge-Schick*). But in the act of discovering beings, Being conceals itself. This is why the most fundamental question of Being is forgotten in metaphysics. “In his lectures on Nietzsche’s doctrine of the Will to power (*Wille zur macht*) specifies the ‘what’ of a metaphysical fundamental stance, and that the ‘idea of the eternal recurrence of the same (*Ewige widerkunft des Gleichen*) specifies the ‘how’” (Philipse, 1999, p. 279). Nietzsche’s metaphysics of the will to power and the eternal recurrence is posited as an anti-Christian principle of valuation, which will necessitate a radical reevaluation of the values (*Umwertung aller Werte*). By taking a position of anti-Platonism and anti-Christianity – the root of all fundamental metaphysics according to him, Nietzsche claimed he had overcome metaphysics by his doctrine of the will to power. Because the will to power that exists in the manner of an eternal recurrence of the same confirms the truth that even if he might not have shown the validity to a special historical epoch, the doctrine itself authenticates its validity for all times. But a close examination of

this notion will assert that this is the point that Heidegger's notion of a fundamental metaphysical stance is alien to Nietzsche.

According to Heidegger, Nietzsche's philosophy is only the end of the metaphysical tradition, because by Nietzsche's reversal of Platonism, all possibilities of metaphysics have been exhausted. His philosophy holds the last fundamental stance in a series of metaphysical stances. Whereas Nietzsche claims to have overcome metaphysics in the sense of a doctrine of transcendent Being, Heidegger argues that Nietzsche's philosophy is the final stage of metaphysics where all the possibilities of metaphysics within its fold / paradigm ends up. As the end of metaphysics, it allegedly still belongs to metaphysics because it merely reverses Platonism – the beginning he said, of all metaphysical tradition. His advocacy of the sensible world over the suprasensible world is only the reversal of Platonism; hence it cannot be called as overcoming. Heidegger says, it still belongs to the tradition of metaphysics.

Heidegger's reading of Nietzsche as the end of metaphysics is also supported by another argument saying, Nietzsche's synthesis of the two contradictory metaphysical doctrines exhaust the possibilities of metaphysics for further expansion. The fundamental metaphysical question of what is Being? is the answer of which began with Parmenides saying: "Being is" and Heraclitus who answered it as "Being becomes," is apparently synthesized in Nietzsche. According to him, "Being is an eternally recurring becoming, in which each time a will to power fixes the stream of becoming, so that it becomes stable Being" (Philipse, 1999, p. 281). According to Heidegger, the notion ends up the metaphysical possibilities or all the battles grounded upon the question of Being.

Lastly, Heidegger's Critique of Nietzsche is derived from the idea that Nietzsche's will to power is nothing but the echoes of Western Metaphysics that always pays heed to subjectivity. It is the notion emphasized more on the reality of the eternal "will" that determines all entities. Hence, to the worst of it, Nietzsche's philosophy serves as the motives of modern technology, according to which entities are nothing but resources that can be exploited for 'Technological benefit'. And because Nietzsche's Metaphysics holds

that the essence of all beings is will to power, it expresses the fundamental stance of the epoch of technology. This danger of technological willing for power is explained thus by Julian Young: “*Gestell*, however, drives out our ability even to see the whatness, objectness, the in-itselfness of beings. By doing so it deprives us of the ability to stand in a gentle, careful as opposed to violent, relation to things. If one cannot see the forest as anything more than a supply of cellulose (Heidegger, 1977, p. 18), the river as anything more than a power source, or the person as anything more than a sexual resource or productive unit, then the beings in question show up as available for, in Heidegger’s words, the technological will’s ‘unconditional self assertion’. Since nothing shows up save their resourceful being-for-us, nothing presences to ‘condition’ to act as a possible limit upon, their manipulation and exploitation as resource (apart from the requirements of their own efficient and sustained functioning as resource). As a hammer is not violated, not abused by a hammering that takes it to its limits, so a river is not violated by its ‘unconditional use as hydro-electric power source, since that from the perspective of *Gestell*, is all it is. *Gestell* makes violation inevitable because, fundamentally, it takes away the concept of violation” (Young, 2002, p. 53).

But according to Heidegger, to overcome metaphysics really means changing the very concepts in which metaphysical positions are expressed. Unlike Nietzsche who claims to have overcome just by negating or reversing the existent metaphysical position, it is a shift in paradigm with a new way of raising the fundamental question right from the beginning. Insofar as one holds a position within the bounds of metaphysics where never raises the fundamental question concerning (postmonotheist) Being, there happened the incomplete understanding of Being. And the contemplation never comes out of the metaphysical realm, therefore, not overcome at all. In that sense, Heidegger says in *Beitrage*, “Nietzsche’s philosophical preoccupations are far away (*wei entfernt*) from the question of Being” (Philipse, 1999, p. 283).

To overcome metaphysics precisely, according to Heidegger is to rekindle the question of Being in a new way. Unlike metaphysics takes up the task in a way to answer the “what” and “how” of Beings in their totality are, a new way of understanding Being is required.

Because, Being is not a being (an entity), one cannot really overcome metaphysics as long as one goes on using traditional metaphysical concepts, which are concepts denoting entities. A new way of taking up the issue of Being only, can guarantee overcoming of metaphysics. Because he claims, that postmonotheist Being (*das-sein*) is the source of meaning (*sinn*) in our life, and that Being is transcendent in relation to all beings. Being re-defined life, meanings and values in every epoch of history rather than defined everything in terms of will to power as does Nietzsche. Since transcendent Being is the source of meaning, every epoch of history became the meaningful disclosures of Being, opposite to Nietzsche, who did say the epoch of completed meaninglessness. And unlike Nietzsche who holds that everything there is has been posited by a subject – a will to power, transcendent Being is over and above the source of all meanings, disclosed its living nature in daily experiences of Dasein-being.

To Heidegger, Nietzsche only raised the question of “nihilism” saying it is metaphysics as well as Christianity the prototype of incomplete nihilism, but Nietzsche combated nihilism without ever coming to terms with the essence of nihilism. Nietzsche surmounted metaphysics and nihilism by arguing that the real source of values is life itself, and he thought that this insight would prompt a reevaluation of values because he conceived of life and indeed of beings in their totality, as “will to power.” The charge for nihilism over and above is on the ground that metaphysics that always emphasizes on the reality of transcendent Being (entity) devaluate the value of life as such. Therefore, every epoch of history became chaotic, a pity one rather, due to misunderstanding of values, the ultimate content of life. Hence, Nietzsche’s victory over metaphysics as one might understood consisted in abolishing each and every transcendent authority, celebrating the vitality of life on earth. But according to Heidegger, Nietzsche’s anti-nihilism philosophy still commits a fallacy because of its oblivion to Being which he claimed is the root cause of the essence of nihilism.

According to Heidegger, metaphysics is essentially nihilistic because of the fact that within it, the question of Being is never raised, the same of which applies to Nietzsche. The essence of nihilism lies not with the question of transcendence of Being but with the forgetfulness of

Being. Therefore, he concludes, Nietzsche's victory over metaphysics would have been a final entanglement in the same old metaphysics. Nietzsche was not in a position to discuss the fundamental question of philosophy because he only recognizes beings, claiming that beings are a will to power. But to Heidegger, Being is transcendent in relation to all beings, and cannot be posited, calculated, or otherwise controlled by power as does Nietzsche. Values or authenticity of life will be had only in alignment with this Being. The essence of nihilism is the fact that Being counts for nothing during the history of metaphysics which Nietzsche missed it.

To Heidegger, "Nietzsche remained embroiled in metaphysics and nihilism instead of overcoming them, for he merely reflected on beings in their totality without paying heed to transcendent Being" (Philipse, 1999, p. 286).

### **3.6. A Nietzschean Interpretation of Heidegger**

It sounds inadequate / inconsistent only hearing Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche without letting Nietzsche speak on his behalf, and how he fenced himself off with his doctrine of the will to power from all obstacles. Of course, Heidegger is right when he claims that Nietzsche failed to grasp the essence of nihilism and of metaphysics in the Heideggerean sense. But the truth is Nietzsche defined "metaphysics" as Platonism which later on is manifested in terms of Christianity that underestimates sensible world of bodily life because the transcendental world is the only thing real. And this is the point Nietzsche said, where the real source of values which is other than this very life itself is devaluated. His philosophy then mainly targeted to negate every transcendent authority; the process of which he claimed is the source of nihilism. The existed "metaphysics" is nothing but the root of "the will to power," and insofar as this "will to power" dominates each epoch of history, Nietzsche tried to surmount metaphysics. Therefore, even without changing the concept of metaphysics, the condition to overcome it as Heidegger insists, Nietzsche claimed he had overcome metaphysics; for he blocked all the possibilities of it for further expansion within its limits.

### **3.7. Heideggerian position on Metaphysical reading of Technology, Theology and Onto -Theology**

While Heidegger rejects the God of metaphysics he most certainly does not reject the possibility of a belief in God. “Metaphysics, for him, covers a vast era of human history: one whose end has already been marked, though not yet fully realized, in Nietzsche’s claim ‘god is dead’. Nietzsche is crucial for Heidegger partly because the inversion of Platonism one finds in *the will to power* brings metaphysics to its conclusion and partly because it is Nietzsche’s account of nihilism which Heidegger takes as his proof text in his reading of the history of metaphysics as the history of nihilism. ‘What does nihilism mean?’ asks Nietzsche, ‘that the highest values devaluate themselves’ then adds, ‘the aim is lacking; ‘why?’ finds no answer’. It is this remarks which becomes the leitmotif of Heidegger’s elucidation of nihilism” (Hart, 2000, p. 79).

Heidegger finds onto-theological position a natural outcome of metaphysical thinking. Metaphysics as nihilism devalues the highest value and in the philosophy from Plato to Nietzsche, ‘is that historical process whereby the dominance of the ‘transcendent’ becomes ‘null and void, so that all being loses its worth and meaning’, the end of which is given in Nietzsche’s ‘God is dead’. To quote Kevin Hart : “For Heidegger there may be a God who can be apprehended solely by faith ,and therefore he is committed to the possibility of two theologies, one which forms part of onto-theology and one which does not. Thus, when specifying the characteristics of onto-theology, Heidegger observes that ‘we must remember that the word and concept “theology” did not first grow in the framework and service of an ecclesiastical system of faith, but within philosophy” (Hart, 2000, pp. 80-81). Odd as it may seem, Heidegger is following tradition ‘theology’, Aquinas tells us, is twofold: one in which divine things are considered not so much as the subject of the science but as the principles of its subject, and such is that theology which the philosophers sought after and which by another name is called ‘metaphysics’; the other which considers divine things on their own account as the very subject of its science, and this is that theology which is communicated in Sacred Scripture (Hart, 2000, p. 81).

Heidegger is not inquiring how the Christian thought of God may trouble philosophy. He concentrates wholly in his thought of Being. More than philosophers of metaphysics it is poets who provide guideline on his quest for being. “When he does discuss God or increasingly in the later works, *The sacred and the gods* – Heidegger attends to the poets: Angelus Silesius, Rilke and above all, Hölderlin. There is still a gulf between thought and faith ...” (Hart, 2000, p. 81).

### **3.8. The Diagnosis and the proposed Cure**

As we have seen here the root cause of this enframing is the metaphysical tradition and its culmination in the understanding thinghood as present-at-hand activity in which nature is just manufactured in “formed-matter.” Enframing describes the mode of revealing which challenges, orders and determines the standing in reserve: “The essence of modern technology lies in enframing.

As already shown, Heidegger found the Greek word *techn*, not as a production of the ready-to-hand instruments but rather an artistic and poetic bringing forth of something into presence. In this, Heidegger was also inspired by Earnst Junger’s essay “*Der Arbeiter*” (The Worker). Venturing to think modernity in the wake of Nietzsche’s analysis of nihilism as the loss of the transcendent source of meaning, Junger sees the emergence of a new type of configuration (*Gestalt*) of human being, “the worker.” “Human being as the worker has entered into a symbiotic relation with the machine and with technology in the form of laborer or soldier, and is thus a complex manifestation of a will to power” (Ruin, 2010, p. 188).

This is how Heidegger understands significance of Nietzsche’s philosophy of nihilism in this context. Heidegger sees a continuation and a fulfillment of the metaphysical tradition in it. The technological disclosure of Being is the picture of an alienated man who is the centre of everything. “If being is ‘will’ ... The essence of modern metaphysics can be presented by means of the complete unfolding of this hypothetical statement. With Nietzsche’s utterance, “Life is will to power, western metaphysics is said to complete itself” (Davis, 2010, p. 169).

“The will to be master,” is a will to increase and preserve the power of the subject and the “subject of will” contributes to the “substance metaphysics” that Heidegger seeks to deconstruct. The will to power transforms human to “human resources,” despite the fact that humans can never be wholly reduced to ‘cogs’ in the wheel of the technological “will to will.” Heidegger comments: “Sometimes it seems as if modern humanity is rushing headlong toward this goal of ‘producing itself technologically; and if humanity achieves this, it will have exploded itself...” (Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 2008, p. 197).

At this juncture, the holistic nature of human existence is forgotten and Being is simply forgotten at this ‘oblivion of Being’ as distinct from particular beings. With Christianity, a theological slant is given to this “productionist metaphysics” when God is seen as the great author and “manufacturing cause,” and “nature” is God’s created product. At the age of technology all beings are at the disposal of the willful subject and determined according to mere “framing” or positing by this subjective will. The history of the beginnings with the Greeks, has led to a culmination or an exhaustion of the possibilities for naming Being. The ending of metaphysics and philosophy – from its beginning with the Greeks, and as it first culminates in Hegel’s systematic logic, but also as it attains a more through exhaustion in Nietzsche’s inversion of Platonism – appears precisely in the ultimate epoch of metaphysics. In order to understand in what sense the age of modern technology and of nihilism of metaphysical philosophy that culminated in the philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche and his pronouncement on the “Death of God” and man’s “will to Power,” we have to re-visit what is meant by philosophy in the age of technology as interpreted by Heidegger.

### **3.9. Search for a New Paradigm: The Phenomenological Quest for Fundamental Ontology: Heidegger’s New Project – Metaphysics of Dasein**

The new project of “metaphysics of Dasein” was developed by Heidegger, soon after the partial publication of his greatest work - *Being and Time* (1927) (Jaran, *Heidegger's Project of a Metaphysics of Dasein*, 2010, p. 205). It was somewhat a revolutionary task against metaphysics which may also be called the resurrection of metaphysics that gained popularity

at the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century. Heidegger himself contemplated it as “scientific metaphysics,” which accommodates his Phenomenological Ontology where things as such – Being as such are countered.

Heidegger’s new approach is solely meant to overthrow the entire metaphysical trend by challenging the idea that reality must be thought of in terms of the idea of substance at all. Its novelty may be stated as the inclusion of human beings (Dasein), as a part of reality, or at least as ‘the horizon of the disclosure’ of reality. Heidegger says, “once one understands the notion of a transcendental horizon and sees its historically and culturally relative character (of human being), the conclusion presents itself that in addition to what is intelligible to us, reality possesses an indefinitely large number of aspects, a plenitude (*Vollzähligkeit*) of ‘sides’ or ‘facets’ (*seinten*), which would be disclosed to us were we to inhabit transcendental horizons other than the one we do, horizons which, however, we can neither inhabit nor even conceive” (Young, 2002, p. 9). Heidegger took a phenomenological methodology for the whole notion of his “ontologizing of reality,” which again is of a synthesis between subject and object reality. No doubt, Husserl’s phenomenology already formed the background of Heidegger’s conceptual framework. After making a painstaking analysis over Husserl’s phenomenology, Heidegger seemed to have greatly sharpened his sensitivity to the importance of precision in phenomenological description. But soon difference cropped with his sole emphasis on intentionality in Husserl, concentration on intentionality and on the act of consciousness is more emphasized.

Heidegger’s task as such includes the analyses to uncover the phenomena that have been covered up or hidden, or in his own term “concealed,” so that they have to be “freed” or laid bare. His method of uncovering or unconcealment proceeds on two levels. He distinguishes between –

- (a) The ontic level of the factual that is open to observation, the level of field studies for the phenomenologists, and
- (b) The ontological level, which is the phenomenological description of the deep structures that underlie and explain the ontic.

By “ontological,” Heidegger means the “study of Being itself,” rather than the question regarding the ‘ontic’ relations between particular beings or things. The relevant questions may be of ‘how the meaning of Xs and Ys and their possible relations gets determined in the first place? (The question merely not ask about the most basic or fundamental question of being itself). The question addresses, the anticipation of knowing the being itself, not the peripheral things around. In fact, raising a question of Being is the authentic way of approaching or taking up of ontology.

However, Heidegger pointed out again that there is another possible way of questioning or taking up ontology by raising question as “why there are beings at all and not rather nothing?” (Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, New Translation, 2000, pp. 1-3), as had also raised by later philosophers such as Leibnitz and Schelling.

But this way of framing the question, Heidegger says can be misleading, in so far as it would lead us to think of Being (*das-sein*) as the highest Being or entity, and it leads to Onto-theology. But for Heidegger, such rigorous answers evade rather than address the question of Being, in that they fail to see what he calls the ‘ontological difference’ between Being and beings. In this way Being sounds as if it had the character of a possible being. In this sense it means that his ontological investigation of Being begins with the ontic verification of beings. In the *Letter on Humanism*, Heidegger quotes this –

“Metaphysics does indeed represent in their being, and so it also thinks the being of beings, but it does not ask about the truth (character) of being itself. Nor does it ask in what way the essence of human being belongs to the truth of being” (Letter on Humanism p. 246 as cited in (Young, 2002, p. 26).

To initiate a new way of understanding of ourselves and of the world, Heidegger in ‘*Being and Time*’ raised certain questions already advocated by traditional ontology. For he reckoned that the question of Being remains itself naive and opaque, if it fails to inquire first into the meaning of it. The crucial and sensitive failure which Heidegger attributes to

Metaphysics is that of missing the essence of Being in its decisive relation to the being of human being belongs to Being. As the thing in what they are, is accessible only in so far as they become intelligible to us, there he felt the need of redefining “Fundamental Ontology” that clarifies the meaning of things or Being. And since our existence or “Being-there”(Dasein) is “the horizon in which something like being in general becomes intelligible,” “Fundamental Ontology” must begin by “clarifying the possibility of having any understanding of Being at all – an understanding which itself belongs to the constitution of the reality called Dasein” (Heidegger, 2008, p. 274).

Hence, our inquiry eventually, leads us to further analyze about the Being (as such) – an inquiry into our own Being, in so far as we are the entities who have the awareness of Being, in order to lay a basis for inquiring into the Being of entities in general such as rocks, river, trees, heaven, music, etc. the question of Being therefore, is reformulated as a question about the conditions for the accessibility or intelligibility of things as well for the foundation of conceiving and explaining Reality with a new dimension.

Heidegger’s metaphysical reading, ranging from technological disclosure of being to the rise of cause effect understanding of reality closes off an understanding of God as something mysterious and holy, God being reduced to the god of the philosophers. In this fallen stage an inauthentic *Da-sein* not only fails to own up to a kind of being that is not just technological disclosure of the being of beings, its own-ness is scattered in diverse ways in accordance with the dictates of the das Man, it also fails to own its own essential structures, the ontological structures of *Dasein* as being in the world. This ontological structure not only includes temporality, historicity, of a *factual* language user man thrown into a context, it also fails to motivate one to a phenomenological disclosure of the Being and the meaning of Being, In its quest for authenticity with a turn away from the in- authenticity of metaphysical thinking Heidegger also looks forward to an ontological disclosure of the fourfold, including the radiance of the sacred that transforms mundane world into a sacred and a mysterious earth, a place to dwell. In order to do that Heidegger begins with a question of the Being and its meaning as the following chapter intends to show.

We have seen that for Heidegger, the Metaphysical tradition of philosophy with its centrality of substance, presence and subject over and above objects, etc, has contributed to the difficult times of nihilism and skepticism in which technology rules supreme, and the Being is remote and distant from the Being of beings, and is in concealment. In this nihilism of the west there is not even a trace of any authentic memory of Being. This also leads to the end of philosophy and Heidegger diagnoses this end not as conclusion of the metaphysical tradition but a fulfillment of the tradition and it culminates in the philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche. This Eighteenth Century thinker, in making the famous pronouncement that “God is dead” (Heidegger, *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays*, 1977, p. 56), was conveying this increasingly dominant sense of nihilism that pervaded the world and specifically the Western tradition. There remained no “true world,” and no “permanent values,” for philosophy to continue its academic pursuit.

Heidegger’s “*Nietzsche, Volume. 4: Nihilism*,” makes up his most explicit engagement with nihilism and indirectly with Nazism, the way Nietzsche himself attempted to overcome nihilism in some sense which ultimately led him rather to accept it, “...taking it not as a counsel of despair but in order to affirm the view that humanity alone must remake itself according to the measure it chooses, and thus to impose itself from things. Such transformed humanity is what Nietzsche called the super-man (*Ubermensch*)” (Clark, 2002, p. 29).

Heidegger’s analysis of the root cause of nihilism is more comprehensive than Nietzsche’s. To quote Timothy Clark: “...For Heidegger, it is productionist metaphysics, the basis of Western life and thought that is nihilistic. Contemporary nihilism is only the most over manifestation of an anthropocentric, exploitative thinking that has been entrenching itself for over two thousand years. Nietzsche’s doctrine of the super-man, far from being some kind of answer to nihilism, is an instance of it; it renders explicit the destructive tendency of western thought to conceive the world merely in turn to enhance the apparent power and mastery of the thinker” (Clark, 2002, p. 29).

Leaving Onto-Theology and the Metaphysics far behind, Heidegger now moves into the dimension of a deeper layer of meditative thinking that he thought, would keep unveiling the

hidden truth of Being as a disclosure to the Being-in-the-world - the *Dasein*. In that realm of thinking: “The rose is without why: it blooms because it blooms, it pays no attention to itself, asks not whether it is seen” (Davis, 2010, p. 225). This “without why” thinking is “without ground.” Can this provide a counter paradigm to metaphysics? This question needs to be addressed more adequately in the chapter that follows it, the problematic of the Being question, in Heideggerain approach toward unveiling the truth of being in the realm of meditative thinking that restores Being question in a more meaningful dimension of Being.

Heidegger’s destruction of the tradition of western ontology paved way for Jacques Derrida’s deconstruction of the “metaphysics of presence” at a later phase.



## **THE BEING QUESTION: DASEIN AS BEING-IN-THE-WORLD**

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### **4.0. Re-Kindling of the Question of Being: A Quest for the Meaning of Being**

The entire philosophical work of Heidegger is centering on the question of Being, starting with its meaning in order to find out the reason for something “to be.” “The last sentence of Heidegger’s inaugural lecture at Freiburg University reads: “*Why are there beings at all and why not rather nothing?*” (Heidegger, 1993, p. 110). Heidegger calls this the basic question of philosophy, a question that we all tend to forget. His only obsession with the question of Being has remained his life-long philosophical commitment. Heidegger believed in this single minded pursuit of one particular theme to be the best possible way for philosophical pursuit. And this philosophical quest for the meaning of life and existence as such is re-analyzed and re-interpreted with the notion of Being. For, Heidegger understands that the question of Being is a question about everything, especially for the ontological description of phenomena or existence in general. Heidegger pursues the Being question throughout his life but it remained an open question to the very end.

Being is always described as the most universal but the emptiest of concepts that resists every attempt at definition. It is treated as something indefinable, and any attempt at defining it is treated absurd. Hence the question of Being as such is lying untouched and forgotten since earlier times. No doubt, certain presuppositions and prejudices made the question indefinable; uncanny which later on became the reason to make ontological investigation biased. Therefore, Heideggerian ontological phenomenology took the challenge of defining what is considered obscure and uncanny “Being,” and endeavored to expose it clear to the level of measureable daily experiences.

Despite the difficulties in understanding the meaning of Being amidst certain prejudices, Heidegger sees the light of how the obscure Being can be brought to light; the approach road

via which a meaningful disclosure can be made. “He argues that interrogation of the meaning of Being requires a *fundamental ontology* whose point of departure is an analysis of existence” (Heidegger M. , Basic Writings: Second Edition, Revised and Expanded, 1993, p. 3). As it has been intimated that the question of Being is a distinctive one where the question itself is resulted out of the already understood something rather than a mere asking of question in order to find a solution (in such a state the inquirer is totally ignorant about the result). But the Being question as such in the Heideggerian way is the endeavor to know Being from our already involved situation with it but without knowing the meanings of it. It can be clear from the way he said as –

*“We do not know what ‘Being’ means. But already when we ask, ‘What is Being?’ We stand in an understanding of the ‘is’ without being able to determine conceptually what the “is” means. We do not even know the horizon upon which we are supposed to grasp and pin down the meaning. This average and vague understanding of Being is a fact”* (Heidegger, 1993, p. 46).

Heidegger’s attempt at thinking of Being in terms of the “beingness of beings,” made him to transcend Metaphysics which reduced Being question to “a being,” taking “Being” as an object thought by a “subject.” Heidegger is indebted to Edmund Husserl’s Phenomenological approach to philosophy and for Heidegger too, the question of the meaning of Being must be treated phenomenologically, by letting anything manifest itself in the very way it manifests itself from itself. He said in the introduction to *Being and Time*: “The following investigation would not have been possible if the ground had not been prepared by Edmund Husserl, with those Logical Investigations phenomenology first emerged” (Moran, 2000, p. 195). Thus, Heidegger sought to disclose Ontology of Being through Phenomenology only. Heidegger sets out to set Fundamental Ontology as “inner possibility of Metaphysics,” the concrete determination of the essences. According to Dermot Moran, with this obsession for Being quest, Heidegger sought to the shape of 20<sup>th</sup> Century philosophy in the following manner:

- (a) It's rejection of Idealism and of Neo-Kantianism through its anti-Subjectivist and anti-Anthropological account of human subject.
- (b) That human encounter the world in concernful dealings which are bound up in situations.
- (c) With its destruction of philosophy as metaphysics it inspired deconstructionist like - Derrida and others to challenge traditional interpretation of the readings and texts of Pre-Socratics, Aristotle, Kant, Nietzsche and others. By dismantling the wrong tradition of philosophy as metaphysics, Heidegger thus paved room for recovering Greek ways of conceiving existence for a deeper exploration of how human relates to the world through phenomenological thinking of Being.

Under such interpretation, what we really aim at by raising the question what is Being, is to show Being in a manner of determining beings as beings within which beings have always been understood. As the Being of beings is itself not a Being or in other term "entity" as conventional philosophy does. All we can take into account is its ontological nature in opening grounds or horizons where beings as such are determined. Hence, the first philosophical steps in understanding the problem of Being consists in avoiding the *mythos tina diegeisthai* in not 'telling a story', i.e. not determining beings as beings by tracing them back in their origins to another being as if Being had the character of a possible being (Heidegger, 1993, p. 46).

Being thus requires its own kind of demonstration which is essentially different from discovery of beings. The attempt to understand Being by categorizing a hierarchy of existence in the hope of seeing the most primal and highest one would not matter in our contemplation. Therefore, Being can be understood only by referring to beings, more specifically from the way it is shown or experienced in such a being.

*"For manifestly you have been aware of what you mean when you use the expression "being". We, however, who used to think we understood it, have now become perplexed"* (Heidegger M. , Being and Time, 2008, p. 1).

Being question is not of ontic particular beings of regional ontological but of Fundamental Ontology: it centers round the question: “What does it mean for such things to be?” Nor it is an Ontological quest that addresses Being as the highest Being.

#### **4.1. Heidegger’s Methodology: The Phenomenological Disclosure of Being**

*Sein Und Zeit* was written with a mission to explicate the meaning of Being in general is but partially directed as the analysis of human way of being (of course a human way of being is what is found worthy enough of showing the meaning of Being in general). And it is known too, the intended publication of the unfinished work of *Sein Und Zeit* is never published by Heidegger, is concerned herewith, the Being of beings – i.e. What it means for beings to be, the horizon of their intelligibility and Being as such i.e. the originary event through which the Being of beings get determined. Being here is contemplated not as something as earlier metaphysics does; it is rather in itself nothing but the conditions through which the manifold of existences have their bases. It is concerned more on the horizons of disclosure of things. And when we speaks of horizons of disclosure, it means ultimate horizons, in which things gets determined. It is as what he says, “Transcendental” (Heidegger M. , Poetry, Language, Thought, 2001, p. 63), and in the Kantian version an “a priori” feature of (all) existences. Heidegger makes a phenomenological analysis of Da-sein, the “there-being.”

When Heidegger wrote *Being and Time* he still described himself as a phenomenologist. However what he understood by phenomenology was already very different from what Husserl understood by it. For Husserl the subject-matter of phenomenology is consciousness and the intentionality of consciousness. Phenomenology thus understood or describes the essential structures of consciousness independently of questions of the reality of its objects. For the Heidegger of *Being and Time* the subject-matter of phenomenology is ‘Dasein’ or, what comes to the same thing, “the understanding of Being.”

In his Marburg lectures of 1928, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, he describes phenomenology as the science of Being, but because Being is only accessible in the understanding of Being this does not contradict the assertion that the subject-matter of

phenomenology is Da-sein. It would be unfair to suggest that what Heidegger calls phenomenology is wholly unrelated to Husserlian phenomenology that in effect he is simply cashing in on the power of the name. He was in fact passionately committed to the basic ideal of phenomenology of “letting things show themselves” rather than having them dictated to by a system. And it is not the case that what he chooses to call Da-sein bears no relation to Husserl’s “consciousness.” In Heidegger's view intentionality, though not only the 'theoretical' kind, is an essential structure of Da-sein. It is however a structure which requires an understanding of Being as a condition of its possibility. While addressing the question of what sort of method does Heidegger propose for investigating the way of Being and of Being of Da-sein in particular, David R. Cerbone comments: “In a word, the answer to these questions is, simply ‘phenomenology,’ though, not surprisingly, working out just what Heidegger means by this term will take quite a few more word” (Cerbone D. R., 2008, pp. 12-13). Tracing back to its Greek origins, phenomenology for Heidegger, is “what shows itself,” “What becomes manifest” (Guignon, 1993, p. 6). Differing from Husserl’s concern for phenomena of consciousness, “what” of being of beings, Heidegger focuses on the “how” of phenomenological research. Husserl’s dictum of “to the things themselves” is interpreted by Heidegger as follows: “...Phenomenology lets ‘what shows itself’, seen from itself, just as it shows itself from itself” (Heidegger M. , Being and Time, 2008, p. 3). Phenomenology, for Heidegger starts with Da-sein’s understanding of Being and the goal of phenomenology is to bring out what is implicit in that understanding by attending to Da-sein’s encounter with entities. This is then phenomenology, not of intuition of experience as in Husserl, but a hermeneutical-phenomenological quest for interpretation, since the methodological meaning of phenomenological description for Heidegger is interpretation. Thus “Phenomenology of Dasein is hermeneutics in the original signification of that word, which designates the work of interpretation” (Heidegger M. , Being and Time, 2008, pp. 33-37). Still for him, it was phenomenological quest since phenomenology “lets phenomena speak for itself.” Besides, Heidegger keeps a link with consciousness although of a practical kind. It is the “know how,” than “know what,” of what phenomenology reveals before us.

#### **4.2. The manifold ways of the Being of beings: Da-sein, the Human way of Addressing the Being question**

Thus the existing text makes explicit that out of the many possible understandings of Being, a human way of Being is the only possible way with which the manifold meanings of Being can be accessed. The Being understood in a sense of determining things as such is revealed only by referring to something essentially involved in it. However, the later philosophy puts more emphasis on the multi-facets of Being which may even be realized in the silent meditation of Da-sein, because of which Heidegger himself is more inclined towards mysticism in the later part of his life. Following this, we tend to say that apart from Being's disclosure through a human way of beings, there are so many indescribable essences of Being, far beyond our definitions.

In his later philosophy, the ontological difference and the primacy of Being becomes more pronounced and here he opts for meditative experience and a way of thinking. At this juncture the phenomenological method, used in the analysis of Da-sein, gives way to an appreciation of the language of the poet. While his early thinking is investigative and active, the later thinking became more meditative. This is more in terms with Being's relation with *Non-Being*. Further, Heidegger conceives man as a being-to-death or a being-to-nothing and in this manner man can illuminate Being as Non-Being.

But the prime concern of Heidegger is simply to understand Being in terms of what "is" or in a normal expression "what really conditions existence or the plentiful entities lying around?"

#### **4.3. Approach to Being through Dasein**

The question for *Being and Time* is the question of Being. In the introduction, Heidegger tells us that his primary task is to clarify the meaning of Being (Heidegger M. , *Being and Time*, 2008, p. 31). For the question concerns with the most basic question that always presuppose other questions and all the sciences make assumptions about Being. By the term

Being, Heidegger always means the Being of entities, but that it is not itself an entity. And when he says that Being is always the Being of beings, it would be natural to suppose that Being must be the defining and thus essential property of entities. But Heidegger negates the idea that Being itself is an entity. Against the notion he advocated that although the empty abstract Being is emphasized, as if no way of accessing it, but we must approach and understand Being as such through that is “privileged” in its relation to it. This entity is the fact that it not only asks the question of Being, but does so out of a prior inarticulate familiarity that it has, which he tells us with Being as such.

Heidegger asks in the introduction of *Being and Time*, what is the being that will give access to the question of the meaning of Being? His answer is that it can only be that being for whom the question of Being is important, the being for whom being matters. In fact, there’s no other being other than human who questions their own existence. And this question calls for an analysis of the entity that has some prior understanding of things: human existence or Dasein (the German word for “existence” or “being-there” used to refer to the structures of humans that make possible an understanding of Being). Heidegger’s claim that Dasein’s pre-theoretical (or pre-ontological) understanding of Being, embodied in its everyday practices opens a “clearing” in which entities can show up as, say tools, protons, numbers, mental events, and so on (Audi, 1995).

#### **4.4. Dasein as Horizon for Being**

In *Being and Time* Heidegger sought to approach the question of Being through a Fundamental Ontology of Da-sein. Da-sein, for want of a better way of expressing it, is Heidegger’s term for the human being. It means *being-there* and connotes being *there, here* and *now*. Da-sein is that peculiar “place” where Being is revealed and as such is fundamentally “in” a world. The idea is that Being is something like *meaning* and Dasein is that being who is sensitive to meaning. It may be put as “Being is the difference it makes that there is something rather than nothing.” It is Da-sein who is sensitive to this *difference*. Fundamental Ontology sought to lay out the structures of Da-sein so as to prepare the way for tackling the problem of Being. Of all things that are, it is only Da-sein whose ‘being is

an issue for it' (Polt, 2010, p. 78). Da-sein *has* its being "to be" (their life to live) in a way that no other thing has. Before the question of Being is even explicitly stated, Da-sein has an implicit awareness of what it means to be. In Heidegger's terms, Da-sein has a pre-theoretical understanding of Being that is always in play in Dasein's everyday dealings with its environment. The question of Being is nothing less than the radicalisation of this preunderstanding.

Despite its helplessness, Dasein's being is privileged with numerous activities, provided it is performed and taken up within the understanding of Dasein itself. Here Heidegger clearly acknowledges the rationality of Dasein in terms of understanding and appreciating others and most of all for the inquiry of Being itself. For Dasein's capacity is such that it even understands its own existence or Being which Heidegger identifies it as the perfect position for the understanding of the entire stories of Being itself. Dasein's rationality always serves as the perfect parameter for it is never exhausted with the understanding of its present situation, but also included the awareness of its possible existence even up to death in future, the overall understanding of which matters a lot for the Being to reveal it. In fact, without such capacity, the mysterious concealed ontological Being cannot be revealed at all. Only within the rationality of Dasein that the veil of Being can be cleared off. And it is only within the understanding of Dasein that its being-in-the-world has a meaning. "Dasein is an entity which, in its very being comports itself understandingly towards that Being. And Dasein is an entity which in each case I myself am; mineness belongs to any existent Dasein, and belongs to it as the condition which makes authenticity and inauthenticity possible" (Heidegger M. , *Being and Time*, 2008, p. 78).

Since the work is about Being and not about this or that sort of being or entity, his task, Heidegger says, in the first place is Ontology. And in justifying his question of Being, he clarifies the meaning of Being by giving an account of what he calls "Dasein," the there (*Da*) where Being (*Sein*) shows itself. Before directly addressing the central theme, Being, Heidegger felt the need of considering first the being where it is that Being shows itself.

Since answering the Being question by taking into account Dasein way of Being, which is more or less equated with human being is concerned, many phenomenologist including Husserl criticizes Heideggerian approach that it runs out of phenomenological realm and focuses merely on human being. For Husserl, such a move historicizes Being in such a way that we are left only with anthropology, historicism, and relativism. He understands Heidegger this way because Heidegger's starting point is Dasein, defined as a Being-in-the-world, that is thoroughly historical (Guignon, 1993, p. 151). But Heidegger's response is that his study of Dasein is a study of us insofar as we can come to terms with Being. As his phenomenological account is about Dasein – “being-there,” and not about human being as such. Thus it is not an attempt to give a full account of what it means to be human, but Being as such. And by accounting Dasein's average everydayness for the description of Being, it provides the appropriate basis or background where the Being understanding can be obtained at all. Heidegger's strategy of re-visiting the Being question by focusing on the nature of human existence, which he now renamed as Dasein, served the purpose of freeing from it any unwanted connotation of prejudices, like using the term “human being” or “*homo sapiens*,” a biological or even a theological Categorizations of us humans. Dasein is not a substance, nor a *cogito*, but an entity for which its own being is in question. And also Dasein alone has an understanding of Being.

If we now proceed step wise toward addressing the Being question, we may begin with Dasein as a being that can ask about the Being question. It is because human being can be aware of their beings and already have some understanding of Being, a fact that is hardly true of other instances of being as rocks and roses, we may begin our quest of Being with Dasein quest itself. Using familiar words in a new way, Heidegger introduces new way of speaking about human beings as Dasein, more than a human being, Dasein is an existence, a presence, that reveals the Being and is thus connected with Being. With regard to the starting point or accessibility, Heidegger makes explicit in *Being and Time* that the meaning of Being would be clear through the being for whom his own being is an issue; who keeps of inquiring his own being. And this inquirer is nothing other than human being. Thus to work out the question of Being adequately, we must make an entity – the inquirer – transparent in his own Being. Heidegger understands those entities as Dasein which literally stands for

being-there. Therefore, Fundamental Ontology, from which alone all other ontologies can take their rise, must be sought in the existential analytic of Dasein. Because the very asking of this question is located within such entity's mode of being; and as such the analysis of such entity's essential character would enhance the understanding of Being in general.

#### **4.5. The ontic and ontological status of Da-sein**

Heidegger in *Being and Time* discusses the unique character of Dasein, which he also identifies as an ideal position for the investigation of Being in general. And the entity we denote by the term Dasein is nothing other than human. Reiterating what he claims that –

1. Dasein is a being whose being is an issue for it.
2. Dasein is a being who has an understanding of Being.

Heidegger elaborates that Dasein is an entity, which does not just occur among other entities. Rather it is ontically distinguished by the fact that, in its very being, that Being is an issue for it. By this he means Dasein has essential relationship towards that Being – a relationship which itself is one of Being. And this means further that there is some way in which Dasein understands itself in its Being, and that to some degree it does so explicitly. Hence understanding of Being is itself a definite characteristic of Dasein's Being (Heidegger M. , *Being and Time*, 2008, p. 12). As Dasein in its being has an understanding of Being (which Heidegger searched for) by being part of it, there is no better place other than this to look to get started. Any existential constitution of Dasein in its everydayness would anyhow reveal the ontological Being. The proper meaning of Being, and its meaningful disclosures as world is understood only by taking into account the essential constitution of Dasein's existence. What really shapes and molds Dasein's Being is the horizon with which the Being understanding can be made. And this horizon serves as the most original interpretation of Being. Ultimately the first concern in the question of Being must be an analysis of Dasein. However, this plain and rough reasoning of Dasein would not enhance a specific and more technical understanding of Being. A detailed analysis of Dasein with time, temporality,

historicity, language, care, authenticity as well as inauthenticity, would rather makes explicit the technical understanding of Being.

Heidegger considers Dasein's understanding of Being as pre-ontological because what a thing is to be, including its existence with a possible or inevitable happening in future even death, is already embedded in its awareness of Being. And to say that Dasein is "ontological," which means that the capacity to raise and work out the question of Being, in particular its own Being, is part and parcel of what it is to be Dasein, i.e. Being itself. Dasein is a being that confronts the question of what it is to be that Being, and by extension, the question of what it means to be anything at all. Being for Heidegger is Being as it enters into Dasein's understanding of Being.

The Being question can nevertheless be answered or approached from Dasein's everydayness. Because "in his everydayness there are certain structures which shall exhibit – not just any accidental structures, but essential ones which, in every kind of being that factual Dasein may possess, persist as determinative for the character of its Being" (Heidegger M. , *Being and Time*, 2008, p. 17).

#### **4.6. The "Who" of Being-in-the-World: Ontology of Dasein's "Mineness"**

So far our ontological interpretation of the world and of course Dasein is held by going through what is ready-to-hand within-the-world; Dasein's everydayness or being fully absorbed in the world – the kind of Being which it thus possesses. Following this, there's a very important question to raise and without which our subject of interrogation would not have been completed. The question may be of who it is that Dasein is in its everydayness? Who then is this Dasein? Nevertheless, our inquiry moves on to the topic of personal identity – the same old metaphysical concern, discussed and speculated in Cartesian as substantive soul, a *res* beneath *cogitans* which Husserl too described it in terms of "ego-pole" from which the illuminating rays of consciousness are thought to emanate. But an existential treatment of the "I-ness of the I," Heidegger says, must proceed another way.

The definition relatively indicates the ontological constitutive state of Dasein's Being, but is ontically verifiable in terms of the "I" not others. Because Dasein has in each case "mineness" (*Jemeinigkeit*), hence one must always use a personal pronoun when one addresses it: "I am," "You are" (Heidegger M. , Being and Time, 2008, p. 68). "The 'who' of Dasein's being-in-the-world, expressed ontically by the term "I," is tinged by an almost ineffably intimate 'mineness'" (Davis, 2010, p. 54).

Dasein's being is not supposed to be identified with mere corporeal stuffs. It is the Being which made decision and choices, but only within the paradigm of the already ontological conditioned world of his existence. That "mineness" of his Being presupposes his capacity to will, to make choice, to evaluate, to understand and make decision over his Being with others. And after all, this "mineness" is an existential. The assertion that it is "I" who in each case Dasein is, is ontically obvious, but not to be confused with ontological character of his already conditioned Being – Dasein as being-there-in the world.

"Mineness" belongs to any existent Dasein, and belongs to it as the condition which makes authenticity and inauthenticity possible. Certainly, because of this "mineness" Dasein's being is possible to interpret it in terms of authentic and inauthentic existence – the only two possible modes of existences. An authentic way of existing is one that requires when individuals Dasein to take responsibility for their attitudes and actions and vice versa. Under authentic existence, each Dasein or a particular human being individualize himself as distinct from yielding the authority for their lives to others. But to individualize here does not mean rugged individualism, which favors the fantasy of self- sufficiency or protection from others. Heidegger rather means the awareness of one's own connections with the inevitabilities of existence throughout the world. Authentic existence can come only when individual is at the realization of himself; who he is, what he is supposed to do, as a distinct human being rather than identifying himself as a mass human being. This realization may includes fulfilling of one's own destiny, taking decision and responsible for his being in the world so as to cope with his potentiality for being, which is away from the common influences. Inauthentic Dasein on the other hand, does not live as "itself" but as "they" live, which means living along the flow of the general influences – stereotypes, consensus, etc. In

fact, for Heidegger, it barely exists at all and it exists in a state of fear (*Furcht*). Such existences he said can be easily shaken especially in a situation of fear of losing one's life and some other undesired forms of life. For us our existence is at issue. We are to decide who we are and how to be that.

#### **4.7. Dasein as “Being-in-the-World”: the a priori and ontological structures of Da-sein**

In *Being and Time* Heidegger lays the ground for answering the question about the meaning of Being. The understanding of Being is what makes possible any kind of having to do with entities, anything that is: sticks and stones, chairs and tables, numbers, works of art and, most importantly, ourselves. What sets us apart from all other entities is that we are in such a way that we understand Being. Heidegger has no wish to deny the other things which have been taken to distinguish human beings from other beings: consciousness, self-consciousness, reason. It is true that he thinks that there are other more basic ways of comporting ourselves to things, including ourselves. But more radically he thinks that even these more basic modes of comportment presuppose something which is not a mode of comportment to entities at all, namely, the understanding of Being. It is because he sees this as what distinguishes human beings from all other entities that he uses the ontological term of Dasein to refer to this entity. Man is in a situation of receptivity to Being. Only man as Dasein can carefully attuned to the silent summoning of Being and can attend to that call. Thus the two are related not as subject related for an object but as man's relationship to Being as constitutive of man's essence.

The fundamental structure of Dasein is always understood “a priori” as grounded upon that state of Being which is now called “being-in-the-world.” By the expression “being-in-the-world,” Heidegger incorporated certain essential relationships where Dasein finds itself in so as to fulfill its ontological conditioned being-in-the-world. As the compound expression, it stands for a unitary phenomenon, which should not be broken into contents. For such an attempt always missed the constitutive items understood as the entire structure. Heidegger describes Dasein's being as “thrown” in the world without any prior choice about its own

existence. This also indicates that there already is the world, where there is a harmonious blend of things (beings) in which Dasein but meaningfully and purposefully situated. This harmonious blend is what Heidegger describes as ready-at-hand, which always shows that the world as such, is a balanced one, meaning oriented and sustained on its own. And this primordial phenomenon is something inevitable, a priori, and mysterious forever, but very true in a sense that nobody can deny it for it is experienced by anyone. Hence, ontologically Dasein's being-in-the-world is being in the (already) a priori conditioned situations where its being is molded, shaped up, nurtured and driven by those a priori conditions without itself interfere in it in terms of making rational choice or decision making. Unlike Jean Paul Sartre who goes on proclaiming that "each human being creates his own essence; man first of all exists and defines himself afterwards" (Morris, 2008, p. 35), Heidegger assessed that it's not Dasein which determines its own existence, hence uses the expression "thrown in the world," to state that Dasein always stands helpless in terms of its ontological conditioned Being. Rather it becomes a constant issue for it.

Heidegger spoke of the two possible modes of Dasein's existence – Authenticity and Inauthenticity, a division which matters a lot for his fundamental interpretation of Dasein. Authenticity is a mode of living where Dasein is in tuned with Being; there's always the realization of its own being as it is a constant issue for it, vis-à-vis Inauthenticity where Dasein failed to understand the being question as it is here indulged in the everydayness, without questioning its own being. In such a state of inauthenticity Dasein is not at all reflective, as it is far from its capacity of questioning the most fundamental issue including its own existence / being. Hence it is the Authentic Dasein which makes possible the disclosure of Being as such.

Dasein is thrown in the world of meanings, to unreflectively coping with it as it is its essence after all. As Heidegger's phenomenological interpretation clarifies that nobody is reflective and curious about the body he possesses, rather he takes it for granted as it is and unreflectively use it no matter what his wish is, in the same way Dasein's coping of the world is unreflective in a sense that it is after all its essence. He just inherits it without further questioning it. Phenomenologically what determines human to live this way is

certainly his essence. And it is what defines Dasein's Being-in-the-world, the inevitable a priori conditions which Dasein but unreflectively taken up for the necessary constituent factors of its existence. Those conditions includes "being-there" - to dwell, to care for the fourfold, to be mortal, to be with others (being-with-others), together these defines Dasein as context bound, embodied being, and to be under the influence of numerous meaningful relations. And by saying "unreflective," it doesn't mean that the rationality attributed to Dasein is of disembodied Cogito, but it is man as being-in-the-world. It is acknowledged in a sense of enabling Being's disclosure into meaningful inter-relations, which Dasein itself purposefully inherited it for its essence.

Da-sein is in such a way that it understands Being, its own being, the Being of entities other than itself to which it comports itself, and Being as such. The meaning, the sense (*Sinn*) of Being is not the meaning of the word 'Being' (or *Sein*) but rather that on the basis of which we understand Being. And it turns out that this "on the basis of which," the horizon which makes possible the understanding of Being, which in turn makes possible all comportment to entities, is time. Not however time in the sense of a series of "nows" but time in the sense of the temporalisation (*Zeitigung*) which makes comportment to past, present and future possible.

In *Being and Time*, Heidegger suggests the need to analyze Dasein (the place where Being manifest) which in fact, is the first requirement in the question of Being. But in doing so, he adds, "we must choose such a way of access and such a kind of interpretation that this entity can show itself in itself and from itself (*an ihm selbst von ihm selbst her*). And this means that it is to be shown as it is proximally and for the most part – in its average everydayness. In this everydayness there are certain structures which we shall exhibit – not just any accidental structures, but essential ones which, in every kind of Being that factual Dasein possess, persist and determinative for the character of its Being" (Heidegger M. , *Being and Time*, 2008, p. 38). Hence any definitions pertaining to Being automatically is drawn from whatever things essentially involved in Dasein's way of Being in its everydayness. Both Being and Dasein are inseparable.

#### 4.8. Dasein in the World

Heidegger's interpretation of Dasein as such is that it pays more emphasis on its being, that is embodied one, culturally and linguistically conditioned to practically engaged in daily works, the overall essence of which cannot be measured only by referring to rationality or capacity to think. In fact, he tries to overcome the subject-object dichotomy, the same old parameter in every conventional philosophy. Dasein is an embodied being, embedded in the world to have connection with others and after all to care, which is its ontological nature.

The obvious question on this regard is Why Heidegger, out of the many possible interpretations of the world with its subtle contents including human, come out with this interpretation of being-in-the-world? Is there a better scope of interpreting that way, which is philosophically sound? The answer being Heidegger's using a phenomenological parameter (but contrary to Husserl) paying more emphasis on the lived-dimension of the world, has in its most concern of making explicit the status of Dasein's understanding of Being as pre-ontological as a result of which its unreflective encounter with the world possible. In this sense, there is no better scope of explaining than a phenomenological description of Dasein as being-in-the-world this way.

By "Phenomenology," Heidegger means unveiling of something that essentially conditioned the world as such. It consists of uncovering the world hood of the world that ontologically makes possible our engagement with the everyday surrounding world. By doing this, he rebelled against Husserl's phenomenological reduction which he says is the attempt to work out the structure of manifestation to consciousness in isolation from any engagement between consciousness and an envioning world. And it is against too, Descartes's *cogito* where the self is first in the order of knowledge, since it can be known to exist even while everything else is open to doubt, but the self is revealed to be a special kind of entity, an immaterial being, clear and distinct, that can exist apart from the goings-on of the material world. Heidegger rejects both the epistemological and ontological dimensions of Descartes philosophy on the ground that Dasein's embodied being practically engages in the everydayness which is but its existence, cannot be neglected. Rather it serves as the

necessary constitutive factors of Dasein's being. "The essence of Dasein lies in its existence...In its day-to-day activity, Dasein is always taking a stand on the kind of being it is, not in the sense of actively declaring itself to be one thing rather than another, but in engaging in some activities rather than others, taking up certain tasks rather than, adopting certain goals rather than others, and so on: it has somehow always already decided in which way Dasein is always its possibility" (Heidegger M. , Being and Time, 2008, pp. 40-42).

#### **4.8.1. Existence and Existential: ontic and ontological**

In *Being and Time*, Heidegger argues that certain ontological question like, what is the Being of all entities, would remain naive and opaque in case it fails to inquire first into the meaning of Being. And it is absurd to approach the task in this way. Rather ontology should be reformulated in such a way to inquire into the conditions which made beings accessible and intelligible to us; and it is the only possible way which satisfies the question of Being in its most meaningful way. As such our existence or "being-there" (*Dasein*) is the horizon in which something like being in general becomes intelligible. Hence, Fundamental Ontology must begin by "clarifying the possibility of having any understanding of being at all – an understanding which itself belongs to the constitution of the entity called *Dasein*" (Heidegger M. , Being and Time, 2008, p. 274). This specific use of the word 'existence' is clarified as follows: "The kind of Being towards which Dasein can comport itself in one way or another, and always does comport itself somehow, we call 'existence'" (Heidegger M. , 1962, p. 32). Defining Dasein as existence is an emphasis on the dynamic character of Dasein as full of potentiality and possibilities as Being is also defined more in terms of possibility than actuality. Dasein alone has possibility and choice as it also relates to its own existence and to others, to the dimensions of time, to the world and most essentially, to Being. Since the essence of Dasein lies in "ek-sistence," man has "ek-static openness to Being." Being offers itself to the openness of man and in his "*Da*" (openness) of Dasein could Being essentialize itself as Being.

Our inquiry then after all turns toward the inquiry into our own being, because we are the entities who have an understanding of Being (our own being) and the Being of others such

as the corporeal stuffs. And it is most appropriate to commence from the “*existential*” (concrete, specific, local) sense we have of ourselves as caught up in the midst of a practical world, which presupposes the reality of phenomena in terms of showing themselves, becomes manifest or shows forth in relation to us.

The universal characteristics of existence, the existential can be brought out as Being-with, Being-in-the-world, Language as Being-with, Existence as Attunement, Existential Temporality, Being, Language and Meaning, Authenticity, Inauthenticity, Technology, etc.

#### **4.8.2. Everydayness of a worldly Dasein**

“The passage indicates how things show up or manifest themselves to Dasein will largely be determined by the stand Dasein takes on its existence: things will manifest themselves in ways that are coordinate with those activities, tasks and goals” (Cerbone, 2008, p. 35). Heidegger cites instances for a workshop environment. For the carpenter whose workshop it is, the workshop is manifest as a familiar place, a place for working with an array of tools that play various roles in that work, is conditioned by the carpenter’s readiness to work in the workshop. Of course, there are numerous other possible ways that workshop may manifest itself. But what Heidegger means is that only in terms of Dasein’s orientedness towards object, is object manifest in a specific way, which after all defines Dasein’s essence. From this kind of ground-level phenomenology is Heidegger’s investigation based upon. By doing this it challenges the hegemony of categorical and thus advocated the embodied being of Dasein in return.

Thus Heideggerian phenomenological investigation at the earliest had a pivotal concern of disclosing the a priori structures that enables Dasein’s unreflective coping with the world. And to uncover such a priori structures, Heidegger turns not towards some special or privileged way of being-in or toward a world, inhabited only at certain moments or times. Instead, what must provide the beginning point for such a “transcendental” analysis is the everyday world in which we continually live, that which is closest to us and out of which

other sorts of worlds might emerge: the everyday world of our ordinary surroundings (*Umwelt*) (Davis, 2010, p. 48).

To Heidegger this everyday world of Dasein is not one of theoretical contemplation, of trying to describe the way things “look” or “see” the causal connections between events, but one of practical engagement. An illustration may be given as – my daily roster being myself engaged with playing Tennis in the morning, followed by breakfast before I became ready go to office. And when I reached the office, I kept myself busied with computer keyboards, papers, books, and a short break for coffee outside, chatting with others, and drive home in the evening. Those things with which I deal discloses themselves not as objects to be looked at from the outside, nor as entities that might exist in themselves were I not there. They disclose themselves in a manner to be unreflectively used as the way they are interconnected with me.

Dasein or “being-there” is the essence of Being, is always manifested in terms of its average everydayness or its practical contexts. Heidegger is emphasizing the essence of entities as something for them “to be,” a hammer; a hammer for hammering, a door to open, a sound to hear, etc. things at the most basic level is conditioned primordially by what it is “to be” in virtue of what it is. Dasein as being is conditioned as being-in-the-world. Instead of defining Dasein as a thing or entity deeply rooted in the unchanging underlying substance or whatever may be called. Heidegger interpreted it as a “happening,” a life story unfolding between birth and death. Dasein’s being inevitably is hanging between meaningful contexts of the past and its directedness toward the future for its culmination. As such its liveliness; its everydayness cannot be trivially considered and wiped off. Therefore, an investigation which acknowledges Dasein’s “to be” or essence as being-in-the-world is considered worthy and the authentic way of approaching or disclosing it.

Dasein’s being-in-the-world is something “a priori” in nature; it is not pieced together, but is primordially and constantly a whole. Dasein’s Being has a definite character which is seen and understood “a priori” as grounded upon that state of Being – a being-in-the-world. And the expression “being-in-the-world” entails a unity phenomenon.

The technical understanding of being-in-the-world can be articulated as the intertwining results of the following (not in a fragmented ways but) –

1. The In-the-world – where the task of inquiring into the ontological structure of the world and defining the idea of worldhood as such.
2. The being-in-the-world – which includes exposing the nature of Dasein as something to inherit, to dwell the world, provided it is enveloped with “Care.” To set forth the ontological constitution of inhood itself.
3. The entity or “who” which is as Being-in-the-world – An analysis of the “who” in the mode of Dasein’s average everydayness. Here we are seeking that which one inquires into when one asks the question “Who?”

(Heidegger M. , Being and Time, 2008, p. 78).

Each of these dimensions will show the essential interconnectedness of Dasein as being-in-the-world.

#### **4.8.3. The World-hood of the World:**

It may be commonly assumed or argued that the world is the totality of manifold entities; the referential ground or component of being-in-the-world. It may also be described as the sum total of all plentiful objects and their possible relationships among themselves pertaining to subjectivity in nature. However, Heidegger’s understanding of the world belongs to Dasein’s Being. Dasein’s being is such that “being-there”; it is not of something subjective, some inner state or idea that stands between the self and the things that are. Being-there entails living in a familial world, to experience them as a part of my extension or as a family.

Heidegger’s interest hereby include the emphasis of the phenomenon of the world as such; the worldhood of the world, which is a priori in nature. His interests is revealing something that is ontologically conditioned Dasein’s Being as something being-there – living and

experiencing the world as its own extension which in fact, is the totality of the world as such.

*“World” designates the ontologico-existential concept of worldhood. Worldhood itself may have at the time; but it embraces in itself the a priori character of worldhood in general”* (Heidegger M. , Being and Time, 2008, p. 93).

Since the everyday world is not one of theoretical contemplation or of trying to frame them up with their possible internal causal connections, emphasis are given in Heideggerian Phenomenology, the liveliness, and the dynamic practical engagement of the world. The phenomenal world no doubt, cannot be wiped off from any of the contemplation: rather it affirms the a priori existential nature of Dasein’s being as being-in-the-world. The world and its worldhood is characterized by practical engagement which entails Dasein’s being as to engage with others, to live, to write, to feel, to shift the place, to appreciate, to enjoy, to care, to amuse, to love, etc. and these things which I disclose themselves not as objects to be looked at from the outside nor as entities that exist in “themselves” were I not there (Davis, 2010, pp. 44-56). This is the phenomenal challenge to the natural tendency or how they deviates themselves by claiming the truth that is grounded in the very being of Dasein. Heidegger is at great pains to remind the reader that, “worldhood itself is an existential” (Heidegger M. , Being and Time, 2008, p. 92). Following this, uncovering the worldhood of the world certainly be involved in disclosing these structures that belong to and make possible my (Being) engagement with the everyday surrounding world. A historically, linguistically and culturally constituted Dasein is myself, is naturally conditioned to fall and interfere in this living world, which again is of a priori necessary and universal. And the worldhood becomes possible only when it is meaningfully disclosed to Dasein.

These a priori structures of the worldhood may be summarized as follows – “Within ... in...in order to ...for the sake of...” (Heidegger M. , Being and Time, 2008, pp. 91-96). An illustration may be given as in the act of me engaging with window. That I am engaged with the window in the act of opening in order to let in the cool fresh air for the sake of my own comfort. Likewise, my being engaged with the world in a certain way authenticated the worldhood, is the only way of disclosing the truth rather than theoretical abstractions.

#### 4.8.4. Being-In

The second of the triadic structure of Being-in-the-world comes to our specific investigation. Like the world and its worldhood understood in terms of essential existences, so is the Being-in understood as an existentiell (Heidegger M. , Being and Time, 2008, p. 79). Hence, setting forth the ontological constitution of “inhood” itself or disclosing the truth of “inhood” from what is concealed is of the pivotal concern. Of course Being-in-the-world is a state of Dasein which is necessary a priori, but hitherto its concealment state is far from revealing in the earlier metaphysical contemplation.

What then is Being-in? By the expression “Being-in,” our proximal reaction is to round out this expression to “being-in, ‘in the world,’” because there is a tendency to understand it as being in something as the water is in the glass, the garments in the cupboard, the city in the country, the furniture in the house, etc. by this “in” we mean the relationship of being which two entities extended in space have to each other with regard to their location in that space. It conveys the “side-by-side-ness” of an entity called “Dasein” with another entity called “world.” But in the Heideggerian sense, Being-in is a state of Dasein’s existentielle Being in which certain essential constitutive factors fused together to be Dasein’s essence. Taken his explanation –

*“‘In’ is derived from ‘Innan’ – ‘to reside’, ‘to habitare’, ‘to dwell.’ ‘An’ signifies “I am accustomed”, “I am familiar with,” “I look after something”...Dasein when it is understood as an existential, signifies ‘to reside alongside...to be familiar with...’ Being-in is thus the formal existential expression for the Being of Dasein, which has Being-in-the-world as its essential state” (Heidegger M. , Being and Time, 2008, p. 80).*

Hence Being-in-the-world technically is indicated as a state of Dasein’s existential being ‘to be’ alongside the world, to be immersed or absorbed in the world, to be part and parcel of the inter-connected world. And as a being always expressed in terms of existence or “Being

alongside the world,” it never means but anything like the Being-present-at-hand-together of things as “the-side-by-side-ness” of an entity called Dasein and with another entity called world. To understand this technicality where two things are thought to have encountered and belonged together to be the so called world, our normal way of understanding did not allow us to believe this way, because our strict and accurate measurement eventually reveals that they were not at all the same. Even if they come closer together to be a joint object, there at least are some boundaries or space which always divided from one another. But according to Heidegger,

*“...an entity present-at-hand within the world can be touched by another entity only if by its very nature the latter entity has Being-in as its own kind of being only if within its Being-there (Dasein), something like the world is already revealed to it, so that from out of that world another entity can manifest itself in touching, and thus become accessible in its Being-present-at-hand...”* (Heidegger M. , Being and Time, 2008, p. 55).

Following this what Heidegger wants us to know is the fact that when two entities are merely present-at-hand within the world, they are by themselves “worldless” and can never “touch” or “encounter” one another as meaningful as Dasein encounter the things. For there is no realization on the part of them to act and perform, the way they are doing practically. But Dasein understands its ownmost Being in the sense of a certain factual Being-present-at-hand, which is a definite way of being (*Seinsbestimmtheit*) different from the beings of other corporeal things.

*“Whenever Dasein is, it is as a Fact; and the factuality of such a Fact is what we shall call Dasein’s facticity”* (Heidegger M. , Being and Time, 2008, p. 56).

Here Dasein exists not simply to include as one of the parts of the a priori conditioned world, but to understand and appreciate the purpose behind its being in the world and thus safe-guarding the Being at large. But Dasein in its inauthentic mode of existence failed to

see such meaningful disclosure of beings, and its role in safeguarding the truth of Being. He again said as –

“Dasein’s facticity is such that its Being-in-the-world has always dispersed (*Zerstreut*) itself or even split itself up into definite ways of Being-in. the multiplicity of these is indicated by the following examples: having to do with something, producing something, attending to something and looking after it, making use of something, giving something up and letting it go, undertaking, accomplishing, evincing, interrogating, considering, discussing, determining...All these ways of Being-in have concern as their kind of Being” (Heidegger M. , *Being and Time*, 2008, p. 57).

Above all, the elaboration of the technical expression of Dasein’s Being-in-the-world, what is acknowledged is, Dasein has a concerned being. The expression ‘concern’ is used in this investigation as an ontological term for an “existential,” which will designate the Being of a possible way of Being-in-the-world. “Colloquially, it can mean ‘to carry out something,’ ‘to get it done (*eredigen*),’ ‘to straighten it out’” (Heidegger M. , *Being and Time*, 2008, p. 57). It can also mean to provide oneself with something. The idea of choosing the word “concern” is to expose the Being of Dasein ontologically as Care.

Just as the world and its worldhood should not be understood categorically as the totality of objects, but as existential, so is “Being-in” itself must be given an existential sense. For Dasein’s being, Heidegger appeals to the sense of “being-in” as dwelling, residing among or being familiar with (*In* here is delivered from “*innan*” which conveys “to reside,” “to dwell”). Existence and understanding are the two constitutive structures of Dasein’s being as Being-in the world. Whereas ‘existence’ presupposes our inherent existential being and the understanding of being makes us aware our already situated nature of being-in the world. Emphasis is given here on the elemental “givenness” about my existence. Heidegger uses the expression “thrownness” for our existential nature. For, our lives just erupted into the world beyond our control. I do not have any choice of being black, white, big or small. Man, Heidegger says, always find them thrown in a world and so “thrown” into the situations of a given culture as well as into the inevitabilities of being human. One cannot avoid such

thrownness. And this thrownness presupposes Dasein's facticity as its Being-in-the-world has always dispersed itself or even split itself up into definite ways of Being-in.

The essential relationship between two entities as Being-in the world is possible only under the already conditioned world where they find themselves already in a world not of their makings. But their inter-connectedness or existential status is such that contrary to anything like the Being-present-at-hand together of anything that occur. There is no such thing as the side-by-side-ness of an entity called Dasein with another entity called "world." Contrary to what Heidegger mean, there is a possibility of expressing Being-in metaphorically as a state when we say "I am into Jazz Music," "I am in love," etc., in an abstract way. But Heidegger's Being-in entails the existential one and the objective or literal derivative – a practical engagement with gear of the surrounding life world; a dwelling expanding in the Euclidean space.

The crucial claim that Heidegger made is his inclusion of human being or Da-sein (literally "being-there") as the site of the occurrence of Being. He argues that the question of Being matters only for those beings whose being is an issue at all; and the being which able to understands the question of Being in general. He named this being Da-sein (an ordinary German word meaning roughly (human) existence or more technically "being-there"). Humans are the sites that open up a meaningful world, and it is only in such a world that beings can be the beings that they are (otherwise not). As he himself often stressed that the Being question can simply be understood as a question of the relation between Being and human being, a relation he characterizes as a "belonging together." As being is what "presence," is that fundamental disclosure which is embodied in the linguistic practices of a given culture in a given epoch of its historical existence. It is for this reason that Heidegger says that being exists only through human beings. Being in its broadest sense is here conceived to have a number of horizons of disclosures. And when Heidegger talks about "horizon of disclosure," he incorporated certain essential disclosure of beings which will be discussed in the proceedings - such as Dasein, temporality, Time, Language, Care, etc.

**DASEIN'S BEING-IN-THE-WORLD AND BEING-WITH-OTHER:  
TEMPORALITY, HISTORICITY AND LANGUAGE**

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**5.0. Question of Temporality: Being and time**

Being is understood as “horizon” as if understood as space or ground where diverse essential constitutions of entities are fused together. Accordingly, Heidegger described Being as follows: Firstly, Being is nothing mysterious, requiring special competence or revealed only to initiates. It is rather supremely simple, too simple in a way of experiencing and thinking in a more direct and immediate way, of relating themselves to the whole in more open and self-evident fashion. The concept already involved in our experiencing of a thing, hence unconcealed already and universal. In this way, “Being is nearer than any existent thing, any object, yet paradoxically it is far off, too, since it is endless and inexhaustible” (Gray, 1952, pp. 415-422).

Secondly, the so-called Being is understood as “temporal.” By advocating this, Heidegger is known to have clearly departed from the Greek philosophers from whom he borrowed so much of ideas about Being. However, Heidegger did really make a turn because Being in the Greek tradition came to be understood as “substance” (*ousia*), and substance in turn was equated with *parousia*, presence. That which is truly present is the enduring, unchanging, to which both past and future are irrelevant. So being became in Plato, Aristotle, and even the later Christian philosophy identified with the timeless and supreme consequently, ontology passed into theology (Gray, 1952, pp. 415-422). Heidegger wanted to eradicate those understandings; on the contrary he understands that Being is neither substance nor God nor a world-ground in the German Idealist – Hegelian tradition. The essence of Being certainly is “temporality.” And there is no dualism in his thought of reality and appearance, of unchanging form and protean matter. The identification of Being with unchanging reality which is beyond time and space is negated and cultivated instead, the notion of temporality of Being. We have seen that Heidegger shows how even in Aristotle, it is the primacy of substance as constantly present. Heidegger’s dismantling of western tradition of metaphysics

proceeds by pointing out the temporal determination of Being, that Dasein tacitly interprets / understands Being from time, so time must be grasped as the horizon of every understanding and of Being. So Being is to be understood from its temporality.

### **5.1. Time as the Horizon for Being: Temporality and Historicity as Dasein's Being**

Man as Da-sein is distinguished by the understanding of Being and man as Dasein in terms of temporality and historicity. Heidegger associates time with Being not in a series of time but as which that stands still, a series of “nows,” and Being as temporal in the sense is a timeless, supernatural, metaphysical conception of time. For Heidegger, Being is temporal and thereby, it is not a substance. “...To deny substantiality to the self and to interpret it as a temporal structure would seem to rob it of claims to permanence. What is even more startling in Heidegger's philosophy is that Being as such appears to be temporal, and such a view is almost inevitable if one takes Dasein as the clue to the meaning of Being, and holds that Dasein through and through temporal...” (Macquarrie, 2002, p. 131).

An analysis of Dasein includes certain a priori essential constitution of its Being involved in its everydayness. In such analysis what we found at the earliest is that temporality is the meaning of the Being of that entity which we call Dasein. Dasein always finds itself in a situation of temporal and non permanent being. From the light of what already discussed, Dasein to have a pre-ontological Being as its ontically constitutive state, it may be further elaborated that Dasein understands itself as something of temporal being only with reference to time. Hence, Heideggerian Phenomenological analysis of Dasein consists of the need to explicate time as the horizon for all understanding of Being, that is the Being of Dasein.

*“Time needs to be explicated primordially as the horizon for all understanding of Being, and in terms of temporality as the Being of Dasein, which understands Being” (Heidegger, 2008, p. 18).*

We come to the discovery of Being through an understanding of there-being (Da-sein). Since the metaphysical conception of man fails to take into account the relationship of man's essence to Being, man's ek-sistence is ek-stasis. So being can be revealed only in Dasein. On the other hand, Being determines beings, Being breaks into openness which is the essence of man. Since disclosure is truth as *aletheia*, Dasein is the truth of Being and Dasein is the place of the truth of Being. Both are interrelated. The temporal ek-stasis of human being as Da-sein exists not simply in the present but lives out to future – to and past – then. Being is thus essentially and ontologically temporal.

Heidegger's dismantling (*Abbau* or destruction) of the western tradition of metaphysics proceeds by pointing out the temporal determination of being implied in his thinking of Being in terms of "constant presence" (Davis, 2010, p. 7). As Heidegger's ontological investigation took the challenge of defining the meaning of what "presences," the ground where all such disclosures taken place, only the temporal understanding of Being in relation to Dasein with time can satisfactorily answer the question.

To understand this Heidegger pointed out how the Greeks interpreted Being in terms of time: *ousia* (being) meaning presence, the present. From the light of this he interpreted that if Being is what it is / presences (temporally understood Dasein), then authentic Being is that which is never not there. i.e., what is always there (*aci on* - perpetual Being). Hence, one of Heidegger's central and most decisive philosophical claims is that "Being itself essentially occurs temporally and historically" (Davis, 2010, p. 8). Heidegger asks why we understand Being as presence in the first place, and propose in *Being and Time* that this understanding is made possible by our own temporality. By using the term 'temporality' in Heideggerian sense one should know its unique feature from the traditional understanding of temporality where time is the infinite transcendental framework in which is found different fragmented times, or the temporal phenomenal changes taken place without itself changed. By 'temporality' Heidegger means a state where Dasein's "thrownness" is temporally experienced with the identification of itself as something like Being with reference to time. The transcendental infinite time here is reduced down to the essence of Dasein's being, of course without Dasein time is said to have no meaning at all. Only when the two are fused

together that the realization of Dasein's being as temporal can be thought of. Time in that sense is finite, it ceases to exist with the death of Dasein. Hence it is always limited by the mortality of Dasein, or the possibility of death. Similarly, Being and time determines each other reciprocally. Dasein is not the master of its own origin; man is a project or illumination of Being.

We have seen that for Heidegger a human being is never an isolated, wordless subject, but is an entity that in its very essence is constituted by its world (Guignon, 1993, p. 63). Dasein, always finds its being as temporal. "By temporality, it does not mean that we are, as are all other things, confined to time, nor that we have a sense of time, but rather that we exist as three temporal dimensions at once: it is being ahead of ourselves in the future, drawing on our pasts, while being concerned with the present that constitutes our being. The way we project ourselves into the future (ahead of ourselves) while taking with us our past (being already in) in our immersion into the present (being at home with) is what Heidegger designates as the "ekstases" of temporality" (Guignon, 1993). All it means is that we are already "extended" outward in temporal dimensions and so are never contained in a "punctual" here and now (Heidegger, 2008, p. 370). The temporal ek-stasis of human being – to exist not simply in the present but out future – to and past – then. Dasein's unity is found in the structure of finite time.

So Being attended to one's Dasein is Being attended to the temporal structure of the human beings have to be. Our thrownness is experienced as a mood, pastness and futurity together that makes Dasein an "I am as having been." Its futurity is only through pastness. The past provides possibility of the future.

Some people consider the discussion of temporality as the climax of Heidegger's *Being and Time*. And this temporality is nothing other than the discussion of time, where several points were raised against the common conception of time. Firstly, he is trying to criticize the idea of time as a uniform, linear and Infinite series of "now – points." Of course, this idea traced to have its origin or influence from Aristotle's *Physics* which systematizes time as a fragmentation of the future - i.e. the not-yet-now, the past – i.e. the no longer now, and the

present that is “the now” that flows from future to past at each passing moment. This is what Heidegger calls the “vulgar” or ordinary conception of time where the present time is prioritized as what matters most. And this conception, Heidegger says has pervaded the ancient Greeks to Hegel and even up to his near contemporary Bergson.

Secondly, he wanted to negate the idea of time that begins with a distinction between time (temporal) and eternity. Under such notion time itself is reckoned to be infinite, eternal where all temporal human time has its roots. This is clear even from the Christian theology where the eternal God whose timeless essence is thought to determine the temporal time. The classical St. Augustine’s *Confession* made it clear that temporality is derived from a higher-non-temporal state of eternity, which is co-extensive with the infinite and eternal now of God.

## **5.2. From time to Dasein**

In order to understand what Heidegger means by temporality, we should remind ourselves of the fact that it always can be made clear only in the context of the existential analytic of Dasein. For Being as such is understood from Dasein’s way of Being, which means each of our interpretation begins with the analysis of Dasein including temporality. Heidegger in *Being and Time* made it clear that Dasein is always ahead of itself; the human being is always running ahead towards its end. Being-towards-death is the technical description of it. For Heidegger, the primary phenomenon of time is the future that is revealed to me in my being-towards-death. The tricky thing involved here is what comes out of the future is my past, my personal and cultural baggage, which he calls my “having-been-ness” (*Gewesenheit*) (Critchley, 2009 ). And because of who I am in a free action (Resoluteness), I determine the present time. The present is something that I can seize hold of and resolutely make my own. Time should be grasped in and of itself as the unity of the three dimensions – what Heidegger calls “ecstasies” – of future, past, and present. This is what he calls “primordial” or “original” time and he insists that it is finite. It comes to an end in death. For Heidegger, we are time. Temporality is a process with three dimensions which form a unity.

Dasein always finds itself a temporal being. Its being is a being-towards-death, which means death is the culmination of its being that inevitably comes at the end or for the completion of its being. Mineness that is also attributed to Dasein's being is experienced when a particular Dasein faces death as its own. And this temporal being of Dasein is realized only with time as the horizon of disclosure. With the inspiration of Wilhelm Dilthey and Count Yorck's letter on historicity, Heidegger's concept of time finally emerged in 1924, where he made certain claims that – "Each Dasein is itself time": "Dasein is history" (*Gesamtausgabe* 64: 57, 86 as cited in - (Polt, 2010, p. 70).

In *Being and Time* he even made a claim already that Being itself exists temporally and historically, to show that the intertwining results of the two made the disclosure of Being meaningful. In other words, "to be human is to be temporal and historical; conversely, time and history can be understood only with reference to ourselves" (Polt, 2010, p. 70).

The crucial point that Heidegger wanted to explicate is time is the horizon for any understanding of Being. And when we say Being, it is none other than Dasein's essential constitution of its Being-in-the-world. Following this, whenever we talk of Dasein's being as primordial temporality, it realized with time which again is speculated in three dimensions: future, past and present. The reason for saying is that when we think of a human being as the temporal unfolding of a life course, we can identify three structural elements that make up human existence. First, Dasein always finds itself "thrown" into a concrete situation and attuned to a cultural and historical context where things already count in determinate ways in relation to a community's practices. In fact, this prior thrownness into the medium of shared intelligibility, disclosed in our moods, makes up Dasein's facticity. Second, agency is "discursive" in the sense that in our activities we are articulating the world and interacting with situations along the guidelines of interpretations embodied in our public language. Third, Dasein is "understanding." It has always taken some stand on its life insofar as it has undertaken the vocations, roles, life-styles, personal relationships, and so on that give content to its life.

### 5.3. Definition of three dimension of time

Here Heidegger advocated the “fluidity of time” where we always found the inter-play of future, past and present. And it is the subordination of natural, linear time to the temporality of Dasein, because in 1935 Heidegger himself clarifies that: “strictly speaking, we cannot say there was a time when there were no human beings. At every time, there were and are and will be human beings, because time temporalizes itself only as long as there are human beings” (Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, 2000, pp. 88-89). Therefore he suggests that it is always right to ask “Am I time?” than “what is time?” Time has a meaning only when human being (Dasein) identifies themselves with it. And the Infinite time – the necessary a priori conditions in Kant is reduced to finite, for the future is always limited by the possibility of death; it came to end with the death of Dasein.

Heidegger’s new way of defining ontology proposes that time is not simply an aspect of change, or a subjective framework for perceiving change. Time is rooted in our very essence, in our concern with our own being (Polt, 2010, p. 69). Thus his new interpretation of ontology relies upon the intertwining results of Being and time as a result of which, Dasein’s temporal Being can be conceived at all. Against infinite time, he introduced finite time, because the influence of time terminates following the death of Dasein. The so-called Being question is only defined within the context of this temporality with time rooted in our very essence.

Heidegger’s concept of time can be understood only within the paradigm of Dasein’s temporality, which means the question of Being is validated so long as Dasein understands itself with time. The fundamental task of *Being and Time* is thus showing of time as the “horizon” for any understanding of Being (Heidegger, Being and Time, 2008, p. 1 / 17), where it says that if our being is not temporal, there’s no chance for us to distinguish ourselves at least in terms of bothering the question of Being. And if there is no such distinction, we could not be there at all which means further that there could be no Dasein, and more extensively no one to whom the issue of Being could be given. Hence, time is not something where Dasein finds itself, rather time is understood only with reference to Dasein,

together which project the meaning of Being clearly. And when we say that time is deeply rooted in our very essence, one should always understand what Heidegger said, that our given being and our possible being, can be technically termed as “facticity” and “futurity.” “Facticity” simply conveys a state where we find ourselves ‘thrown’ into a given situation or historical context in which our being is passive but to simply identify it as our own –our ontological embeddedness to the world. On the other hand, futurity entails the need to come to grip with our own existence because we generate time of our own. Here, our rationality is somewhat emphasized to be what we are in connection with the understanding of Being in general. Heidegger emphasized several traits of temporality. Firstly, it is ecstatic: the future, past and present are ways in which we “stand out” into possibilities, facticity and current situation. Time does not consist of point like instants, but stretches into three dimensions. Secondly, the primary temporal ecstasies are the future: the present and past are awakened as such by Dasein’s need to pursue some possible way of existing. Time is also finite, in that the future is always limited by the possibility of death (Polt, 2010, p. 73).

#### **5.4. Death**

How far is Being determined by time? Being and time, says Heidegger, determine each other reciprocally. Dasein is not the master of its own origin but finds itself as already an existing fact, i.e., immersed in its original situation of mundaneness in dependence on other beings as thrown into the world to existence. Da-sein is a being to death or a being to nothing. Da-sein is an incomplete being, has to realize itself in the face of death and nothingness. “...in so doing, he becomes conscious of himself as the torchbearer of true Being, which through man’s thinking and language, illumines the world. Man is the project (*Entwurf*) or illumination of Being (*Lichtung des seins*). As such he leads an authentic existence. In this authentic existence the truth of Beings revealed. In this revelation of unveiling of truth, man experiences the metaphysical, namely, Being as the foundation of his thinking and culture” (Macquarrie, 2002, pp. 116-117).

As Dasein is a “being-toward-death” which terminates with death, temporality is what characterized Dasein thoroughly. Dasein’s totality can be revealed only in its being-toward-death. Death accomplished the totality of Dasein’s being meaning, the primordial reality of

death which comes at the end of Dasein's being is something true, and will always be true, so long as Dasein's ontological being is concerned. Since the aim of this project is to investigate the meaning of Being in general, and since the meaning of Being in general is disclosed by Dasein, the ultimate clarification of the meaning of Being demands an appropriately ultimate (primordial) interpretation of Dasein. Dasein always clarifies itself as a temporal being, which is its primordial nature.

Dasein's mortality is what really makes its being a temporal being. The unshakable truth of Dasein is its total vulnerability to death and which again is its forever identity. My first-person sense of death establishes my life not only a "totality," but also as uniquely mine – that is beyond my social being of sharing a community to fulfill the law of the community. But it is by virtue of mineness that the occurrence of death can be happened only with me. It cannot simply be represented by others. Heidegger's justification of "death" as "totality" and "mineness" for the completion of Dasein may be clear from the following elaboration. For instance, my profession of being a teacher in the university can be undoubtedly be replaced by some other able persons. My role here is such that it can be made common to people of possessing the same educational qualifications, which I now just enjoy it as my own. But there's a possibility of losing it, when I do not cross the norm of the employers or of handling it over to my colleagues to mind it for a while, as they are also qualified to pursue it so. Likewise, somebody else could have filled the position I occupy in society; somebody else could have been the husband of the wife I now married, the father of her children, and so on. The commonality among ourselves made us possible either to be represented or to represent in that manner. Even the concrete marriage that normally happened only between the couple remained helpless before such possible interchange or representation. However, my possibility of being represented by another individual breaks down in one case and in one case only: in the case of my death.

My possible death or inevitable death (ontologically) is what is private and not shared by none. Of course, there are a number of other possible cases in which, apparently, our personal presence is indispensable. For instance, I am required to be present when operation on my body is to be performed by doctors. In other case, I need to be present before the

authority, when I am found not doing justice in the service of mine as teacher of the university, or else I should be terminated. But it is also clear that such counterexamples can have no bearing whatsoever on Heidegger's point about death, for there's always a chance for me to decide whether to undergo surgery or to face the authority respectively. If I later on realized myself that I already have lived long enough, and no point of further sustaining my life with such surgery, or if I am not afraid of losing my job at all, I can always decide not to meet or avoid the doctor or university authority. My presence or absence on those occasions is solely a matter of my own choice. But the crucial point Heidegger wanted to emphasize is in no case can I avoid appearing before the tribunal of death. Man alienates himself from his authentic existence as being-to-death and acts in an inauthentic way. Man is not the ruler but guardian of Being and his way of being is bound up with destiny of Being. This relation is characterized as summoning-listening. In order to exist, man must carefully attend to silent summoning of Being and attend the call preserve it in truth.

Now we can understand why Heidegger had attributed to death the power of both totalizing and individualizing Dasein. Death totalizes Dasein's being because only with the occurrence of death in Dasein will its identity become complete. And it individualizes too Dasein for it imposes upon me the one and only experience that is inescapably mine. Thus whatever negative aspects we may be attributed to death, such as annihilation, demise, vanish, no more there in the world, die out, etc. are not what is primarily emphasized upon, rather death which inevitably happened at one's life is constitutive for Dasein's totality. And this phenomenon is something each one can or will take as their own. But death, understood here as totality of one's life and mineness always remain inescapable; rather a simultaneous occurrence to one's life is noticed unfailingly.

By clinging to this notion, Heidegger is known to have come closer to the modern idea of subjectivity, particularly to Descartes metaphysics of consciousness. Because it is true to both philosophers that the human individual is thrown back upon his own self by a sense of total powerlessness and vulnerability in the face of an ultimate threat (the evil demon in Descartes and the threat of death in Heidegger respectively) (Guignon, 1993, p. 199). There may be a common sense objection to this notion that death is not at all a problem when we

are healthy, and when we knew that we are free from any dreadful diseases following the medical checkup we recently had. But what Heidegger reminded us is that when the final revealing of death is happened in one's life, or the actual state of affairs – that is, the two face of death is brought out and articulated, the treat of death reveals itself as being indeed constant and all pervasive. Death certainly makes our being a temporal being, a non-permanent being and the duration within which the question of Being matters only lasted for a short time, i.e. the span of one's (Dasein) temporal being.

### **5.5. Historicity**

From what is already discussed, we come to another crucial point of Historicity. As Heideggerian ontological Phenomenology at the deepest is trying to understand Being by taking into account certain 'horizon' through which the manifestation of what "is" or Being in general is made explicit. Owing to the phenomenological description of Being he sees the necessity of understanding Being with historicity, following the idea that Dasein is itself temporal, thrown in a particular context of the world with care conceived as the overall essence of it. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger made a claim that temporality and historicity are central to any understanding of Being whatsoever. Of course, by making such a claim or in pursuance of his own phenomenology, Heidegger is already filled with certain precedent notions such as Husserl's inner history – the immanence of history in the consciousness of a subject, historical approaches of Freidrich Nietzsche and Wilhelm Dilthey, which he later on reacted on another way round. And it is needed to remind ourselves once again of the Being for whom the question of Being matters; it is none other than Dasein where every parameters of Being attributed to. And when we speak of temporality / historicity, it is something that centers in and around Dasein only.

In his earliest formulations of phenomenology, Husserl negates the idea that all human understanding is contextualized in history, and wanted to cultivate on the contrary that phenomenology as a concept should describe how things show up for consciousness, not provide historical explanations of how they came to be. His proclamation of "philosophy as rigorous science" (*Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft*), rejected all accounts of our beliefs

as historical products on the ground that such genetic approaches promote “historicism” a form of historical relativism that sees all belief and interpretation as relative to the historical worldview in which they appear (Guignon, History and Historicity, 2009). Martin Heidegger, Husserl’s protégé did make a challenge to this conception of phenomenology and advocated instead that historicity is embedded in any understanding of Being. Drawing on the explicitly historical approaches of Nietzsche and Dilthey, he shifts the focus of phenomenology from the intuitions in the consciousness of a subject to what emerges into presence in a temporal and historical unfolding.

Heidegger’s conception of history and historicity grew out of his account of Dasein as temporality. And this temporality is nothing but the mortality that inevitably happens in Dasein for its completion. Temporality, Heidegger says is, “the condition for the possibility of historicity as a temporal mode of being of Dasein” (Guignon, The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger, 1993). In other words, it is because of Dasein’s unique characteristics or distinctive structure that made relevant the world (transcendental) as its own, particularly the unfolding of the world-history. Of course, its entire way of life is described as movement or happening rather than describing it as a life where the subjective part is playing more heed. Its movement or happening where Dasein’s being is wholly determined by its historicity for its being is thrown in such a particular context of history to fully immerse in it and being colored by such background.

To say that Dasein’s being is characterized by historicity is to say that it has two related characteristics. Firstly, it means that Dasein is its past, where this past is given meaning and salience by Dasein’s future-directed projects. This, he clarifies it in his notion of “fluidity of time” in which the past happens out of its future on each occasion. Secondly, it means that whatever way has Dasein of understanding itself at any time stems from the traditional or handed-down (*uberkommene*) way of interpreting itself into which it has grown up in the first place. By this understanding, Heidegger said, is the possibilities of its being are disclosed and regulated. The concrete range of possible roles and self definitions we can take over in realizing our identity are all drawn from the pool of self-interpretations handed down to us by our history. For the past here, is not something which follows along after

Dasein, but rather (the past is) something which already goes ahead of it: the possibilities we receive from the past give us guidance and direction in taking a stand on the future.

For Heidegger there is a good reason to say that human beings are essentially historical. We are born into an environment already formed by multiple layers of interpretation and tradition, even down to the most seemingly immediate sense of things and of the “I” that perceives and thinks them (Clark, 2002, p. 29). And in *Being and Time*, he already asserted that there is no pre-given, timeless human nature; what is certain is that he is thrown to the world to fully immerse in it, which means also that his being is shaped up and nurtured by the tradition where we fall is what basically determined our identity, because how we think and act, or technically being-in-the-world is wholly determined by our historicity. When Heidegger turns to the topic of history, unlike Husserl who goes on undertaking history in terms of meaning-world, or immanent in subjectivity, Heidegger emphasized upon the practical dimension of human being caught up in the lived-world, where community and history really have direct relevance to one’s life. And the way human beings are thrown to such history is something we can never fully objectify and comprehend. He simply took it for granted history to be part of the factual thrownness that constitutes our being enmeshed in a non-totalizable context.

History really determines us that way because to Heidegger, our being-in-the-world has nothing more unique identity than our being in terms of existence. To be in the world here means to fully inherit the world and accept our thrownness and experience them by living. And this history is more or less encountered in the form of tradition. No person is away from such tradition, rather one’s being is shaped up and molds by such tradition. But the danger he adds is that when Dasein is fully immersed in a tradition there is a chance of indulging only in the shallow way of existing which he also termed as inauthenticity. For he says we “fall prey” (*verfallt*) to this tradition in such a way that it becomes master of us: the tradition takes what has come to us and delivers it over to self-evidence, with the result that we lose the ability to grasp what it transmits. So tradition “blocks our access to (the) primordial ‘well-springs’ (*quellen*) from which our concepts spring in such a way that we forget that they have had such an origin’. In such a state of fallenness, or inauthenticity there used to be

the forgetfulness of one's authenticity, because under such condition one simply indulges himself in everydayness. Hence, to counteract the fallenness and forgetfulness because of such complete immersion of the tradition, Heidegger suggests at the end the need to destroy or deconstructing the tradition and retrieve rather the originality where Dasein's authentic being will be restored. To deconstruct here means to peel off the hardened layers of concealment superimposed by tradition in order to recover or retrieve the "primordial experiences in which we achieved our first ways of determining the nature of being – the ways that have guided us ever since" (Guignon, History and Historicity, 2009).

With these characteristics of being's essential temporality, historicity, which includes the requirement of human being, and its truth as an event of revealing / concealing, we can assure that Heidegger's approach to Being is not of something real despite all changes, universal among particulars, substance behind the substrate as traditional ontology does. It is rather a new approach of trying to explicate in the form of horizons of disclosure of Being.

## **5.6. Facticity, Moods and Thrownness**

Being is nothing, No-thing, because it is not a being, Being as No-thing is other than what being is. It is anxiety that reveals nothing. It is the world itself before which Dasein is anxious. It is the world in which Dasein has to find its meaningful existence and thus it is the very being-in-the-world of Dasein before which Dasein is anxious. Being hides itself and conceals itself, it is the mystery of Being.

"Dasein's essence is its *Existenz*, which is an issue or question for it, characterized by a thrownness and temporal finitude; a being that is "delivered over to itself" and is responsible for what it makes of that. The lucid realization that my "Dasein as being-in-the-world" is "without ground," a truth from which I flee in the habitual dispersal into the "they-self," provides the possibility for that might be termed as "existential autonomy," in which I take up the burden of, and responsibility for, my existence, as being with others, where "the-they" that still is me neither absorbs nor releases me from the responsibility for my ownmost being-in-the-world..." (Davis, 2010, pp. 55-56).

Death also reveals the factual nature of Dasein who is thrown into the world and is ahead of itself as a being-toward-death. As bound up with thrownness Dasein discovers the temporal nature of its being as disclosed in anxiety and in moods Heidegger refers to anxiety as a “*Grundstimmung*,” a fundamental attunement or mood. The moods show up how everything shows up to a being in the world. Anxiety lays bare the structure of Dasein’s existence. Anxiety is just the experience of disconnection from one’s commitments and projects.

That no particular thing shows up as threatening means that anxiety is to be sharply distinguished from fear, despite a certain qualitative similarity in terms of how it feels. Anxiety has all the trappings of fear, but part of what makes anxiety so unsettling is the absence of anything that is prompting these feelings or toward which such feelings are directed. (Fear, by contrast, is always directed toward something, where ‘something’ should be constructed broadly to include situations and eventualities, as well as objects and agents). The only threat which can be “fearsome” and which is discovered in fear always comes from inner worldly beings” (*Being and Time*, p. 174 / 185-6 as cited in (Cerbone, 2008, pp. 89-90). Anxiety reveals the vulnerability and the temporality as well as facticity of its existence that Dasein confronts its existence as an issue, to be constituted by a “not yet”: “That for which *Angst* (anxiety) is anxious is not a definite kind of being and possibility of Dasein” (Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 2008, p. 175/188). Anxiety individuates Dasein to its own most being and takes it away from anonymous they self. While an authentic Dasein can only come to itself through and as history, the authentic self is an appropriation of a history into which it has always already been thrown. Authentic self finally resolute its own ending in a way suited to its own pre-governed nature. And this resoluteness is somewhat identified as releasement too.

In order to explore further the ontological structures of Dasein Heidegger now concentrates more on deeper sense of language, in poetic revelations and the care structures that also reveal the deep historical and epochal call of the destiny of being to be essentially attuned to a mysterious depth of the Being of beings.

**LANGUAGE IS THE SAYING OF BEING: LANGUAGE AS THE HORIZON  
OF DISCLOSURE OF BEING-WITH-OTHERS**

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**6.0. A Phenomenological exploration of Language as a “horizon of disclosure”**

As Heidegger tries to explicate Being in the form of horizons of disclosures, Being in its broadest sense is conceived to have a number of horizons. And when Heidegger talks about “horizon of disclosure,” he incorporates certain essential disclosures of Being such as Dasein, temporality, time, language, care, etc. In this turn, Dasein discovers the essence of Language as the house of Being and reaches out to Being by constantly re-visiting this house. In *Poetry, Language, Thought* Heidegger writes as –

*“Whenever we go to the well, or walk through the wood, we are always already going through the ‘fountain’ and the word ‘wood’, even though we are not saying those words or thinking of anything linguistic”* (Parkes, 1992, p. 208).

Heidegger’s *Question Concerning Language* is a phenomenological exploration of how language involved in our daily human experience as an event or a happening. Heidegger clarifies this thus: “to explain something, whether a thing, a human, or a god, means that something befalls us, strikes us, comes over us, overwhelms and transforms us” (Heidegger, *On the Way to Language*, 1971, p. 57). Heidegger says we are off track in accepting language as included in our daily experience and hence we just take it for granted. Thus the necessary and immediate task is to establish conditions steering our experiences particularly of what seems intimately at our disposal. Even though, we read and write sentences consisting of words and symbols with which communication goes smoothly without bias, yet we fail to pay heed to language itself on ‘how’ it serves as the meaningful communication tool, and we eventually fail to grasp its full dimensionality.

Heidegger's thoughts on language are gathered in *On the Way to Language*, Vol.12 of his collected edition. Language also arises as a key theme in *Being and Time*, *The work of Art* and *Letter on Humanism*. "Heidegger's analysis of the origins of language can be traced back to his earlier works like *Duns Scotus*, his doctoral dissertation—*The Theory of Judgment in Psychologism* of 1913, *The Recent Researches into Logic* of 1912, and *The Habilitationsschrift*. (Rampey, 1994) The compendium of the investigation of language in Heidegger must be *On the way to Language*, volume 12 of his collected Editions (GA 12), Gesamtausgabe – 1975 – English translations are distributed among the essay *Language*, which appeared in *Poetry, Language and Thought*, translated by Albert Hofstadter (PLT). *The way to language* was re-translated by David Krell for the revised edition of *Basic Writings* (BW). Other works where the issue of language is taken up includes – 34 sections of *Being and Time*, *The Origin of the work of Art*; *Letter on Humanism*, both in *Basic Writings* (BW) as well as many lecture courses and unpublished manuscripts" (Lysaker, 2010, p. 195).

Heidegger's understanding of language has two distinct phases. The first of these two phases is found in his post *Being and Time* works or the later philosophy. In general, the apparent difference between the first and the second phase is that the understanding of language attributed to or moving along with Dasein's (man) capacity in the earlier phase has shifted to *Sein* (Being) in the later phase. The active participation or capacity of Dasein in acknowledging and making use of language in the earlier phase is replaced by the passivity of Dasein in listening to the new language of Being in the later philosophy. The concept of language which emerged in his analysis of Dasein has turned to the more general investigation or deeper investigation of Being as such. In line with the general pattern of the thesis, between authenticity and in-authenticity part, Heidegger's address to language is also found to be divided into two parts, after *the Turn*, the post *Being and Time*, one and the earlier one scattered in *Being and Time* writings. Both these phases of his writings on language are Being-centric and similar in essence although the focus in the first phase is more Da-sein based while the second is more the mystery of the Being / *Sein* (man to Being) centric. To quote Timothy Clark: "The crucial issue for Heidegger after *Being and Time*

becomes language, and the language of a tradition, what it covers over, the recourse it draws from, what it reveals unsaid” (Clark, 2002, p. 72).

## **6.1. A phenomenological re-interpretation of Language**

Greeks defined man as an “animal who speaks,” which was later forgotten in a more focused definition of man as “rational animal” (Alackpally, 2002, p. 166). Heidegger re-interprets the Greek definition of the essence of man as “*Zoon logon echon*” (Heidegger, Letter on Humanism, 1993, p. 226) – “the living being” who has language, showing that language is not only natural for man but a distinctive trait of man, in fact, so distinctive that he is defined in terms of his speaking (language). Heidegger interprets that it is language which enables man to be precisely that living being which he is as man, not that man has only the capacity to speak in order to maintain his identity in this sense. Thus language holds a crucial place in the “being of man.” But unfortunately, Heidegger regrets, that the traditional philosophy goes on interpreting man not as “the living being that has language,” or “the living being that speaks,” but as “the rational animal,” the interpretation, he thinks, is in a reversed way. Against the traditional view which told that language is the audible activity which gives external expression to human thought and feeling, Heidegger wanted to redeem language as a primordial event by which Being is raised to the level of *Logos* (Alackpally, 2002, p. 166). Since the popular views failed to realize or ignored deliberately the oldest natural cast of language as language, Heidegger tries to re claim it in order to restore the fundamental ontology of Dasein. In this turn, Dasein discovers the essence of Language in a new way that “Language is the house of Being” (Lysaker, 2010, p. 202), since one can have a glimpse of the “unsaid” and “undisclosed” essence of Being through a phenomenological exploration of language since it is this house only in which Being resides. Language is fundamentally meaningful not as mechanical combination of words but as the fundamental and ontological disclosure of that meaningful dimension of Being in its natural participation of beings of things and of human beings as Dasein. We live in a world that is meaningful prior to the syntactic and semantic combination of sentences and words that convey a particular kind of meaning to us.

## 6.2. Language, Being, and Da-sein

Heidegger never claimed that his investigation of the essence of language is a new philosophic endeavor of the Being-question. Rather Being's disclosures into beings is thought to be filled by the complex and necessary interference of temporality, Dasein, time, etc, of which language is what is necessary too. In his work, *On the Way to Language*, Heidegger claims that from the beginning, the question of language and logic was closely related to the Being-question. He states: "...reflection or language and on Being had determined my path from early on..." (Alackpally, 2002, p. 165).

Heidegger's phenomenology, right from the beginning concerns with the disclosure of phenomena as exactly as what they show from themselves. Heidegger's philosophical endeavor is the task of analysis of the phenomenological slogan – "Back to the things themselves" (Moran, 2000, p. 9), in a more daily experience-oriented way that accords the praxis over theory. Within such context language plays a crucial and spontaneous role in the first phase of Dasein's intelligibility. In this sense, it appears in the speculation that language is more closely allied to understanding than a mere activity of man or the state of mind. For understanding, Heidegger indicates that the world is "there" as that for the sake of which Dasein is. And "in the for-the-sake-of which, existing Being-in-the-world is discovered as such and this disclosedness we have called understanding" (Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 2008, p. 182). Understanding thus defined, grounds "significance" as "that on the basis of which the world is disclosed as such" (Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 2008, p. 182).

Heidegger's probe of language in *Being and Time* is the result of his investigation of Dasein, the Being, he said, for whom its own existence or Being is an issue. As his understanding of Being is something in terms of a space within which variety of entities play essential roles. Language automatically appears in the analysis of Dasein.

Heidegger acknowledges the necessity of language in the process of the horizon of disclosures of Being into different phenomena. Understanding makes Dasein realize its world including its potentiality of involving in the disclosure of the world as such.

Heidegger names it as “Interpretation” (*Auslegung*). Accordingly, interpretation is grounded in the understanding. In the early phase of the development of Being, Heidegger conceives that Dasein’s being-in-the-world may be termed as “a priori,” where Dasein’s capacity is like a portal through which the totality of world’s disclosure happened. More specifically, the Being-in of Dasein or the “there” of being is constituted by state of mind (*Befindlichkeit*), understanding (*Verstehen*) and Discourse (*Rede*) collectively. In this way it is apparently observable that the ontology of language is within the fundamental ontology of Dasein. Heidegger later calls for non-representational saying of Being where Dasein is no longer active in commanding the language but passively listens to the saying of Being.

Heidegger initially discusses language in *Being and Time* as an instrument of human expression although Heidegger often stressed that the Being question can simply be understood as a question of the relation between Being and human being, a relation he characterizes as a “belonging together.” Unlike Descartes’ “cogito,” where the a priori idea / mind claims the identity of a man and in the process of intelligence, and the alternative provided by Kantian *a priori* structures of the mind in which the perception of a thing is determined by structuring of the idea, Heidegger is looking for the Being as such with emphasis on the existential structures. It is for this reason that Heidegger says that Being exists only through human beings. Hence language is one of the agencies of the coming into presence of that which is.

Traditionally, the crucial problem of the philosophy of language lies in the area of “semantics” (Alackpally, 2002, p. 163), where intention is made to inter-relate language with the non linguistic features of the world, with which its accessibility to us will be made known. Heidegger had no problem in accommodating this idea; however, for him there is an even more crucial problem, i.e., tracing out the essence or ground of language itself, as a result of which intelligibility will be apprehended. And in doing so he hoped to come to the ultimate concern of reality that language a priori nature has privileged Dasein, prior to any initiatives taken on the part of it.

In order to explore the role of language in terms of the existential constitution of Dasein's disclosedness, for there is a realization that it is no longer we who speak, but language which speaks through us prior to our composition of our own language, the essence of language is understood in the most basic everyday existential context of Dasein's being-in-the-world. It appears that communicating with others is intelligible only when language first and foremost communicates with us.

“One does not have language if one merely defines it as a totality of words and leaves it. Language is rather a totality of words in which the intelligibility of our being-in-the-world is expressed...Heidegger does not work out an elaboration of language based on a foundation ontologically more primordial. He attempts merely to locate the phenomenon of language in the existential analytic of Dasein and describe its meaning, structure and possibilities with respect to this locus which is essentially time-bound” (Alackpally, 2002, p. 172).

Language is what constitutes Dasein's existential existence, along with those other fundamental principles / modes. “Heidegger indicates that the existential–ontological foundation of language is ‘discourse’ which is existentially equiprimordial with state-of-mind and understanding in Dasein's constitution” (Alackpally, 2002, p. 172).

Thus the existence of individual human being in a broader, technical sense is essentially conditioned by language. And discourse is here mentioned entailing the language of that sort that first beacons or gives indications which man accordingly reacts / respond with appropriate language. The existential – ontological foundation of language is thus shown to be discourse or talk, which is found to have associated with Dasein's existence. Hence, whenever Dasein's essential existence is systematically sought, its language embeddedness is an undeniable issue to be discussed.

The analysis of the already highlighted points of language can be summed up in three principal ways –

1. Language as discourse (*Rede* – the articulation of intelligibility) appears as constitutive of the disclosedness of the there (*Da*) of Dasein. Language hereby acts as the entity which makes possible the disclosure of beings as what they are.
2. Language as talk, speech (*Gerede*) served as the ground for enabling everyday's Dasein's conversation and communications, is an outcome of Dasein's thrownness to the world as the to-be-in-the-world. Being-in-the-world is preconditioned by language.
3. Language in a subjective sense also serves as the idea behind Dasein's conscience. The way thing gets revealed in Dasein's consciousness is the result of its pre-conditioned relation with language.

### **6.3. Language as Discourse**

Discourse, is what is primarily expressed in terms of speech or talk in a normal consideration. However, as an essential constitutive element of 'Da', the openness of Dasein, discourse basically is not the formal articulation of words and making use of it by Dasein according to its wish, but because it is the articulation and meaningful ordering of Dasein only as the 'to-be-in-the-world'. The being of Dasein as of now is the result of what is already conditioned in its thrownness to the world as something to automatically follow and enjoy the things which conditioned its existence. Our 'to-be-in-the-world', the openness of Being is revealed to us only by virtue of our meaningful thrownness to the world. Hence, language in terms of discourse, speech or talk in this sense constitutive of our existence primarily is the language of Being, the self-utterance of Being, and not of human speech. Humans began to speak only when they listened to discourse. Language is thus in every respect constitutive of his ek-sistence (existence).

As stated earlier, Heidegger's thematic investigation of language appears for the first time ever in section 34 of *Being and Time*, entitled as "being-there" and discourse. The main intention is to show that the phenomenon of language has its roots in the existential construction of Dasein's disclosedness (Alackpally, 2002, p. 170). The task here nevertheless includes displaying the 'ontological locus' of language in the disclosedness of

the 'there' (*Da*) of Dasein. He calls this existential ontological foundation of language '*Rede*' which is meant for "the articulation of intelligibility." The reason that Heidegger uses this word '*Rede*' – a normal everyday German usage which stands for 'talk', 'speech' or 'discourse' is to bring into the notice that language speaks to us or else playing a meaningful role in our everyday communication with others, finds itself always already rooted in an articulation of intelligibility. The intelligibility of being-in-the-world – an intelligibility which goes with state-of-mind expresses itself as *Rede* (Alackpally, 2002, p. 171). What Heidegger means by language in this sense is a complex phenomenon, which is not merely a totality of words but a complex whole in which present totality of words along with all agencies through which '*Rede*' gets expressed in our human's everyday communications. And it seemed that Heidegger's choice of the term '*Rede*' points us towards everydayness rather than towards something abstract and scientific. And this point authenticates that his way of doing phenomenology concerns with finding out all agencies involved in the presencing of things or beings.

It is necessary to further state that Dasein's being-in-the-world involves being-with-others, wherein Dasein's connection with others resulted in exchanging daily conversation or communication, which again happened within the context of meaning-bound. Otherwise the communication stands absurd, and rather useless. Hence Dasein's language after all leads to the connection with "*Logos*." A language in general presupposes certain interpretability a Dasein understands which is discourse, is modified in the later philosophy that discourse is the language of Being.

#### **6.4. Language speaks, not us**

Now if we analyze what is stated so far, we find that language is an essential existential structure of Da-sein and of Being and that Da-sein is first thrown into language over which he has no choice. In his everyday existence he just picks up language and its vocabulary as it is handed to him by tradition and he is engaged in usual mundane way of interacting with others or as inauthentic Da-sein.

## 6.5. Language as “*Gerede*”

In section 34 of *Being and Time*, Heidegger spoke of ‘*Gerede*’ (Idle talk), following the idea that Dasein’s Being-in-the-world is being-with-others in daily praxis to communicate others, shared and connect others. And this being-in-the-world is pre-determined by language in a sense that he has the capacity of listening to Being’s indication explainable as the language of Being. It also means that Dasein’s capacity of listening to the call of Being is what enables Being to be heard as a language. And no doubt, this deeper realization – representation is what makes possible the understanding of Dasein’s existence in an authentic way. Hence, Dasein now is apparently characterized by a discourse-oriented, a being which speaks and talks in the daily existence, the possibility of which is rooted in his logical orientedness reasoning capacity. Because, only by taking into account Dasein’s ability of representation, the art of reading the language of Being, discourse, will the language in the purest sense will emerge, not simply through the formal symbolic human speech or talk. Now, Dasein is the being engaged in everyday discourse – idle talk, a being using language as his identity manifestation.

But the danger appears when Dasein shallowly lives with such everyday discourse, because in such a state the hearer does not allow himself to be brought “into a being-towards what the disclosure is about so as to have a primordial understanding of it” (Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 2008, p. 212). Heidegger further states: “And because this discoursing has lost its primary relationship of Being-towards the entity talked about, or else has never achieved such a relationship, it does not communicate in such a way as to let this entity be appropriated in a primordial manner, but communicates rather by following the route of gossiping and passing the word along” (Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 2008, p. 212).

Vycinas also comments as: “In the everyday usage of language, the speaker and the listener are not oriented to the discourse, but they merely stick to the spoken words and their combinations separated from their ontological basis (discourse). Thus, the dictum replaces reality and becomes the location of truth, such an eradicated discourse, Heidegger calls chatter (*Gerede*). Just as discourse means the disclosure (openness and also truth) of Dasein,

so chatting means the opposite, namely, the concealment (untruth) of Dasein” (Vycinas, 1961, p. 49).

Heidegger again stated: “Idle talk, which closes things off in the way we have designated, is the kind of Being which belongs to Dasein’s understanding when that understanding has been uprooted ontologically...when Dasein maintains itself in idle talk, it is – as Being-in-the-world cut off from its primary and primordially genuine relationships-of-Being towards the world, towards Dasein-with, and towards its very Being-in” (Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 2008, p. 214).

The above passages makes explicit that when Dasein involved in daily idle talk, it no longer reflects its authentic existence which is a meaningful dialogue with Being, its primordial already conditioned existence rooted in its being-in-the-world is neglected and forgotten and hence groundless exchange of language it becomes. Then the phenomena of idle talk cuts Dasein off from its authentic way of Being as being-in-the-world. Because idle talk is the possibility of understanding everything without previously making the thing one’s own. Originally, Dasein’s involvement with language is conditioned by meaning-oriented, always in tune with Being’s disclosure, discourse, representations, *Rede*-oriented. But with *Gerede* – everyday language, Dasein is put under the domination of or being superimposed by the average everyday ways of the ‘they’ mode of existence. It means Dasein is no longer concern of itself. It lives as “*das man*” (the theyness mode) in its most shallow and superficial way of existence.

T. Lagan distinguishes talk (discourse) and idle talk as expressions of authentic and inauthentic modalities of Being-in-the-world: “Discourse allows the synthetic transcendence of subjectivity into objectivity by the person’s encounter (as subject) with an external objectivity that suggests the person’s objectivity. Thus, existence as both subject and object is the primordial or authentic states revealed by talk or discourse. However, idle talk is more of a probability in our encounters with the world... Idle talk reveals an experience in the absence of perception; it is an appearance – intelligible, yet lacking complete meaning. Idle

talk is thus an in-authentic form of communication that does not convey authentic existence” (Lagan, 1991, p. 39).

Then at a later phase, there is a turn, an attempt at discovering the true significance of language as a disclosure of Being and that it is no longer *Rede*. It may also be interpreted this way that Heidegger understands being as what enables all existences including man may be somewhat equated with reality in common parlance. Although this is not the way Heidegger understands it. But the idea is Being by itself is uncanny, mysterious, the reasons behind all existences, in which man finds himself embedded in. This truth is failed to realize by philosophers throughout ages and advocated subjectivism or anthropocentrism which Heidegger bitterly criticized and the blame for which he gave to Plato and Aristotle for being the pioneer works on it.

#### **6.6. Language behind Dasein’s Conscience: The recovery from “Idle talk” via Conscience (Discourse)**

In part II of second division of *Being and Time*, Heidegger talked of the redemption of Dasein fallenness from the situation involved with idle talk. The call of conscience (*Gewissensruf*) is what liberates and lifted Dasein up to regain its authenticity of Being. As the discourse mentioned in the earlier phase of the analysis of language is so rich that it contains in its realm *Rede* – the intelligibility connected to *logos* in realizing the final meaning and purpose of Dasein’s existence. *Renede* – the idle talk, superficial is winded up with sheer interaction / communication unreflectively, and even silence through which the listener can heard a meaningful inner calling i.e., reticence in Heideggerian term. Dasein understands the call of conscience and responds to the call of conscience in the mode of keeping silent. It is true that the person engaged in the conversation can clearly understand what the conversation is all about only by listening in silence what is after all being said through but the whole conversations.

Dasein is ontologically conditioned by its capacity of listening to the inner voice or conscience, with the help of which is the possibility of introspecting itself and sets itself

right from wrong or authenticity from inauthenticity. Hence its capacity of paying heed to call of conscience that Dasein saves itself from its “they” mode influenced by idle talk and regain its original authentic mode of existence. But “only in keeping silent does the conscience call, that is to say, the call comes from soundlessness of uncanniness, and the Dasein which it summons is called back into the stillness of itself, and called back as something that is to become still” (Heidegger, Being and Time, 2008, p. 343). Since hearing by keeping silence is part of discourse; Dasein meaningful discourse comes through this.

### **6.7. A Phenomenological explanation of Language: The essence of Language**

What Heidegger intended to expose was human beings are already embedded in language by using it as a form of communication, but because of which left the essence of language unthought and forgotten. On the contrary or solution rather, he affirms that the essence of language should not be thought fundamentally in terms of human communication. More specific or more precise rather is the claim that language does not originally occur as a medium whereby human beings express something through representations following the idea of what is already indicated (by Being). Our communication, which is a harmonious mixture of grammars, representative symbols, sentences, etc, does not necessarily connote our basic relation with language.

*“Our basic relation to language is not the result of human decision to represent, express and / or address. Rather, most human decisions presume this relation, and thus Heidegger would prefer to say, it is less that we speak language than that “Language speaks” (Lysaker, 2010, p. 199).*

In a lucid expression of the above claim, Heidegger even articulates as –“Every spoken word is already a response – a reply, a saying that goes to encounter, and listens” (Lysaker, 2010, p. 200). In the context of communication, words come to us already pregnant with signification. Language located at existential analytic of Dasein and is meaningful in terms of time bound Being context. That the being of Dasein is a structural unity constituted

according to three fundamental modes of equal importance; under the mode of discourse one is constitutive of the existence of individual human being.

The essence of language is understood in the most basic everyday existential context that Dasein's being-in-the-world, in terms of communicating others is intelligible only when language first and foremost communicates us. Here, our concern is not just narrowing down to a particular language or dialect but of a universal whole through which is possible Dasein's communication among themselves.

One does not have language if one merely defines it as a totality of words and leaves it. Language is rather a totality of words in which the intelligibility of our being-in-the-world is expressed...Heidegger does not work out an elaboration of language based on a foundation ontologically more primordial. He attempts merely to locate the phenomenon of language in the existential analytic of Dasein and describe its meaning, structure and possibilities with respect to this locus which is essentially time-bound (Alackpally, 2002, p. 172).

Another crucial point that needs to be emphasized is that when Heidegger took the 'turn' (*Kehre*), his phenomenological contemplation is colored by the change in emphasis on the essence of language and the Greek concept of *logos*. How the *logos* changed? The Aristotelian conception of language is what is traditionally taken for granted to be sound where language is primarily taken as communication; language does not play a role in the foundation of meaning. But Heidegger recognized that the pre-Socratic thinkers like Parmenides and Heraclitus, held a different but precise understanding of the *logos*, than did Plato and Aristotle (Plato and Aristotle held the idea that language is the outcome of the logical and scientific reasoning capability of human beings). They held the locus of language to be of something immutable, permanently real from which drawn even the meaning. Heidegger retrieved and re-interpreted the pre-Socratic usage of the word *logos*, which signify a primal collecting or gathering. He says man's thoughtful dwelling within the essence of language takes the fundamental form of "gathering" of that which lies before him according to the manner in which it lies before him. What is noteworthy is Heidegger approves the derivative grammatical and assertive significations of language by Plato and

Aristotle. Because language he says, is such a complex concept where scientific and logical reasoning can have no precise explanations, but suitably be defined by grammar and poetic revealing – “*aletheia*” in the Greek concept. The Greek no doubt, had interpreted primarily as the manifestness of being in Being, that is possible to be revealed only in the poetic mode of Dasein’s existence, formalized by its words, symbols and grammars. In *Identity and Difference*, Heidegger associates the logos with the essence of language; *logos* he said, “Contains within itself the origin of the character of all language.”

In a normal way, we hardly are aware of the fact that we are already inspired by a primal language (Being), when we communicate one another by using formal language. When a claim like “language speaks” (Heidegger, *Poetry, Language, Thought*, 2001, p. 188) uttered, Heidegger reminds us by turning our attention back to what our everyday speaking presumes but overlooks, namely, the fact that in our speaking, language has already addressed us and we have responded accordingly. The claim also includes the idea that language already shapes and molds even our thinking which prompts us uttering words so spoken. And our speaking after all is a listening response in tuned with thinking grounded in language itself.

## **6.8. Language: The House of Being**

Thus far we have explored how humans belong to language in the Heideggerian line of thought. According to it, language claims us in speech and even in thought, prior to any willingness on the part of us, in doing or acquiring it. Language is what already sets our beings (Dasein’s being in the technical / original way) in communicating others without bias and in understanding or to make ourselves intelligible in the sight of the phenomena. Re-iterating the treatment of language in *Being and Time* in the early philosophy of Heidegger would make it clear that the understanding of language is more closely allied to intelligibility. Because the understanding of Dasein about the phenomena, occur within the already given condition of language in the original sense. “The presencing of language needs and uses the speaking of mortals in order to sound as the peal of stillness for the hearing of mortals. Only as men belong within the peal of stillness are mortals able to speak in their own way in sounds” (Heidegger, *Poetry, Language, Thought*, 2001, p. 205).

## 6.9. The Turn in Later Philosophy

In *Letter on Humanism*, he asserts that the thinking of the truth of Being elevates reflection on the essence of language to a new rank. By taking up the analysis of language, he is reflecting upon the *logos*, which after all culminates comprehensively in the Being. Understanding language as the defining characteristic of humanity, he rejects the traditional view of language that it is an instrument whereby, a sheer medium of communication. Heidegger is insistent that the essence of language should not be thought in terms of human communication. More specifically, the claim is that language itself speaks in a sense of letting happen, reveal themselves, showing indication which in tuned with it human understand as its own. Man speaks and communicated on what is already shown by language itself. It is evident that the analysis of *Being and Time* never directly confronts the problem of the nature of language as such. It came to the essential issue on verifying what “is” there – a being that lies before our perception or attention. The Later Heidegger moves to resolve this difficulty, as he asserts in *Letter on Humanism*: “But the human being is not only a living creature who possesses language along with other capacities. Rather, language is the house of Being in which the human being ex-sists by dwelling, in that he belongs to the truth of being, guarding it” (Lysaker, 2010, p. 202). Man dwells in the language – the clearing of Being by being thoughtfully attending the call of Being. And the call of Being, insofar as it is silent, man’s response to it in return is equally wordless mode of listening. By responding thoughtfully in silence to the call of Being man becomes manifest as that being who thinks. The call of Being indicates that man’s thoughtful nature resides within the essence of language, which is the primal saying of Being. The difference here is the role of language is taken up within Being itself. Heidegger himself told in *Letter on Humanism* that “Language is the clearing and concealing advent of Being itself” (Heidegger, *On the Way to Language*, 1971, p. 230).

Language is now compared with the two mysterious dimensions of Being, the lit part of understanding is defined as “world” and the unlit and the undisclosed part, the mystery of Being, is now no more a matter of conceptual understanding of Being but a phenomenological disclosure of the hidden essence of Being and of the mysterious

dimension of “the earth,” that is to be poetically and artistically disclosed although poetic disclosure too is a part of phenomenological disclosure of authentic meaning. World is the intelligible truth, that which is lit up, the clearing. Earth, the, the dark ground is the space that opens up in language and this is how Da-sein finds itself as the receiver of language and of Being. Language is not something humans create. The basic words, nature, art, being etc., in which deep historical shifts show up, are disclosures of a trace of what was not explicitly thought about. What it thus discloses is not an entity in the world but a holistic world out of which pattern of things emerge. This finds place in language in which the past thinkers left their mark. Heidegger’s deconstruction of metaphysical underpinning of language and of Being is not just complete rejection of tradition but it is a deeper listening to a trace unthought-of to be captured so far. Language as a gathering is more originary and holistic sense of the order of things prior to the forming of concepts. Being thus comes, self-illuminatingly into language.

Heidegger hereby means that language is, at its birth, a genuine revelation of reality when words arise from an original experience of the cosmos. Language domesticates Being; it makes the world livable for us. In the later Philosophy, Heidegger famously claims that “language speaks” (*Die Sprache Spricht*), while “humans speak in that they correspond (*entspricht*) to language” (Lysaker, 2010, p. 179). This indirectly is to show that the ever pervading nature of Being is revealed in language, the understanding of which can come only when Dasein is in the mood of listening to it, or put in differently in a meditative thinking of Dasein.

Heidegger says when Dasein listens to the “saying of Being” in his meditation, the silent but understandable meaningful language of Being can be heard. This is what Heidegger paradoxically says “Language speaks” to show the meaningful showing of Being itself. This hidden truth is what, Heidegger claims, is overlooked and missed by the modern philosophies that turn language into a mere tool of communication. Language in the Heideggerian sense is more than that; it is compared like a house where man meaningfully can dwell.

### 6.9.1. Language as the disclosure of Being: A re-examination in late Heideggerian phenomenology

As indicated earlier, the reason that induced language in Heideggerian ontological phenomenology is undoubtedly the fact that it has unequivocally embedded in the problematic of the Being-question itself. Being, the pivotal agenda within the context of which is negotiated all the necessary but subsequent agendas, has a close or undifferentiated relations with language. In fact, language is very intimately bound up with Being. And to remind us once again that Heideggerian ontological investigation of language is possible to broadly dichotomized in “the early” and “the later,” where language in the ‘earlier treatment’ as the “primal language,” the emergence of which however, is the constitution and influence of the Being of Dasein, is later realized as the “voice or call of Being” itself. Dasein’s being-in-the-world – a complex concept, where Dasein’s capacity to listen and respond the Being in terms of discourse and representation have been replaced by the passivity and inactive interference of Dasein, only to certain limit of listening to the manifold expression of Being itself. In fact, there is a shift of emphasis in the “later philosophy.” The fundamental task of *Being and Time* is the analysis of Being in its ontological and phenomenological sense, i.e., the preparation for the revelation of Being with an issue of Dasein being, the disclosure of it, perhaps the only meaningful possible way of revealing Being. Man ontologically considered is called Dasein because of its proximity to Being. However, its special character of privileged nature is fully disclosed only in the light of or in conformity with Being. But the so-called “later philosophy” of Heidegger is characterized with the emphasis on the “*Da*” to “*Sein*” – a seeking for revelation of the meaning of Being in the light of which our very analysis of Dasein will be fulfilled which in turn, will have an impact on the meaning of language. There is apparent shift from the explicit focus of Dasein’s capacity through which meaningful realization or formal use of language is possible to conceive. Hence, the analysis of *Being and Time* as a whole is itself provisional i.e., awaits its fulfillment in the revelation of the meaning of Being in general (Aler, 1992, p. 24).

Besides this, what we already learnt is that our human language is nothing linguistic initiated and made by man, but only a response to Being ontologically. Language is the agency of the coming into presence of that which is (Being itself). Thus in the “*Letter on Humanism*,” Heidegger famously wrote that “Language is the house of Being,” (Heidegger, *Basic Writings*, 2012, p. 161) that is to say language demarcates the parameters of a realm wherein humans can meaningfully dwell. Language domesticates Being: it makes the world livable for us.

*“We are...within language and with language before all else...the ability to speak is what marks man as man”* (Heidegger, *On the Way to Language*, 1971, p. 112).

The Being’s disclosure is culminated in language in terms of widening the horizon of or the articulation of intelligibility. The uncanny and silent speech of Being can be meaningfully heard when language in the original / primal sense is taken up. Dasein’s intelligence or capacity can catch up the voice of Being by dwelling in the house of language. The call of Being indicates that man’s thoughtful nature resides within the essence of language, which is the primal saying of Being. Since language is the house of Being, when man learns to dwell in the speaking of language, It means that he learns to dwell even in the site where beings are disclosed or unconcealed, which after all fulfills Dasein’s being-in-the-world. Under the a priori aspects of Dasein’s being-in-the-world, man always finds himself as existing, that is praxically oriented towards beings bounded by rich context, in which to use language as original as it is existed.

The above claim is beautifully recorded in a way thought provoking revealing as –

*“But the human being is not only creature who possesses language along with other capacities. Rather, language is the house of being in which the human being ex-sists by dwelling, in that he belongs to the truth of being, guarding it”* (Pathmarks 254= Gesamtausgabe 9: 333 as cited in (Lysaker, 2010, p. 202).

The paradox of the passage indicates that Dasein’s being-in-the-world is enabled and decorated by the marvelous inter-play of the glory of the sky, the sublime world with its

diverse entities, the regulator - gods, and the reasoned mortals – the four folds. Man always finds himself already surrounded and conditioned by the ontological phenomena, under which he speaks and uses languages in accordance with such eternal disclosures of Being. The multi-dimensional site /event is the truth wherein human beings dwell, and this is the truth that language houses in the speaking that pre-reflectively claims us and to which our own words and sentences are responded (Lysaker, 2010, p. 203).

To sum up the above investigation that when language is thought to be claiming us in speech and thought, it does convey that its presence is already encountered in our specific experience with which the intended speech conceals or the already spoken words is uttered. For an instance, when I said “the hockey ball hit my thigh,” I am already directed towards in saying that I am hit by the hockey ball, for I am already encountered with language which informed me that I was hit by the ball. Language is thus the house of Being because, in claiming us, it houses and makes manifest the fact that beings appear to us, engage us. And lastly, one communicates and speaks with Being only by going through or dwelling in the house of language. Language serves to facilitate understanding. As a tool appropriate for this purpose, it is good. But the essence of language is not exhausted by being a means of understanding. Language is not merely one tool among many others that the human possesses; rather language first grants the possibility of standing in the midst of the openness of beings. Thus only where there is language is there world – that is, constantly changing cycle of decision and work, of act and responsibility, but also of caprice / noise, decay and confusion. That is why it is also interpreted as the most dangerous thing, a good for humans besides its goodness. Now it is customary to maintain that Heidegger's thinking underwent a radical change, which is sometimes called *die Kehre* (the turn). Insofar as there is a turn it concerns the relationship between Dasein and Being.

He distinguishes early part with everyday language while that everyday language itself is derived from more primordial spoken word. (Language) that which Truth conceals is mystery, because of certain facts as correspondence or proposition. This background clarification is the horizon of truth. These are not optional horizon but fundamental ones like

language, culture, tradition; there are forms of life. So language is not that man possesses but language is a happening.

In the *Letter on Humanism* he clarifies as “Man is not the Lord of existing things. Man is the shepherd of Being” (Heidegger, *Letter on Humanism*, 1993, p. 234). Like that of the shepherd, Man’s dignity consists in his function of taking care of, of being a protector and a guardian. His being is care (*Sorge*) in the comprehensive sense of the term. However, man does not create Being, but he is responsible for it since, without his thinking and remembering, Being has no illumination, no voice, no word. Only with his involvement, will Being be understood as comprehensive as it is. The identification of man as something super which over and above reigns all existences is negated. And the word like rational animal attributed to him is totally negated. Instead he clarifies man’s essence is found in his existence. Which also means each of man’s being-in-the-world is determined by Being itself. As a result of which man’s unreflective coping with his environment is only possible. For Heidegger, the substance of man is neither reason nor animality. It is his capacity to stand out from Being. To cut it short, everything is lumped up or have their origins in the pervading reality of Being.

Heidegger says, in order to understand the ontology of language, one needs to step into the realm of it and find out how it is embedded in our experience. When he said that ‘we are always speaking in one way or another,’ his idea is that despite our daily chatter, speaking need not necessarily be verbal. What Heidegger wanted to explicate throughout his academic endeavor is undoubtedly ‘how language claims us in thought and speech with which may be accomplished his task of revealing the uncanny Being. By doing this, he is concerned with showing the possibility of experience with it in the most experience-able way, rather than merely willing it.

How does then this possibility proceed, is answered by Heidegger in a variety of complex ways, which ever requires the employment of hermeneutic descriptions. Firstly, he acknowledges the capacity of Dasein in which is found the ability to think reflectively and to responding well what is indicated to it. Secondly, through the unusual locutions such as

“language speaks” (*die sprache spricht*), Heidegger realized a poetic mode of thinking of revealing as an ideal way of letting speaking language or Being. Language after all he says is the house of Being in which man dwells, so that he understand the language of Being. Language eventually is the dialogue between Dasein and Being in the original sense.

“Thinking accomplishes the relation of Being to the essence of human beings. It does not make or cause the relation. Thinking brings this relation to being solely as that which is handed over to thought from Being. Such offering consists in the fact that in thinking, being comes to language. Language is the house of Being. In language’s housing human beings dwell. Thinkers and poetizers are the guardians of this housing. Their guardianship accomplishes the manifestation of Being insofar as they, in their saying, bring this manifestation to and preserve it in language” (Lysaker, 2010, p. 198).

The passage indicates the stakes with an appeal to make us prompt that we learn to dwell in the house of language by speaking it and formalize it in human-oriented way. After leading so much of effort in his enquiry, the goal of Heidegger is to make us all aware that we belong to language, even prior to our deciding to speak or read in communicating others. And to explore the essence of language does not mean narrowing our scope of investigation into specific languages. Rather, a “meta-language” (in the sense of a universal language) as Heidegger calls, will give us what we seek.

**RESTORATION OF AUTHENTICITY: CARE AND THE FOURFOLD  
DWELLING OF BEING**

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The preceding chapters undertook the task of showing how Heidegger diagnoses modernity like loss of an authentic dwelling, under the particular frame called *Gestell*. The associated problems like insecurity, anxiety, loss of gods, are the outcomes of what he termed as “metaphysics.” Metaphysics failed to expose the truth of Being, leading to an “inauthentic existence” of Dasein. In other words, our investigation of Heidegger up to this point only deals with the inauthentic existence of Dasein. But Heidegger did not stop with that; he rather tried to save the world by prescribing a “therapy” which is grounded in his method of hermeneutic phenomenology. Of course, Dasein exists either in one of the two modes – authentic and inauthentic, not in a dichotomous manner which shows that though it is something that is inseparably related to authenticity. Dasein cannot but live its life as an inauthentic and fallen Dasein engaged in an everyday world of mundaneness. It just inherits or lives what is primordially given to it as the fundamental mode of existence. But as modernity keeps no scope for understanding of authenticity, inauthenticity alone, the flip side of Dasein’s being-in-the-world, rules. In order to restore the loss, Heidegger went to an extent that he prescribes a basic state of living (*being-in-the-world*) where certain metaphysical debates centering on subject-object dichotomy, anthropocentrism versus non-anthropocentrism, etc. were made non-issues.

“One of the central goals of *Being and Time* is to describe Dasein in such a way as to bypass the traditional conception of man as a “substance” or “thing,” whether psychic, physical, or personal. In order to capture the dynamic nature of life, Heidegger begins by portraying Dasein’s Being as a “happening” or “event” (*Geschehen*) extending from “from birth to death.” Just as the being of an event is defined in terms of its outcome (i.e. what happened), so the being of Dasein is defined in terms of the achievement of its life as a whole” (Guignon, 1984, pp. 321-339).

The following sections proceed step by step toward an understanding in Heidegger's system.

### **7.1. Authenticity as a Concept**

The concept of Authenticity, the ultimate aim of *Being and Time* (in the form of therapy to the groundless modernity), is apparent only when we review how systematically “the Being question” is sought in Heidegger's ontological phenomenology. It is true that Heidegger's explicit aim is to work out the “question of Being”: that is, to develop a “science of Being as such” which will provide a genealogy of the different possible ways of being, and account for its modes and derivatives” (Guignon, 1984, pp. 321-339). And this investigation into the meaning of Being, he says, makes up the first stage of fundamental ontology. However, according to Heidegger, the concept of Being itself became naive and opaque unless it is explained or defined with an entity from which every possible form of understanding of Being can be had at all. The investigation then requires a preliminary inquiry into the Being of such an entity which understands what it means “to be” of being. “The question of Being aims to restore a sense of the gravity and responsibility of existence by recovering a more profound grasp of what it is to be” (Guignon, 1984, pp. 321-339).

The fundamental question, Heidegger says is “the problem of the internal possibility of the understanding of Being, from which all specific questions relative to Being arise (Heidegger, 1962, p. 240). It further shows that only if we have clarified the horizon in which Being is understood can we pose the question of Being in the proper way (Guignon, 1984, pp. 321-339). Consequently *Being and Time* begins with an “existential analytic” which is none other than human existence itself or technically called “Dasein” – a concept where the clearing of Being or understanding of Being can be had at all that we have shown in our previous chapter. But to be precise in the investigation or to show the sensitivity of Heidegger's investigation, it began with certain “essential structures” or “existentialia” that constitute Dasein's being-in-the-world. It means there are certain primordial structures that originally conditioned Dasein's existence which remain revelatory of Being. Hence Dasein or being-there of human being is the ground from which the Being quest could be made at all.

“Authenticity” is another disclosure of Being. Although, there are different layers of interpretation about authenticity, especially when Heidegger took a “Turn” in his thought-path, where from the emphasis on Dasein is shifted toward the truth of *Being*, he remained explorer of authentic existence where Dasein use tools as tools, and take every form of living as the way it is to be authenticity qualifications. As such, by the expression authenticity, it means a homecoming to the original position. It is an authentic existence when Da-sein understands itself as a continuous process that stretches between birth and death in which it lets all the essential structures of its own happen as they are originally designed in the teleological sense. Heidegger thus accommodates teleological structures of Da-sein, but the crucial point is that Dasein has pre-logical understanding of its own authentic rootedness in Being that needs to be restored. An authentic Da-sein realizes its own inauthentic “they-self” and resolves to restore its authentic “myself,” that itself in true relationship with beings and with Being.

Authenticity, “to make possible the cultivation of individuality, emerging out of an age that perceived itself as a time of profound crisis, a period shaken by intellectual currents of relativism, scientific materialism, Darwinism, and the complete secularization of life, *Being and Time* attempts to combat the “groundlessness” (*Bodenlosigkeit*) of the contemporary world by uncovering enduring values and meanings within the framework of “worldliness” (*weltlichkeit*) and human finitude” (Guignon, 1984, pp. 321-339). The ultimate concern of Heidegger is to unveil human existence to such an extent that it retains its primordial being in the harmonious blend of a meaningful life-world. Such a state of existence is devoid of any kind of metaphysical legacy. It means, although the Being question manifests in Dasein’s “anyone nature” i.e. “its public nature” where “representable” or “delegatable” everydayness of Dasein eventually ends up with “mineness” - its privateness, where it alone decides its own end. Accordingly, the authentic Being then understands its privateness or mineness, and resolves to accomplish its life-long mission. In other words, authenticity can be described as a “letting happen” of the primordial truth that condition Dasein. However, this realization of one’s own most possibilities / impossibilities cannot be equaled with Cartesian “introspection” where subjectivity is the deciding factor of one’s authenticity.

Rather the authenticity of Heidegger is to simply being-in-the-world or possessing all sorts of “worldliness” enmeshed in the temporal historicity.

Although, the essence of Dasein lies in its everydayness (in fact, without this everydayness, authenticity can't be thought at all), which is characterized by its public “theyness,” Dasein needs to be forever encountering with others. Authenticity requires staying out of its public “theyness” and letting manifest a life of its own. Dasein's authentic being, unconcealed in its ultimate being, is fully engaged in the practical life-world. Hence the question of authenticity aims at restoring a sense of gravity and responsibility of existence by recovering a more profound grasp of what it is “to be.”

## **7.2. The Role of Hermeneutics in the Issue of Authenticity**

In *Being and Time* Heidegger argues that our normal, involved practical dealings in the world always embody a “vague average understanding of Being,” and this “pre-ontological understanding of Being” can be described in order to develop a “preliminary” basis for interpreting Dasein. But insofar as this everyday pre-understanding is still infected by distortions conveyed to us by our social and historical context, it is necessary to engage in a deep interpretation of “everydayness” to reveal its underlying structure and content (Guignon, 1984, p. 325). Heidegger employs “hermeneutics” for the method of the existential analytic to break open and bring into light certain layers of existential compartments. There are certain reasons which urge Heidegger to expose the analysis of Dasein to the scrutiny of the “Hermeneutical circle.” As Dasein's existence is compared like a ‘text’, the reading of which can be taken up into different ways, hermeneutics, being the “science of interpretation” is a suitable methodological way that can play a consistent role in it. Heidegger acknowledges the importance of this at the outset of *Being and Time* that the reading of this text can only be had in terms of some preliminary grasp of the whole. It means the reading of a particular text is possible only from the context of “what is already familiar with,” on account of it. Accordingly: “Heidegger argues, in order to inquire into the being of Dasein, I must have some preliminary grasp of being in general is, for otherwise how would I know it is that entity's being I am discovering by the analysis and not

something else? But since the meaning of Being in general was to be uncovered by first examining Dasein, there seems to be a circle: we can only identify the being of Dasein if we have a prior grasp of Being in general, yet we can only determine the meaning of Being in general by working out the being of Dasein” (Guignon, 1984, pp. 321-339). Heidegger thus found consistent to begin with our vague average understanding of Being and use it as a ‘preliminary’ and ‘tentative’ horizon of understanding for inquiring into the being of Dasein. Of course, Dasein is the place or clearing where the understanding of the most abstract Being in general can be had because of its being which is primordially in relation to Being and also because of its being which constantly inquire its own being. Taking into account such context, the Being at large can be accessed. But the investigation did not stop here, since it is the only preliminary analysis for the larger investigation of the uncanny Being. Though the vague average “everydayness” serves as the essential comportment of Being, but it is somewhat used here as a stepping stone in order to unveil the larger Being. The reason for driving the investigation that way Heidegger argues that “on the basis of this first analytic of Dasein, it will then be necessary to revise our initial understanding of Being. And this revision will then generate a new horizon of understanding of Being that will enable us to “repeat” the analytic of Dasein on higher and authentically ontological basis” (Guignon, 1984, pp. 321-339). Though vague and inconsistent the average everydayness is, it served as the means to disclose a new horizon for understanding Being in general. Since it serves as the context from which the many facets of Being can be unconcealed, hermeneutics remains instrumental in revealing the different layers of Being only through such context. And this is the only point where a methodology like hermeneutics can play its role of interpretation since our pre-understanding assures us that we can initiate the inquiry.

We have seen that by “authenticity” Heidegger means primordial truth which underlies the existence of Dasein in its worldliness. He says “truth which is primordial and authentic must guarantee the understanding of the being of Dasein and of the Being in general” (Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 2008). He makes it explicit also that the authenticity which is achieved via Dasein’s resolution to its life, is not merely of “intentional” as Husserl did. It is but Dasein’s disclosedness in its being-in-the-world that is an existence always already in relation to being.

“Heidegger’s continuous adherence to his thesis of the hermeneutic situation of the interpreter indicates that authenticity cannot be interpreted as depending on the (*existentiell* possibilities to perform the) intentional act of believing that Dasein’s existential structure is Dasein’s disclosedness, that dasein’s disclosedness is composed of existentials, etc” (Henschen, 2012, pp. 95-113).

The task of ‘Hermeneutics’ Heidegger assigned is to unveil such primordial truth that enabled Dasein unreflectively but authentically lives. With respect to the confirmation of the presuppositions that make up the “hermeneutical situation,” becoming authentic will enable us to justify the “formal idea of existence” that has guided the interpretation. For when Dasein is authentic, it can “decide for itself whether, as the entity it is, it has the composition of being which has been disclosed in the projection of its formal aspects” (Guignon, 1984, pp. 321-339). The ‘authenticity’ which means arrived at the deepest horizon of understanding (of ourselves) is possible only when Dasein peels off the primordial “sources,” “wellsprings,” “origins,” and native “soil” of its “everyday way of grasping what it is to be.”

### **7.3. Authenticity –Inauthenticity Dichotomy for the Grasp of Authentic Principle**

Dasein exists either in two modes of existence – authentic or inauthentic. However, without understanding how Heidegger dichotomized it for a complete analysis of the multiple dimensions of human existences, it tends to puzzle us to fully grasp the idea of authenticity in his context. As such the need is to understand this dichotomy in the exact Heideggerian way. For the notion of authenticity arises in the lengthy analysis of Dasein’s being, more specifically the description of Dasein in its “average everydayness.” Insofar as the general understanding of authenticity is formally analyzed from the multiple dimensions of Dasein’s being which is thoroughly described as a combination of a given nature and decisiveness about one’s own specific possibilities, there occurs in our investigation the issue of authentic – inauthentic existence in order to enhance the accomplished nature of authenticity. Many philosophers have accused Heidegger for the “inconsistencies of *Being and Time*.” Hence,

our formal task of reinterpreting Heidegger's authenticity would not be clear without bringing into account the sensitivity of authentic – inauthentic division in order to grasp Heidegger's notion of authenticity.

The charge of Heidegger's inconsistencies began with his formal division of Dasein's being as two modes of existence often called here authentic and inauthentic respectively. But at least in one occasion he mentions an "undifferentiated mode," suggesting that there might be three (Guignon, 1984). Following this, there is a tendency to think whether "everydayness," our essential involvement in day to day preoccupations, is necessarily inauthentic or not. There is uncertainty of authenticity – inauthenticity in this respect. Of course, in the early phase of his description of Dasein via its "average everydayness," he made an emphasis on Dasein's tendency to conformism or the orientation to work out in a norm bound, within the socially approved context. In such an existence Dasein's understanding is shaped and molded by its public orientedness, which means a being well defined by its public nature. Heidegger tells us in *Being and Time* that it is "*das man*," the anonymous "one" or the "anyone" which defines Dasein. In this respect the "I" like Descartes' *Cogito* where "privacy" is the defining identity, is replaced by the public identity of Dasein in which I can be "anyone." But on the contrary, he later put more emphasis on the unreflectively immersed public "they" world to an extent that there is a tendency to forget of ourselves and our innermost possibility, which is sometimes referred to as death. Hence authenticity in this respect is to come out of our public nature and to privately face our innermost possibility with equanimity. Hence, the concept of authenticity falls between the debate of the "Anyone" and the "I" of Dasein. Heidegger affirmed at one instance that being the "Anyone" is not just an error that should be avoided since it is an existential or essential facet of Dasein's Being and belongs to Dasein's positive constitution. But on the contrary he made another claim that to be authentic, one needs to come out of its public oriented nature and exercise its own will so as to be accomplished Dasein's being.

Heidegger writes in *Being and Time*:

“...that Authentic Being-one’s-self (*eigentlicheselbstein*) does not rest upon an exceptional condition of the subject, a condition that has been detached from the Anyone; it is rather an existentiell modification of the Anyone – of the Anyone as an essential existentiell...” (Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 2008, p. 168).

But he also writes as...

“Proximally and for the most part *dasein* is not itself but is lost in the anyone –self (*man-selbst*), which is an existentiell modification of the authentic self (*eigentlichen Selbst*)” (Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 2008, p. 364).

What should be the solution to this controversy in the Heideggerian original hermeneutics? Is this charge of Heidegger an undoubted one? Our answer apparently should be “No” in the original Heideggerian context. Because a close study of the above “Heidegger’s passages undoubtedly reveals that a distinction is made between the “authentic self” and the “Anyone” as existentialia, on the one hand, and “authentic being-one’s-self” and the “Anyone-self” as existentiell modifications, on the other” (Guignon, 1984). In short, *Dasein* is simultaneously both an “authentic self” and the “anyone,” and that is what we have to make explicit, in order to solve the said controversy. If we are not able to clarify authentic – inauthentic division so as to grasp the existentiell structure of *Dasein* in terms of both the constitutive of *Dasein*’s thrown nature as well as of the capacity which after all can make the modification of its final culmination of life, we fail to understand the purpose of making a dichotomy in Heidegger’s formal analysis of *Dasein*’s being.

In each of our actions we express goals which point outward to some sense of our lives as a final definitive configuration of meaning. As a projection towards its culmination, *Dasein* is defined as a “self-projective being toward its ownmost ability-to-be” (Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 2008, p. 191). As *Dasein* is a being for whom its own being is a constant issue because it matters to it; it takes certain decision to be the determination of its accomplished being. To be human (*Dasein*) in this respect is to be underway in the enterprise of living, to be “projecting” (*entwerfen*) oneself toward the realization of one’s life as a whole. Hence

this “being-a-whole,” which is the ultimate goal of life, is called “existence.” Although “facticity” is the essential components of Dasein’s being which it has to take it as its own, no matter what the willingness is on the part of it is, but authenticity is a matter of how Dasein relates itself to the task of living by taking a concrete stand on its life as a whole. Since who and what I am is defined by the actual roles I take over in making choices for my life, my being defined by the goal-directedness with which I take up pre-given possibilities in dealing with the current situation. This idea liberates us in understanding what Heidegger means when he says that “the essence of Dasein lies in its existence” (Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 2008, p. 67).

The resolution taken by Dasein which is more like a modification of its given nature or essence is what after all defines the totality of its existence. As Heidegger says that Dasein is “in each case mine”; “mineness is what ultimately defines Dasein.” Though often described as being in everydayness where Dasein is understood as “representable” because of its public “we-world” orientation, but no one can interfere in the task of projecting itself as something that ultimately will define the totality of its life.

Equipped ourselves with such a background analysis of Dasein, we now move on to clarify the issue of whether authenticity is solely being the “anyone” or “authentic being-one’s-self,” our answer in the light of Heidegger should be a combination of both. For to be authentic is to be resolute about one’s ability to live one’s life as a coherent totality, but remain dependent upon the “Anyone” and its world. Heidegger himself claims that authenticity is only an “existentiell mode” of our essential way of being as the “Anyone”:

*“Authentic Being-one’s-self (eigentliche Selbstsein) does not rest upon an exceptional condition of the subject, a condition that has been detached from the Anyone; it is rather an existentiell modification of the Anyone – of the Anyone as an essential existential” (Being and Time p. 130 as cited in (Guignon, 1984, pp. 321-339).*

The role of authentic –inauthentic division eventually is to make sense of the fact that the multiple facets of Dasein's being can be accomplished only by taking into account these two aspects of existence, but not about the idea of uplifting one in order to suppress the other.

#### **7.4. Authentic Selfhood in Heidegger**

The reason that “analytic of Dasein” – “theory of the self,” elaboratively taken up in *Being and Time* stems from the Heidegger's observation of too many people leading inauthentic lives when each however, he thought, has the ability to lead an authentic existence. Although, Dasein provides an ideal site or clearing place where the unconcealment of Being can be revealed, is comprised of Forfeiture, Facticity, conscience, and Existentiality, in its active, dynamic, verbal sense (DeGreff, Bernett, & Cooley, 2009). These used to overshadow Dasein in the realization of its ownmost reality and hence caught up in the middle of inauthentic existence. As such in the process of projecting towards the end, Dasein is biased, puzzled, irresponsible, frightened about its end, purposeless, uncaring, insecure, etc. As Dasein's essence lies in its existence of living a life of world with all its existential contents, which more or less can be misleading in the realization of one's meaning of life, it has to go through authenticity despite the fact that its “worldliness” is one in orientation toward Being. Dasein's “facticity” is to practically engage in the world having experienced all the dynamics of life. But being active in the “public – they” world, Dasein is sometimes deprived of seeing its own reality and therefore remaining inauthentic in its whole existential accomplishment. Hence, “authenticity” in the Heideggerian sense is to become “true to oneself” (Cohen, 1993, pp. 111-128), in terms of deciding one's own life authentically. For each person has the internal ability to break out of the inauthentic life in order to face the “mineness” of Dasein that is what is referred as authenticity.

As already discussed for Heidegger, the act is first revealed in everyday life, contrary to the thinking that it is determined by its subjectivity. However in this context, “everydayness means that the self thinks of itself and behaves as if it were one entity among other entities. Because it represents itself as an object, the self *qua* objects is in all its specific determinations interchangeable with other objects” (Cohen, 1993, pp. 111-128). Although

Dasein is merged up with objects in the world, in terms of essence but the main difference between Dasein and object is Dasein's capacity to evaluate its own being, and accordingly take the necessary resolution against its existence. But to say that Dasein is consistently determined by its 'everydayness,' Dasein is inauthentically "thrown" into the world; it finds itself in the world of not its own making where it has to live. The everyday self is practically involved in the world. However, apart from its situatedness where Dasein is merely given the status of objects in its everydayness, it rather decides its own being for its accomplishment. And this is the reason that Heidegger's analytic simply does not wind up with the impossibility of differentiating it from objects, but moves forward with the phenomenological description of something special about selfhood. That the everyday self is, according to the sense of its own self-representation, at bottom no more than one entity among others, is particularly manifest in the way it relates to space and time. Because of this Heidegger argues that authenticity is nothing but Dasein's ability to deciding its own being apart from its inalienable everydayness.

In fact, superficial object-like existence is shattered when the everyday self comes up against that which is in essence inalienable, fully ownmost. Heidegger argues that the everyday self with which one always starts is not the authentic self with which one may end. As such everydayness must be shattered. The authentic self understands its own being (i.e. its "mineness" in the projection towards the end) which is not just one entity among others. It comes to understand that it is itself thoroughly made up of relationships, ultimately an inalienable own most relationship of Being. The ultimate concern of authenticity is Dasein's realization that death is no one else's but its own. For its being consistently is defined by its inalienable death bound nature. According to Heidegger, when the everyday self owns up to its own death, in this recognition, Dasein realizes its own projective and individualized engagements in a concrete place and history. It no longer lives within an allegedly pre-set, objectively given, independent framework, but comes to recognize itself in and through the setting wherein and whereby it dwells, in the significance of the world and world-time, history. Dasein is being-in-the-world (*in-der-welt-sein*) and authentic Dasein grasps the significance of this engagement (Cohen, 1993).

The concept of authenticity which is vaguely a shift from everydayness to authentic selfhood entails a retrospective recognition of the inadequacy, the superficiality of everydayness. More specifically, although, the everydayness which is the essential component of Dasein's being, or the self where one begins, is not the authentic self, out of which authenticity is what, is deliberately be obtained. What Heidegger called for in this regard is a break with the nominal existence of everyday life, and a shift into the intensity of a more genuine self-relationship. Everydayness must be shattered anyhow. "The authentic self comes to understand that it is itself thoroughly made up of relationships, ultimately an inalienable own most relationship of being" (Cohen, 1993, pp. 111-128).

The authentic self comes to understand that death is no one else's but its own, that its true nature as it were, is inalienably deathbound. Authenticity of selfhood consists of true appreciation of the significance of death which though hard it may be, but a sheer indicator of our being that deeply enrootedness in Being itself. Our being as it is "to be" is culminated only when in touched practically with death. The inevitable happening of death at the end of one's life shows that Dasein is a deathbound being – a being-toward- death. And the authentic being should not miss such truth.

*"Being-toward-death breaks Dasein from its everyday self-concealment, doing so by means of a firmer, more resolute enrootedness in being, in authentic selfhood as being- toward-death, as being-in-the-world, and ultimately as being-the-question-of-being" (Cohen, 1993, pp. 111-128).*

The "I" remains as essential characteristic of Da-sein and it must be interpreted existentially. It is well known that this put of *Being and Time* starts with an inquiry on the encountering of otherness and everyday being-with. "We shall not pursue this analysis but I wanted to show its philosophical locus. We can dwell in the question of the "who" without introducing the self-knowledge, the problem of the relation to the other and, ultimately, the relation to death. For Heidegger, at least in *Being and Time* (and we shall see that perhaps what this constitutes major difference with Heidegger), the authenticity of the who is reached only when we have gone to the end of this process and have reached the theme of freedom for

death. Only then is there a “who.” There was not yet a who in ordinary life; there was only a kind of anonymous self; “one” “man.” This means that the question of the self remains formal as long as we have not developed the whole dialectic of inauthentic and authentic existence. In this way, the question “who” of Dasein emerged in that of the potentiality of being one’s self as a whole. The recapitulation of existence in the face of death is the response to the question of the “who” of Dasein. And then we have a hermeneutics of the “I am” which culminates in a hermeneutics of the finite totalization in the face of death” (Ricoeur, 2004, pp. 226-227).

### 7.5. Toward Authenticity

Following this, we can construe that Dasein is authentic if the everyday self is known to have represented by time. The authentic selfhood rather consists in the realization that time ceases to exist when Dasein not there – the basic site for counting time and history. “From the perspective of its resolute self-appropriation, the appropriation of its true being or existence, Dasein sees that a time line, a wall calendar, for example, is a representation of time, a tool of Dasein’s own design and device for Dasein” (Cohen, 1993, pp. 111-128). Hence it is inauthentic to anticipate the future time according to our normal calculations using certain devices of measuring time. In truth, the future is precisely what might not come, but only of possibilities. What is only certain is, time and history can be conceived only when Dasein exists; there’s no guarantee of future time. If that be so, our question must be what guarantees our future death? From where this recognition come from? Heidegger says it is *Angst* (anxiety) that reminds us of our true reality. It comes as voice, a voice so quiet that is literally silent. It comes sometimes to us in the form of questions like whether life as such is a permanent or one that ended with death? When questions like this strike us, it reminds us of the true nature of ours. Hence it gives us recognition of our finitude, the surety of death in each of us.

Heidegger initially calls this voice in *Being and Time*; the “voice of conscience” (*Stimme des Gewissens*) for it is true to each person. Though it silently communicates us and interferes in the midst of our busy but unreflective everydayness, it pulls us back from this

everydayness into the realization of our own reality – that is a mortal being whose reign of being is finite anyhow. Insofar as it is silent and internally originated in us, Heidegger reminds the reader that it should not be co-understood with the subjective reality of consciousness like Descartes' deliberations. It is only but one of the attributes of our existence, an existence nothing but the being that lives out as it is "to be" (i.e. already in relation to being). "Anxiety" (*Angst*) is the later version of Heidegger initially conceived of it as something initiated and invoked by Dasein itself is replaced in the later thought by *sein* or Being. Because Dasein is passive in the strict sense, that the best thing it can do to cautiously or patiently listen to such call or voice. Hence such voice or call is later acknowledged as the "voice of Being."

The formal plausible question then is How Heidegger linked up "Anxiety" (*Angst*) with the issue of authenticity of selfhood at all? Is this mere silence or mood enhances the restoration of authenticity? Heidegger's response is this silence and the equation of conscience and anxiety are possible because what occurs in the genuine recognition of mortality is a profound realization of the self, a deepening, awakening, or taking over of its own ontological self relationship. It is undoubtedly true that Dasein continues to live in the world but with conviction to take over one's own futural death anytime they meet face to face. The silent call succumb Dasein to reflectively introspect itself and in the light of that owns death as nothing other than its own being. It reminds of its mortality and because of which also comes the realization of its own life as what is to be cared for, and already harmoniously in balanced with and found in the being-in-the-world. With such a call Dasein is a being "called from itself to itself." That is the self-relationship of being, being related to being, being faced with nothing other than being, that is faced with itself. Authentic self understands "death-bound" is the nature of Dasein, and it should be accomplished individually. When we say Dasein is called from itself to itself, it means each Dasein has to fulfill ultimate nature privately by leaving behind its public nature which is also technically understood as its thrown or inherited nature. Although, Dasein is often understood from the context of where it is grounded, its thrown being with which it unreflectively coping up its environment because of its being more specifically, enrooted with the being, or a being already in relation to being, but more than that authentic self realized its being that is

ontologically characterized by “mineness” (Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 2008, p. 78), which can only be accomplished when Dasein cuts itself off from everydayness, and take death as its own.

## **7.6. Heidegger’s Turn to and Away from the Will for Authenticity: The Mystical Inclination of the Later Phase**

Heidegger’s thought-path has undergone different break ups of philosophy. The fundamental concern of *Being and Time* (the initial attempt) as stated before, is to make explicit “the question of Being, more specifically the question of the relation between Being (*Sein*) and the being-there (Dasein) of human existence” (Davis, Will and Gelassenheit, 2010, p. 168). It emphasized the Being question disclosed in and through the there-being of human existence as if Dasein’s (humans) are the portal through which Being can be revealed at all. The change of Heidegger’s philosophy is famously remarked as “the turn” in the thought-path in around 1930s where we find a shift in focus from a focus on Dasein’s temporal projection of the meaning of its being to emphasize on the event of the truth of Being or Being (or “*beying*”), as determined through its historical “sendings.” Here Heidegger is more drawn towards the truth of being itself, which is self disclosing. Here humans are conceived as passive to such truth and only serves as the clearing ground or one who listens to and understands the voice of Being. Very surprising further, Heidegger’s thought-path also underwent another change in around 1940s - the “second turn,” which is less remarked on but no less remarkable in the strict sense. It is a “turn from a tendency to think the relation between Being and human being in terms of “Will,” and a turn to a sustained attempt to think this relation in terms of a non-Willing letting-be (*Sein-lassen*) and releasemnet (*Gelassenheit*)” (Davis, Will and Gelassenheit, 2010, p. 168). Because Dasein’s willful projection is shifted to the will-less passivity of dasein, it needs to be looked at from various angles in order to unveil the rich meanings of it.

As broadly described before, Heidegger’s concept of authenticity begins with the role of human Dasein in resolutely projecting the meaning of its being. In *Being and Time* he stressed the role of Dasein as that which authentically projects its life towards the

accomplishment by understanding its ontologically structured Being. The “thrown” nature of Dasein which is unreflectively taken up by it in the form of living-existence, technically understood as being-in-the-world is needed to be perfected by Dasein itself, since the “thrown” nature is more of “they” oriented, where Dasein necessarily is submerged and engaged in the public “they” world. But Dasein is inauthentic if it is faded up in the public “they” world for it lacks responsibility, mineness in terms of owning death. An authentic Dasein should imbibe resoluteness, purposiveness, which should be initiated by each authentic Dasein. Authenticity in this sense is what can be achieved when individual Dasein took the responsibility of its own being. In fact, “faced with her own mortality, in “resoluteness” a human being must “choose” for himself or herself, his or her life-project, “for-the-sake-of-which” (*Umwillen*), he or she finds “ready-to-hand” on “environment” (Davis, Will and Gelassenheit, 2010). Authenticity in that context is initiated by and culminated with the will of Dasein, which is but different from Descartes’ will. Heidegger, rather than narrowing down to the subjective consciousness of individual human being, conveys the world-forming decision which stirs all the ontic activities with their meaning orientedness. “In the texts from 1928 and 1929 Heidegger explicitly claims that this world-forming decision is carried out by a kind of finite yet transcendental will” (Davis, Will and Gelassenheit, 2010). More elaborately this “will” is not an act in the world, but rather a priori determination of the very significance of the world, that is to say, this transcendental or ‘ontological’ will opens up and establishes the context of meaning fully related entities within which any specific “ontic” act can take place (Davis, Will and Gelassenheit, 2010). To serve our purpose of trying to unveil the reason behind the turn to and subsequently away from will, it may further be re-interpreted that this will is transcendental in origin, high above the superficial world but experienced and manifested explicitly in Dasein (i.e. the finite / temporal existence of Dasein).

To quote Heidegger, “World...is primarily defined by the for-the-sake-of-which...But a for-the-sake-of-which, a purposiveness (*umwillen*), is only possible where there is a will (*willen*)” (Davis, Will and Gelassenheit, 2010). By the exercise of its “will” which is but just one of the essential components of its existence, Dasein understands its authenticity. Hence will in that sense play a role of drawing the authenticity. Heidegger roots the question of

Being in the question of freedom, and he defines freedom as a finite yet “pure willing,” that is, as a concrete will that actually leads willing and nothing else besides. Apparently, this willing that wills only its own willing is what Heidegger himself sometimes described it as the “will to will,” which he later on sees as the ‘nihilistic abandonment of being’ into its modern determination as will. This will in the original context can authentically fit in only when Dasein did not cross the bar of the equilibrium. Because this willing should only be there within the paradigm of willing as it is ontologically conditioned / characterized. If Dasein exercises its freedom in a way to negate or contrast the original way of willing, it is in any case inauthentic.

What puzzled us most in the discussion of “will” is when Heidegger did explain it in terms of historic-spiritual *Volk* - where German nation particularly the then rising Nazi movement is somewhat identified as the unconcealment of the Being. This idea of developing the philosophy of will allegedly appear during his short but deeply troubling alliance with National Socialism. This certainly is the time where he developed a political form of voluntarism, in which it is not the individual will but whether the will of the *Volk* that must be resolutely be enacted. In around 1930s he proclaimed thus: “whether such a thing (as the collapse of the “Moribund pseudo-civilization” of the West) occurs or does not occur, this depends solely on whether we as a historico-spiritual *Volk* will ourselves...but it is our will that our *Volk* fulfill its historical mission...we will ourselves” (Davis, Will and Gelassenheit, 2010). “We are only following the towering willing of our *fuhrer*,” since “there is only the one will to the full Dasein of the state...the *fuhrer* has awakened this will in the entire *Volk* and has welded it into a single resolve (*entschlub*)” (Davis, Will and Gelassenheit, 2010). But to the surprise of all further, Heidegger in the subsequent years, bitterly criticized Hitler (who initiated the Nazi movement) saying that the will of the *fuhrer* is nothing but the desire for power and the concept as such should be overcome by way of inserting the “I” into the “we.” He deviates himself from the movement after all because through that movement he comes to recognize willful “subjectivity only gains in power.”

The “will” that is commenced with the individual thinking faculty, however, only within the domain of the will, where willing is only for the sake of willing, is now manipulated to the

level of political movement (we oriented one), which eventually is wiped off, makes us confused and certainly turned out to be ambivalent. However, by seriously going through the account of Heideggerian will it is apparently clear that he later on sees it as the root of misleading the western tradition (not merely to deny the historical determinations of Being and human being as will), because of which it is characterized by the “oblivion of Being” and finally the inauthentic existence of ourselves in this context. As such “Heidegger’s later thought is dedicated to preparing for an ‘other inception’ of the history of being, and this entails not just carrying out a personal conversion but participating in a ‘being-historical’ turn from the metaphysics of will to thinking of non-willing or *Gelassenheit*” (Davis, Will and *Gelassenheit*, 2010).

Heidegger’s turn away from the will is the point where he began to make a rapport with Eckhart’s mysticism. In fact, the very word “*gelassenheit*” – “releasement” from the bond of will, is borrowed from Eckhart himself. This again is the means to enhance authenticity in our concern.

### **7.6.1. Out of the domain of will vis-a-vis a new region of *Gelassenheit* for Authenticity**

What would it really mean to turn away from will and enter into a new region of will-lessness? Can there be a sheer radical will-less activity insofar as human is more or less characterized by will? And if at all, what then is this non-willing, which Heidegger eventually prescribed as releasement for the solution of his fragmented philosophies – the multiple dimension of Being explication or authenticity in this regard?

Since a leap into the realm of non-willing is at all not easy, Heidegger himself warns us in the beginning that non-willing is understandable only once when have reached it. In fact, this turn from the domain of the will to a new region of non-willing is not just a change in strategy or method, rather a radical “step back,” a returning or a home coming to the original relation between Dasein and Being. Precisely, this is so crucial that it eventually is the culmination of the issue of authenticity in Heideggerian Ontologico-Phenomenological

investigation of Being. Since it is not just the attempt to reverse the will theory within the domain of will, but a radical move out of the domain of will, it entered into a new realm of thought where the will of human is just boiled down only to the means of listening the voice of Being. In such a new realm of thought humans are no longer active, but passive' only the clearing place of Being. Heidegger warns us that the expression "non-willing" (*Nicht-wollen*) could be used to name a variety of comportments, and most of these remain squarely within the domain of the will, therefore our very task of negating and willing are turned out to be mere variations of the will. So our attempt at overcoming should be a "twist free" of the domain of the will, which is only possible by going through a paradoxical 'willing non-willing'. He further goes on to suggest that a transitional "willing non-willing" should be understood as a renunciation of willing that prepares for letting oneself into an engagement in the essence of thinking, which is not a willing" (Davis, Will and Gelassenheit, 2010). It is more like widening our horizon till we reach nothingness where we find ourselves of containing nothing including our will, so that a new look of Being will tend to be unconcealed. And this state of existence is what he referred as *Gelassenheit*, devoid of will or all sorts of subjective influence, where one is totally calm, contented, submissive to Being. For the authentic determination of its being, Dasein hereby, letting beings be as they are primordially conditioned. As Dasein is already out of the domain of will (which means out of its limited horizon of disclosure), it now entered into a region or wider horizon where the manifold mysterious unconcealment of Being can be experienced. It means, now Dasein is released from its place to see the fullness of Being. Earlier when it was under the influence of will, it remained within a dialogue of concealment-unconcealment disclosure, in which unconcealment is already pre-characterized by concealment and *vice versa*.

### **7.6.2. Mystical Elements in Heidegger for Authentic "letting-be" of Being**

Truly a turn to non-willing, letting-be is clearly the echoes of Meister Eckhart's mystic theology. Meister Eckhart, who is famous and at the same time notorious to Church authorities because of his so called radical theological outlook, speaks of the nothingness of the creatures in comparison with the "all light" and "divinity" in God. Given the metaphysical mode of thinking that prevails in the West during Eckhart's time, he also

speaks of Godhead, beyond the grasp of metaphysics, God as Godhead is beyond the God of metaphysics, beyond any name that the mind applies to him, beyond logical grasp and that way God is “nothing” to the logical mind. When Eckhart speaks of Godhead, he means the God beyond the grasp of metaphysics. Godhead is the God of mysticism, for the true God cannot be comprehended by any conceptualizations. One can see that Heidegger’s way is similar to the mystical view expounded by Eckhart. Like the mystics way, Heidegger eventually calls for a non-representational approach to Being and not a conceptual or rational determination of it. He concludes in the “later thought” that the way to Being is not through some ground or first principle as what metaphysics proposes, but letting-be of what it ontologically is. Even the term *Gelassenheit* is what Heidegger borrowed from Eckhart who coined the term in the thirteenth century. What Eckhart proposes the “union” with the Godhead via detachment, or nudity of soul, is apparently appeared in Heidegger as non-willing letting be.

All the mystics talk about the “poverty of spirit,” the spirit of renunciation. Even this Rhineland mystic very much talks about the physical-less carnal and then more divine. He is a poor man who wills nothing and knows nothing and has nothing. Eckhart talks about poor of willing, to will nothing, to suspend all teleological attitude (*Gillesheit* – let it be) release man. “Will-less letting be,” is the state when the soul simply lets the light of God through itself. No other thing enters or fills the life except God himself. In the famous sermon 52, he says, “Blessed Are the Poor”: “Therefore, we beg God to get rid us of God so that we may grasp and eternally enjoy the truth where the highest angel and the fly and the soul are equal.” Equally, in the sermon 83 we read: “When (the soul) sees God as he is God or as he is form or as he is three, there is something inadequate present in it; but when all forms are detached from the soul and she gazes only upon the One alone, then the pure being of the soul finds that it bears hidden in itself the pure formless being of divine unity that is being beyond being” (McGinn, 1981, pp. 1-19).

Eckhart talked about three kinds of poverty that is:

- 1) A man has nothing, because, you surrender your very being to be finally true being. as being, as a creature something other than God is nothing at all because,

whatever it has is borrowed from Being – God, like the way the air has light, as white thing are white because of whiteness.

2) God inheres in all. Our being is a borrowed being. In itself this self is nothing, therefore this spiritually poor is detached from everything created and back from everything created and back into being becomes like home going – God to God. In return to union with God which is God, “Blessed are the poor in spirit, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven.” Knowing, willing, Being are surrendered in Eckhart. The liberation of the individual lies in the effort to give up any distinction and to accept all things as belonging to the one: “Therefore it is in oneness that God is found, and they who would find God must themselves become one”

(Radler, 2006, pp. 111-117).

3) Poor in spirit knows nothing. The highest knowledge of all is to know nothing; unknowing, a wholly unknowing which Nicholas of Cusa following Eckhart called a learned unknowing -*Dacta ignorantia* –which is a way of learned in the way of God. Because conceptual knowledge gives us a man made concept of God, and idolatry. It is not the God whom we have devised with our thought, whom we should seek, but the essential God, God in His very Being. Human passivity here, in terms of will and knowledge is oriented towards God’s activity. God cannot speak His word in the soul Eckhart insists. It is soul filled with its own discourse. Hence, the soul must clear itself of all noise; it must suspend all concepts and images all spoken and written words than alone can their Eternal word be spoken. In a text that later attracted the attention of Heidegger, Eckhart writes that the soul comes to see with the same eye in which God sees Himself.

When Eckhart does preach his sermon, his concern is not only of moral and ethical aspects but also expresses his concern with spiritual well-being, suggesting a meditative stage during which the self can explore its inner or essential concerns and philosophical framework of human existence. Heidegger also speaks about poverty of spirit, and of non-willing. He says in the midst of productivity, thought produces nothing. In the midst of control thought is lord over nothing. In the midst of mastering the art, thought is art bound and mortal. The task of thought is not to

acquire the power with which to travel to the moon and back; it is to learn, to dwell on the earth. It should be to respond to the destiny which is unfolding in western history, to assume mastery over it. In a sense, in Heidegger we find poverty of thought is less than political and technological action. Humanity rests on higher destiny of Being itself.

Hence in both the philosophies of Eckhart and Heidegger there is a commonality of will-lessness. In Heidegger thought is always thought of Being, Being as Being, brings itself to thought in man; it is being's own thought of himself, man is thoughtless. Of itself thought drives towards being calculating, manipulating, accumulating Being. So thought stands in need of a grace which will lift it up and bring it back from its fold. But it cannot be done by Being's effort, it is Being's doing in man. So this relationship is sustained by Being. Being gives itself to thought. Thought is to response the response to the gift the giving of thanks.

Eckhart states: "They (those who believe) must know that the very best and noblest attainment in this life is to be silent and let God work and speak within. When the powers have been completely withdrawn from all their works and images, then the Word is spoken. Therefore he said: 'In the midst of the silence the sacred word was spoken unto me'" (Schalow, 2001). As Caputo summarizes the parallel between Eckhart and Heidegger: "With the Zen masters, he (Eckhart) agrees that the Divine Godhead is understood only in absolute silence and so, on this point, is nearer to Zen than to Heidegger. But, like Heidegger, he is considerably interested in language and is himself a master of German vernacular; as a Christian he is deeply interested in the Sacred Scriptures, and, most importantly, in the doctrine of the 'Divine word'" (Schalow, 2001).

Apart from the influence of Eckhart, Heidegger is also inspired by Nietzsche's proclamation of the "death of God" which is acknowledged as the continuation of traditional theology. Although, Heidegger did make a turn away from theology, yet it holds an important place in formulating his own position. It also means further that the theology that is matured in Heidegger has a new face which underestimates the human representation of the Divine mystery. It rather advocates the human thought or being to be only the clearing of the Being

itself, in which the (Davis, Will and Gelassenheit, 2010). Will of man is subordinate to the Divine Will which is but expressed here in terms of Being's language. Heidegger understands the human thought, as the capacity which is able to realize Being's language in silence /meditation, and in line with Meister Eckhart; the subjectivity of man is no longer active but passive to such language. Because, he later on found that the best thing that human can do is to patiently listening to the language of Being. Because of its richness, many theologians, including Rudolf Bultmann to Karl Rahner have appropriated many of Heidegger's insights in order to develop their own religious perspectives. Unfortunately, however, these theologians have less remarked in distinguishing the ingredients in Heidegger's thinking which provide the fertile soil for those breakthroughs. When Heidegger made a "Turn" he did it by using a hermeneutical approach to reciprocate philosophy and theology to a post-metaphysical stance (Davis, Will and Gelassenheit, 2010).

What is crucial in Heidegger is his turn away from the Theo-centric theology which indirectly negated anthropocentrism that privileges "man" over all creatures. He accused such metaphysics of prioritizing human will or thought to unveil the mystery of Being / God. But this movement on the contrary, subordinates thought to language, and thereby restores religious meaning through the genesis of the most primordial linguistic gestures. In rejecting the metaphysical identification of Being (*Sein*) with God, Heidegger does not simply take refuge in a 'secularized theology'. Rather, his philosophy of Being safeguards a concern for the divine mystery by inviting thought to explore the limits of language, and seeking what is unique to the divinities as much in the modality of their absence (*Abwesenheit*) as their presence.

### **7.7. The Concept of Dwelling as the means to guarantee Authenticity**

Dwelling authenticates Dasein in a sense that its original - "being-in-the-world" where "tools are used as tools," and unreflectively encountered everything as the way it is "to be," is pre-determined by Dwelling. Dwelling is the essential component of Dasein. Dasein is best understood with a being to "dwell" a place of the world, rather than to do anything else.

And this certainly is the point of what guarantee the authenticity of Dasein, because under such condition of dwelling, Dasein originally dwells the world as it is “to be” primordially conditioned. In *Building, Dwelling, Thinking* (1971), Heidegger traces the roots of the word *Bauen* – the German word commonly translated into the English, “building.” Heidegger enriches this meaning, suggesting that in its original sense, *bauen* means “to dwell,” which in turn, means “to remain, to stay in a place”... Noting an etymological connection between the German verb ‘*bis*’ (to be) and ‘*bauen*’ (to dwell), Heidegger asserts that “dwelling” constitutes a central feature of human experience, writing, “to be a human being means to be on the earth as mortal, it means to dwell” (Ladkin, 2006, pp. 87-98). Fairly early, it is good to remind us all that Heidegger took the task of dwelling in the later period solely because he claimed, there happened the loss of place in the age of modern technology: place not in the sense merely, of a bounded region of space but in the sense of dwelling – place; “*Heimat*” or “homeland” (Young, Heidegger’s *Heimat*, pp. 285-293). Thus akin to Hölderlin, when Heidegger claims that “poetically man dwells,” he tried to reconstruct this loss of dwelling by bringing back Dasein to its original dwelling condition as if a “homecoming” to its original dwelling place, where Dasein dwells the world as a home with a sense of care and responsibility over it. He revived the Greek form of “revealing” or “*aletheia*” for his true sense of dwelling which he thinks is already in the original dwelling structure. As such the best thing for rebuilding the loss of dwelling, he said, is to revive those spirits of Greek revealing where Dasein safely found himself in his dwelling place, where the world appeared to him as home, no matter what the diverse places may be. To be a human being, says Heidegger means ...to dwell. “When I think the word ‘man’ properly, I think of a ‘being who exists in a human manner – that is, who ‘dwells’” (*Building, Dwelling, Thinking* p. 156 as cited in (Young, Heidegger's Later Philosophy, 2002, p. 63). Dwelling nevertheless constitutes the essence of human that is to be in the world as in a *Heimat* (homeland) or dwelling place. But the plausible question follows: when man unceasingly dwells the world following its essence as Heidegger claimed, what then is the issue of dwelling? Is there a different way of dwelling other than the way human dwells the world? Is it right to claim modernity as the loss of dwelling when man undoubtedly dwells a place?

Heidegger's response is, Yes! Modernity has lost "dwelling" in the truest sense, even though, human keeps on living or dwelling the world continuously. Modern man is, according to Heidegger a homeless one: the plight of modernity is 'man's homelessness. So it seems, not all men dwell. Even by living or dwelling a place, it may be far from the spirit of how human dwells the world in the original sense of the term. One may dwell his or her own place like a foreigner who is insecure, in fact, alien to it. As such "care" which always underlies the spirit of dwelling in Heideggerian way, is absent in such condition. Hence dwelling in modernity turned out to be a critical issue which Heidegger elaboratively explained it to be the grasp of authentic being of Dasein. To him, to dwell is: "To be at peace, to be brought to peace, to remain in peace. The word for peace, *Friede*, means the free, *das Frye* (in old German), and *Fry* means, preserved from harm and danger, preserved from something, that is, taken-care-of (*geschout*). To free really means to care-for (*schonen*). The caring-for-itself consists not only in the fact that we do no harm to that which is cared-for. Real caring-for is something beforehand in its nature (*wesen*), (or) when we gather (*bergen*) something back into its nature, when we "free" it in the real sense of the word into a preserve of peace. To dwell, to be set at peace means, means to remain at peace within the free sphere that cares-for each thing in its own nature. The fundamental character of dwelling is this caring-for" (Young, Heidegger's Later Philosophy, 2002, pp. 63-64). "And when he says dwelling in the sense of *Heimat* or homeland, it indicates that which is 'near' to us. Yet nearness implies farness, fails to appear if 'remoteness...remains absent.'" (Julian Young: Heidegger's *Heimat*, International Journal of Philosophical Studies). Unfortunately, he says, modernity is the age, where everything is being lumped up to a "uniform distancelessness," in which nothing is 'remote,' and so nothing 'near,' and so nothing a dwelling-place" (Young, Heidegger's Later Philosophy, 2002, p. 63).

From the above passages, Heidegger stresses 'Dwelling' in terms of two fundamental conditions that is 'to dwell' is –

1. To be cared-for in the dwelling- place.
2. To care for the things of the dwelling –place.

Accordingly, to dwell is to experience oneself as safe in, cared-for by, the dwelling-place in a way one is not safe in or cared-for by the foreign, and to dwell is to care for the place where one dwells in a way one does not care for the place where one does not.

As dwelling is what Heidegger prescribes as a therapy against the destitution of modernity – the loss of dwelling, anxiety, loss of gods, insecurity, the violence of technology in the modern era, different dimensions of existence comes under the fold of dwelling. While it does takes up the task of making explicit the form of living (authentic existence) on the one hand, it also bothers about how one can be safe under the threat of death – the ultimate threat in fact, on the other hand so that human dwelling will no longer be disturbed by a feeling of insecurity, fear; rather they will let a happy or secured life. Being implicated different aspects of life, dwelling may thoroughly be summed up as being safe, homely, cared-for, or guardian of the world. And this in fact, is the essence of dwelling, not simply of what Dasein derived to be the character of its way of dwelling. When modernity deviates itself from those original set ups / form of dwelling, Heidegger ultimately calls for a homecoming in which Dasein's authenticity may be restored in the form of dwelling in the original sense.

### **7.7.1. Dwelling through Equipmental familiarity or attunement to one's environment**

Though Heidegger did mention his notion of “dwelling” only in the later philosophy, but it should be a reminder that the idea of dwelling is already implicit in *Being and Time*. This far sighted philosopher (Martin Heidegger) while discussing about every entity as ready-to-hand, or tools which is used by Dasein as nothing but tools of a particular kind, already have shown that the idea of dwelling is already included in it. “What is there in the room is, Heidegger writes in 1923, ‘not a table among many others...but a writing table, a dining table, a sewing table.’ This raises the thought that, already in *Being and Time*, Heidegger's underlying motive for attacking ‘*Cartesianism*’ – the view that the world we human confront is a realm of ‘objects’ situated in impersonal, uniform and undifferentiated space and time – is the fear that to the extent we are persuaded that this is the ‘right’ account of our world we are deprived of homeland” (Young, Heidegger's *Heimat*, pp. 285-293). *Being and Time* then

concerned with dwelling in terms of things manifestation and equipment-use, which is but expanded by Heidegger in the later philosophy by 'dwelling' in particular. We can construe that the idea of dwelling comes under the issue of equipment and the unreflective use of it by Dasein as nothing but as it is "to be," is clear from the following analogy.

Consider a cooking in one's own kitchen with cooking in someone else's. In the home kitchen, cooking is smooth and relaxed – relaxed because it is almost entirely thoughtless, due to the familiarity of all the equipments and their uses. In a foreign kitchen, on the other hand, it is a sheer tense, jerky, and rather frustrating, full of thought of forming numerous hypothesis, and hypothesis-refutation. What the difference Heidegger wanted to explicate through this is the fact that in the home cooking, one is at home, solely because all the cooking tools are disclosed to him in such a way that they are already familiar with including the place where they are placed, therefore, without having to think about it (equipments), one comfortably can cook. Everything in the cooking premises appeared as ready-at-hand in the home, as if the extension of his or her body for which the very activity of cooking goes so well. Opposite to this, in the foreign kitchen, cooking happened to be frustrating as all the equipments are appeared unready-to-hand or something totally strange, unhandy, hostile, and therefore, not homely.

One should keep in mind that Heidegger in that context negates "dwelling with curiosity": curiosity in the sense of guessing entities of what they are all about ontological / transcendently as the way metaphysics does. Rather dwelling emphasized here indicates a kind of living where every structures of living are unreflectively taken as part of living ingredients. Dasein in that form of dwelling never alienates itself from entities of the surrounding but receives every single entity of its "worldliness" as metaphorically part of its own living or at least as the extension of its own body. These extensions of the body one way or the other define the boundaries of the homeland. As the analogy of the cooking clearly remarked, a home is justified when every entities (that works in building what we called 'home') including the man who dwells coordinates in the home as if one of the many parts of the home. One never wondered what is there in his own home, as the way he / she wondered things of the foreign house / home. Rather he / she takes every components of

home as part of or the extension of his / her body and therefore, dwells not curiously but with a feeling of homeliness. This feeling of homeliness, according to Heidegger's ontological phenomenology undoubtedly could come through the equipmental familiarity or the attunement to one's environment. Although this alone does not satisfy the condition of dwelling, but dwelling is far more meaningful only when there is the attunement to one's environment or the equipmental familiarity. But the irony is, one can of course, become attuned to all sorts of places – to one's local filling station or restaurant where one can dine out for example – in which one is not at all at home. This is the reason for Heidegger saying that modernity is the age of loss of dwelling, loss of gods, insecurity so on and so forth. For he knew that attunement to a place is a necessary but far from sufficient condition of dwelling. It may well be proceeded with a question as what else is therefore needed in order to turn attunement into dwelling in Heidegger's? The answer unsurprisingly in the light of *Being and Time* is the complete account of the "fourfold." According to Heidegger to become a dwelling-place, a place needs to become a "fourfold" – the gathering of the earth, the sky, the gods and the mortals.

### **7.7.2. Dwelling in the Fourfold**

Heidegger introduced the boldest statement of his thinking, announced it as the *Fourfold* in the late 1940s, under a teaching ban imposed by the French authorities in the wake of the Second World War. Named the lecture series as "*Insight Into That Which Is*," held at the private club *Zu Bremen*, the idea of the "fourfold" is introduced in such a way to have grounded deeply in the poetic description of a thing by Hölderlin and the general understanding of what he called *The Thing* (Mitchell, 2010, p. 208). Yes the simple things around us – indeed, the things themselves – the prime concern in Heidegger's phenomenological investigation of Being. So the fourfold (*das Geviert*) is nothing but a thinking of things. Certain horizons or characteristics through which things get determined in their respective positions, is what the fourfold aimed at disclosing. Heidegger makes explicit the idea of dwelling both in *Being and Time* and *Building Dwelling Thinking*, that the basic character of our dwelling gets its content form the notion of the being-in-the-world and the fourfold respectively. That this being-in-the-world or the field of site in which we

dwells is “the world,” understood as a meaningful assemblage of social practices and things. That this claim is true of the fourfold. He claims that if we reflect on the notion of dwelling properly, the fourfold just falls out of it.

The fourfold is the Later Heidegger’s account of world. To dwell, says Heidegger, is to “belong...within the fourfold of the sky and the earth, mortals and divinities” (Young, Heidegger's Later Philosophy, 2002, p. 93). In his “*Building Dwelling Thinking*,” Martin Heidegger relates to his concept of ‘fourfold’ as a central aspect of dwelling. The four elements of the fourfold are earth and sky, divinities and mortals. The fourfold is a kind of fullness which is a part of dwelling. The unity of the fourfold cannot be divided into its components of each one of these can only be what it is only when the other are kept in mind. Therefore, Heidegger claims, a man is not only a being in the world, but a part of the fourfold of the earth, sky, divinities and mortals. To dwell means simply to let this fourfold be what it is. To dwell is to be on the earth. “But on the earth already means ‘under the sky,’ both of these also mean ‘remaining before the divinities,’ and include a ‘belonging to men’s being with one another’” (Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, 2001, p. 147).

The metaphorical description of “fourfold” by Heidegger in *Building Dwelling Thinking* may directly be quoted: “Earth is the serving bearer, blossoming and fruiting, spreading out in rock and water, rising up into plant and animal. When we say earth, we are already thinking of the other three along with it, but we give no thought to the simple oneness of the four”...

“The sky is the vaulting path of the sun, the course of the changing moon, the wandering glitter of the stars, the year’s seasons and their changes, the light and dusk of day, the gloom and glow of night, the clemency and inclemency of the weather, the drifting clouds and blue depth of the ether. When we say sky, we are already thinking of the other three along with it, but we give no thought to the simple oneness of the four”...

“The divinities are the beckoning messengers of the godhead. Out of the holy sway of the godhead, the god appears in his presence or withdraws into his concealment. When we

... speak of the divinities, we are already thinking of the other three along with it, but we give no thought to the simple oneness of the four” ...

“The mortals are the human beings. They are called mortals because they can die. To die means to be capable of death as death. Only man dies, and indeed continually, as long as he remains on earth, under the sky, before the divinities. When we speak of mortals, we are already thinking of the other three along with it, but we give no thought to the simple oneness of the four” (Heidegger, *Poetry, Language, Thought*, 2001, p. 147).

World is a world of things, each a cluster of streaming relations reciprocally determinative of world. The fourfold is the key to understanding the utter rationality of worldly existence, for things are now understood to be the gathering points of the fourfold. Only with the fourfold does Heidegger attain the simplicity of vision adequate to a thinking of thing and world. For under this fold everything or each entity happened to be the ‘gathering’ of the earth, sky, mortals and divinities; the essential blend or gathering that collectively constitutes the thing for Heidegger. The fourfold assembled the thing in its own position, for it is said to be “gathered” into things. But being a (mere) gathering, it desubstantialized the thing, rather than concretized it as a substance which is present and self-enclosed entity as metaphysics does. The thing is the intersection of earth, sky, mortals and divinities, without which its thinging cannot be considered. “Considering the thing a gathering thus precludes any conception of the thing as a steady presence. The fourfold gathers around the thing is a tenuous convergence. There is nothing everlasting or monumental about such things; they tarry ephemerally (Heidegger’s term is *Weilen*), the thing abides” (Mitchell, 2010).

The same gathering that unites the four in the thing is equally a disaggregation of the thing. What is gathered is not homogeneity, but a spaced parting of assembled members. The fourfold disaggregates the thing by releasing it from the bonds of an encapsulated self-identity. Heidegger’s name for this, not surprisingly, is “Thinging.” In Heidegger, the thing in its thinging is telescoped out beyond itself. For the thing is not only gathered but disassembled at once, because of which (disassembly) it enters the world. In fact, the fourfold delimits and thereby situates the thing in a context of the world. The four avenues

of relation taken together contextualize the thing. “The fourfold names the reverberating extent and radiant fringe of the thing, the way it issues out beyond itself in an infinite belonging to the world” (Mitchell, 2010).

The fourfold serve to weave the thing into place; they open the register of relations whereby the thing is contextualized within the world. Each member of the fourfold forms a bridge by which the thing relates to the world, which Heidegger refers to it as a “mirror-play” that in fact, is the essence of each of the four and also what allows them to come together as the fourfold. “The appropriative mirroring sets each of the four free into its own, but it binds these free one’s into the simplicity of their essential being toward one another” (Mitchell, 2010).

The manner Dasein dwells the world is something to-be-cared-for. And this something to-be-cared-for is what we exactly point out here as the fourfold.

### **7.8. The “Festival” – An Antidote to Destitution of Modernity**

By taking up the issue of modern technology, dwelling, Heidegger’s innermost idea is to present the fact that we are so different from pre-modernity, from paradigmatically, the Greek. The reason for all such disclosures is ‘metaphysics’ which wrongly guided modernity into the disclosures of beings in the most negative ways. Unlike Being’s disclosure as *aletheia* in the Greek, modernity is the epoch where every form of disclosure is driven in such a way to empower man and do whatever he likes to nature according to his wish. By putting man on top, the disclosure no doubt, is man-centered, where the rest of entities are underestimated and possible to be exploited in every possible means, if there is any will at all. Such is the disclosure (a biased one) in the epoch of modernity which Heidegger aimed at re-interpreting it in the light of authentic disclosure of Being. Yes the matter is very much within the domain of authenticity, implied in different aspects of living in the world. The issue that is discussed in the ‘Festival’ – the antidote to the metaphysical misinterpretation of the technological disclosure of Being, concerned upon the reciprocity of the fourfold that binds thing together in their respective places including man. In fact, it is a primordial bond

where the reverence of everything is observed. It means every entity stands in their own right so as to make being accomplished or illumine them together. In that epoch of disclosure, no entity including man, is superior over other, but essentially worked together beautifully and harmoniously within the fold of Being, so no exploitations. Every entity appeared in the sight of others to be the extension of their bodies resulted in the care-for others. In fact, care or protection is what is already implicit in such condition, for uncare-for the other ultimately entails doing things for one's own destruction, because everything under such condition is inter-related, a necessary extension for others. The disclosure of things as resource colored every epoch. But Heidegger did make a stronger claim that modernity is the technological disclosures of Being, where things are disclosed as pure resource and nothing more. The sacredness of things are no longer revered, and respected. But Heidegger warns us that when things are viewed merely from a practical point of view that is acknowledged only as "equipment," their being-in-itself disappears into usefulness, or further things-in-themselves are intruded by reduced them to the level of something to be exploited, manipulated, transformed to a wider use.

Heidegger said, unlike modernity, the Greek did not succumb to the violence of metaphysics. For they knew that the metaphorical pronounced "the festival" is an antidote to metaphysics, is deeply grounded in their worldliness. By the term "the festival," it should be equated with the holiday – a break from work where "setting oneself outside of everyday activity, the cessation of work" (Young, Heidegger's Later Philosophy, 2002, p. 57). The metaphorical "work" here indicates the "average everydayness" which is often called the "they" world, unreflective one, full of technological works in the modernity. But the irony is as modernity is the epoch where the technological disclosure of Being is the only form of disclosure, it fails to disclose being in its most primordial or rather authentic form of revealing. Unless something extra-ordinary happens the world shows up as pure resources. As such Heidegger eventually calls for the holiday where one should step out of the usual or normal everyday living, a break from work, a sheer rest and recreation, meaning Being in the play of the fourfold which is exactly identified here as the Greeks revealing (*aletheia*). Because in such a condition Dasein, either alienating itself from or elevated above entities (to exploit it), it merges with the fourfold and let the being disclosed as exactly as the way it

reveals in the original “worldliness,” therefore, authentic in living. In fact, it is the real holiday unlike the modern holiday meant to use only in the form of stress-relief, and a mere break from hectic work schedule, but a situation where things are reconciled (because man equalized himself with nature, no longer controller) and illumined together in their respective positions so as to be the disclosure of Being.

*“The authentic, the Greek, holiday is first of all, then, genuine ‘time out’, a genuine work-pause, a stepping out of the everydayness in which things show up as pure resource”* (Young, Heidegger's Later Philosophy, 2002, p. 58).

The most obvious reference for “the festival” is the celebratory occasion in temple, amphitheatre, or Olympic stadium which occurred from time to time and during which the Greeks were “transported” into the “extraordinary” (Young, Heidegger's Later Philosophy, 2002, p. 43/66). But this is what can be referred as the “ontic” festival, which is more or less same with the average everydayness. Heidegger, on the other hand, is more interested in and rather calls for the ‘ontological’ festival where everything is transformed into something new. Such a festive state, Heidegger says, is characterized by change of time that is genuinely ‘time out’ from the harried world of everyday activity, a time of “coming to oneself” or “coming to one’s senses,” escaping the perpetual illusions of harried everydayness (Heidegger, *The Question Concerning Technology*, 1977, p. 27), and realized the senselessness of work in the modern way. The result is that things show up in their “ownnesses” or “essences” (Young, Heidegger's Later Philosophy, 2002, p. 65), because such a state wore the spectacle of the Greeks (*aletheia*), which is also described as “the ownness of beings.” The second defining feature of the festive state Heidegger says is a leap into the state of “radiance” (a new domain) out of the hectic everydayness. This apparently is the point where Heidegger developed a new domain of thinking, which is but devoid of will or any rational or logical form of thinking like Platonic, rather a poetic form of revealing where one is passive but active in terms of letting happen as the way it is. This state of radiance is described by Hölderlin’s poem that Heidegger is fascinated with; it goes as...

*As when on holiday, to view the fields  
Forth goes a farmer, at break of day,  
When all through the sultry night cooling flashes  
Have fallen and the thunder still rumbles afar  
And back into its channel the stream retreats  
And newly grows the grass,  
And heaven's gladdening showers  
Drip from the vine, and gleaming  
In peaceful sunlight stands the grove of trees*  
(Young, Heidegger's Later Philosophy, 2002, p. 59).

This state of radiance can only be had with wearing the spectacle of the poet, meaning the poetic disclosure, Heidegger says is the highest form of revealing for it enables authentic appreciation or true admiration of the things. It is a leap into the world of *poiesis* where things are seen as something granted to us in the self-disclosure of the divine and self-concealing origin; therefore, reverence has a place in it. Every entity appeared as something sacred, holy, harmoniously blended, and something to be cared-for. “Experienced as such, one understands the world as something, contingent, fragile, precious, something which, far from being of course there, might not have existed at all. Subjectively this produces a profound sense of ‘wonder’ and ‘gratitude’” (Young, Heidegger's Later Philosophy, 2002, p. 60). The world now appeared to have different looks, although the contents are same throughout. There is a complete realization that everything in their own positions are one of the many facets of being, essentially inter-related or works together. It is a state of disclosure of world anew, full of enthusiasm, bloom, and revered. In fact, it is a celebration of the world and of our life in it, of the fact ‘that there are things and we ourselves are in their midst’. Lastly, “in the festive state Heidegger says, beings ‘come to stand within the measure (mass) of their essences,’ their whatnesses, and so, together with the ‘lighting and shining’ of the essential, demand of men that they observe this measure” (Young, Heidegger's Later Philosophy, 2002, p. 61). It is such an ecstatic state of being, where care is the prime character of the world which Heidegger wanted to revive in his notion of authenticity. However, in the midst of technological form of disclosure (of world) where

work is the characterizing feature, it is obvious that it cannot always go hand in hand with such ecstatic form of being, yet Heidegger's response is that even if it is taken up (works) in different ways, it should be taken up in the form "*techne*" as the Greek originally called it.

### **7.9. The Poet as the Ground of Being: The Essence of Poetry – The Ultimate Revealing of Being**

Heidegger wanted to re-awaken the spirit of how the early Greek understood language as the revealing (*aletheia*) or *poiesis* (bringing forth) of the Being. Poetry, he thinks is what enables such revealing in the most original and highest sense. As language (in the primal sense) in the Heideggerian understanding is something that can be identified with the Being's disclosure as beings, the horizon of intelligibility, the response of the language of Being, rather than human composition. Therefore, such uncanny truth can be best realized in the poetic revealing or mode of existence.

From the light of what have discussed so far, the possible question often asked were: How is Being discovered and illuminated? And how can we hold fast to it and preserve it, when we do penetrate to the truth of Being? Questions like those appeared because the mysterious dimension of Being is always inexhaustive; and adequate description of it cannot be had only with reference to human way of being and nature in a larger usage. But the technical answers to these questions reveal that Heidegger seems uncommonly suggestive and original. He suggested that Being can be discovered through the investigation of, the listening to, and meditating upon the language of genuine thinkers and poets. Here Heidegger sees language as what enables the accessibility of Being. But again, the way Heidegger understands Language is directly contrary to the common thinking, in which language is conceived as mere tools or instrument, a means of transmitting information. However, in the Heideggerian line of thought, Language is the supreme event of human existence because it enables man, in the words of the poet Hölderlin, "to affirm what he is" (Gray, 1952).

In *Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry*, Heidegger makes it clear that “the role of poetry is to bring originally into the openness of the clearing of Being that which is subsequently dealt with in everyday language” (Allackpally, 2002, p. 214). Heidegger views the poet as he who lets things be present in the higher sense, namely as things called forth which reflect the world - foursome and the four world-poles of the interplay.

In his work, “*The origin of the work of Art*” Heidegger writes as –

“*Essential poetry includes poesy, or what we ordinarily refer to as poetry, indeed in a privileged way, but extends beyond it to all genuine forms of art*” (Heidegger, *Poetry, Language, Thought*, 2001, p. 187).

To put in a simpler way as the works of Art concerns with the letting happen of the advent of the truth of what is, which Heidegger thinks is essentially poetry. A poet is one who see the harmonious inter-play of the fourfold and appreciate such harmony in his poem, i.e., language in the original sense. No doubt, the poet’s superiority lies in the fact that poetical discourse is after all more primordial in that it deals with things in their ready-to-hand kind of Being within the pre-scientific world of Dasein. To disclose beings as time is to discuss it as *poiesis* – as an event of creative imagination. At the risk of repetition, it may be summarized: Imagination is the foundationless foundation of our knowledge of all things. It is the blind spot of truth which enables us to see things as identifiable objects without itself being seen, imagination cannot be derived from any other faculty, Heidegger insists. It is “*poiesis*” without “why” – or as Schelling put it, imagination is a power at once human and divine for it is nothing less than the “unconscious poetry of being” (Kearney, 1998, p. 53).

Thus in *Hölderlin and the essence of poetry*, Heidegger writes:

“...poetry never takes language as a material at its disposal, but instead first makes language possible. Poetry is the primordial language of a historical people. Thus the essence of language must be understood out of the essence of poetry, and not other way round (Heidegger, *Holderlin and the essence of poetry*, 2009, p. 125).

#### 4.9.1. From the Language of the Poet to the Care of the Fourfold

In language Heidegger claims: “what is purely spoken is the poem” (Lysaker, 2010, p. 204). Some poems unfold an originary language with a language of essence. Hölderlin, as read by Heidegger, finds in the fourfold world, earth, sky, mortals and divinity an originary language that grounds us by exposing us to the differential dimension of world and thing. For example, whereas the figures such as jugs and bridges, when the fourfold is woven through the site they inhabit, individually and collectively, they shine with radiance. “In other words, as a language of essence the fourfold bathes every occurrence. One thus never encounters just isolated jugs and bridges, but rather always encounters them on the earth, beneath the sky, in relation to one’s mortal being and in a presently desacralized (which is not to say desecrated ) milieu” (Lysaker, 2010, p. 205).

This poetic finding of a historical event is subject to historical decisions that do not follow from individual or aggregate human choices. In fact, it could very well prove that our world belongs to a *poiesis* altogether un-poetic in the sense of the language of the poem. Here we have in mind global technology, what Heidegger names *Ge-stell*, the “en-framing.” Such is “un-poetic” because, as Heidegger argues in the “*Question concerning technology*,” *Ge-stell* which presents every being as energy to be organized according to productive apparatuses such as the global marketplace, erases its own *poi sis*. Rather than present itself as a way of revealing, thereby exposing the *differential* dimension of the world and thing and the event of unconcealment in which the whole unfolds.

## **THESIS CONCLUSION**

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This concluding chapter is a summing up of the basic findings of the thesis re-visiting Heidegger's critique of the metaphysical tradition of philosophy in light of his phenomenological and hermeneutical quest for fundamental ontology of Being.

The thesis began with Heidegger – a life, as a prerequisite to his philosophical position still contributing to the idea that a philosopher's biography may also be philosophically significant. As Heidegger himself argues in *Being and Time* that the life projects of an individual are embedded in the historical and social context into which one is “thrown.” One can authentically choose to modify one's “existential situation” only by first being into it by attending to the life situation in which Heidegger, the philosopher lived, found him thrown into and out of which context he developed his quest for the life of an authentic Dasein and of Being. Heidegger's concern for restoring the *facticity* of life situations is significant in unveiling the layers of his philosophical commitments in many ways.

Adorno, while analyzing the “philosophical banality” of Heidegger's employment of a jargon of authenticity finds that it exploits some of the worst aspects of human romanticism, religious enthusiasm for the authentic and popular folk nationalism. Further, Heidegger's own admission that his short term entanglement with Hitler and Nazism, stemmed from his own vision of what the movement should be about, his own “Private National Socialism,” and his conviction that it was his philosophical calling to take a leading role in the movement. “The conditions to which he was thrown into, that he lived through a Nazi era, that he was German writing in German, that he studied theology than to philosophy, and more so, because he comes to hold that the historical existence of the individual is located within the ‘history of Being’ itself ...” (Bambach, 2010, pp. 2-3).

So, after placing Heidegger's philosophical quest for authenticity out of an essential inauthenticity of “thrownness of life” and its tug of war between these two tendencies of

inauthenticity and authenticity, Heidegger needed to begin from the beginning, thinking in a way that differs from the abstract detached philosophical stand of his time. The thesis thus follows Heidegger's critique of philosophy as metaphysics as prerequisite for his quest for Being in and through a being in the world for whom alone this urge to explore this authentic dimension of Being and of life remains a burning question. His rootedness in Alemannic – Swabian soil, a homeland, shared world, a place to dwell will continue to exert its decisive influence in his later quest for authentic care structure and a place to dwell drawing more from poetic concealment – unconcealment of Being in Heraclitus and others than the computational model of reasoning in the era of technological nihilism. Heidegger's Hitler association, "the greatest stupidity in my life," as he later admits, had this subtle connection with his version of an "inner truth of the movement," as an unfortunate by product of global technology and its greater holocaust and his later Hölderlin lectures still continued to look for an authentic quest for Being and also of the 'volk' (in *Who are we?*), still using the language of a Fatherland in the historical *being* of the *volk*, but with a critique of the more dubious and noisy patriotism of official Nazism. For a deeper quest for authenticity now the Fatherland's unfathomed mystery still remains beyond the grip of group ideologies of what the *volk* is, it must also shelter the essence of the Greek *volk*, and beyond! In this background the thesis made select identification of portions and chapters that will somehow give a glimpse of what actually underwent, or what he actually tried to unearth, in his effort at transcending inauthenticity with a deeper realization of authenticity.

When the world witnessed the emergence of the existentialist philosophers since the first half of the twentieth century, there began the reaction against the modernist age of scientific humanism that existed. Heidegger was no exception among those existentialists, even though he himself rejects the label of existentialism. They all were deeply unhappy with the notion that theoretical knowledge was in some way privileged; in fact, Heidegger considered it subordinate to primordial or essential, *factual* knowledge. For reason, according to him, is insufficient or rather useless for the explanation of the ontological or phenomenological subjects. Being a philosopher of paying more emphasis towards the lived dimension of phenomena, contrary to the inner subjective determination, his method of phenomenology targets the explication of how things manifest themselves in the daily world. "Heidegger

tells us that phenomenology pinpoints, firstly, the phenomenon or that which ‘shows itself’ or ‘allows itself be seen’ for what it is and, secondly, the *logos* (which as speech) is also a showing. In *Being and Time* it is the method of that is directed to Being; the being which is disclosed to Dasein in its primordial grasp of itself” (Sluuds, 2011, pp. 47-63) .

Thus unlike his predecessors – Edmund Husserl, whose method of phenomenology primarily deals with “intentionality” of the self, Heidegger is concerning with Being (the fundamental determinant of every phenomena / phenomenon) which is but disclosed in the being of Dasein. As Dasein provides the only site for the investigation of Being because of its being that is a primordially conditioned one, where its existence or living is under a blend of primordial or pre-governed order, and a being which also has the capacity of introspecting its own being, for the being of itself is a constant issue for it, certain things that characterizes Dasein as the necessary structure of its own existence (being-in-the-world), is what inevitably should come to the fore for the ontologico-phenomenological investigation of the B/being of Dasein.

In the light of the above, the issue of dwelling automatically enters into the investigation as it is what fundamentally characterizes Dasein in its being-in-the-world. It was first introduced in 1951 in the famous Darmstadt lecture, *Bauen Wohnen Denken*. The fundamental question, Heidegger says is “the problem of the internal possibility of the understanding of Being, from which all specific questions relative to Being arise” (Heidegger, 1962, p. 240). It further shows that only if we have clarified the horizon in which Being is understood can we pose the question of Being in the proper way (Guignon, 1984, pp. 321-339). Consequently *Being and Time* begins with an “existential analytic” which is none other than human existence itself or technically called “Dasein” – a concept where the clearing of Being or understanding of Being can be had at all that we have shown in our previous chapters. But to be precise in the investigation or to show the sensitivity of Heidegger’s investigation, it began with certain “essential structures” or “*existentialia*” that constitute Dasein’s being-in-the-world. It means there are certain primordial structures that originally conditioned Dasein’s existence which remain revelatory of Being. Hence Dasein or being-there of human being is the ground from which the Being quest could be made at

all. In line with this the previous chapters retained a search for both these *ontic-ontological* disclosures of Being specially in terms of temporality, historicity, *facticity* or *thrownness*, language and others as an intermingling of inauthentic and authentic as two sides of the same coin into which *Dasein* is either fallen as inauthentic “they self” or else striving for recovering its authentic *mineness* also in essential relation with others and in a world.

Over all, the thesis examined the two divisions of Being, the inauthentic “they selves” with whom *Dasein* finds itself thrown into a world and its *facticity*. In its inauthenticity there is distance between the subject and the object, the Being and the beings and this metaphysical disclosure of Being centers round a mundane world of things and beings which are “ready-to-hand” to be manufactured in an inauthentic and a mechanical system. Human beings too are thus robbed of their radiance and become instrumental to the idle and the common way of being-in-the-world with “being for one another.” In such an inauthentic stage things are just resources to be manipulated, so are humans as resources. In this metaphysical enframing language becomes an ordinary, inauthentic mode of communication and temporality is reduced to ontical time, the clock time that is just a mechanical combination of disconnected moments. Once beings restore their deeper layer of care structure then everything transforms miraculously and the ontic dimension of being-in-the-world becomes radiated with the divinity of the four fold: the earth then becomes a place to dwell, the sky regains its lost radiance and becomes the abode of divinity, and an authentic *Dasein* dwells in a language that houses the Being of the beings. Man thus restores ontological dimension of existence imbibing temporality, *facticity* and vulnerability of a death bound existence and remain essentially bonded with one another in a caring relation with things and beings. Heidegger thus leads us to a stage which is beyond metaphysical realm of subject–object duality and which takes recourse to a path of meditative thinking that is now disclosed by the poets, artists and by meditative thinkers. At this juncture authentic thinking transcends metaphysical way of philosophizing and remains resolute to unearth the hidden meaning of Being of beings. A new Hölderlinian myth of temporality takes place to a turn to the more originary form of *volkish nationalism*, a position of the *arch* that he finds in language, history, the sites for the home coming of the German *volk*. “In its poetic confrontation with the first Greek beginning the *Volk* of Hölderlin’s invocation takes upon itself the call of /

from being to fulfill its ontological destiny as those called on to prepare the transition to an 'other' beginning" (Bambach, 2010, p. 111).

We have also seen how this quest for authentic temporality is essentially related to the preparation for our understanding of a realm of authentic history. "Turning to Hölderlin's notion of festival and festal time, as that which founds a-new the time of the *volk* community"... The festival announces "the appropriative event" (*Ereignis*) that conciliates gods and humans in *kairological* time, a time of celebration, benefaction and consecration that is more originary than calendrial time of planning, policy and the political. It is this festal time that Hölderlin had already uncovered in Sophocle's tragedies that Heidegger seeks to retrieve for an originary German politics of 'authentic history'" (Gesamtausgabe 52) (Bambach, 2010, p. 111). Thus the search was on for restoring another kind of homeliness and a dwelling place to homeless men and beings in general and those homeless Germans in particular, when a shift was made fate to destiny of *volk* turning away from political affiliation to Nazism, another familiar instance of the same mechanization, assertion of will to power and uncontrolled subjectivism that seeks to dominate the earth, toward an a-political, poetic dwelling in terms of dialogue with Sophocle's tragedy and pre-Socratic philosophy. Embracing the tragic dimensions of life, imbibing the fourfold of mortality, and *facticity* of earth bound man toward a disclosure of the divinity of the heaven and the sacred on earth, authentic humans thus aspire to become a part of the fourfold.

At this juncture man attains a mystical communion with the Being of beings and mundane time is radiated with sacred and joyous temporality and inauthentic 'they self' is now recovered into a silent zone of "mine-ness" which is essentially tied with the "otherness of the other," Dasein retains its authentic "*mit-dasein*," its being in the world becomes a being for others and also being-in-the-world. Now man, the shepherd of Being, must listen to the silent call and presence the truth of Being and by this process man releases the thing to be what it is, by which the thing is left to rest on its own grounds. Thus man's new found authentic relation to Being is constitutive of man's essence and in this mode of disclosure things stand forth and emerge out of their own grounds, free from the categories of

metaphysics of thought. Metaphysics dissolves into the technological and empirical sciences which perform a scientific study of man.

## 8.1. Critiques of Heideggerian Deconstruction of Metaphysics

In this concluding chapter an attempt is also made to address some critics of Heideggerian position especially with reference to Derrida and Merleau-Ponty, also touching upon Nietzsche, along with some other observations made on Nietzsche in the previous chapters.

### 8.1.1. Jacques Derrida's Deconstruction theory

A French Algerian of Jewish descent, Derrida does not oppose Heidegger but for him, in Heidegger too metaphysics is overcome but not disappeared from the scene. Directly attributing the concept of metaphysical closure to Heidegger, Derrida comments: "Heidegger ... says that the thinking of Being was lost when at the birth of philosophy, Being was determined by metaphysics as presence, as the proximity of the being (*etant*) before the glance (*eidos*, phenomenon, etc.), and consequently as object. This determination of Being as *pre-sence* as the proximity of the being of itself, as self consciousness (from Descartes to Hegel), would outlive the closure of the history of metaphysics" (quoted in (Critchley, 2007, p. 81).

Derrida's critique of Heidegger is best found in his essay, "*spurs: Nietzsche's styles*" directed against Heidegger and the philosophical position called "hermeneutics." Since the major precursor for the project of an *Überwindung* (overcoming) of metaphysics is Nietzsche, the paradigmatic problem for Derrida is to deconstruct Heidegger's destruction of Nietzsche (Hoy, 1979). A footnote in *Spurs* reminds us that Derrida has addressed the question of Heidegger's reading of Nietzsche as the thinker who in the very act of attacking the epoch of metaphysics remains unconsciously trapped in it. Of Derrida's many deconstructions of philosophical and literary writings, none is more significant than that of deconstruction's own parent, Heideggerian deconstruction itself. But unlike Heidegger whose "destruction" of the history of Ontology as originally announced in *Being and Time*,

is to result in a more fundamental ontology that would overcome the traditional philosophy, Derrida's method of "deconstruction" aims to dismantle a style of writing and thinking to see how it works (or in the case of traditional philosophy, to see how it does not work) without any intention of replacing it by a more proper one. The prescriptive thrust of Heideggerian destruction purportedly veils an ontological commitment to the "truth of Being" when this is the very sort of thing that should have been destroyed. Derrida's deconstruction is not to be yet one more ontology that will in turn be superseded. Furthermore, since the major precursor for the project of an *Überwindung* of metaphysics is Nietzsche, the paradigmatic problem for Derrida is to deconstruct Heidegger's destruction of Nietzsche.

*Grammatology*, suggests that Nietzsche, can be freed from Heidegger's reading not simply by defending Nietzsche, but by letting this reading reach its own limits, beyond which the unique strangeness of Nietzsche's text will appear in its own right. Heidegger's failure to perceive this strangeness is itself said to be due to the inability of Heidegger's destruction to transcend the metaphysical epoch. Despite Heidegger's efforts to avoid any commitment to an ultimate metaphysical reality, Derrida thinks that Heidegger's talk about the presencing of Being and its appropriation involves such a metaphysical metaphor. In fact, it is Heidegger's theory of language that reveals his entrapment. Of *Grammatology* intends to show that any theory of the sign as consisting of an 'irreducible dualism between signifier and signified is based on the metaphysical illusion that a sign must be a sign of something and that language needs this preferentiality to be capable of expressing truths. Derrida's critique of Heidegger in *Grammatology* is thus that Heidegger and Hermeneutics are wrong in thinking that a theory of language must involve a theory of truth and of reference, and that Nietzsche is one who in fact sees this.

Hermeneutics is precisely the area of philosophy that concerns itself with such theory (of truth and of reference), yet Derrida makes a project of opposing it. He emphasized this opposition by selecting from Nietzsche's *Nachlass* a paradigm text that he thinks will inevitably frustrate the hermeneutic interpreter. The "text" is simply a scrap of paper, found with other apparently unrelated jottings, on which Nietzsche wrote "I have forgotten my

Umbrella.” The interesting feature of this passage for Derrida is that the words are entirely translatable and unambiguous, and yet its interpretation is completely indeterminate. It necessarily escapes the hermeneutic circle of interpretation and the attempt to bring totality of a text into an intelligible reading because it has, in Derrida’s words, “no decidable meaning.” He also suggests, furthermore, that this lack of decidable meaning may hold for all of Nietzsche’s writings, both individually and as a corpus. The play with this possibility is part of the “difficult thought” that is to take both Nietzsche and Derrida beyond the confines of the metaphysical epoch (Hoy, 1979).

Heidegger’s attempt to show that the meaning of Nietzsche’s writings amounts to a failed destruction of metaphysics thus does something that is proper only to a philosophical order and this is indeed, says Derrida, “the very order that Nietzsche’s operation should have otherwise put out of order” (Hoy, 1979). Derridean stance resembling Nietzsche’s spurs at this juncture is that there is no decidable meaning of the text. Contrary to the hermeneutic reader who thinks that a text cannot be interpreted unless the surrounding context or the underlying reference can be discovered, Derrida did emphasize that there is no such thing as a truth in itself. Accordingly, he argues that a text does not have a singly precise meaning; rather the truth about the text is plural as there are numerous ways of possible readings, none of which cannot be underestimated or ignored. They all stand out or convey a particular truth of its kind without reference to others. Same is the case with the umbrella passage of Nietzsche that can be read coherently in any number of ways. Hence, the possibility of a text without referring the context, according to Derrida, would show that the limits of hermeneutics are only the beginnings for deconstruction. Besides the serious determinations from a text, there is a tendency to “play” with all the texts, has indirectly emphasized the inconsistency of hermeneutics in general and Heidegger’s methodology in particular of using it as Dasein’s-Being verification. For there is nothing wrong with play. Derrida attacks of hermeneutics and Heidegger’s is to bring the whole enterprise of epistemology as a methodology, however, the deconstruction that brings this about does not itself make any knowledge claims, yet his is an epistemologically privileged or fenced he claimed. But the difficulty is since it is not a result of certain epistemic claim, as Derrida himself asserts, that it is almost impossible to decide what he means by it. But he endeavors straightforwardly to

maintain the impossibility of decidable meaning in order to dig the hidden content of the “text” just by reading with reference to the context. There is certain obscurity that does not permit the readings, as a result inaccessible in principle. Out of many concerns, the first is a syntactical matter. Consider the umbrella passage as the sentence “I have forgotten my Umbrella” stands in the original within the quotation marks, it closed off all the possible readings that usually leads to the ultimate meaning which ‘hermeneutic circle’ uses for determining the text. In fact, there is no such thing as the unique or ultimate significance of the text, rather there are usually many possible implications or connotations that might be relevant (but might not). Of course, the Umbrella passage is peculiar in that there is no available evidence for deciding whether it is significant at all; it is inaccessible in so far as quotation marks block all possibility of reference.

Overlooking these features of quotation marks, Derrida dramatizes his opposition to Heidegger’s conception of philosophy by claiming Heidegger fails to understand that Nietzsche is the very thinker who undercuts philosophy in this sense through his institution of what Derrida calls the epoch of Quotation marks. (Hoy, 1979) In this epoch it becomes a characteristics of textuality as such to be in quotation marks, as thus methods of interpretation like deconstruction itself, must resist trying to dig behind texts to find their “hidden meaning” that is, some causal relation to an aspect of the real world (Hoy, 1979).

Despite these criticisms Derrida’s own reading of western thought as dominated by ‘*logocentrism*’ is effectively Heidegger’s point of domination of “metaphysics of presence.” But in order to ‘turning Heidegger against Heidegger’, Derrida locates in Heidegger’s thought “the signs of belonging to metaphysics.” That by admitting two kinds of thinking, meditative and calculative modes of rationality, the distinction between essential and inessential still remains in Heidegger and Derrida terms it metaphysical. Following Derrida, Foucault criticizes hermeneutics and says historical discourses should be examined to see what is said, and not what might be meant. He also maintains that descriptive terms in scientific discourses do not refer to theory-independent objects, and that such discourses are incommensurable.

Timothy Clark makes an overall assessment of Heidegger's influence on philosophers after Heidegger, including Derrida as follows: "So how does Derrida's reading affect the issue of judging Heidegger's importance? To criticize Heidegger as Derrida does, in terms of certain 'signs of belonging to metaphysics' is still the opposite of refuting him. Who, after all, is responsible for the argument that Western metaphysics must be deconstructed but Heidegger? Work such as Heidegger's which also provides the source of most of the thinking one might want to direct against that work – this is not something anyone is going to be able to view from the outside for a very long time" (Clark, 2002, p. 153).

### **8.1.2. Maurice Merleau-Ponty: On account of Body and perception**

A follower of Martin Heidegger apparently, whose philosophy is somewhat developed on the basis of Heideggerian existential analysis, Merleau-Ponty is one of the critics of Heidegger. Before going into details about the criticisms he had over Heidegger's, a brief introduction of points where the two thinkers agree to one another, may be highlighted. There are many obvious connections between Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger, especially in their treatments of "existence" and "being-in-the-world." Where Heidegger maintains that Dasein is something whose being as being-in-the-world is antecedent to the distinction between "subject" and "object" Merleau-Ponty makes a similar point, though in a different idiom, by his repudiation of Husserl's Augustinian call for a return to the 'inner man' and his insistence on the contrary that "man is in the world" (*au monde*).

The other special striking similarity between them is characterized by their attitude to Descartes' famous *Cogito ergo sum*. While Heidegger remarked that this slogan needs to be read in a reversing order as *Sum ergo Cogito*, meaning my being in the world is prior to Cogito that is my ability to have thoughts about things within the world, Merleau-Ponty did say something very similar saying the proposition "*I think, I am*," the two assertions are to be equated. It is not the "I am" which is pre-eminently contained in the "I think"...but conversely the "I think," which is re-integrated into the transcending process of the "I am," and consciousness into existence.

Still there is also another area where the two thinkers agree to one another; in fact, it is what is borrowed by Merleau-Ponty from Heidegger, which is about time: Merleau-Ponty takes over Heidegger's conception of temporality as a fundamental structure of our being, as an ek-stase, whereby our life is a present that looks towards a future that it intends which acknowledging a past that it was. Merleau-Ponty affirms that "time is the foundation and measure of our spontaneity, because we are the upsurge of time."

Apart from the similarities, the main difference between the two may be summed up as Merleau-Ponty does not show any great interest either in the general question of the meaning of Being that Heidegger seeks to raise or in the questions about authenticity, death and anticipatory resoluteness. Heidegger avoids all talk of "intentionality" and says little about the detailed structure of perception and action that Merleau-Ponty discusses so illuminatingly. As the perception which is nothing other than the body itself is what Heidegger overlooked it, but rather clubbed it with *dasein's* existence or being-in-the-world, is what Merleau-Ponty wanted to clarify in his critiques.

For Merleau-Ponty, the body holds the most primordial nature which enables our understanding of the world as such. We grasp external space through our bodily situation. A corporeal or "postural schema" gives us at every moment a global, practical, and implicit notion of the relation between our body and things, of our hold on them. A system of possible movements, or "motor projects" radiates from us to our environment. Our body is not in space like things; it inhabits or haunts space. It applies itself to space like a hand to an instrument, and when we wish to move about we do not move the body as we move an object. We transport it without instruments as if by magic, since it is ours and because through it we have direct access to space. For us the body is much more than an instrument or a means; it is our expression in the world, the visible form of our intentions. Even our most secret effective movements, those most deeply tied to the humoral infrastructure, help to shape our perception of things (Baldwin, 2003, p. 36).

To sum up, he emphasized the body as the primary site of knowing the world, a corrective to the long philosophical tradition of placing consciousness as the source of knowledge, and

his insight that the body and that which it perceived could not be disentangled from each other.<sup>1</sup> Merleau-Ponty's allegation to Heidegger is that Heidegger's general description of human being as Dasein's being-in-the-world failed to discuss the lived world including the body which in fact, experiences the world. Hence he, along with thinkers like Simon de Beauvoir insisted upon the necessity for reconsidering the human body – the site of knowing the world. Parallel to Merleau-Ponty, it was Alphonse de Waelhens – a French thinker like Merleau-Ponty who really engaged the debate when he criticized Heidegger for having neglected a suitable description of the mixture which is human consciousness. He suggested that in *Being and Time*, Heidegger oriented himself on a level of complexity which encourages us to believe that the problem of the relation between consciousness and the world had been solved. De Waelhens argued that the projects Heidegger described, disclosed a possible understanding of everyday concrete existence which already presupposed for example, that the subject of daily existence raises his arm, since he hammers and builds. The subject who accomplishes such ordinary everyday tasks is simply presumed to have the capacity for movement and action, his faculty of perception is simply discerned as “evident,” and therefore ignored. He contended that Heidegger was guilty of completely neglecting the primordial lived-world which is always already there for us: “In *Being and Time*, one does not find thirty lines concerning the problem of perception; one does not find ten concerning that of the body” (Askay, 1999, pp. 29-35).

De Waelhans believed that Merleau-Ponty's investigation of the lived-body on the level of perception provided the most primordial description of the world and consciousness and their relation, and hence that Heidegger's analysis presupposed Merleau-Ponty's transcendental perspective.

As had briefly described, Merleau-Ponty wrote extensively on the primacy of the body in terms of understanding the world: “the body can symbolize existence because it brings it into being and actualizes it...Bodily existence which runs through me, yet does so independently of me, lies only the barest raw material of a genuine presence in the world. Yet at least it provides the possibility of such presence, and establishes our first consonance

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<sup>1</sup> See [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maurice\\_Merleau-Ponty](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maurice_Merleau-Ponty) (retrieved on 07.04. 2013)

with the world” (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, pp. 164-165). Also he wrote, “The theory of the body is already a theory of perception...we are our body. In the same way we shall need to reawaken our experience of the world as it appears to us in so far as we are in the world through our body, and in so far as we perceive the world with our body. But by remaking contact with the body and with the world, we shall also rediscover ourselves (*sic*), since, perceiving as we do with our body, the body is a natural self and, as it were, the subject of perception” (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, pp. 203-206). Contrary to the French philosophers, particularly of de Waelhans, however, Merleau-Ponty considered the lived-body and existence to be equiprimordial: “Neither body nor existence can be regarded as the original of the human being, since they presuppose each other, and because the body is solidified or generalized existence, and existence a perpetual incarnation” (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 166).

### **8.1.3. Some Feminist Critiques of Heidegger**

Out of the many critiques, the French existentialist, particularly the Feminist phenomenologist claimed that Heidegger failed to address sufficiently the problem of the body. Drawing their attention towards the original issue, that is all about the lived world including the body which experiences the world, what Heidegger proposes being-in-the-world as the more primordial than bodily being, rather as the sum total of all existence, is found inadequate for them. Hence they insist upon the reconsideration of the body.

Sartre, whose philosophy paved the way for Feminism, does a pioneering work through his criticism of Being and Time. He believed that Heidegger failed to adequately discuss the issue, pointing to the fact that there are barely six lines on the body. (Askay, 1999)

As the critique revolves around the issue of the body, the same of which is more complex in the case of woman, it accused of Heidegger to have least saying on the issue. According to Simon de Beauvoir, “our existence is expressed by our body which has both the history and a pre-history, a previously given spatial milieu within which the body can be situated” (Glendinning, 1999, p. 325).

## 8.2. An attempt at re-capitulating the thesis position in light of some of its basic Findings

Heideggerian quest for fundamental ontology of Being is his attempt at exploring hermeneutical disclosure of Being is also a bold attempt at a shifting the familiar ground of the *cogito*, the thinking center, to the being center of “I am.” In the overall designing of the present thesis this attempt at deconstruction of the metaphysical tradition of the quest for subject centric epistemic certainty was shown to be essentially linked with the two, the question of the “question of Being” and the questioner for whom it is a question, between Being and the emergence of Dasein in this very process of re kindling the Being question.

This is the juncture at which the significance of the Dasein emerges and accordingly, the thesis now dwells at length on Dasein as being-in-the-world. Dasein is important here as the site in which the Being question occurs. Interestingly enough, the forgotten question of the Being of beings, does not reflect some kind of confusion on the part of the inquirer, the way Descartes asked the *cogito* question aiming at regaining the lost certainty of the *cogito*. But the question of Being reveals a different pattern here, what is questioned about remains decisive on the nature of the question asked. As Paul Ricoeur lets us remember that for Heidegger: “Every inquiry is a seeking; every seeking gets guided beforehand by what is sought ... any inquiry, as inquiry about something, has that which is asked about (*hat sein Befragtes*)” (Ricoeur, 2004, p. 24). This is the first implication which will be developed as the negative aspect of the critique of the *cogito*.

Is this questioner of Being question still an ego in whom there is both the forgetfulness of the Being question and then reemergence of the question with fresh rigor? To quote Ricoeur: “This ego, as in the question, is not posited as certain of itself. That is to say, it is posited as being itself a being, the being for which there is the question of Being” (Ricoeur, 2004, p. 223).

The ego here is immediately an “I am,” not an “I think”: “The very asking of this question is an entity’s mode of Being; and as such it gets its essential character from what is inquired

about –namely, Being. This entity which each of us is himself and which includes inquiring as one of the possibilities of its Being, we shall denote by the term Dasein” (Heidegger M. , 2008, p. 27). Though the opposition between cogito and Being becomes subtle but despite much scope for misunderstanding regarding the priority of the question of the Da-sein over the question of Being, a priority that might have led to *Being and Time*'s anthropological overtone in the minds of critics, including his mentor Edmund Husserl, is sought to be clarified with re-location of ontic–ontological priorities in terms of the possible anthropological dimensions of the question of the Dasein as something to be left behind in its further quest for the Being question, the ontological dimension of the Being cum being. Everyone also knows the famous formulae according to which Dasein is “ontically distinctive in that it is ontological.” Accordingly, the thesis now seeks to highlight all such possible ontic-ontological dimensions of Being, with special emphasis on ontic and ontological dimensions of the essential structures of the being of dasein such as time and temporality, language, historicity, mortality, vulnerability and finally the restoration of the authentic care structure in the harmonious relation between the being of the four fold in which the Being of beings and the being reciprocate the one providing a place to dwell to the other.

So this ontic-ontological interplay of Being of beings makes a shift from the cogito to the Being and then toward fundamental ontology thereby the care structure revealed in the authentic Being is not the subject of the Being as such, a human subject before whose “gaze” the world and other beings just become a representation, a “sight” to be viewed, since these others stand before us in that manner. But the Greeks did not face the world and so there was no *cogito* for them. For the Greeks, it is rather man who is faced by the existent. Heidegger does not say that there was not yet a man for the Greeks. On the contrary, this man had an essence and the task to “collect” (*legein*) the self disclosing in its disclosure and to save (*s zein*) it, to catch it up and preserve it, and to remain exposed to all sounding confusion (*al theuin*)” (Ricoeur, 2004, p. 224).

Deconstructing the metaphysical tradition of philosophy Heidegger sought to restore the belonging of Dasein to *Sein*, not as subject-object split the one representing the other as a

picture, but in order to restore an authentic “who of the dasein,” one has to wait till one owns one’s own death. There was not yet a “who” in ordinary average usualness of an inauthentic “they,” but there is only a kind of anonymous self: “one man,” (the German). To quote Ricoeur again: “In this way the question of the ‘who of Dasein emerged in that of the potentiality of being one’s self as a whole. This recapitulation of existence in the face of death is the response to the question of ‘who’ of Dasein. And then we have a hermeneutics of the ‘I am’ which culminates in a hermeneutics of the finite totalization in the face of death” (Ricoeur, 2004, p. 227).

The thesis thus highlights the *existentiells* rather than existential, and this authentic disclosure of being of “mineness” replaces language as *rede* by discourse or speech, the word of the poet and the thinker. Gradually the linguistic turn in philosophy of Being question replaces analytic of Dasein and gradually the authentic life which was called “freedom for death” in *Being and Time* is drifting toward the obedience of the poet and the thinker in the later Heidegger.

This is what the thesis sought to explore and despite limitations and many shortcomings that is looked forward to be corrected and improved at a later phase, the thesis concludes with these famous quotations on the overall assessment of Heideggerian deconstruction of metaphysics and the essential quest for Being ,which, it is felt, is self explicative. Could Heidegger achieve what he was looking for? What for was this effort at the whole exercise of hermeneutical phenomenological exercise? Could he still retain something phenomenological that initially attracted him to his mentor Edmund Husserl? What is the general assessment of others in this regard?

### **8.3. An attempt at re-assessment of Martin Heidegger’s philosophy in light of some other scholars**

“The philosophical tradition that goes from Descartes to Husserl, and indeed a large part of the philosophical tradition that goes back to Plato, involves a search for foundations: metaphysically certain foundations of knowledge, foundations of language and meaning,

foundations of mathematics, foundations of morality, etc. Now, in the twentieth century, mostly under the influence of Wittgenstein and Heidegger, we have come to believe that this general search for these sorts of foundations is misguided” (Searle, 1983).

“Heidegger’s concept for the kind of being we ourselves are is Dasein. Literally it means “being-there.” We are the sort of beings who are there, in the world. What characterizes Dasein is that its existence is a concern for it in its existence” (Svendsen, 2005, p. 114).

Stephen Hicks: "Ask professional philosophers of today to name the five most significant philosophers of the twentieth century and, whether they love him or loathe him, most will include Heidegger on the list" (Hicks, 2010, p. 10).

Thomas Sheehan: “Heidegger’s expression “being itself” refers to “the analogically unified meaning of Being which is the intelligibility correlative with our everyday background practices.” (Philipse, 1999, p. 3)

Herman Philipse: “Here finally was a philosopher for whom philosophy meant more than an intellectual game concerned with artificial problems such as the problem of the external world, a philosopher who tried to intensify life itself.” (Philipse, 1999, p. xii)

#### **8.4. A brief account of ‘Newness’ of the thesis in Heideggerian scholarship**

The thesis makes an attempt at re-opening a nuanced way of engaging with Heideggerian scholarship that enables one toward a new reading of art, language, theology and even the notion of self of a historically situated being that also incorporates being and time in a unique manner. The thesis thus keeps room to re-looking Heideggerian position on hermeneutics of Being, investigated through the concrete, existential, local nature of Dasein thereby encouraging a new interference of discipline like psychotherapy in modern times. This ‘Daseinanalyse’ (analysis of Being-there, a term coined by Swiss psychologist, Binswanger) encourages the understanding of each individual person without a distinction between ‘healthy’ and ‘sick’, ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’. This generates a new idea of

critiquing the assumption that there was no meaning to be found in the minds of patients who were mentally ill. It follows from the idea that Dasein's 'They-mode' – a mode not at all aware of its own self is but comparable with certain mental illness symptoms. Hence they all represent the complex nature of mind / psyche.

Besides, the thesis highlights the fact that in Heidegger, one can look for a new understanding of language as the primordial saying that takes it beyond the usual horizon of language understanding only as a medium of communication created and spoken of by human beings. Accordingly, language widens its scope to include metaphors, and penetrates into the domain of poetry and arts are the symbolic expressions of existential beings. This idiosyncratic treatment of language really goes beyond the traditional view of language by revealing it as a primordial event by which Being is raised to the level of *Logos*.

The thesis also re-establishes the claim that Heidegger's 'hermeneutic turn' is a new orientation with profound representations for such issues as the nature of the human sciences, the possibility of Artificial Intelligence, and the prospects for a post foundationalist culture. This is widely acknowledged in the writings of diverse influential thinkers such as Richard Rorty, Charles Taylor, and H.L. Dreyfus, and other hermeneutic thinkers like Clifford Geertz, Thomas Kuhn, Michael Walzer, Roy Schafer, and many other more. It is not absurd to say that there would be no continental philosophers such as Gadamer, Habermas, and the post modern thinkers like Derrida, Foucault, and Bourdieu if there is no Heidegger. Besides these, the thesis re-discovers the corporeality of being in Heidegger enhanced a new judgment over the debate between anthropocentrism and non-anthropocentrism in the modern environmental studies.

Above all, the thesis explores the richness of Heideggerian scholarship for its relevance to the recent trends of theoretical as well as technological studies.

## Appendix - I

### CHRONOLOGY OF HEIDEGGER'S LIFE<sup>i</sup>

- 1889 Martin Heidegger is born on 26 September in Mebkirch. His parents are Friedrich Heidegger, master cooper and sexton, and Johanna Heidegger, nee Kempf.
- 1892 On 12 November, sister Marie Heidegger is born (died 8 March 1965).
- 1894 On 6 February, brother Fritz Heidegger is born (died 26 June 1980).
- 1903 Heidegger enters the Gymnasium in Constance. He lived in the St. Conrad dormitory of the seminary there.
- 1906 Transfer to the Berthold-Gymnasium in Freiburg and to the arch-episcopal seminary there.
- 1907 Conrad Grober, prefect of the seminary in Constance, gives Heidegger Franz Brentano's book *On the Manifold Meaning of Being According to Aristotle*.
- 1909 After his Abitur, Heidegger enters the Jesuit novitiate in Tisis near Feldkirch (Vorarlberg), on 30 September. He is released on 13 October on account of heart trouble.
- 1909 Enrollment at the Albert-Luwig-University of Freiburg. Heidegger studies theology and philosophy.  
First publication in Catholic Journals.
- 1911 Heidegger breaks off his theological studies. He studies history, natural sciences, and especially philosophy. Heidegger's most important teacher is Heinrich Rickert.  
Intensive reading of Husserl's *Logical Investigations*.
- 1913 Graduates on 26 July, with a thesis on "The Teaching of Judgment in Psychologism." Thesis advisor: Arthur Schneider.
- 1914 At the outbreak of the war, Heidegger voluntarily registers for the military. He is selected on 10 October, but released again on 15 October for health reasons.
- 1915 On 26 July, Heidegger qualifies for teaching (*Habilitation*) with the dissertation "Duns Scotus' Teachings on Categories and Meaning." Advisor and director:

Heinrich Rickert. On 27 July, Heidegger gives an examination lecture on: “The Concept of Time” in the Historical Sciences (*Geschichtswissenschaft*).”

On 18 August Heidegger is drafted into the services. After basic training in Mullheim (Baden), he works as a private in the Militia at the censure office in Freiburg after 1 November.

1916 Heidegger becomes engaged to Elfride Petri, a student of economics that he met in the winter semester of 1915-1916. The engagement is kept secret from March until August, when it becomes official.

Husserl comes to Freiburg as successor to Rickert.

1917 Closer acquaintance with Husserl, who becomes a promoter of Heidegger.

On 20 March, marriage to Elfride Petri.

1918 Heidegger is called to the front-line weather service and, after training in Berlin, is ordered to the army weather station at Verdun.

Acquaintance with Elisabeth Blochmann.

1919 After 1 January, Heidegger is Husserl’s research assistant.

On 21 January, birth of son Jorg.

Heidegger holds his first lecture course after the war: “The idea of Philosophy and the Problem of the World-View” (war emergency semester). It is the earliest course retained word for word, and demonstrates clear lines of independent philosophical thought.

1920 on 20 August, birth of son Hermann.

Beginning of friendship with Karl Jaspers.

1922 Heidegger is a promising candidate for professional positions in Marburg (as successor to Nicolai Hartmann) and Gottingen (as Successor to Herman Nohl). To make up for not having published since his dissertation, Heidegger writes the sketch of a palled book on Aristotle. This text, “Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle” is a concentrated summary of his lectures and, as such, the nucleus of *Being and Time*.

On 8 August, the Heidegger family moves into the Todtnauberg cabin that was planned and designed by Elfride Heidegger, and which thereafter serves as Heidegger’s refuge and preferred workplace.

- 1923 Hans-Georg Gadamer studies in Freiburg. Heidegger takes him up into his closer circle of students.
- 1923 As an *ad personam* full professor, Heidegger is called to an associate professorship at the University of Marburg (Lahn). He begins his teaching activity in the winter semester of 1923-1924 with the lecture-course “Introduction to Phenomenological Research,” in which he openly criticizes Husserl’s philosophy.  
Beginning of friendship with Rudolf Bultmann.  
Among Heidegger’s students at Marburg are Karl Lowith, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Gerhard Hruher, Hans Jonas, and Herbert Marcuse.
- 1924 Heidegger is recommended by the faculty for the position of first chair of philosophy at Marburg, to replace Nicolai Hartmann. To qualify for the position, Heidegger prepares a publication based on materials from his lectures.
- 1926 Separation from Hannah Arendt. On Heidegger’s suggestion, she goes to Heidelberg and studies under Jaspers there.
- 1927 On 1 October, Heidegger succeeds Nicolai Hartmann as chair of philosophy at Marburg. The first part of *Being and Time* appears in the “Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Research,” which is edited by Husserl. The lecture course of the summer semester, “The Basic Problems of Phenomenology,” is an approach to a continuation of *Being and Time*, the second part of which is never completed.
- 1928 On 1 October, Heidegger is called to the University of Freiburg as successor to Husserl. His first lecture-course in the winter semester of 1928-1929 is an “Introduction to Philosophy.” The Heidegger family moves into a house designed by Elfride Heidegger, Rotebuckweg 47, in Freiburg-Zähringen.  
Heidegger holds talks at the Herder-Institute of Riga.
- 1929 On 24 July, Heidegger delivers his inaugural address, “What is Metaphysics?”  
From 17 March to 6 April, Heidegger takes part in the second Higher Education Courses at Davos. He gives three talks under the title “Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason* and the Task of Grounding Metaphysics.” Heidegger and Ernst Cassirer voice their different understandings of philosophy in discussions about Kant.

Heidegger publishes the book *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*. Speech at Husserl's seventieth birthday, on 9 April. In the lecture-course for the winter semester of 1929-1930, "The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World-Finitude-Solitude," Heidegger develops a new philosophical orientation that goes beyond *Being and Time*.

- 1930 Heidegger is offered a position at the University of Berlin, which he turns down. He holds the talk "On the Essence of Truth," which is determinative of the new paths of his thinking.
- 1931 In the lecture-course for the winter semester of 1931-1932, "On the Essence of Truth," Heidegger continues work on the problematic of truth in his engagement with Plato.
- 1933 On 21 April, Heidegger is elected almost unanimously to the position of rector of the University of Freiburg (with three abstentions and one vote against). On 3 May, backdated to 1 May, he joins the National Socialist Party (NSDAP).
- 1934 At the end of February, Heidegger is ordered by the Ministry of Education in Karlsruhe to fire Wilhelm von Mollendorff as dean of the faculty of medicine and Erik Wolf as dean of the law faculty. Heidegger refuses, and resigns his rectorship. He is urged to keep his resignation secret until a successor can be nominated. Despite this, Heidegger publicly announces his resignation in April.
- 1934 Heidegger holds his first lecture course Holderlin in the winter semester of 1934-1935, "Holderlin's Hymns 'Germania' and 'The Rhine.'"
- 1935 Heidegger holds his lecture course "Introduction to Metaphysics," which is important for his thinking in the later thirties. On 13 November, he gives the talk "The Origin of the Artwork" at the Freiburg Art Association.
- 1936 Speaking tour to Rome. On 2 April Heidegger speaks on "Holderlin and the Essence of Poetry," and on 8 April he speaks on "Europe and German Philosophy." He meets with his student Karl Lowith, who had emigrated to Italy. The exchange of letters with Karl Jaspers is broken off. Heidegger continues to send his publications to Jaspers. In the winter semester of 1936-1937, he holds the first to four total lecture courses on Nietzsche: "Nietzsche: The Will to Power as Art." The occupation with Nietzsche

- serves as impetus for an engagement with his own time. The Gestapo watches over Heidegger's lectures.
- 1937 Heidegger turns down traveling to Paris as member of the official German delegation to the International Philosophy Congress.
- 1938 Heidegger completes the manuscript of *Contributions to Philosophy*.
- 1939 Completion of the Manuscript of *Mindfulness (Besinnung)*. Together with *Contributions to Philosophy*, this text is Heidegger's attempt to unfold the thoughts developed in the thirties.
- Heidegger publishes the treatise "On the Essence and Concept Aristotle's Physics."
- 1944 Heidegger is conscripted into the Volkssturm and deployed to the Alsace region. After a heavy bombing attack on Freiburg, he brings his manuscripts to Mebkirch. The philosophy faculty of the University of Freiburg is relocated to the Wildenstein castle near Beuron.
- Heidegger publishes *Elucidations of Holderlin's Poetry*.
- 1945 After the war ends, Freiburg falls under French military administration. Heidegger is called before the *Bereinigungsausschub* (purification committee), a university commission formed by the military. Karl Jaspers submits an extremely critical letter about Heidegger.
- Correspondence with Jean-Paul Sartre.
- 1946 On 28 December, Heidegger is banned from teaching. He suffers a physical and emotional breakdown and is treated by Victor Freiherr von Gebattel, a student of the psychoanalyst Ludwig Binswanger.
- Heidegger gets to know the French philosopher Jean Beaufret. He writes the "Letter on Humanism" to him.
- 1948 On 16 September, Ernst Junger, whose essay "The Worker" (1932) had had a lasting effect on Heidegger, makes his first visit to Todtnauberg, arranged by Vittorio Klostermann.
- 1949 In the "Club of Bremen" on 1 December, Heidegger gives the talk "Insight into That Which Is," which is dedicated to an interpretation of modernity.
- The teaching ban is lifted in September.
- The correspondence with Karl Jasper resumes.

- 1950 The Bremen lectures are repeated at the Buhlerhohe near Baden-Baden on 26 and 27 March. On 6 June, Heidegger speaks on “The Thing” at the Bavarian Academy of Fine Arts in Munich.
- Hannah Arendt, who had immigrated to the United States, return to Germany and visits Heidegger for the first time.
- Heidegger publishes *Holzwege*, a collection of works written between 1936 and 1946.
- 1951 Heidegger retires properly on 26 September. At the sametime, he resumes his teaching with the lecture-course “What is called Thinking?”
- On August, Heidegger speaks on “Building –Dwelling-Thinking” at the “Darmstadter Gespräch II.”
- 1953 On 18 November, Heidegger gives the talk “Question Concerning Technology” at the Bavarian Academy of Fine Arts in Munich.
- Beginning of friendship with Erhart Kastner.
- 1954 Heidegger published *Lectures and Essays*.
- 1955 At the Conradin Kreuzer memorial celebration in Mebkirch on 30 October, Heidegger speaks on “Releasement” (Gelassenheit). Heidegger gets to know the poet Rene Char through Jean Beaufret.
- 1957 At the five-hundredth anniversary celebration of the University of Freiburg, Heidegger gives the talk “The Principle of Identity.”
- Reception into the Heidelberg Academy of Sciences.
- Reception into the Berlin Academy of Arts.
- 1959 Beginning of seminars with doctors and psychotherapists in the clinic at Zollikon, near Zurich, which is directed by Medard Boss.
- Heidegger is named honorary citizen of Mebkirch.
- On the Way to Language* appears.
- 1960 Heidegger receives the Hebel-Award.
- 1961 In two volumes under the title *Nietzsche*, Heidegger publishes a reworked and supplemented version of his Nietzsche lectures from the thirties.
- 1962 The first trip to Greece. Heidegger captures the experience in his journal “Sojourns.”
- 1966 The first seminar in Thor (Provence), Rene Char’s hometown.

Heidegger receives Rudolf Augustein, Georg Wolf, and the photographer Digne Meller-Marcovic for Spiegel interview which, in keeping with his terms, is not published until after his death.

- 1967 Heidegger publishes *Pathmarks*, a collection of works from 1919 to 1961.  
In Freiburg, Heidegger meets Paul Celan, who is there for a reading. They go together to Todtnauberg, and Celan captures this in his poem “Todtnauberg.”
- 1969 Reception into the Bavarian Academy of Fine Arts.  
Heidegger’s last publication, the book *On the Matter of Thinking*, appears.
- 1971 In the fall, Heidegger moves into the retirement home planned by Elfride Heidegger (Owner: Hermann Heidegger). It is a Fillibachstrasse 25, behind the old Heidegger residence on Rotebuckweg.
- 1975 The first volume of the Heidegger *Gesamtausgabe* appears.
- 1976 Heidegger dies on 26 May, and is buried on 28 May in Mebkirch. The Freiburg theologian Bernhard Welte, who is also from Mebkirch. Speaks at the service. At the open grave, Hermann Heidegger reads poems by Holderlin that his father had selected.
- 1985 Founding of the Martin Heidegger Society.
- 2002 Opening of the Heidegger Museum in Mebkirch.  
(Figal, 2009, pp. 334-340)

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<sup>i</sup> This chronology was researched by Martin Heidegger’s son and executor, the historian Dr. Hermann Heidegger in collaboration with Gunter Figal, the editor of the book, “The Heidegger Reader,” from where this source has been taken.

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