The Problem of the Embodied Person

A

Thesis Submitted to

Indian Institute of Technology Guwahati

for the degree of

Doctorate of Philosophy in Philosophy

Ms. Akoijam Thoibisana

Department of Humanities and Social Sciences

Indian Institute of Technology, Guwahati

Guwahati 781039, India

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STATEMENT

I hereby declare that the matter embodied in this thesis is the result of investigations carried out by me in the Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, Indian Institute of Technology Guwahati, India under the supervision of Dr. Archana Barua, Associate Professor in Department of Humanities and Social Sciences.

In keeping with the general practice of reporting observations, due acknowledgements have been made wherever the work described is based on the findings of other investigations.

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CERTIFICATE

It is certified that the work contained in the thesis entitled "THE PROBLEM OF THE EMBODIED PERSON" by Ms Akoijam Thoibisana, a student of the Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, Indian Institute of Technology Guwahati, for the award of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, has been carried out under my supervision and that this work has not been submitted elsewhere for a degree.

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This is to certify that Ms. Akoijam Thoibisana has satisfactorily completed all the courses required for the Ph.D degree programme. These courses include:

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HS 719	Philosophy of Religion

2nd Semester:

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Ms. Akoijam Thoibisana has successfully completed her Ph.D qualifying examination on 30th March 2005.

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Dedicated

to

My Husband

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A journey is easier when we travel together. Interdependence is certainly more valuable than independence. This Thesis is the result of three and a half years of hard work during which I was accompanied and supported by many people. It is my pleasure that I have now the opportunity to express my gratitude to all of them.

The first person I would like to thank is my supervisor Dr. Archana Barua, who I have known as a sympathetic and principle-centered person. Her enthusiasm and her mission for providing 'only high-quality work and not less' have made a deep impression on my research and me. Her philosophical sensitivity, displayed both in discussions and in textual comments, has been invaluable. I owe her plenty of gratitude for having helped me to stay focused on the right track of research. Without her, this Thesis would not have been written. Besides being an excellent supervisor, Dr. Barua has been as understanding as a mother and as helpful as a friend. I really consider myself fortunate for getting the opportunity to work with her.

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I thank my husband Mr. Ghana Kanta Chutia, for all his support in every step and, more for his faith in me that led me to undertake this study. The logistic and the moral support of my parents, sisters and brother throughout this study are also thankfully acknowledged.

Many thanks to my dearest friends at IITG: Gitanjali, Madhusmita, Alka and Lopa Mudra for their support, endless encouragement and for giving me the feeling of being at home during my stay on the campus.

Last but not the least doing a PhD is a sacred task and this was definitely one of the best decisions of my life. All remaining errors are, as the saying goes, entirely my own responsibility.

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Abstract

The Thesis is a study of the ways in which we sensually embody and experience our world. The last few years have seen scientific advancements that were thought to be possible only in the realm of science fiction. From nuclear transfer to exogenous pregnancies, implantable brain chips to transgenic engineering, cyborg to chimera, we may be taking the next step in our own evolution. The Thesis is a meta-philosophical account that begins within the different emerging views of corporeality. While many studies of embodiment tend to focus upon "the body" as object, cultural artefact, or text for cultural inscription, the approach used in this dissertation is phenomenological. It is an approach in understanding the shift from investigation of bodies to bodying, from noun form to transitive verb of incorporealization. This shift is felt necessary in order to better understand the so-called dualisms of traditional Western philosophic thought: mind body, self-other, self-world, nature-culture, etc. The Thesis draws upon the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty, in endeavoring to rethink certain "givens" of everyday life, such as perception of time and space, place, enacted memory, having empathic feelings for others, and so on, from within bodily experience and philosophies of being.

The Thesis makes a rubric reviews/outlines of various embodiment studies for considering the definition and scope of the human identity as embodied person from three major different research perspectives in philosophical studies ranging from, the dualistic standpoint of disembodied person, to the true physicalistic view of machine body to the phenomenological aspects of embodied person. In its quest for commensurability, the Thesis argue that a balancing approach between phenomenology and cognitive science is warranted, resulting in an expanded, evolving notion of embodied personhood.

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FROM ZOMBIE TO CYBORG BODIES - Extra Ear, Exoskeleton and Avatars

Chapter 1
Introduction

The thesis focuses on the problem of what it means to be an embodied human person, that is, the problem of how somebody *puts his or her person in the body*. Centering round *The Problem of the Embodied Person*, the thesis makes an attempt at articulating a meta - philosophical account of embodiment that begins within the different emerging views of corporeality. Positivists, reductionists, sociologists, psychologists and scientists have made studies based on empirical observations, verifications and quantitative measurements of embodied subjectivity that exists *out there in the world*. Within the above-mentioned models of embodied study, certain areas of human-person dichotomy remain unsolved. While the materialistic theories are not able to do justice to the mental, what they can do is to detect a concomitance of mental phenomena and certain biochemical processes. Although a revolution is happening currently in Philosophy of Mind (which draws from neuroscience, computer modeling and complex dynamics), the mental does not fall in this preview. Someday, physiology would be able to describe exactly what and how biochemical processes evolved in the perception of a particular colour (red) and the embodied response to it. But this information does not say anything about what it means for me to see this colour (red).

Following Thomas Nagel one could still ask for an explanation of "how something that is an aspect or element of an individual's subjective point of view could also be a physiologically describable event in the brain"(1998, pp.337-352). Because of these limitations, the above mentioned mind-body relationship theories have failed to give a proper account of how subjective and physical features could both be essential

aspects of *a single entity or process*, namely, the embodied person, or, the *mindful body*. What remains outside the grip of the scientist is the fact that there is some kind of mysticism about life that is understandable although this cannot be captured in a laboratory. In order to understand what makes one an embodied human person, one might look for what it is that is lost at death; the body, the self and relationships with others.

The thesis aims at developing and defending an account of persons and of the relation between human persons and their bodies. The thesis focuses on the definition and scope of the human identity as an embodied person from three major different research perspectives in philosophical studies ranging from, the dualistic standpoint of the disembodied person, the physicalistic view of the machine body and the phenomenological aspects of the embodied person.

The original impulse to write this thesis came from the radical difference between how the concept of an embodied person is understood in different contexts differently. The lived body is the dignified subject as opposed to the corpse body that can be objectified and commodified. What seemed vital and alive in one context, seemed to become dead in the other. This is why Husserl repeatedly emphasized how important it is to distinguish between *Leib* and *Körper* that is between the pre-reflectively lived body, or the body as an embodied first person perspective, and the subsequent thematic experience of the body as an object. To be a self in the most basic sense is a gift, the result of a happening, and not something that we decide to become. I do not need to perceive my arm visually in order to know where it is. Rather than being yet another perspectively given object, the body itself, as Sartre and Merleau-Ponty argued, is precisely that which allows me to perceive objects perspectively (see, Zahavi, 2005).

This gradually gave rise to the thesis determination to provide a corrective account of what it is to experience the body as a gift, one that should remain true to the vitality and openness of the real embodied persons. The study attempts at understanding embodied subjectivity or embodied experience as the *experience of the body* in both senses of that phrase, that is, both as a subject and as an object. The thesis draws upon the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty, in endeavoring to re-think certain 'givens' of everyday life, such as perception of time and space, place, enacted memory and having empathic feelings for others, from within *Bodily* experience and 'Philosophy of Being'. Phenomenology is the philosophical approach specifically interested in consciousness and experience inaugurated by Edmund Husserl and further developed and transformed by, among others, Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau Ponty, Levinas, Henry and Ricour.

Preliminary literature review and theoretical framework:

The body has become an increasingly significant concept over recent years both within and outside the academic circles and much work has been done in areas related to embodiment study with special emphasis on the problem of an embodied person. The following is a selective overview of the main topics, perspectives and theories, which surround these issues. In doing so, the thesis examines some of the basic issues underlying Cognitive Science as an interdisciplinary study of the mind, taking in topics from psychology, neuroscience, linguistics, computing, artificial intelligence, robotics, evolutionary theory, biology and philosophy.

Embodiment: The Return of the Absent Body to Cognitive Science

We live in a world of cell phones, ipods, palm pilots, the worldwide web, email, blogs, e-publishing, etc. where 'I' has no fixed form and 'I' could get rid of the physical and moral restraints. New media and technology such as the video camera, tape recorder, plastic wrap, and the computer processor begin an information revolution that lead to the postmodern condition, the transition from analog to digital, from human to cyborg-enhanced human. It is no wonder that for some *embodiment* is virtual space that has to do with robotic.

There are many cognitive scientists who reduce mental events to brain processes replacing intentional explanations with neuro-physiological accounts. An idea that would be 'dangerous if true' is what Francis Crick referred to as 'the astonishing hypothesis'- the notion that our conscious experience and our sense of the self is based entirely on the activity of a hundred billion bits of jelly — the neurons that constitute the brain. Yet the far-reaching philosophical, moral and ethical dilemmas posed by his hypothesis have not been recognized widely enough. Crick comments, "You can either be this incredible, deliriously happy being floating forever in the vat *or* be your real self, more or less like you are now! (for the sake of argument we will further assume that you are basically a happy and contended person, not a starving pheasant)" (cited in Ramachandran, 2000)[1]. We are all slowly and imperceptibly approaching the *brain in the vat* scenario where all functions will be the brain. What is missing in such an account is, as, the fact that the brain is only a natural extension of the body, not an isolated computer sitting on our neck literally at our fingertips as we become dissolved in cyberspace. Drawing on

[1] See, http://www.edge.org/3rd_culture/ramachandran06/ramachandran06_index.html

experimental psychology and linguistics as well as Edelman and other cognitive neuroscientists, Rohrer discusses how both our neural and developmental embodiment shape our mental and linguistic categorization (2005, pp. 165-196).

Sociology of the Body and the Status of the Embodied Person:

Historically, body has been ignored and especially its forms of imagination that grow out of bodily experience seem to have no role in our reasoning about abstract subject matters (Johnson, 1987, p.14*).* During the past twenty years the human body evolved from a rather marginal social fact into a notion of central concern to current social and cultural anthropology. In addition, women have, historically been tied to their bodies, nature and private sphere, while men have been allied to their mind. Williams and Bendelow came to similar conclusions in their work 'The Lived Body: Sociological themes, Embodied Issues (1998)'. They comment that in its march for the ideal of rational and objective knowledge the 'detached human mind' has struggled to free itself from the human body and slimy desires of flesh.

Culture and Body Image:

Austrian artist Stelarc and French artist Orlan identify forms of embodiment involving interchange between image and flesh. The former talks about the transcendence of the body and escape from death while the latter about the transcendence of life and its pain, both through experimenting with their body. Michael Atkinson (2002) of McMaster University is engaged in research that explores the relationship of obsessive bodybuilding and the consumption of health supplements among men and their pursuit of a masculine ideal. He seeks to take a series of calculated risks involved in dangerous masculinity through sport. One crucial explanation for neglecting the natural body and

focusing on a machine body or a virtual one comes from our fascination with the ideal of abstract reasoning that craves for exactness and perfection. Accordingly, the essence of man lies in its being parts of various cells and organs that can be mutilated and reorganized to reach that Platonic concept of an 'Ideal Man'.

This craze for abstractness has led scholars and theorists to question the idea of the body as a given physical entity. They focus on the experience or threat of finiteness, limitation, and vulnerability and also raise doubts regarding the individuality of the self. Instead they emphasize its fragmentary character and focus on the embodied uncertainties (such as hybridity or irony) of human existence. In this context of celebrating the genetic jubilee, it can be quoted: "People say, "Well, these would be designer babies," and I say, "Well, what's wrong with designer clothes?" If you could just say, 'My baby's not going to have asthma,' wouldn't that be nice? What's wrong with therapeutic cloning? Who's being hurt?" (Watson, 2003)[2].

Fraser's 'The Body: A Reader' (2004) offers fascinating topic of the body covering important issues such as the body and social (dis)order; bodies and identities; bodily norms; bodies in health and *dis-ease* and bodies and technologies. They have raised major practical questions on limits of human body and its relationship to personhood and identity with the developments in medical biotechnologists, the introduction of genetic diagnostics, organ and xenotransplatation, cyborged and new generation psychopharmacology.

[2] see, A Conversation with James D. Watson, in *Science Magazine*, March 10, 2003, available at : http://sciam.com/print_version.cfm?articleID=00062AB0-2F4F-1E64-A98A809EC5880105

Feminism, Post Modernism and Beyond:

The body has long been a contested site in feminist circles. From debates about motherhood, pregnancy, and abortion, discussions of pleasure and sex, to more philosophical discussions of embodiment and the gendering of bodies, the major thinkers of feminist theory have reshaped our ideas of how women and men understand what the body is. Halley's 'Split Decisions: How and Why to Take a Break from Feminism' (2006), is a groundbreaking book examining the contradictions and limitations of feminism in the law. Halley argues that sexuality involves deeply contested and clashing realities and interests, and that feminism helps us understand only some of them. To see crucial dimensions of sexuality that feminism does not reveal--the interests of gays and lesbians to be sure, but also those of men, and of constituencies and values beyond the realm of sex and gender—she urges that we might need to take a break from feminism. That is though Halley is sensitive to feminism's contributions yet she refuses to apologize for its contradictions and its limitations. It is a form of theorizing that can take a break from feminism without dismissing feminist theory from the discussion. However critics argue that Halley's version of feminism is an elite and whitewashed feminism that has been under attack for some years.

Janet Prince and Margrit Shildrick (1999) bring together over forty of the world's greatest feminist writers to represent the key arguments from all of the different feminist schools of thought on the body in their 'Feminist Theory and the Body: A Reader'. It includes articles on race, cyberspace, theatre, classics, transexuality, reproductive technologies, illness, rape, plastic surgery, disabilities and much more. The concept of body politic was also not new for Haraway, the authors of 'Simians, Cyborgs, and

Women: The Reinvention of Nature (1991)'. Haraway develops a definition for the word "gender", in her, 'Gender for a Marxist Dictionary,' which highlights the difficulty of reducing complex concepts to keywords. In her, 'The Biopolitics of Postmodern Bodies' she develops the views that "biomedical, biotechnical" self, incorporates modern discourse on the immunological system; bodies, like gender, she contends, *are not born; they are made*, as biomedical construct.

In line to this, we have Balsamo articulating the key issues concerning the status of the female body in cultural studies in era of postmodern world covering aspects from female bodybuilding to virtual reality, from cosmetic surgery to cyberpunk, from reproductive medicine to public health policies to TV science programs. She reads the female body as a field that is still gendered in the vast spaces mapped by science and technology. Her book 'Technologies of the Gendered Body: Reading Cyborg Women (1995)' sets the stage for a renewed feminist engagement with contemporary technological narratives and thereby also countering the claims that body has become obsolete in scientific culture.

Susan Bordo gives a well-balanced, detailed and illustrative account of the female postmodern 'body politic'. She explores women's obsessions with appearance, their struggles to control food and hunger, and the pressures brought on by a society that worships the ideal female figure in 'Unbearable Weight: Feminism, Western Culture, and the Body (1993)'. The New York Times reviewed Bordo's book as: "This excellent study links the fear of women's fat with a fear of women's power and shows that as

opportunities for women increase, their bodies dwindle." [3] It provides an accessible look at the historical and current representation of women in history and in popular culture.

A theory of gender-dependent subjectivity in the spirit of Gilligan's 'In a Different Voic*e* (1993)' can serve as a pedagogic tool for reminding students of how certain aspects of their lives to which they have never given a moment's reflection can actually form how they see the values that they may otherwise assume to be universally valid. And this kind of self-understanding can indeed be both intellectually and existentially liberating, and may certainly have consequences for political decisions, for instance, in issues involving morally sensitive questions such as those having to do with abortion and euthanasia.

Jose Van Dijck in her, 'The Transparent Body: A Cultural Analysis Of Medical Imaging (2005)' traces the cultural context and wider social impact of opening to public sphere the medical imaging practices like X ray and endoscopy, ultrasound imaging of fetuses, the filming and broadcasting of surgical operations, the creation of plastinated corpses for display as art objects, and the use of digitized cadavers in anatomical study and explores the complex multifaceted interactions between medical images and cultural ideologies that have brought about this situation illuminating thereby their uses and meanings of *Body*, both within and outside of medicine. Van Dijck demonstrates the ways in which the ability to render the inner regions of the human body visible-and the proliferation of images of the body's interior in popular media-affect our view of corporeality and our understanding of health and disease.

[3] see. http://www.amazon.com/Unbearable-Weight-Feminism-Western-Culture/dp/product-description/0520088832

Contemporary criticism of modernism draws inspiration from the work of Nietzsche because in Nietzsche the body is crucial for understanding the dilemmas of modernity.

The intellectual legacy of Nietzsche in the philosophy of Heidegger, Foucault, and Derrida has been more explicit. There is attempted reconciliation of Marxism and Freudian psycho-analysis in the philosophy of body that we come across in Herbert Marcus. Foucault was specially interested in the construction of a micro-politics of regulation of the body and the macro politics of surveillance of population. Michel Foucault's theoretically charged denial of the existence of thinking subjects as objects of historical fact, for example, can shed light on the manner in which historical writing may illicitly assume the standpoint of a certain group of actors when describing the motivations and activities of another, perhaps oppressed group. Post-structuralism challenges ideas of embodiment in the principles of absence and the disappearing self, exemplified by Jean Baudrillard and Jacques Derrida, while Post- humanism, described by Katherine Hayles and Cyborg Feminism (cited in Haraway, 1991, pp.149-181) reconfigure the embodied self.

Victoria Pitts's, 'In the Flesh: The Cultural Politics of Body Modification (2003)' gives an insightful examination of the more extreme body modification subculture, one that invites the reader to re-examine his or her expectations about bodies, body politics, and medical technologies. Pitts neither romanticizes nor objectifies body modifiers. Instead she honestly explores their narratives, from 'reclaiming', to 'queer', to 'modern primitive' to 'cyberpunk'.

Although I have been benefited by all the above-mentioned theories, however insofar as these theories are intended to serve either as pedagogic instruments or as one methodological possibility for shedding light on historical events and its understanding, they are not directly relevant to the present thesis study.

Literary Gaps & the Research Problem:

> *Two men are on the street. One asks, How do you get to Carnegie Hall?*
>
> *The other answers "Practice. Practice. Practice.? (Henny Youngman 1960's)?How do you get to get to Carnegie Hall?, ?Theory. Theory. Theory.? (Charles Bernstein 1990s)* (cited in Dean, 2002)[4].

In the epigraph above, Charles Bernstein revised Henny Youngman's joke to highlight the paradigm of theory and practice. The problem of "dualism" arises when we treat ordinary facts about the practices that make up our lives as something not belonging to us. The critique of dualism, as was said, usually takes one of two forms. Either one denies the legitimacy of the first-person perspective altogether, or one tries to reduce it to the third-person perspective. In either case, one cancels the distinction. If Biotechnologies have paradoxically resulted in undermining the tradition mind-body-dualism, the question arising of how to conceive the newly discovered unity of man shows the importance of the phenomenological approach to the mind-body-problem, especially because the naturalistic model of the mind-body-identity is not able to explain all aspects of this unity.

[4] see, http://pw.english.uwm.edu/~jdean/avant.htm

Phenomenology seeks to further our knowledge of the role of embodiment in self-understanding and meaning-making through an illumination of how different subjectivities are embodied in everyday life. Otherwise the theorists are for the idea that any reference to mind involves a process of mind reading in terms of a particular theory of mind. Contrary to this, Merleau Ponty has suggested that the infant will understand the affective meaning of the mother long before it has seen its own face in a mirror; will understand threatening gestures long before it has itself executed any. “The infant does not need to carry out any process of inference. Its body schema is characterized by a trans-model openness that immediately allows it to understand and imitates others” (Merleau-Ponty, 1962.pp 208).

Phenomenology insists that we have a primitive type of self-awareness that is an embodied, that is not brought about by some kind of reflection or introspection, but is rather an intrinsic feature of the experience. This leads to the view that a proper understanding of self awareness must broaden its focus and acknowledge the existence of non conceptual and pre linguistic forms of self awareness that are logically and ontologically more primitive than the higher forms of self consciousness that are usually the focus of philosophical debate (see,Bermudez, 1998). Some influential developmental psychologists as Stern, Neisser, and Rochat have also reached similar conclusions. “As perceivers we are embedded and embodied agents. We see with mobile eyes, set in the head that canturen and attached to a body that can move from place to place; in this sense, a stationary point of view is only the limited case of a mobile point of view”(Gibson, 1986,pp.53, 205). Every movement of the perceiver produces a systematic flow pattern in the visual field that provides her with awareness of her own movements

and postures, and thereby with a weak, or primitive form of ecological self awareness (ibid.p199). Arguing that this ecological self is a bodily self, Rochat (2001) argues that the infant's self-experience is initially a question of the infant's experience of its own embodied self. This body awareness constitutes genuine self-experience.

While the above psychologists conceive of the embodied self as an object, phenomenology insists that first personal experience presents me with an immediate, non-objectifying and non-observational access to myself (Rochat and Striano, 2000,pp.513-530) [5]. In other words, the phenomenological analysis complements the argumentation provided by developmental psychologists. The newborn does not have to master the word and concepts 'pain', 'hunger', 'frustration', and 'mine', in order to feel the "mine-ness" of the pain, the hunger and the frustration. To put it another way, the question of self-awareness is not primarily a question of a specific *what* but of a unique *how*. In his actual research, Husserl shows that we are entwined with nonhuman animals because the primary stratum of our life is the experience of our own animate body. This has found theoretic support from cognitive neuroscience in the discovery of the 'mirror neuron' system in the premotor-cortex, [6] in which primates have been shown to have neural systems which are activated not only by their own motor actions but also by witnessing another's motor action. Gallagher suggests that the emergent sense of 'inter-corporeality' from mirror neuron-activity could be a basis of human intersubjectivity. [7]

Phenomenology proposes that theory usually follows practice, and argues for embodied experience (practice) as the motivating source informing new cultural theory

[5] http://psychology.emory.edu/cognition/rochat/RochatStriano_self.pdf.

[6] Gallese, Vittorio, Intentional Attunement, The Mirror Neuron system and its role in interpersonal relations, http://www.interdisciplines.org/mirror/papers/1.

[7] ibid

and critique. The thesis is an exploration of the question of embodiment and its ethical implication in the various aspects of day-to-day life on the basis of Maurice Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological thought. Accordingly, the research hypothesis is formulated with due emphasis on the two sidedness of human person. The research statement is: A human person is a person in virtue of having a first-person perspective, and is a human person in virtue of being constituted by a human body (or human animal).

Methodology and Structure of the Thesis:

The types of questions and forms of knowledge, which determine the nature of truth, have different aspects that are based on any methodological choice. A doctor or a scientist will ask question about body in anatomical terms, its functions and specialization of its different parts. The sociologist might ask questions about body in terms of racial, gender etc., tension of body in social phenomena, while a psychologist might try to question the behavioral science of the body phenomena. What will the Humanist do with such a topic?

Humanities which study aspects of the human condition that includes the subjects such as the classics, languages, literature, music, philosophy, the performing arts, religion and the visual arts[8] is distinguished from both the Social Sciences and the Natural Sciences. The humanist whose subject matter is individualistic-subjective experience of the person might ask question like *what it is to have a body or to be a body?*

Thus different disciplines have different socio-phenomenological aspects of understanding bodily existence, focusing on how physical examinations transform (body of a patient from social subjects into medical objects (physical / natural sciences). Hence

[8] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Humanities

the nature of research question determines the ways of looking at Body, as transformation of a person into a patient, the shift from the body as the vehicle of self to the body as an object of scrutiny. The application of the methods of natural sciences to the research of human behavior has not been very successful. One reason for this is that whilst using such methods it is difficult to design studies which enable us to take human motives, beliefs, and, especially, so-called 'intentionality' into account. Phenomenology as a form of qualitative research has emerged as a special research method for accessing 'subjective' phenomena of human experience.[9] Phenomenology can be defined as the study of lived or existential meanings. It is concerned with the phenomena that are given to experiencing individuals. In other words, phenomenology is the study of phenomena as experienced[10].

Contribution of the Research:

The phenomenological framework keeps provision for creative assimilation of different embodiment studies in its attempt at addressing some of the following:

a) What is the role of the body, the environment, and action, in integrating the first person perspective of phenomenology with the perspective of science?

b) What are the possibilities and common grounds for this integration? What are the problems, questions, disciplines and research areas that are central to this integration?

c) What are the possibilities for a transition from the multidimensionality of human experience to what can be achieved within the framework of phenomenological model of embodied person?

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[9] Creswell, 1998:51;Giorgi, 1997:238;Kruger, 1988:27;Morse & Field, 1995:151-152; Valle, King & Halling, 1989:6. http://etd.rau.ac.za/theses/available/etd-08222005-125928/restricted/8.pdf

[10]Giorgi, 1989:41; Giorgi, 1997:238; Van Manen, 1997:11. ibid 9.

d) How to describe the social dimension on our way to the 'phenomenology of intersubjectivity'?

e) What are the theoretical as well as practical consequences of embodied and situated cognition for science, for human action in the world, and for experiencing the world?

Future scope of the research might include the following related topics: ethical and legal issues of embodied subject, problem areas like that of hybrid individual, the marginal differences between human and non-human persons, embodied person and globalization and some other related issues. The thesis in addressing the absence of the moving body in contemporary social theory that claims to be embodied, and proposing ways of going beyond it toward a conception of dynamic embodiment has the above primary aims that will be achieved through an examination of the meaningful dialogue between phenomenology and cognitive science. These aims also introduce the basic structure of the thesis as follows:

Chapter 1
Introduction:

The question of what 'personhood' is, is one of the more difficult, and more central questions raised by many of today's ethical dilemmas. The classic body-soul problem formulates unaltered a key philosophical problem, body becomes problematic. The first chapter provides a preliminary outline of more elaborate discussion on the research problem, literature reviews, objective and methodology of the research theme.

Chapter 2

The Body- A Brief Tour of Western Dualism:

From Plato toDescartes

The second chapter identifies the root cause of the Caretesian prejudice that has a very long history, beginning with the philosophy of Plato and continuing with equal vigor till the contemporary time. Despite its familiarity, the notion that human minds or souls are fundamentally different from human bodies is a cultural construction that took many centuries to build. Plato introduces what was to become a central ingredient in later versions of dualism: the elevation of the life of the soul (or mind, or reason, depending upon the system) to the pinnacle of human achievement, with the body imagined as the enemy of its aspirations.

Rene Descartes (1596–1650) was to decisively change that, in a reformulation of mind/body dualism that would herald the birth of modern science. For Descartes, the body is a mechanically functioning system with nothing conscious about it—simply the interaction of fluids, organs, and fleshly matter. Mind, in contrast, became pure consciousness—the famous "I think, therefore I am". This was a separation far more decisive than anything imagined before, as mind and body became defined as mutually exclusive substances.

Chapter 3

Disembodied Person:

Persons and their Bodies

The third chapter takes up the issues that are discussed in the works of the Western Dualism, showing how the application of theoretical positions offered by, amongst others, the exponents of the Platonic tradition and Rene Descartes, demonstrates

that body can be ignored, rejected and completely done away with, as the possible thought experiments of Darik Parfit and others have shown. In the contemporary time, a revised model of disembodied person is found in the philosophy of Peter Strawson. This chapter is a critical review of Derek Parfit's account of personal identity that is inspired by the Lockean model of Disembodied Person. John Locke argued for a distinction between personal identity and human (animal) identity on the basis of a thought experiment. He asked us to imagine that the consciousnesses of a prince and a cobbler are switched, each into the other's body, and to work out where the person of the prince and the cobbler would then be. He took it to be obvious that each would be where his consciousness went rather than remain with his original body. For Parfit no particular brain or body appears to be necessary for sustaining the existence of a person. What *is* necessary for is the continuing series of mental events. Provided this series continues, we may contemplate any amount of alteration or interruption of the physical events, which in some sense or other sustain it, even down to the massive spatial interruption of so-called tele-transportation. It is similar to Ayer's overall view of memory [as] something that is through and through cognitive. But experiential memory has an affective character as well and Parfit nowhere considers just how the particular affective character which a person would give to an experience of his as he experiences it at *time* t^{1} would cohere with another person's character when she subsequently remembers it at *time* t^{2}.

The idea that we may continue to exist in a bodiless condition after our death has long played an important role in beliefs about immortality, ultimate rewards and punishments and the transmigration of souls. There has also been long and heated disagreement about whether the idea of disembodied existence even makes sense, let

alone whether anybody can or does survive dissolution of his material form. The apparent ease with which the experience of disembodied existence can be imagined is neatly expressed by P. F.Strawson in his well-known essay on persons. Strawson concludes that we can conceive of a 'pure individual consciousness,' a non-bodily entity that has psychological but no physical properties. The chapter is a critique of this model of disembodied person.

Chapter 4

Mechanised Bodies or Embodied Persons?

Artificial Intelligence, Cyborg and Transhumaism

> 'Thinking is the chemical process of associating moods ('chemistry'). The brain is a chemical computer controlling many functions in the body. 'The Mind' or 'Thinking' is a process executed by part of the body (the brain). In simple shape: using the chemical reaction 'mood' aroused by a rose as 'chemistry' when seeing your daughter. That takes 'conditioning', first you see and smell a walking rose." [11]

In addition to the natural body and its parts, there now exists a series of artificially produced bodily elements, which make the distinction between natural body and artificial body much harder to pin down. New biotechnologies disaggregate the body, robbing it of its organic unity and encouraging the view of body parts as separate components, which do not sum to anything more than their compilation. Can present-day brain research offer us solutions to these questions whereby man proves himself to be an electrochemically-controlled mechanism? Or is psychology the science, which has to probe and examine our emotional and cognitive faculties? Can the assumption of an immaterial world be

[11] http://huizen.daxis.nl/~henkt/the-mind-body-problem.html

reconciled with scientific, technical reality? The chapter looked for an alternate model of an embodied person that can imbibe the fruits of contemporary research in science and technology on the one hand and can also avoid the pitfalls of reductionism and physicalism.

Chapter 5

Implications - Humanism at the Cross Road:

Bodies, Commodities, and the Crisis in Ethics

The thesis's critique of both the dualistic and the reductionist or physicalist model of persons becomes more explicit in this chapter where it explores how the collapse of moral values are associated with the mechanistic model of bodies or the physicalism model of reducing embodied persons to a mechanical combination of body-organs. This chapter also re-asserts the relevance of the concept of embodiment in the contemporary crisis of various ethical dimensions. The implications of the faulty models of persons, mechanistic or disembodied, have lead to problematise the following:

a) The moral meaning of the living human body-whether it exists simply as an interchangeable collection of parts, whether it exists merely as a carrier for what really counts (the personal realm of mind or spirit), whether a living human being who lacks cognitive, personal qualities is no longer one of us or is simply the weakest and to most needy of us, is a question to be thought about. The Biomedical model is firmly grounded in Cartesian thought. Descartes introduced the strict separation of mind and body, along with the idea that the body is a machine that can be understood completely in terms of the arrangement and functioning of parts. A healthy person was like a well-made clock in

perfect mechanical condition, a sick person like a clock whose parts were not functioning properly.

b) One of the major drawbacks of the Biomedical models is that it does not view health in a holistic context. It has a compartmentalized view in its approach on providing health care. There are specialists for every aspect of a person's make up; for example, one would go to a psychiatrist for emotional problems, a physician for medical problems, a gynecologist for 'female problems', ad-infinitum. Therefore one can have people who have a range of health problems being treated by a range of specialists. They can spend much of their lives waiting in the outpatient departments of these specialty units waiting to have their problems solved! The signs and symptoms of ill health are fitted into a box labeled with the name of the disease. Included with the contents of this box is all the associated knowledge on how this disease is to be treated, not unlike a recipe book! This process almost always occurs in isolation from other factors in a person's life.

c) The new enclosures of the genetic commons or of forms of human tissue threaten to extend the objectification and commodification of the body to both sexes. Everyone has a female- body now, or, more properly, a feminised body: while men do not have bodies that are biologically female, both male and female bodies are now subject to the objectification that was previously largely confined to women's experience. That, at least, is the presumption underlying much current discourse and debate over the ethics, law and politics of human tissue, particularly in the areas of genetic patenting and bio-banks. It has been argued, 'what we are witnessing is nothing less than a new gold rush, and the territory is the human body'. "An eBay auction for a healthy human kidney attracted global bids up to US$5.75 billion. A criminal ring stole the leg bones of the late

broadcaster Alistair Cooke as his body lay in a New York funeral home, and subsequently sold, like those of an estimated 1,800 others, for processing into dental implants. Advertisements regularly circulate in US college newspapers, offering egg 'donors' amounts varying between US$5,000–$50,000, depending on 'desirability': blond, tall, athletic and musical donors command the higher prices, at considerable risk to themselves" [12].

Chapter 6

Phenomenology of the Embodied Person:

Rejecting the dualistic and mechanistic models of disembodied persons and their ghostly presence inside a body machine, Chapter 6 intends to show that physically embodied human persons can be genuinely relational – that is, that out of a physically embodied person can come genuine manifestations of the relational 'fruits of the spirit' – love, joy, peace, patience, kindness, gentleness, and self-control – as well as 'works of the flesh' – strife, jealousy, anger, quarrels, dissension, factions, and envy. It thus seeks to make an attempt to reform the Western mechanical model of the body by formulating analternate model of the embodied person that can restore the lived relationship between humans and persons, between the body as object and the body as subject. The chapter comes to the conclusion that Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of the lived body is an alternate and a viable option to the mechanistic and the dualistic understandings of the body as corpse. In order to do justice to the Merleau-Pontian model of the embodied

[12] Schneider, Weidman, Susan, 'Jewish women's eggs: a hot commodity in the IVF market-Place' (2001) 26(3) *Lilith* 22, in Dickenson, Doona, *Property in the Body*,2007, available at : http://assets.cambridge.org/97805218/67924/excerpt/9780521867924_excerpt.pdf

person, the chapter finally widens its scope to accommodate a phenomenological understanding of the embodied person.

Chapter 7
Towards a New Concept of Life in a Life World:

Chapter 7 is a continuation of the Chapter 6 that seeks to explore the embodied and the embedded dimension of the human-person who is always already immersed in a Life-World that ensures its essentially relational nature. In the introduction to '*Phenomenologie de la perception'*, published in 1945, Merleau-Ponty describes the nature of phenomenology as a philosophy of essences (*eidos*) based upon a consciousness rooted in the facticity of existence that enables one to see the being of existence as "being-at-the-world". It gives the very act of seeing our being-at-the-world, the phenomenality of the phenomenon of existence or open-ness to the world. At the same time it enables one to see the world as the permanent horizon of our presence to things and to others; it grasps our point of view as the center around which things receive their meanings and orient themselves with respect to each other.

Chapter 8
Conclusion:

The thesis throughout have been trying to reflect on the sense of a philosophy, which is not based on a universality of transcendental reason, but meets the event of existing beings as being-at-the-world. The ontology of Merleau-Ponty has remained immensely helpful in the realization of the fact that the human experience of 'bodiliness' reveals itself to us. Phenomenology of Embodiment is a model of the relationship between one's *Personhood* and *Bodyliness* that could successfully restore the lived

relationship between humans and persons, between persons and AI (artificial intelligence), and between patients and agents. The embodied person as the lived body (*Leib*) is metaphysically and conceptually basic, in the sense that one's consciousness, on the one hand, and one's corporeal being (*Körper*), on the other, are nothing but dual aspects of one's lived body.

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Chapter 2

The Body - A Brief Tour of Western Dualism:

From Plato to Descartes

In our everyday language or in our scientific and philosophical thinking, whichever way we try to wriggle out of it, we seem to end up talking about two incompatible kinds of stuff whether it is spirit and matter, mind and body, inner and outer, subjective and objective (Blackmore, 2004, p.8). The dualistic standpoint has shaped Western culture since the time of Plato, through Augustine and Descartes, up to the present day. All three of these philosophers viewed the body as "animal, as appetite, as deceiver, as prisoner of the soul and confounder of its projects" (Bordo, 1993, p.3). They try to detach the soul from the physical body and depict its relationship with body/corporeality as some sort of accident and thereby provide instructions, rules or models as to how to gain control over the body, with the ultimate aim of learning to live without it. They believe in the principle that the mind is superior to the body, and that strength comes from disregarding the body's existence to reach an elevated spiritual level. Within this conceptual framework, the body becomes an impediment to humanity's acquisition of knowledge and is regarded with increasing derision.

This chapter provides a historical background on philosophical discourse from antiquity to enlightenment, that constructs the body as something apart from the true self (whether conceived as soul, mind, spirit, will, creativity, freedom) and as undermining the best efforts of that self. The chapter reflects upon issues of rationality, objectivity and Cartesian dualism in order to identify the source of the negative theorization of the body

and present a way to clear the air so that a positive articulation of the 'material- body' might be taken seriously. The objective of the chapter is to make a critical reading of the body as a concept, as a material thing and the ways in which its meaning is shifted by our immersion in understanding the concept of personal identity in relation to the body. Throughout this chapter, the thesis will consistently employ the term Dualism to describe the systematically hierarchical devaluation of the bodily and privileging of the intelligible or spiritual.

The classical and medieval era, starting from early Greeks to Augustine, was the period of intellect that was thought to be most obviously resistant to a materialistic account. The modern enlightenment period from Descartes onwards, was concerned with consciousness as the main stumbling block to materialist monism. The soul/body dualists believe that there is a distinction between the soul or mind and material bodies. This belief has often led to a theory of the souls as a temporal constancy. This brand of 'Dualism' is partially responsible for the epistemological divide that was created between philosophy and science within traditional philosophy. This has also led to the suspicion that the temporal body and its senses cannot be trusted, that we have no hope of ever having knowledge of the sensible world because it is constantly changing, and so truth cannot be found in the sensory world. Philosophers desire knowledge of that which is immutable and unchangeable, thus, from this epistemology arose the firm conviction that we must look to the transcendental intelligible world for truth and turn away from the ephemeral world of physical bodies.

Soul/Body Dualism in the Platonic Tradition:

The hierarchical variety of soul/body dualism found a firm advocate in Plato's *Phaedo*[1]. Plato believed that the true substances are not physical bodies, which are ephemeral, but the eternal *Forms*[2]of which bodies are imperfect copies. These Forms not only make the world possible, they also make it intelligible, because they perform the role of the universals, or what Frege called 'concepts'. In *Phaedo,* the body becomes an impediment to humanity's acquisition of knowledge and is regarded with increasing derision. Plato writes:

> "…the body provides us with innumerable distractions in the pursuit of our necessary sustenance, and any diseases which attack us hinder our quest for reality. Besides, the body fills us with loves and desires and fears and all sorts of fancies and a great deal of nonsense, with the result that we literally never get an opportunity to think at all about anything. Wars and revolutions and battles are due simply and solely to the body and its desires. All wars are undertaken for the acquisition of wealth, and the reason why we have to acquire wealth is the body, because we are slaves in its service. That is why, on all these accounts, we have so little time for philosophy. Worst of all, if we do obtain any leisure from the body's claims and turn to some line of inquiry, the body intrudes once more into

[1] Plato's ***Phaedo*** is one of the great dialogues of his middle period, along with the *Republic* and the *Symposium*. The *Phaedo* is also the fifth and last dialogue detailing the final days of Socrates and contains the death scene. (The first four being *Euthyphro*, *Apology*, *Crito* and *Meno*). The dialogue is told from the perspective of one of Socrates' students, Phaedo of Elis. Having been present at Socrates' death bed, Phaedo relates the dialogue to Echecratesa fellow philosopher.

[2] The Theory of Form**s** typically refers to Plato's belief that the material world as it seems to us is not the real world, but only a shadow of the real world. The forms, according to Plato, are roughly speaking archetypes or abstract representations of the many types and properties (that is, of universals) of things we see all around us.

> our investigations…..interrupting, disturbing, distracting, and preventing us from getting a glimpse of the truth. We are in fact convinced that if we are ever to have pure knowledge of anything, we must get rid of the body and contemplate things by themselves with the soul itself" (65A-66E in Collins, 2005).[3]

In Plato's thinking, the relationship between the body and the soul is the unfortunate and artificial arrangement of two unequal partners. "The soul is a helpless prisoner chained hand and foot in the body, compelled to view reality not directly but only through its prison bars, and wallowing in their ignorance"(Phaedo, 839, cited in Kaplan, 2007)[4]. The soul was then 'elevated' from a materialistically conceived double to a dematerialized divine being, of a nature totally different from the body (*soma*). Plato tells us that the Orphics (the followers of Orpheus) called the body a prison of the soul, and that others with comparable ideas called it a tomb (*The Oxford Classical Dictionary*, 1969, p. 895). For Plato (Phaedo, 83a), "the evil acts of the body pollute the soul and prevent it from achieving a complete and clean separation and returning to the world of Ideal Forms" (ibid).

Only the soul can perceive Ideal Truth, but it cannot do so as long as it must perceive Reality by use of the five bodily senses. Thus, the real attainment of truth can come only in the higher world when souls can perceive directly without interference of the body. This idealizing of a state of existence after life is not necessarily a direct call to suicide and the philosopher is encouraged to believe that separation from earthly life is

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[3]Collins,D,Phillip, *Re-establishing the Temple: Reconciling the Body and Soul*, Nov. 17th, 2005, http://www.conspiracyarchive.com/Commentary/Temple.htm

[4]Kaplan, J,Kalman, *Two views of body and soul: Psyche versus Nefesh*, Jewish United Fund/Jewish Federation of Metropolitan Chicago (JUF), 5/16/2007, http://www.juf.org/news/world.aspx?id=15852

the only road to the ideal human existence. Thus, Plato calls philosophy "preparation for death."[5] Socrates in this later dialogue further explains the linkage between philosophy and death: *death frees the soul*. "For, if pure knowledge is impossible while the body is with us, one of the two things must follow, either it cannot be acquired at all or only when we are dead; for then the soul will be by itself apart from the body, but not before" (Phaedo, 66e, ibid. 4).

Plato argues that if a person is overly concerned with bodily things in life, weighed down by the polluting force that is physical desire, this will pass with them into death, and they will remain caught up in the prison of the physical. In order to achieve freedom from the fetters of the body, Plato advocates that philosophers avoid both the pleasures and pains of the body so as to allow the soul freedom from its powerfully corrupting grip[6]. Later, the Neoplatonists like Plotinus[7] and Porphyry[8] come to take up this notion of the soul's struggle with the body in their versions of Platonism. For both, the body is an obstacle in the way of the soul's ascent.

Aristotle did not believe in Platonic Forms, existing independently of their instances and the mystery of union that binds a particular soul to a particular body.

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[5] Socrates's imminent execution sets the stage for the dialogue (Plato's *Phaedo)* He maintains that one aim of practicing philosophy is to prepare for death Philosophy frees the soul from the body as much as possible in life So the philosopher is thought by the many as being close to death

[6] Plato suggested that the soul can be separated from the body by a process of gathering all the elements of soul which are dispersed through the body into a single whole which presumably was the state of the soul before its embodiment. This process is called purification. […] Plato argues that the unified soul can live both here and hereafter as an entity separate from the body. "And does purification not run out to be what we mentioned in our argument some time ago, namely, to separate the soul as far as possible from the body and accustom it to gather itself and collect itself out of every part of the body and to dwell by itself as far as it can both now and in the future, freed, as it were, from the bonds of the body?" (Plato 1997a, 67c-d).

[7] For Plotinus, "Soul, as the source of life in bodies, is not a body and does not depend on body for its existence. This in turn points to the immortality of soul. Plotinus is quick also to convert the distinction he has established between soul and body into a broad distinction between intelligible and sensible reality […] between what is truly and eternally and what is subject to perpetual change. (O'Meara 1993, 18)

[8] "The lover of the body is always a lover of wealth; the lover of wealth is necessarily unjust; the unjust person is both irreverent toward God and parents and immoral toward everyone else. [...] Therefore one must totally avoid the lover of the body as ungodly and defiled'" (Porphyry 1987, 59).

Aristotelian forms (the capital 'F' has disappeared with their standing as autonomous entities) are the natures and properties of things and exist embodied in those things. Aristotle in 'De Anima' [9]inquires into the essence and nature of the soul. He speaks of the soul not as a substantial spiritual entity, but the very principle of life, which has meaning only when associated with a body. Apart from this communion with a body it has no property in itself. To quote him:

> "Hence it is unnecessary to enquire whether the soul and body be one any more than whether the wax and an impression made on it are one; or in general the matter of anything whatsoever, and that of which it is the matter"(cited in Goswami, 2006, p.210).

The soul is the essence of the body as 'being-an axe' (*axeishness*) is the essence or the soul of an axe. In the 'Categories' the individual is presented as a numerical unity-something without parts, hence indivisible. This enabled Aristotle to explain the union of body and soul by saying that the soul is the form of the body. There is no exact science of matter and how matter behaves is essentially affected by the form that is in it. This means that a particular person's soul is no more than his nature as a human being. Aristotle explains that the soul is the form of the body in much the same way the form of a house structures the bricks and mortar from which it is built. This was how Aristotle thought that he was able to explain the connection of soul to body: a particular soul exists as the organizing principle in a particular parcel of matter.

[9] *On the Soul* Latin *De Anima* is a major treatise by Aristotle, outlining his philosophical views on the nature of living things. His discussion centres on the kinds of souls possessed by different kinds of living things, distinguished by the different life-processes those organisms go through.

This way of looking at soul-body relations as a special case of form-matter relations treats reference to the soul as an integral part of any complete explanation of a living being of any kind agrees with Plato and other dualists who stress the importance of the soul in explanations of living beings. However, Aristotle rejected Platonic commitment to the separability of the soul from the body, merely by appeal to formal causation as unjustified. He will allow that the soul is distinct from the body, and is indeed the actuality of the body, but he sees that these concessions by themselves provide no grounds for supposing that the soul can exist without the body. His hylomorphism, then, embraces neither reductive materialism nor Platonic Dualism. Instead, it seeks to steer a middle course between these alternatives by pointing out, implicitly, and rightly, that these are not exhaustive options (Howard, 2003).

Aristotle further goes on to describe "mind" (*nous*, often also rendered as "intellect" or "reason") as "the part of the soul by which it knows and understands" (*De Anima* iii 4, 429a9-10; cf. iii 3, 428a5; iii 9, 432b26; iii 12, 434b3) and as essential to being a human. However, he argued that the intellect, though part of the soul, differs from other faculties in not having a bodily organ and hence must be immaterial because if it were material it could not receive all forms. Just as the eye, because of its particular physical nature, is sensitive to light but not to sound, and the ear to sound and not to light, so, if the intellect were in a physical organ it could be sensitive only to a restricted range of physical things; but this is not the case, for we can think about any kind of material object (*De Anima* III, 4; 429a10-b9).

Modern Aristotelians,[10] emphasize that Aristotle was not a Cartesian dualist, because the intellect is an aspect of the soul and the soul is the form of the body, not a separate substance. Kenny (1989) argues that Aristotle's theory of mind as form gives him an account similar to Ryle (1949), for it makes the soul equivalent to the dispositions possessed by a living body. This anti-Cartesian approach to Aristotle arguably ignores the fact that, for Aristotle, *the form* is *the substance*.

Augustine's Soul/Body Dualism:

The medieval era of dualism and the negative articulation of the body can best be highlighted in Augustine's elsewhere, particularly in the *City of God*. In Book 19, Chapter 17 of that text he writes:

> "When we shall have reached that peace, this mortal life shall give place to one that is eternal, and our body shall be no more this animal body which by its corruption weighs down the soul, but a spiritual body feeling no want, and in all its members subjected to the will." [11]

To quote Augustine:

> "Then the flesh will no longer have any desires opposed to the spirit. It will itself be called spiritual, as it will be subject to the spirit without any resistance, and without any need of bodily food to sustain its eternal life" (1990, p.204).

But it is the animal body that needs to be re-claimed for this Thesis; hence Augustine's notion of a spiritual body cannot assist in escaping the issue of animal or

[10] Aristotelianism began its modern history with its reception by Islamic, Jewish and Christian scholars. The most famous of these scholars are Averroes and St. Thomas Aquinas.
[11] Medieval Sourcebook: Augustine: on the Two Cities, http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/source/aug-city1.html

material body. Infact Augustine employs the metaphor of a material body *being sowed* so that the spiritual body can rise. The flesh can desire nothing except by means of the soul; but the flesh is said to have desires opposed to the spirit, when the soul struggles against the spirit because of carnal desires. All of this is ourselves, and even the flesh, which dies when the soul leaves it, is the lowly part of ourselves[12]. It is not cast off to be abandoned, but it is put aside to be received back, and once received back it will never again be relinquished. "A material body is sowed, however, and a spiritual body rises up"(1990, p.204).

Augustine had an exceedingly difficult time throughout his life struggling against what he considered to be the evil desires of his body. In 'Confessions' - Book VII, Augustine describes how the books of the Platonists helped to solve the problem of evil for him[13]. Rather than thinking of evil as a substance as the Manicheans do, the Platonists helped Augustine see that evil is a perversion of the will such that the will turns away from God. Evil, therefore, does not really exist – it is nothing but a lack of focus on God. Particularly, this element of truth in the books of the Platonists was the Neo-platonic understanding that everything is an emanation from the One (God) in a hierarchical ordering: that which is closest to the One has more reality than that which is farthest away; the material world is distant from the One, and humans must focus inwardly away from this material multiplicity in order to ascend back towards the One.

[12] Augustine continues to struggle with an understanding of flesh as both positive and negative. His turn to Neoplatonism allows him to move away from a strict mind/body dualism, yet Neoplatonism continues to harbor a negative view of the material body.

[13] A problem he had inherited from the Manicheans among others: he had troubles in that he had been conceiving of God as corporeal, when he knew that God could not be so – God must be incorporeal. These two problems are really tied together for Augustine.

According to Augustine, in order to avoid evil humans must focus inwardly on their soul or mind, which is closest to God, and not on their bodies, which carry the burden of original sin in the flesh and are farthest from God; in order to do this we must ask for God's grace to help us control the body,[14] though even with God's help this struggle with flesh is never easy. Following in the Platonic tradition, Augustine privileges that which is unchanging: we see this explicitly in Book VII of the *Confessions*, where Augustine attempts to comprehend a God that is non-corporeal. God cannot be corporeal, Augustine reasons, because God is perfect and thus absolute, whereas the body, in a constant process of change and decay, can never be described as perfect. Thus, the soul must struggle against the corrupting influence of the body.

Throughout the 'Confessions', Augustine describes his constant struggle with the world of physical pleasures[15]. In Book VI, Augustine expresses his battle with "carnal lusts" (Augustine, 1998, p. 118); in Book VII, the body is described as a weight: "I was drawn toward you by your beauty but swiftly dragged away from you by my own weight, swept back headlong and groaning onto these things below myself; and this weight was carnal habit" (ibid, p.138). Augustine continues his discussion of the way in which the physical world and its devious pleasures, particularly sexual pleasure, fetter him down in *Confessions* Book VIII: he praises God for helping to set him "free from a craving for sexual gratification which fettered me like a tight-drawn chain, and from my enslavement

[14] Grace is undeserved divine favor, whereby God helps us overcome the problems of ignorance and difficulty that accompany the human condition after the fall of Adam and Eve. Often, when humans ask for it, and sometimes even when they don't, Grace intervenes to help humans break out of patterns that they cannot escape by will, when the hold of the body is too strong for us to handle it on our own. We require God's help; to assume otherwise is pure arrogance

[15] He writes in Book VIII: "To find my delight in your law as far as my inmost self was concerned was of no profit to me when a different law in my bodily members was warring against the law of my mind, imprisoning me under the law of sin which held sway in my lower self. For the law of sin is that brute force of habit whereby the mind is dragged along and held fast against its will, and deservedly so because it slipped into the habit willingly. In my wretched state, who was there to free me from this death-doomed body, save your grace through Jesus Christ our Lord" (Augustine, 1998, 154-155).

to worldly affairs" (ibid, p.155). In Book X, this battle with the corruptible flesh becomes fleshed out to a greater extent. Augustine introduces Book X with an examination of his love for God, which he finds has nothing to do with his bodily senses,[16] and Augustine spends the latter part of Book X confessing the ways in which he is still separated from a truly Godly life due to the concupiscence of the flesh. He examines the ways in which physical touching, tasting, smelling, hearing, and seeing can lure one to ignore the spiritual and to focus on the bodily[17] (ibid, p. 223-235).

The underlying thesis of Augustine is that a life of control of one's sexual impulses is best. Augustine's De Continentia- sermon expresses a hierarchical soul/body dualism, a dualism in which the two parts are engaged in constant struggle in this material realm. Augustine writes that "The flesh has desires opposed to those of the spirit, and the spirit has desires opposed to those of the flesh. These two work against each other with the result that you do not do what you want to do" (Augustine, 1990, p.197-198). Continence, Augustine writes, is "of special importance" in this "war where the spirit has desires opposed to the flesh"; it puts to death "the deeds of the flesh" with which we so greatly struggle.[18]

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[16] In Book X, 6,8,Augustine writes: "What am I loving when I love you? Not beauty of body nor transient grace, not this fair light which is now so friendly to my eyes, not melodious song in all its lovely harmonies, not the sweet fragrance of flowers or ointments or spices, not manna or honey, not limbs that draw me to carnal embrace: none of these do I love when I love my God" (Augustine: 1998:202)

[17] "Quite certainly you command me to refrain from concupiscence of the flesh and concupiscence of the eyes and worldly pride. You commanded me to abstain from fornication, and recommended a course even better than the marital union you have sanctioned" (Augusine 1998, 223). Augustine confesses in Book X that, in spite of this knowledge of God's command, he is still plagued by disturbing erotic dreams, though during his waking hours he is celibate. Taste, smell, sound, and vision are also treacherous pleasures of the flesh that he finds difficult to deal with.

[18] I say to you, however, walk with the spirit and do not carry out the desires of the flesh. The flesh has desires opposed to those of the spirit, and the spirit has desires opposed to those of the flesh. These two work against each other with the result that you do not do what you want to do. […] He therefore wants those living under grace to enter that struggle against the deeds of the flesh. […] last among the good things he listed he put continence, which is the object of the discussion we have now undertaken and the reason for much that we have already said, because the particularly wanted that to be fixed in our minds. Without doubt in this war where the spirit has desires opposed to the flesh, it is of special importance, since in a way it crucifies the actual desires of the flesh. That is why, after saying this, the apostle

Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) argued that Plato's 'substance dualism' went too far. Aquinas agreed with Plato's contention that the soul is a *per se* subsistent entity, which is possible given its ability of abstraction apart from the body. However, Aquinas disagreed with Plato's contention that the soul represents an entirely independent species and genus of substance. Such a contention makes the relation of the soul and the body accidental. Thus, death would not qualify as a substantial corruption. This contention is obviously false. Aquinas effectively exploits Aristotelian identification of form and substance. (Aquinas, 1912, pt. I, qu. 75 and 76). He calls the problem of soul/body as that which stems from a categorical misallocation. Categorically, it is portrait that the soul qualifies as a subsistent form of a substance, therefore not a primary substance, but an energizing mechanism of the corporeal body that animates the hylomorphic composite of man. This view goes along with the etymological meaning of the *Soul* as derived from anima, which also provides the root for the word *animation*.

Aquinas argued that though the form (and, hence, the intellect with which it is identical) is the substance of the human person, they are not the person itself. The soul, though an immaterial substance, is the person only when united with its body. Without the body, those aspects of its personal memory that depend on images (which are held to be corporeal) will be lost. (ibid, *part I*, question 89.) That is, the body is tailored according to the parameters of empirical utility. It serves a teleological function for the soul. This view of body demolishes the portrayal of the body as an impediment to the soul and reverences it as wonderfully designed machine. Jesus made it clear that the body

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immediately went on: Those who belong to Jesus Christ have crucified their flesh with its passions and desires. This is what continence does; this is how the deeds of the flesh are put to death. On the other hand, those deeds in their turn bring death to those who are lured by carnal desire to abandon continence and consent to committing them" (Augustine: 1990, 197-198).

is not just informationally different from other quantities; it is purposefully different. That is why the resurrection is a physical one at its core. The body matters in the eternal sense, not just the temporal (Zacharias, 2000, p.71).

Aquinas illustrates the centrality of the physical body to humanity's acquisition of knowledge. Through the body, humanity obtains sensory data concerning individual things. Thus, the body supplies the passive component of knowledge. This is the fundamental stage of knowledge acquisition. It is the bedrock upon which the active component of knowledge, which is supplied by the mind, rests. According to Aquinas, this is the fundamental stage of knowledge acquisition. It is the bedrock upon which the active component of knowledge, which is supplied by the mind, rests. Aquinas elaborates:

> "Our intellect cannot know the singular in material things directly and primarily. The reason for this is that the principle of singularity in material things is individual matter; whereas our intellect understands by abstracting the intelligible species from such matter. Now what is abstracted from individual matter is universal. Hence our intellect knows directly only universals. But indirectly, however, and as it were by a kind of reflexion, it can know the singular, because… even after abstracting the intelligible species, the intellect, in order to understand actually, needs to turn to the phantasms in which it understands the species… Therefore it understands the universal directly through the intelligible species, and indirectly the singular represented by the phantasm. And thus it forms the proposition, "Socrates is a man" (Aquinas, 1912, pt. I, qu. 86, art. I).

Zacharias takes a step ahead and claim that, the physical body is not simply analogous to a temple. It is the temple itself. He explains:

> "The Christian does not go to the temple to worship. The Christian takes the temple with him or her. Jesus lifts us beyond the building and pays the human body the highest compliment by making it His dwelling place, the place where He meets with us" (cited in Collins, 2005)[19].

This is a position that Paul argued several times in his first letter to the Corinthians. In 1 Corinthians 6:15, Paul writes:

> "Know ye not that your bodies are the members of Christ?" Later, in 1 Corinthians 6:19, Paul recapitulates this message: "What? know ye not that your body is the temple of the Holy Ghost *which is* in you, which ye have of God, and ye are not your own?" (ibid).

Evidently, the physical body is extremely important to the Christian. This was the position that Aquinas philosophically dignified in *Summa Theologiae*. Collins argues that his mission was two-fold: reconcile the body with the soul and re-establish the temple of humanity. This must be the mission of contemporary Christianity as well, he comments.

Descartes: the Cartesian Dualism:

The modern versions of Dualism have their origin in Descartes 'Meditations on First Philosophy', and in the debate that was consequent upon Descartes' theory. Descartes (1596-1650) began his philosophical career by trying to set forth the basic principles of the new scientific method that Galileo had introduced and which had proved so successful. At the same time he wished to show that this new scientific methodology

[19] http://www.newswithviews.com/Collins/phillip9.htm

was consistent with Christianity and provided no threat to it. Thus, Descartes had two main aims in the Meditations*:*

1. To provide a sound basis for scientific method. He aimed to show that the real source of scientific knowledge lay in the mind and not in the senses.

2. To show how science and religion could be compatible. He will do this by splitting the world up into two different types of substances: mind and body. Science will be completely true of body, extended matter; religious truths will deal with the soul or mind.

Descartes started his search for reliable knowledge, a search or certainty by bracketing anything given by the common sense world. In his 'Meditation', Descartes resorted to the method of universal skepticism, a 'methodological doubt' that questioned everything; even the unshakable belief in one's own physical existence. Descartes begins by philosophizing about what would happen if his life was only an illusion or a dream created with the aid of sense perception. When in the process of doubting everything, he realized that there is only one indubitable experience that cannot be doubted, that is, doubting implies the doubter who necessarily exists meaning.

He deduces from his famous wax experiment in his 'Second Meditation' that all physical body has the characteristic of extension in space and is divisible, including the human body. On the contrary he argues that mind is not extended spatially neither are divisible, as we cannot conceive of half a mind. He argues that the mind is not subject to any law. It is *apriori* unlike the body substance, which is determined by causal law and thereby predictable and controllable.

In ‘Meditation V1’ Descartes came to the conclusion of his series of meditations, which deal with the problem of Metaphysics, or his First Philosophy. He thereby states that the mind is what the body is not, and the body is what the mind is not. The body does not die because the soul leaves it but the soul leaves it when the body ceases to exist. Hence what became most obvious to Descartes was that man is a thinker, and that matter must be created by God according to physical laws. By this, Descartes divided existence into two different parts; mind, which is rational and free, and matter or body, which is based upon the laws of mathematics and physics. Maintaining the ‘Dualism’ of body and mind as two separate and independent substances, Descartes states that, he is precisely first a mind thinking, and then a body, which occupies time and space but does not think (Descartes, 1968). He says that he is:

> “a thing that think’, “……...if we were not thinking, thus, I would not know where I existed… be it could even happen…I stopped thinking I might at the same time cease to be” (cited in Wiliams.B, 1978, p.322).

Descartes goes on to argue, that at least in this world it is true that I have a body. Yet, he says in his ‘Meditations on First Philosophy’:

> “Because, on the one side, I have a clear and distinct idea of myself in as much as I am only a thinking and unextended thing, and as, on the other, I possess a distinct idea of body, inasmuch as it is only an extended and unthinking thing, it is critical that this I … is entirely and absolutely distinct from my body, and can exist without it” (1952, p. 98).

Descartes holds that a person's body is under the control of his or her mind and the mind is subjectively free to decide whatever it wants, and then to use the body to attempt to achieve what it decides. That is to say it is the soul, which is what the person really is; the body is merely temporary housing- a transient tool by means of which the soul receives information from the world and acts on the world. The body, according to Descartes is under the control of the mind in somewhat the same manner that the claw of a claw machine in an amusement arcade is in the control of our hands. Descartes considers the body, as a public thing that can be examined by any number of people while the mind is radically private.

Both the body and mind retrieve things, but while the body retrieves them by means of the activity of physical grasping, the mind retrieves things by means of memory. Again both the body and mind create things, but while the body creates a painting by grasping a brush, dipping it in paint, and touching the brush to canvas, the mind creates by means of imagination, which employs no physical implements at all. Descartes holds that without the mind we could not account for our personal identity and continuity. I may lose an arm or a leg or even all of my limbs yet remain the same person. If I were only a body, then when I lost a limb, I would no longer be the same person. But I can lose a limb and remain the same person. Therefore, I must be something different from my body.

As per 'Cartesian Dualism' man is essentially a split person, a body-less *cogito or* a mindless body-machine that work according to its own laws. Except where there are minds interfering with it, matter proceeds deterministically, in its own right. Minds are required to influence bodies by 'pulling levers' in a piece of machinery that already has

its own laws of operation. This raises the question of where those 'levers' are in the body. Descartes supposed that the two stuff interact through the pineal gland (mainly because it is not duplicated on both sides of the brain, so it is a candidate for having a unique, unifying function) in the center of the brain. But proposing a place where it happens does not solve the mystery of their interaction. If thoughts can affect brain cells, then either they work by magic or they must be using some kind of energy or matter. Hence how two such substances interact remains an unsolved logical problem in Descartes' philosophy. Several of Descartes' disciples, such as, Arnold Geulincx and Nicholas Malebranche, concluded that all mind-body interactions required the direct intervention of God.[20] In fact they generalized their conclusion and treated all causation as directly dependent on God. According to these philosophers, the appropriate states of mind and body were only the *occasions* for such intervention, not real causes. These occasionalists maintained the strong thesis that all causation was directly dependent on God, instead of holding that all causation was natural except for that between mind and body.

G.W. Leibniz agreed with the occasionalists that there could be no efficient causation between distinct created substances, but he did not think it followed that there was no efficient power in the created world at all. On the contrary, every simple substance had the power to produce changes in itself. The illusion of transuent efficient causation, for Leibniz, arose out of the pre-established harmony between the alterations produced immanently within different substances. The theory of *pre-established harmony* claims the existence of the mental realm and the physical realm, the two that runs parallel to one another in the way that God deem most appropriate, but the two realms are not

[20] Posted by The Gray Monk, http://graymonk.mu.nu/archives/theology_and_ministry/

directly causally connected. This theory is sometime called the theory of parallelism. The problem with 'pre established harmony' is that, first; it is based on belief in the existence of God and consequently does not hold true for the atheist. Secondly, this position contradicted our commonsense convictions that physical events do cause mental events. The doctor's needles cause us to feel pain as our willing to do more sit-ups causes our stomach muscles to contract.

Nevertheless to say, Descartes' philosophy has had a great impact on our perception of the body. Empirical science often talks about physical bodies in general as subject to a law of cause and effect. Hence modern instrumental science would be inconceivable without Descartes dualistic ontology. Descartes' conception of a dualism of *substances* came under attack from the more radical empiricists, who found it difficult to attach sense to the concept of substance at all. However, the thesis will not enter into this debate.

Locke on Personal Identity:

A moderate empiricist, John Locke, accepted Descartes' concept of the substantial self as the underlying support of all experience that can be called mental. Locke upholds that the world is composed of substances, which are the repository of qualities. He agrees with Descartes that the body is material substance while the soul is immaterial spiritual substance. The ideal of a bodily substance is framed by putting together certain corporeal qualities and supposing a support for them; while the idea of soul substance is framed by reflecting upon the operations of our mind, such as thinking, understanding, willing, knowing and power of beginning motion. (Chakraborty, 1996, p. 350). Locke said:

> " it is plain then that the idea of corporeal substance in matter is as remote from our conceptions and apprehensions as that of spiritual substance or spirit; and therefore, form our not having any notion of the substance of spirit, we can no more conclude its non- existence than we can for the same reason deny existence of body"(cited in Fraser, 1894. p.350).

Locke is certain that there is a spiritual being within him that sees and hears than that there is some corporeal body outside him. He is also certain that he is not his body but he is his soul because the soul being active has the capacity to move the passive body and being passive, in relation to the bodies outside produces changes in the soul, and all our ideas are due to the action of the body on the soul (ibid, p.350). Locke endeavors to identify himself with the self and not with the body. A person, Locke believes, is: "thinking intelligent Being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing in different times and places" (ibid, p. 335).

For Locke, it is consciousness that constitutes personal identity and consciousness is inseparable thinking. The identity of man consists "in nothing but a participation of the same continued life, by constantly fleeting particles of matter, in succession vitally united to the same organized Body" (ibid, p.331-2). He also says: "is the same self with this present one that now reflects on it, that, that action was done"(ibid).

Locke's account of personal identity is the ancestor of all those that dispense with sameness and substance or stuff and concentrate instead on psychological continuity (Winkler, 1991. pp. 201-26). It is his way of saying that personal identity is not determined by the unity or identity of two kinds of substances in particular-immaterial souls and organized bodies. Locke claims that "we have the same person where and only

where we have the same consciousness*:* the sameness of a living body is neither necessary nor sufficient to constitute the same person, nor is the sameness of a spiritual substance but personal identity is somehow to be equated with or based on the unity of consciousness" (cited in Leslie John, 1976, p. 176).[21] He would therefore go to the extent of admitting a body-less unit of consciousness.

Locke has rejected two opposite views of personal identity. First he denies that personal identity consists in bodily continuity and that the same living human being constitutes the same man. But not necessarily the same person. Secondly he also rejects the criterion of the persisting immaterial soul substance. He of course does not deny that there are spiritual substance; but says that the identity of soul does not determine the identity of a person. As he says, that a man can claim to have the soul of Socrates or Nestor, but if he does not have the consciousness of Socrates or Nestor, he cannot be the same person as either.

> "the same immaterial substance, without the same consciousness, no more making the same person, by being united to any body, than the same particle of matter, without consciousness, united to any body makes the same person" (cited in Goswami, 2006, p.34).

His view appears to have been that the persistence of a person through time consists in the fact that certain actions, thoughts, experiences, etc. occurring at different times, are somehow united in memory. Modern theories descended from Locke's take memory continuity to be a special case of something more general, psychological

[21] Leslie John, Mackie, 1976, *Problems from Locke*, available at: http://books.google.com/books?id=gY7_NtUVuQwC&pg=PA176&lpg=PA176&dq=locke+claims+that+%22we+have+the+same+person+where+and+only+where+we+have+the+same+consciousness%22&source=web&ots=42KAr5pIBh&sig=MwJKYhGJZfSaiQo9fWd5vreRfr0

continuity (Audi, 1997, p. 574), but his theory of memory raises several issues about 'par amnesia', false memories, loss of memory which disturbed his view on personal identity. In this context it can be noted that Locke made a classification of Idea of Man and Idea of Person in his Platonic–Cartesian modality where the former refers to physical characteristics and the latter refers to psychological characteristic. Locke's conviction is that "as far as this consciousness can be extended backwards to any past action or thought so far reaches the identity of that person" (cited in Reid, 1785). This means that any change in the psychological characteristic is enough for a change of that person personal identity. However this is also not free from criticism.

A crisis in the history of 'Dualism' came, however, with the growing popularity of mechanism in science in the nineteenth century. According to the mechanist, the conscious mind is an epiphenomenon that is; it is a by-product of the physical system, which has no influence back on it. [22] Huxley, the best-known epiphenomenolist, did not deny the existence of consciousness or of subjective experiences but denied them any causal influence. They were powerless to affect the machinery of the human brain and body, just as the steam-whistle of a locomotive engine is without influence on its machinery. The only legitimate use for the noun 'mind' is as shorthand for the flow of mental phenomena. It holds that there are degrees of correlation, which indicate clearly that mental events are directly dependent on physical events. The analogy often used is that of the smoke that comes from a factory which is a by-product of its running, but does not actually affect its running.[23]

[22] a notion given general currency by T. H. Huxley (1893),the English biologist and paleontologist who did so much to promote Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection), was one of the best known epiphenomenalists
[23] see., www.philosophyonline.co.uk/pom/pom_epiphenomenalism.htm - 15k

Hence it can be established according to epiphenomenalist that both by commonsense and scientific evidence our feeling are causally dependent on our physical states. All aspects of our mental life are generated from our bodies somewhat like light in a bulb is generated by motor. Similarly, our bodily processes generate our mental event, processes, and states. The feeling, emotions, desires, intention, and so on that are generated by our bodily process are "epiphenomenona", that is, side-effects that do not affect us physically, just as the light from the bulb does not affect the generator, the froth produced by waves does not affect the surging of the ocean, the sparks from the wheels of a speeding locomotive do not affect the speed or directions of the locomotive, and the shadows of a object does not affect the object. That is to say the entire factor that determine our behavior are physical. The scientific data seem to support the idea of epiphenomenona that conscious experience is created by non-conscious processes in the brain (Williams, R, 2003).[24]

Everything, according to epiphenomenalism can be explained entirely in terms of the physiology and conditioning of the body, including the brain, how physical input from the world (which causes seeing, hearing, smelling, touching, and tasting) results in physical output from the body (such as talking, writing, walking etc). For example, when we get flu, we feel nauseous (mental states) and then we throw up (physical event), but feeling nauseous does not cause us to throw up. Rather, something physical going on in our body (an invasions of viruses) first makes us feel nauseous and then makes us throw up. Again they argue that feeling sleepy which a mental state is does not cause one to go sleep, which is a physical event. Rather something physical going on in our body first

[24] Robinson, William. (2003) "Epiphenomenalism", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Edward Zalta (ed.). Online text, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2003/entries/epiphenomenalism/

causes us to feel sleepy and then causes us to go to sleep. Also we ordinarily assume that we jerk our hand back because it hurts, but physiologists have discovered that when we touch a very hot object, the nerve impulses from our fingers do not go to the brain before sending signals back to the hand. Hence the epiphenomenalists conclude one need not appeal to the mental realm in order to explain human behavior and that the mental phenomena cannot occur or exit separately from the body, though the body can exist separately from mental phenomena.

Thus epiphenomenalism fails to provide a complete solution to the mystery of mind body interaction because, as Williams Robinson (2003) argued, if it is mysterious how the non-physical can have it in its nature to influence the physical, it ought to be equally mysterious how the physical can have it in its nature to produce something non-physical. Bishop Berkeley famously rejected material substance, because he rejected all existence outside the mind. He makes a distinction between ideas and notions. Ideas are the objects of our mental acts, and they capture transparently — 'by way of image or likeness' (Principles, sect. 27) — that of which they are the ideas. The self and its faculties are not the *objects* of our mental acts. However, he argued that although the self and its acts are not presented to consciousness as *objects* of awareness, we are obliquely aware of them simply by being active subjects. Berkeley appears to provide a modified restatement of Descartes when he claims that:

> "I know or am conscious of my own being; an that I myself an mot ideas, but somewhat else, a thinking active principle that perceives, knows, wills and operates about ideas" (cited in Ayer, 1952, p. 281).

Revolution: Anti Cartesian:

Hume made a revolt against the Cartesian conception of mind-body dualism and maintained in unequivocal terms that there is no such thing as immaterial substantive soul. Infact it was Hume who for the first time has attacked so vehemently, and, so to say, has demolished, the whole edifice of Cartesian philosophy. It is he who has awakened Kant from his 'dogmatic slumber', and in that sense, has given birth to the genius of the latter. It is also Hume who has tilled the ground for the flourishing of Russell, Wittgenstein, Ayer and most of the empiricist tradition, including Strawson in our times.

Hume has built his anti Cartesian philosophy on his hard-core empirical position. Hume agrees with Berkeley in the latter's refutation of matter or the representative theory of Locke and maintained that there is no material substance to be represented. He goes a step further and claims that we find only impressions and ideas, our perceptions; and apart from these no substance-either material or spiritual. He says in his much quoted passage:

> " for my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some perception, or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception. When my perception are removed for any time, as by sound sleep; so long am I insensible of myself and may truly be said not to exist. And were all my perception removed by death, and could I neither think, nor feel, nor see, nor love, nor hate after eh dissolution of my body, I should be entirely

annihilated, nor do I conceives what is further requisite to make me a perfect non- entity" (1739, p.252).

Hume proclaimed that the self is not an entity but more like a "bundle of sensations: the identity that we ascribe to the mind of man, is only a fictitious one, and of a like kind with that which we ascribe to vegetables and animal bodies " (ibid, p.259). Every causation is a customary association of ideas. Consequently, a person's life is a series of sensation, impressions and ideas that seem to be tied together not because they happen to one person but because of such relationships as those that hold between experience and later memories of them. Hence the mind is, he claimed, nothing but a 'bundle' or 'heap' of impressions and ideas - that is, of particular mental states or events, without an owner, which are united in the imagination by the associative principles of resemblance, contiguity and causation. In 'A Treatise of Human Nature' wrote:

"for my part when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat, or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception" (Dennett 1984, *Treatise*.1, V1, iv)

What about the ordinary concept of bodily human being? For Hume the question, whether thee are bodies or not, is not a sensible question. He appears to take for granted the question of human body and the question of embodiment. Sometimes he even goes very near to a modern physicalist:

> " everything is common betwixt soul and body. The organs of the one are all of them the organs of the others; the existence, therefore, of the one must be dependent on the other. The souls of animals are allowed to be mortal; and these bear so near a resemblance to the souls of men, that the analogy from one to the others forms a very strong argument"(Delaney, 1976, p. 237).

Hume has failed to see the otioseness of this permanent self. His position was of a skeptic. Hume has never brought the bodily criterion for consideration. He thinks that it would be nest explained by a permanent self. There is no such self; hence identity of a person is not real. He has not denied the reality of an empirical person. His account of moral theory makes men and his nature and not individual actions, the object of moral approval or disapproval. His main attempt is to show the emptiness of the concept of a pure ego and in it he succeeds. In the course of his argument he however avoided any discussion on the human body, which may be or perhaps strongly need to be taken as a serious gap in his philosophy of person.

The no-soul theory of Hume has had immeasurable influence upon the present day philosophers. Indeed, the construction of a philosophy of person in the Strawsonian sense can be seen as based upon the Humean tradition. Kant in his 'Critique of Pure Reason' tries to give a flexible account of the self. Influenced by Hume, Kant gives an account of the self in terms of an *a priori* principle – *a transcendental synthesis of imagination* as the prerequisite of all our experience. Kant speaks of the self as 'transcendental', but this transcendence is not of the kind like that of Descartes. It has a character, which is neither ontological, nor phenomenal, but something intermediates

between the two. It is the logical subject, and it performs the logical function of ascribing meaning to themselves meaningless impressions.

> "Now in inner intuition there is nothing permanent, for the 'I; is merely the consciousness of my thought. So long therefore, as we do not go beyond mere thinking, we are without the necessary condition for applying the concept of Substance, that is, of a self-subsistent subject, to the self as a thinking being"(Kant, 1933, p.372).

Kant's transcendental ego bears a non-individual character, it is a bare identity, a bare consciousness with no predicate, nor it is expressible any synthetic proposition. At the same time Kant speaks of the noumenal aspect of the self to which he ascribed the qualities of personality, immorality and freedom. Kant and Plato are in agreement in denying that rational form represents the essence of the empirically real. For both of then rational form is at least somewhat alien to the content it serves to order.

Kantian epistemology faces a crisis between his phenomena and nouemena, or body and soul/mind because there is no common measure between what is sensibly given and that, which is conceptualized. It is for that reason any connection between them is inevitably somewhat arbitrary. Hence Kantian epistemology has an unstable center that threatens either to collapse into identity of form/ content (Hegel) or to break apart into a conventional juxtapostion (positivism). Kant was never willing to sacrifice either his empiricism or his idealism, and hence held these factors together in a uneasy alliance. Kant's view of the real self is more difficult to defend against the charge of inconsistency. That is a real self, which is much harder to be reconciled with his agnosticism than is the admission of the things in themselves. His doctrine of the

synthesis makes the inconsistency worse, for it implies considerable knowledge of the relation between the real self and appearances. The assumption that he knows the existence of other real selves beside himself is impossible to reconcile with his agnosticism about reality. "Kants critical idealism inverted the realism of Locke and Descartes while Whitehead's naturalistic realism has in turn, inverted Kantian idealism" (Whitehead, 1929, p.286).

All these have shown how the history of Western philosophy is more a series of revolution than a smooth progression of ideas. The attempt to 'know thyself' is truly represented in the Socratic-Platonic tradition. In the West, it was Socrates, who realized the necessity of objectivity of knowledge as he revolted against the Sophist's radial subjectivism, which makes knowledge impossible. The history of Western philosophy, in general, has been a continual swing between the two poles of 'truth', subject-object, mind-body, culture-nature, self and its other and so on. Because Descartes puts forward his theory of the subjectivity of human being within the framework of his mind/body 'Dualism'; his conception of the subjectivity of the human being as such could not contain any further and deeper intention. It was Liebniz, Kant and Husserl and others to do this.

Kant declared the first Copernican Revolution that could develop new understanding of subject or self-overcoming the limitations that one finds in Descartes or in Leibniz. Kant creatively developed Leibniz's thought of apperception re-considering the subject or self as a kind of synthesizing perceptual data or constructing experiential. What is more, the highlights of European philosophy originated as a reaction to relativism and skepticism, not by ignoring or looking down at them, but by taking them

very seriously. It was in con-fronting the sophists that Socrates developed his method of inquiry. It was in reply to the skeptics of his day that Descartes designed his own sys-tem of clear and distinct ideas. And it was his confrontation with Hume's skepticism that led Kant to develop his critical philosophy. Central to this Cartesian epistemology is a systematic belief in the supremacy of logical reason over the illogical nature, as such; Enlightenment philosophy assumes that the rational self has an 'inner' relationship with the mind and an 'outer' relationship with the body. Therefore, the body is conceived not as part of 'who we are' but part of nature, hence an object to be controlled and mechanized (Seidler, 1998, p.17).

With the Kantian philosophy of ethics, reason is identified with morality for it provides the *priori* principles for knowledge, certainty and universal law, whereas the body is identified with feelings and emotions, which are, according to Kant, external 'forms of determination and a lack of freedom? taking us away from the path of pure reason' (ibid, 17). More recently, it was through a confrontation with psychologism that Husserl treated his phenomenological approach.

In this brief overview of the history of Western dualism from Plato to Kant, it is observed how in Augustine's hands, Plato's prison of the senses could become the home of 'the slimy desires of the flesh,' with the requirement to totally subdue the body's 'law of lust.' Despite their differences, the dualism of Plato and Augustine shared the ancient view of the living body—and the natural world—as permeated with spirit. René Descartes was to decisively change that, in a reformulation of mind/body dualism that would herald the birth of modern science. For Descartes, the body is a mechanically functioning system with nothing conscious about it—simply the interaction of fluids,

organs, and fleshly matter. Central to this Cartesian epistemology is a systematic belief in the supremacy of logical reason over the illogical nature, as such; enlightenment philosophy assumes that the rational self has an 'inner' relationship with the mind and an 'outer' relationship with the body. Therefore, the body is conceived not as part of 'who we are' but part of nature, hence an object to be controlled and mechanized (Seidler, p.17). Because Descartes put forward his theory of the subjectivity of human being within the framework of his mind-body dualism, his conception of the subjectivity of the human being as such could not contain any further and deeper intention. It would be up to Leibniz, Kant and Husserl and others to do this.

With the Kantian philosophy of ethics, reason is identified with morality for it provides the *priori* principles for knowledge, certainty and universal law, whereas the body is identified with feelings and emotions, which are, according to Kant, external 'forms of determination and a lack of freedom? taking us away from the path of pure reason' (ibid). Indeed, this very attitude of inflation towards the mind and deflation towards the body has long set the stage for the 'transcendental' ideals in an attempt to articulate the order of 'empirical' world beyond its particularities and peculiarities, or to use phenomenological terms, beyond its 'immanence' (Husserl, 1990, p.17), driving the Western culture to its quest of disembodiment.

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Chapter 3

Disembodied Person

Persons and their Bodies

The Crave for Transcendence:

The previous chapter has made a brief exposition of the Enlightenment's epistemology regarding the body and precisely that of the Cartesian split between the 'inner' and the 'outer'. Central to this Cartesian epistemology is a systematic belief in the supremacy of logical reason over the illogical nature, as such; Enlightenment philosophy assumes that the rational self has an 'inner' relationship with the mind and an 'outer' relationship with the body. Therefore, the body is conceived not as part of 'who we are' but part of nature, hence an object to be controlled and mechanized (Seidler, 1998, p.17). The notion of transcendence went on to act as a basis for objective and universal knowledge, reinforcing the Cartesian 'method' of existence and cognition, and ratifying the need of disembodied experience, yet, dialectically espousing a synthesis of mind and body where the latter became the obedient rather than the 'prison' of the former.

In fact, this disdain for the body entails a disdain for anything relating to it, such as emotions, feelings and subjectivity. As such and in the episteme of transcendence, experience is deemed to be 'real' only if deeply entrenched within consciousness and entirely detached from the corporeal. With this Cartesian thesis of knowledge and superiority, and its promises of control, it is no surprise that the question of disembodiment should lie at the very heart of technological discourses leading to the belief that the possibility of augmenting or transcending our existing biological bodies must include the apparent non-physical aspects of embodiment—consciousness, self,

mind and psyche. This argument necessarily requires a discussion which includes scientific concepts and various religious and spiritual systems that have made in depth study regarding possibilities of how we existing humans might either live in our present bodies for greatly extended life spans, or how we might copy ourselves to a medium more suitable than our present biological bodies to increase longevity.

Since the question of longevity, and by extension immortality, is one of the most fundamental issues concerning both past and present human beings, scientists, philosophers and religious practitioners have all thought deeply about the various possibilities and explanations humans have devised for surviving bodily death. The numerous versions of this, from the big three monotheistic religions through to tribal ancestor spirits, all believe some 'thing' goes to a higher, or at least different, plane. If we compare Advaita Vedanta, Christian and Shinto belief systems, regarding eschatology — no consensuses can be made in this regard .We also come across the survival picture of occultists and parapsychologists and others who have involved such concepts as astral or subtle bodies, ghosts, spirit entities and near death experiences. Unfortunately none of these concepts can stand up to rigorous scientific or even logically coherent analysis. After going through a detailed discussion of some versions of disembodied survival, this chapter intends to show that disembodied consciousness is impossibility simply on the ground that our bodies are not *merely* life support systems for a mind or self, but that mind and body are absolutely interdependent. That way, it seems logical to come to this conclusion that the end of one's body is the end of one's personhood.

Any discussion regarding the possibility of augmenting or transcending our existing biological bodies must include the apparent non-physical aspects of

embodiment-consciousness, self, mind and psyche. However, in order to explore and understand the ontology or epistemology of disembodiment within any given discourse, it is first essential to understand the conditions of embodiment or put crudely, the reality of what constitutes the materiality so that one can look for possibilities of transcending corporeality, if it is possible. This chapter will provide a foundation for the next chapters of the thesis, which will examine transformation of self, that is, various ways in which a self can change over time through both technology and biology. As a follow up of the previous chapter, the present chapter intends to show how the application of theoretical positions offered by, amongst others, the exponents of the Platonic tradition and Rene Descartes, demonstrates that the body can be ignored, rejected and completely done away with, as the possible thought experiments of Darik Parfit and others would endeavor to show. In the contemporary time, a revised model of disembodied person is also found in the philosophy of Peter Strawson. What follows is a critical review of Derek Parfit's account of Personal Identity and his model of Disembodied Person on the basis of John Locke's account of Personal Identity.

Bodies, Minds and the question of Personal Identity:

Since Heraclitus remarked that no one could step twice into the same river philosophers have wrested with the identity of things and, in particular with personal identity. How can someone possibly remain one and the same person throughout the course of their life, given their physical and mental changes? This old philosophical question has led to a controversy in contemporary analytical philosophy that continues a discussion from the classical rationalism and empiricism of the 17th and 18th centuries (see, Raymond and Barresi, 2000). Locke argued for a distinction between personal

identity and human (animal) identity on the basis of a thought experiment. He asked us to imagine that the consciousnesses of a prince and a cobbler are switched, each into the other's body, and to work out where the persons of the prince and the cobbler would then be. He took it to be obvious that each would be where his consciousness went rather than remain with his original body.

Darik Parfit is influenced by Locke's account of the imaginary brain-transplant and body-switching cases, the famous modern version of Locke's prince waking up in the body of a cobbler; rely on bizarre thought-experiments and puzzle cases, –body-switching minds, split-brains, fission, teletransportation, etc. and on appeals to intuitions and to conceivability. Parfit's theory of personal identity owes much not only to Locke's memory theory and David Hume's bundle theory, but also to Russell's logical atomism according to which, an account of personal identity comes to the same thing as the logical construction of empirical self-identity. Parfit, divides the theories of personal identity into two broad classes: Ego Theories and Bundle Theories (1987). According to the Ego theories the existence of the ego explains the existence of the person and not vice-versa. Ego theories come in different flavors, but all of them claim that what it is to be the same person over time is for some single ego, substance, subject of experiences or what have we to persist over time. That is, the metaphysical ego is primary.

Bundle theories on the other hand take a quite different approach. Hume is perhaps regarded as the first bundle theorist in the Western philosophical tradition while in the east the Philosophy of Buddha takes its stand along with this theory. In 'A Treatise of Human Nature' Hume wrote:

"For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or clod, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and can never can observe anything but the perception." (Dennett 1984, *Treatise*, 1,VI, iv)

Notes on Parfit: Bundles without Selves

"This bundle of elements is void of Self. In it there is no sentient being. Just as a set of wooden parts receives the name of carriage, so do we give to elements the name of fancied being"(Parfit, 1987,p.502).

According to Parfit, one cannot explain the unity of consciousness or the unity of a life by saying that there is some underlying person to whom all the components of the consciousness or the life belong. In particular, there is not some underlying soul or ego that holds us together, so to speak. Rather, there are two things one should say: (1) what we call a person is in effect a long series of experiences, thoughts, feelings etc. - *a series of mental states and events* and (2) each of these series that we associate with a single person's life is tied together by various causal relations, memory being one of the more important ones. [1]

Derik Parfit's philosophy of mind is thus essentially tied to his doctrine of thought-experimentation[2] that ultimately offers some solution to the problem of disembodied existence, so he thinks. Consider the hypothesis:

[1] Parfit is *not* saying that each stage in the series can recall all the previous stages

[2] Thought experiements are not designed to provide reliable answers, although some end up turning into real experiements as technology changes. The thesis proceed to considrs some of the thought experiemtn carried out to understand the place of subjectie experience in analytic philosophy of mind

> "I am often teletransported. I am now ... ready for another trip to Mars. But this time when I press the given button, I do not lose consciousness. ... I say to the attendant[,] 'It's not working. What did I do wrong?' 'It's working,' he replies, handing me a printed card. This reads: 'The new scanner reads your blueprint without destroying your brain and body. We hope that you will welcome the opportunities which this technical advance offers.' The attendant tells me that I am one of the few people to use the new scanner. He adds that if I stay for an hour, I can use the intercom to see and talk to myself on Mars. 'Wait a minute,' I reply, 'if I'm here, I can't also be on Mars.' ... A white coated man asks to speak to me in private. ... Then he says: 'I'm afraid that we are having problems with the new scanner. It records your blueprint just as accurately, as you will see when you talk to yourself on Mars, but it seems to be damaging to the cardiac system, which it scans. Judging from the results, so far, though you will be quite healthy on Mars, here on earth you must expect cardiac failure within the next few days" (Parfit, 1984,p.199).

In the above hypothetical thought experiment, Derek Parfit raises the most fascinating issues with respect to the philosophical puzzles of mind/body relations and identity making creative use of the 'Star Trek' notion of tele-transportation in developing

his theory of personal identity. The idea of his tele-transportation is that one can step into a device which breaks down one's molecular structure, scans, reads and stores the information, then reproduces that molecular structure in another 'identical' device which is many miles away.

Parfit continues his teletranspotation:

> "Since my Replica knows I am about to die, he tries to console me with the same thoughts with which I recently tried to console a dying friend. It is sad to learn, on the receiving end, how unconsoling these thoughts are. My Replica assures me that he will take up my life where I leave off. He loves my wife, and together they will care for my children" (1984,p.199).

The questions such a thought experiment prompts are: *do I die or do I survive? Is that me on Mars?* These puzzling questions seem unanswerable because in this scenario, the reference of 'I' becomes impossible to pin down; it is impossible to say where 'I' am. According to Parfit, the puzzlement produced by these cases demonstrates a faulty logic in the way we commonly think about identity, and forces us to confront the incoherence of personal identity. The confusion, he says, results from the belief that a self or person is some kind of special entity, something over and above one's body and thoughts. Parfit influentially claimed in 'Reasons and Persons (1984)' that what matters to us is not personal identity but psychological continuity**.** In order to articulate these intuitions more precisely Derek Parfit invokes the thought experiment of *mental transfer* (or change of body). If the mental content of a person X is transferred to the body of Y, then, X seems to retain his essential identity. The body of Y and the original body of X appear to have

an influence on what is fundamental for X an inner personality or a self. Locke already remarked:

> "For should that soul of a prince, carrying with it the consciousness of the prince's past life, enter and inform the body of a cobbler, as soon as deserted by his soul, every one sees he would be the same person with the prince, accountable only for the prince's actions: but who would say it was the same man (body)?" (1694, p. 44).

From this it is concluded that the essential mental aspect logically differs from the bodily aspect. The essential constituent of the person is the self, which is only accidentally linked with the body. Consequently numerical self- identity through time makes the person one and the same at every moment of his life. Derek Parfit thus develops a theory of psychological identity from the core of empiricist bundle theory according to which personal identity consists of mental continuity and connectedness only. Accordingly persons are not soul substances or 'egos' but bundles of experiences, united by the stream of consciousness by the continuous connectedness of memory, character and talents, intentions and ambitions, belief and desires, and other mental characteristics.

Personal identity is thus understood to be absorbed completely by mental continuity. A person continues to remain the same person only on the strength of mental continuity. But apart from these mental states and their continuity there is no unified subject where experience it is in-itself apart from mental continuity, personal identity does not exist. Only in grammatical structure the subject exists. Only experiences have an actual existence; persons only exist nominally. This means that experiences do not have a

personal owner; they just occur in an impersonal universe. A person does not exist apart from experience – the existence of person is reduced to the existence of experience. Persons are not fundamental; person therefore exists impersonally. Hence the extreme consequence of bundle theory of personal identity is the impersonal personal identity.

Parfit puts forward several examples in support of his impersonal analysis of experience. It can be assumed that there is simply no answer to the question of identity. This seems to be true, for example, in the middle cases of the spectrum thought experiment, of which the following schema is an instance.

A series of biotechnological cell-transplantation operation tonight say of X % of my brain cells (and remaining body cells) are replaced by new, numerically and qualitatively different cells using DNA blueprint, for example, of Albert Einstein as a model. This spectrum though experiment consists of a series of logically possible cases in which the degree of mental connectedness between the two varies from maximal to minimal. At the start of the series, the resultant person would consequently be identical to me as the relations of memory; character, knowledge and so on are nearly maximal in strength and number. Parfit continues “at the end of the series, the mental connection is minimal or zero and the resultant person would therefore not be identical to me, I will have disappeared and he will be a different person, namely Einsteinium: a copy of Einstein that knows all the secrets of the theory of relativity and displays all of Einstein’s other characteristics. Einsteinium cannot be me, for he is a clone of Einstein and hence qualitatively identical with but, of course, numerically different from Einstein”(eg.,cited in Cuypers, 2001,p.40).

However in the main borderline cases of the spectrum, personal identity is conceptually indeterminate. According to the advocate of impersonal theory, in the borderline cases we are faced with a question without content or an empty question (ibid).

> "There would then be no answer to our question. The claim 'This is the same (person)' would be neither true nor false… we would not be puzzled because, without answering this question, we can know everything about what happened. When this is true of some question (of identity), I call this question empty" (Parfit, 1984,p.213).

Parfit here argues that the Impersonal theory of Personal Identity not only has the consequence that the identity question is sometimes empty, but also that the identity question does not matter in the least. That is to say that the question of identity is unimportant. That the question of identity is utterly unimportant and that it is logically possible that mental continuity can be split into two can be reflected on the result of the *reduplication* thought experiment.

> "It is conceivable that two persons tomorrow-call them Sinister and Dexter are mentally continuous with one person today, call him Medius. The DNA blueprint of the dying Medius is tonight the model for the biotechnological construction of two replicas, Sinister and Dester. Or, perhaps more realistically, the mentally symmetrical brain hemispheres of Medius are transplanted tonight in the brainless bodies of Senister and Dexter. Both so–called 'offshoots' remember Medius's personal experiences from the inside and have Medius's character, intentions,

belief, desires and his other mental characteristics. This implies that both Sinister and Dester stand in a relation of mental continuity to Medius" (Cuypers, p. 43).

In this example, according to the advocates of impersonal theory (like radical reducationalist), there is no answer to the identity question after the completion of the reduplication operation. That is a thorough analysis of the 'reduplication thought experiment' that leads to the conclusion that personal identity is not relevant to survival. The core of the impersonal theory is that only mental continuity is important for survival and if the psychological life of the person is totally reduced to the continuity of the mental bundle, then mental continuity, and mental continuity alone, is important for the continued existence-the survival-of the person. From this it follows that personal identity is not real and important matter, but a nominal and trivial one. The metaphysician will however object that there is in principle always an answer to the question of identity, but that debate falls beyond the preview of this thesis.

Parfit is victim of the misconception of 'I' as different from 'one's body'. So despite his rejection of a metaphysical conception of 'self', Parfit remains within the logic of Cartesians. He understands body as a mechanical combination that is, the sum total of chemicals etc. which is accidental and an artificial adjustment. Parfit illustrates this taking help of a scenario: the case of Teletransportation and replication, wherein I enter a Teletransporter that will send me to Mars at the speed of light, as follow:

"When I press the button I shall lose consciousness, and then wake up at what seems a moment later. In fact I shall have been unconscious for about an hour. The Scanner here on Earth will destroy my brain and body,

while recording the exact events of my cells. It will then transmit this information by radio. Traveling at the speed of light, the message will take three minutes to reach the Replicator on Mars. It will be in this body that I shall wake up" (1984,p.199).

Years pass and a new Teletransporter is built which does not destroy my brain and body, but records a blueprint, which is sent to Mars and reassembled in a new body. In fact, now I can even talk to myself on mars. However, the next time I am scanned I suffer fatal damage to my vital organs. My replica is now on Mars in perfect health, but I am dying on Earth. Parfit says that since my replica thinks he is me and remembers everything about my life up to the moment of being scanned, the replica can continue my life.(ibid)

Here Parfit presupposes the existence of particular persons (person does not exist) without imputing experiences to any particular person. Parfit is denying any essential relation between one's experiences being one's own personal identity. It follows from the fact that we can do away with the personal and adopt a wholly impersonal methodology that 'though persons exist, we could give a complete description of reality without claming that persons exist' (ibid, p.212). That is thoughts do not have owners. Experiences are said to be 'mine' (one's own) only in the sense that they occur as part of a particular series of related bodily and psychological events, and this exhausts the meaning of the expression 'mine'. Hence there is no constitutive link between ' self' and identity, or between one's identity and one's body: "I can trace my identity, quite independent of the identity of my body"(ibid, p.189).

On this view, *my self* is merely a manifestation of the speaking position 'I' and the 'I' is nothing but a speaking position. That is, person is just a quirk of language that gives rise to the belief that 'I' has a referent. In the Teletransportation scenario, for example, the replica, equipped with all my memories and dispositions, represents himself to himself as if he were me, and being *as-if me* is sufficient for him to acquire my identity, since there is no entity 'me' anyway: there are only certain events and states continuous in a certain way.

The discussion shows that Parfit is critical of the hypothesis, *a body without mind* and more close to the hypothesis, *a brain without a body*. Numerical identity of one's body is not necessary to identity or to being a person. For identity, all that is required is that there is *a body* in which certain states and events continue to be related in a certain way: 'R-related' (ibid, p.215). Parfit explains R-relatedness by analogy with a club or nation. These organizations can be fully understood, he argues, by understanding the behaviour of their constituents. The same club or nation can be said to continue to exist over time in virtue of these internal relations, despite the arrival and departure of different individual members. Just as we have little trouble referring to Germany or Malaysia despite changes in culture and population, so we refer confidently to the same particular human beings despite dramatic changes in appearance and character without appealing to some unchanging metaphysical entity, the *self* or *person*. His distinction between personal identity and one's body takes as its target a certain notion of belongingness of body to a self, which is modeled on property ownership. He appears to believe that the use of *my* implies a reference to some kind of entity that *owns my thoughts* on the way that a collector owns a painting.

The *having* of my body is, here seen as a purely external relations: a relation between an 'I' and a body. Experience is treated as information stored in the body, which can be extracted and inserted into another body assembled out of fresh matter.[3]Identity may be transferred between any bodies, which are taken as external perspectives. That is, identity can be traced without *my body* and if there is any requirement for a body it is just *a body* in which certain events and states can continue. Body is hereby seen as purely external which *'I' can own*. The suggestion that the meaning of one's experiences and thoughts could be unproblematically dissociated from the body, which articulates them, is founded on a mistaken view of the relationship between self and body. However, Parfit's rejection of the importance of one's own body is tied to his rejection of a physicalist thesis of personal identity.

This denial of the existence of persons and their identity is not incoherent or absurd. The objection*, I am not a series of experiences, but a person that has experience* is interpreted by the reductionalist as a mere grammatical fact. The belief in deeper, underlying and separate person stems from the way in which we talk about persons. Persons- as subjects of experience-exist only in language, not in reality. Only experiences have an actual existence; persons only exist nominally. This means that experiences do not have a personal owner; they just occur in an impersonal universe. 'Pain occurs' expresses what is really going on, whereas 'I have pain' does not. One could say 'it pains' just like one says 'it rains'. In Western philosophy, the same thought can be found in the work of Lichtenberg (1983, p.521):

[3] refer to chapter 2 for Cartesian body as container

> "We only know the existence of our sensations, representations, and thought. One should say, *It thinks*, just as one says *It lightens*. To say *cogito* is already to say too much, as soon as one translates it by *I think*. To bring in, to postulate, the *ego* is a practical need"(cited in Cuypers, p.39)

Parfit suggests that survival is not what is essential to personal identity. He influentially claimed in 'Reasons and Persons (1984)' that what matters to us is not personal identity but psychological continuity**.** The impersonal theory of personal identity is not particular to Western philosophy. It can also be found in ancient Eastern culture, more specifically in Buddhism. To quote Parfit:

> "Buddha has spoken thus: 'O Brethren, actions do exist, and also their consequences, but the person that acts does not. There is no one to cast away this set of elements [actions, experiences] and no one to assume a new set of them. There exists no individual, it is only a conventional name given to a set of elements" (1984, p.502).

To sum up, the hypothetical case 'Two Bodies, Two Minds, One Self'*?* exposed Parfit's view of the problem of personal identity and his main arguments. It is designed to show the unjustifiability of continuity of consciousness as a criterion for personal identity. Usually criterion of continuity is put forward, where numerical identity fails. In such cases an attempt is made on the ground of continuity criterion to retain the possibility of non-strict identity of persons through time. That is, granted that there is no numerical identity of successive stages of single personality, psychological continuity is supposed to be sufficient criterion for asserting non-strict identity.

The peculiarity of Parfit's position was the fact that he applied that case for denying the possibility of positive solution of the problem of personal identity. He concentrates on psychological criterion as opposed to body criterion. But at the same time, he is not denying legitimacy of pragmatics of objective criterion for identifying persons. That is why the logical independence of self-identification from identity supposition works both ways: for the first personal point of view it allows self-identification, which does not presuppose identity from the third-personal view it leaves the space for pragmatics of bodily criterion. At the same time, he tried to compensate the denial of the notion of personal identity with an attempt to broaden and retain the basic positive concepts traditionally based on that notion.

The reductionist idea that persons exist as impersonally as raindrops is directly at odds with out intuitive, common sense conception of the nature of persons. Brains are imagined to be transplanted between human bodies, and the effect on personhood examined in all sorts of thought experiments. However, these modern fairy tales are very different from Locke's version of the fantasy, since it is the centre of consciousness that is relocated, not the brain when Prince and Cobbler exchange minds (centers of conscious) and/or bodies. But the underlying relationship assumed to hold between brains and Persons is either taken to be more or less like that between brains and bodies or not addressed at all. However, it is far from obvious that the brain/person relation is to be taken for granted. Both are 'individuals' in the metaphysical sense that is substances capable of re-identification. However, persons have a location in interpersonal networks consisting of such moral relationships as obligations, rights, duties and so on, networks in which brains as cognitive organs do not, any more than pocket calculators do. On closer

inspection, the impersonal solution to the analytical problem of personal identity ultimately leads to a serious distortion and even complete destruction of the personalist descriptive metaphysics and the personalist moral and emotional reactive attitudes of 'every man of common sense' (Cuypers, p.55). The next section of the chapter makes a critical survey of the serious threat to moral judgment that Parfit's account of personal identity poses.

Some Critical Responses:

Palmer (1999) makes a critical study of the seriously undermines notion of moral commitment that follows Parfit's theory of personal identity. Granting that Parfit's Psychological criteria of personal identity is correct metaphysically, Palmer suggests in his essay that we may have practical reasons, based on our moral concerns, for holding to a more weighty view of the nature of persons. Parfit thinks that since our views about morality and rationality are often based upon our views about personal identity we may also come to change our beliefs about rationality and morality when we become Reductionists. He thus writes, "when we see the truth, we ought to change some of our beliefs about what we have reason to do. We ought to revise our moral theories, and our theories about rationality" (1986, p.ix). However, Parfit thinks that such changes in many cases represent an improvement over what we formally held to be the case when we considered personal identity to be what matters. In this regard Palmer raises the question as to: "whether or not the theories of rationality and morality resulting from Parfit's

views of indeed represent an improvement in the way that he thinks they do over their more common counterparts?"(Palmer, 1999).[4]

To answer this question Palmer examines the implication of Parfits' view of moral commitment such as promise, in term of his personal identity. According to Parfit what matters for our deliberation concerning morality and rationality is not personal identity but rather psychological continuity and connectedness. Personal identity is not at all necessary. What count is the degree of psychological continuity and its connectedness. Taking in this sense, then I may have greater continuity with myself last year than I do to the child I was ten years ago. Once this is taken to be true, Parfit believes that it is not personal identity that carries moral significance but psychological continuity. If so, then when the degree of psychological continuity has changed to a larger extend within a life, we may then no longer hold someone responsible to their former commitments, we might say that, on Parfit's view, we should proportion moral commitment to degrees of R-relatedness.

If we agree with Parfit's view of personal identity then it seems to follow that, it may be right to break promises made in certain past period if there is lack of psychological continuity at the present period about the promise, and it follows that we are not to be bound to uphold any commitment if there is no psychological continuity. Just as someone else cannot commit me to something, so too my former self cannot make commitments on my part. Thus we may need to consider not only the degree on continuity of our own successive selves (the person who made the promise) but also the

[4]see, Daniel E. Palmer, Parfit, the Reductionist View, and Moral Commitment, *Persons and Personal Identity*, http://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/PPer/PPerPalm.htm

degree of continuity that holds for the persons to whom we make our commitments as well.

Parfit thinks that adopting the reductionist view in these matters and "using the language of successive selves, seems both understandable and natural" (ibid, p.327). He provides an example to show why this is so. The example concerns a young Russian with idealistic tendencies who will inherit a large amount of property. Given his present ideals, he intends to give the land to the peasants. But he also knows that people change over time, and that his ideals may fade. In order to prevent this possibility he asks his wife to promise that she will never consent to revoke a legal document that he has signed giving the land away. Parfit thinks that if the man does in fact change later in his life and asks her to revoke the document we would find it perfectly acceptable of her to regard herself as committed to the young man whom he was and thus refuse to be released from her commitments by her present husband. On this view, her husband in his middle ages "is, in some sense, not *he* to whom she is committed" (ibid, p.328). Many of us would agree that for the wife to revoke the document would be to somehow or another betrays her former commitment.

There are other, even clearer, cases in which Parfit's theory seems to provide the right result. Suppose a soldier is captured behind enemy lines. When in captivity, he is tortured severely; beaten, deprived of sleep, sunlight, food and water and so on. Under great duress he finally gives the enemy highly classified information that he had solemnly promised never to release. It may be granted that we would not be inclined to hold the soldier morally blameworthy for breaking his promise in such a situation. On Parfit's

view we could easily claim that this is because his torture was extreme enough to render him weakly R-Related to the young recruit who made that promise.

The third example involves cases in which persons have lost control over their mental faculties to a large degree. Such cases are quite commonly discussed in legal contexts. Without going into great detail, it may be assumed that most of us would agree that our commitments to persons is greatly modified when such persons become, say, mentally disturbed or have been stricken with Alzheimer's disease. Parfit's view provides a natural explanation for why this is so. We may think that our commitments no longer hold towards them in the same way that they previously did because they are now weakly R-Related to the persons whom we originally made our commitment to. Likewise, we would normally not hold the person stricken with Alzheimer's responsible for their former commitments either. It may seem then that Parfit's reductionist view actually provides some positive support and explanatory force for our moral intuitions in certain circumstances.

However, despite the appeal that Parfit's theory might have for us in considering such situations, the results of Parfit's view are actually extremely damaging to our normal conception of moral commitment. Palmer gives the following example to oppose Parfit's view of morality. First, consider the following scenario.

> "Suppose I am a struggling artist, unsure of my own abilities, despondent over my situation, and almost ready to end it all. However, just as I am about to throw myself off the bridge an extremely wealthy investor comes upon me. Taking pity upon me, he offers to use his wealth and influence in order to help my career and to make a name for myself in the more

prominent art circles. In exchange, he only asks that if he is ever in need of a favor that I promise to help him as well. Due to his patronage, I eventually become an extremely successful artist. My works fetch outlandish prices and my presence commands the respect and admiration of high society. However, my patron does not fare so well over the years. Unscrupulous employees bring about his financial ruin, and he is eventually reduced to tatters, living on the streets from hand to mouth. One day while walking with friends in the park, my former patron sees me and asks me to remain true to my former promise to help him if he should ever need it. We would all, think it morally repugnant of the me to refuse to honor my commitment" (Palmer, 1999)[5].

On Parfit's account there are two reasons for thinking that this will not be the case. First, the successful and wealthy artist that I have become is surely very weakly R-Related to that starving and despondent wreck who was about to kill himself so many years ago. Likewise, the decrepit tramp before me now bears little continuity to the commanding and prosperous investor that I made my promise to on that day. Thus, on Parfit's account, "e could reasonably claim that neither myself nor my former patrons are the same selves as those involved in the establishment of the commitment. I thus have no special moral obligation to the person before me"[6].

According to Parfit, we should weigh promises and other commitments in relation to degrees of R-Relations that can range over multiple selves, each individual life can be

[5] see, Daniel E. Palmer, Parfit, the Reductionist View, and Moral Commitment, *Persons and Personal Identity*, http://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/PPer/PPerPalm.htm
[6] http://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/PPer/PPerPalm.htm

thought of as a series of successive selves, and the psychological continuity and connectedness that matters always comes in degrees. The problem is whether, given all these factors, we can even make sense of the idea of a commitment or a promise. In effect, as soon as they are made their force begins to weaken on Parfit's view since R-Relations are arguably always degenerate. Theoretically, their scope could be infinite: after all one could indefinitely reduplicate oneself being committed to countless generations of oneself. The results of Parfit's view are not only counterintuitive, but that his theory would make it impossible to construct any general principles concerning the nature and scope of one's commitments.

Following Parfit's suggestions concerning the implications of the metaphysics of persons for issues of rationality and morality, there is need for a more radical reconsideration of many of our basic assumptions concerning our commitments and the range of their applicability. According to Palmer, the force of a promise holds precisely in so far as we suppose that it will hold through various changes in psychological character and secondly, common sense would maintain that commitments are to practically hold over us that cannot be supposed to change their degree of strength over time. Hence Palmer maintains that common moral deliberation presupposes that promises and other commitments cannot be degenerate in the way that Parfit's view entails that they are.

The history of personal identity is classified by Parfit as ego theory of the Descartian model and the bundle theory of Humean model. The former is also called the ownership theory and the latter no-ownership theory of the self. Both in the bottom level falls under the doctrine of atomistic self (or personal identity). Ontologically, both

atomize the self either to macro or micro atoms in the physical as well as psychological sense; Descartes in terms of macro atoms, or self in spiritual atom and Hume's bundle theories in terms of micro atom or mental atom. Both kinds of atoms structurally fall under the same category of psychological substance as Russell himself surprisingly remarks:

> "…particulars have this peculiarity …that each of them stands alone and is completely self-subsistent …except that it usually persists through a very short time, so far as our experience goes" (1918, pp.201-202).

The self-subsistent and static character of the self and the experience enable the two to exist separately from one another- that is the self on the one hand and experience on the other. Both theories are grounded on the first person inner experience of the self. The epistemic search for cognitive certainty following Descartes' methodology, straightforwardly gives rise to the privileged position of the first-person or in the word of Russell 'singular' (1912, p.7-8). The atomic theory considers the inner I as immediate, incorrigible and self evident knowledge as opposed to the mediate, fallible and hypothetical knowledge of other minds and external world. Even his body is taken on par with all other external objects in that it can be known only indirectly and therefore drops out as constitutive factor of his identity. Thus all knowledge is grounded in the special and privileged access of the first person to his own inner mind .In order words it is a theory of self-knowledge.

Cuypers mentions Mctaggart as the contemporary follower of Cartesian atomism and Russell as exponent of Humean atomism. Russell agrees with Hume's claims that "I never catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe any thing but

the perception" (Hume, 1739, 162; compare Russell, 1914,p.164). While the ego theories or the ownership theories can observe his experience, the bundle theories can only sight of his experience. But at the bottom, both the theories of personal identity are based on the inner eye of the person that is the self behind the skin. Cuypers makes two important consequences of the atomistic investigation of personal identity that directly follows from its methodological solipsism. First, the problem of certainty of one's own identity leads to non-social identity, as Shoemaker would say "the identity of the person considered in isolation"(1963, p.165). The private non-social self assumes an epistemic asymmetry between the knowledge of one's own mind and the knowledge of Other mind because other person or other mind can be reached only indirectly or if at all by *argument from analogy*. The argument from analogy holds that the connection between the other person's bodily behaviour and his mental states are presumed to be analogous to the connections between *my own* mental states an *my outward behaviour.*

The second problem with such private self-portrait, atomistic doctrine of personal identity is that nothing except the mind to the first person is responsible for the identity of the problem. That is, it is a problem of self-identity. Since *my experience* is immediate and direct, for example to say, 'I am in pain' is sufficient and logically prior to any attempts at the other- ascription of experience like for example, 'He is in pain'. The first person can ascribe experience to the third person experience on the basis of bodily signs of which he knows from his own case that they correlate with the experiences in question.

Foundationalism occupies the central position in the atomistic inquiry into the nature of personal identity. Foundaiotnlism tries to justify not only our non-basic beliefs about the external world, but also the basic beliefs about ourselves. As the atomistic

theory of personal identity is grounded on the perceptual model of self-knowledge, it presupposes the epistemological notion of *acquaintance by introspection* (Russell, 1912, p.26-28). The dethronmenation of the introspective self-knowledge can show the radical inadequacy and untenable notion of atomistic nature of personal identity that can crumble the same theory.

Traditionally the epistemological doctrine of introspection has always been an explicit ingredient of the dualist ego theory. According to the dualist, the self is the primary object of introspection because experiences are only modifications of the self. Sensation, feeling and the like have no independent existence; the self, the experiencer, owns all experience. This principle of ownership claims that all introspective acquaintance for example, a toothache, automatically involves introspective acquaintance with the self, which has a toothache. Chisholm argues the self perceives itself when the self perceives or feels a toothache (1976, p.52).

The denial of introspection dates back to Hume and the tenet of empiricist and thus logical atomistic theories of personal identity (of Parfit). However, the doctrine of introspection has much more implicit and central importance even to the materialist bundle theory. According to the empiricist and also the logical atomist, the experience of sensation, feeling, and the like are the only objects of introspection in their own right. According to Lyons (1986), the process of introspection for the empiricist thought without any ownership of the experience by the self, can still be naturalized as a brain process involving a brain scanner or mechanized as a computer process involving a control module, both of which are compatible with the materialist picture of the whole, (pp.47-890). Hence both the denial of the self or the mechanization of introspection falls

under the same category, the category of the fully impersonal analysis of experience and thereby perceiving only of the inner eye.

Now, if introspection (inner sense) is thought of on the model of perception (outer sense), then it is to be expected that the fundamental characteristics of perception are transferable to its introspective counterpart. However, under painstaking scrutiny, Shoemaker pointed out that, introspection eventually lacks the essential properties of perception and consequently the modeling of introspection on perception is idle (1986). Sense perception certainly involves certain phenomenology- characteristic way of appearing to the subject (McGinn, 1982, p.8). Sense impressions are at least partially constituted by their qualitative content; like *what it is like to feel pain* defines the experience as pain .In the course of experiencing pain, one can also define the feeling of pain as opposed to feeling say of pleasure or anger. However Shoemaker pointed out that, in the case of introspection there is nothing that corresponds to the phenomenal character of perception (1986, pp.19-20). That is because introspective acquaintance has no phenomenology of its own. There are no such things as, feeling of the feeling of pain. But if such thing existed namely the feeling of the feeling of pain, then it consequently follows that this second order phenomenology, (the first order here is the feeling of pain) could in principle be radically different from the first-order phenomenology in the same way as feeling of pain is different from feeling of pleasure. Hence the analogy between introspection and perception is a false analogy.

Another reason for dethronemeting introspection is based on the causal relation between the perceived object and the perception. McGinn (1982, pp.40-41) holds that the concept perception is always a causal concept. Infact the causal concept is the basis for

distinguishing genuine perception from hallucination. However McGinn (pp.51-52) argues that in introspection, there is no point in transferring the necessary causal aspect of the perceptual relation because there can be no sensible distinction made between genuine introspective perception – that is object presented, and an introspective hallucination- that is object absent. This is because all introspective experience (second order) necessary takes experience (first order) as objects. In the word of Cuypers, all introspective experiences cannot fail to be introspective perceptions (p.66). Cuypers attempted to provide a therapy of this epistemic presupposition of the doctrine of introspection by taking aid of Strawson's doctrine of descriptive metaphysic that describes the actual structure of our thought, both the subject of experiences (the person) and the experience themselves.

The Contemporary scene:

Contemporary discussion on 'person' was initiated by Sir Peter Frederick Strawson's celebrates essay 'Person'. Champion of both the richness of ordinary language and of natural beliefs, Stawson's philosophy is close to the common sense view. He criticised Bertrand Russell's renowned 'Theory of Descriptions' for failing to do justice to the richness of ordinary language. Strawson's 'On Referring', published in *Mind* in 1950, was an attack on Russell's *On Denoting* (1905). The latter had claimed that any sentence referring to non-existent or contradictory entities (such as unicorns, round squares, or the king of France) can be logically analysed into an assertion that a particular thing exists and has certain properties - the sentence turns out to be simply false. But Strawson argued that sentences are not in themselves true or false, simply meaningful; it is the statements that they are used to make that are true or false. 'The King of France is

wise' could have been used to make a true or a false statement during the years of the French monarchy, but after France became a republic, the sentence 'The King of France is wise' used in a fairy story, historical legend, or joke, did not give rise to a question of truth or falsity.

Strawson said Russell had failed to distinguish between a sentence and a statement, and had confused referring or mentioning with meaning. Merely by implying that someone existed, Russell had presupposed his existence. He had distorted the nature of how *we actually use and understand* language in an attempt to squash its complexity into uniform usage. Strawson had struck a blow for ordinary language logic. Formal logic he considered "an indispensable tool indeed for clarifying much of our thought, but not, as some are tempted to suppose, the unique and sufficient key to the functioning of language and thought in general"(cited in O'Grady, 2006)[7]. When his erstwhile tutor Paul Grice declared, "If you can't put it in symbols, it's not worth saying," Strawson retorted: "If you can put it in symbols, it's not worth saying"(ibid). Even more than Hume, Kant and Wittgenstein, Strawson insisted on the richness and ineluctability of ordinary language and natural beliefs.

Having approached philosophy without any large general plan of campaign, but with the aim of elucidating particular concepts, Strawson subtitled his work 'Individuals (1959)', an essay in descriptive metaphysics. He did not aim to replace our overall view of the world, as would a revisionary metaphysician such as Descartes or Leibnitz do. Strawson sought to exhibit general and structural features of the conceptual scheme in terms of which we think about particular things. In 'Individuals' and 'The Bounds of

[7] O'Grady, Jane, Sir Peter Strawson, in The Guardian
http://www.guardian.co.uk/obituaries/story/0,,1709718,00.html

Sense (1966)', he sought to give a rational account of beliefs "stubbornly held ... at a primitive level of reflection"; these, even if rejected, or apparently rejected, by philosophers "at a more sophisticated level of reflection", are what we are all 'naturally and inescapably committed to"(ibid, 2006). From meticulous analysis of how humans actually describe the world, Strawson spun what he called 'descriptive metaphysics' at a time when metaphysics was anathema, and so helped transform the strictures of positivism and linguistic analysis into the more comprehensive and metaphysical philosophy of the 1960s.

Persons, according to Strawson, are those basic particulars to which we ascribe consciousness. Persons constitute a fundamental and irreducible kind of being. Persons are credited with *physical characteristics*, designating location, attitude, relatively enduring characteristics like height, colouring, shape and weight on the one hand and various *states of consciousness* like thinking, remembering, seeing, deciding, feeling emotions etc- on the other. Using the thought-experiment of a world composed entirely of sounds, Strawson argued that the most basic particular things could be neither sense experiences, as proposed by traditional empiricism, nor atomic particles, as in science, nor events or processes, since none of these can easily be re-identified or even identified. He claimed that material bodies are primitive in our conceptual scheme, as are persons, to whom both states of consciousness and corporeal characteristics are equally applicable.

Thus, in Strawson's ontology of particulars, both the material bodies and persons, share equal status. How these two sorts of attributes are related to each other and why they are attributed to the very same thing, are the two questions Strawson discusses in the third chapter of the 'Individuals'. Two possible attempts to meet these problems,

according to Strawson, are Cartesianism and what he calls *"no-ownership"* or *"no-subject" doctrine of the self* (1959, pp.94-95). Strawson examines and rejects both of them and proposes to acknowledge the concept of person as primitive. He tries to establish a new theory of person, by treating the two views as the thesis and the antithesis and tries to synthesize the two in his theory of person. For Strawson, the material bodies and persons (which have material bodies), occupy the central position in this scheme. So his account of a person, which can also be viewed as an attempted solution to the traditional problem of the relation between mind and body, is presented as a category of basic particulars.

Strawson's first principle of descriptive metaphysics was the challenge to the no-ownership doctrines of the self that is the bundle theory or logical atomism (ibid, pp.96-97). To the no-ownership theorist experiences are not owned by anything except in the dubious sense of being causally dependent on the state of a particular body. Since this causal dependence is not a contingent or logically transferable matter, it follows that we can own nothing, because owning presupposes causal dependence upon the state of some particular body that is transferable, is incoherent according to Strawson. The theorist denies the existence of the sense of possession but is forced to make use of it when trying to deny its existence. This is contradictory. Strawson argues that any attempt to eliminate the 'my' (or any possessive expression) or for example, *my experience* or *my headache* etc. would yield something that is not a contingent fact at all. It is simply wrong to state that all experiences are causally dependent on the state of a single body. But the theorist cannot consistently argue that 'all experiences of person P means the same thing as all

experiences of a certain body B', for then the proposition would not be contingent, as his theory requires, but analytic.

Cuypers comments, "With *my experience* Strawson means a certain class of experiences and this class of experiences is the experiences of a person. It is the sense of this *my* and of that he requires to deny. He cannot successfully deny that, because being *my* experience is – for the experience in question - no contingent matter but necessary. That *my* headache is – for the headache – no contingent matter. This does not mean that his first principle is synonymous with that of Cartesian ownership of experience. Surely, Strawson, like the Cartesian philosophers, subscribes to the principle of the ownership of experience, reserve the place of he subject for the bodily person whose individuation and re –identification pose no special theoretical problems in our single unified spatio-temporal system of identification" (p.69).

The second fundamental principle of a descriptive metaphysics of the person goes against the Cartesianian view of person. Cartesianism, speaks of a person as really referring to one or both of two distinct substances mind/ body of different types, each of which has its own appropriate types of states and properties. States of consciousness belong to one of these substances and not to the other. Strawson rejects this theory because, for him, "The concept of the pure individual consciousness – the pure ego – is a concept that cannot exist; or at least, cannot exist as a primary concept in terms of which the concept of a person can be explained or analyzed. It can exist only, if at all, as a secondary, non-primitive concept, which itself is to be explained, analyzed in terms of a person" (1959, p.102). Against the Descartes-inspired notion that a person is *an embodied anima*, Strawson argued that we do not begin from our own consciousness and

work outwards, but the reverse - it is a necessary condition of one's ascribing states of consciousness, experiences, to oneself that one should also ascribe them, or be prepared to ascribe them, to others who are not oneself.

Strawson went on to argue that kinds of mental stated for example, pain cannot even in principle be ascribed to oneself without the possibility of ascribing them to others. In order to make possible the self-ascription of experience for example *I am in pain*, other ascription of experiences is just the same sense for example, must be logically possible. To quote Krpke, "Although Strawson does not give any independent argument for this principles; he is clearly steering the typically Wittgenstenian middles course between solipsism and behaviorism (1959, pp.106-108). This can be considered a one of the main conclusion of Wittgenstein's anti-private language argument" (Kripke, 1982, pp.114-45).

To be the subject of a predication, something must be identified. Identification always presupposes location in space-time. Cartesian Egos cannot be located in space-time; only bodies can be located spatio-temporally. So predicating a state of consciousness to an Ego presupposes that the state must be predicated to a subject, which is a material body. The same argument can be used for Strawson's criticism against both Cartesian and bundle theory of person that gives importance to mind which is only contingently linked with a particular body. The argument is also in line even with the radial materialistic empiricist that adhere to soft dualism in that they require only an appropriate body to superveneint the bundle of experience and that can very well change from one particular functional mental continuity between the different substrata.

That the concept of person is neither reducible to body nor to mind also implies two importance aspects: namely the significant of the animal identity or in other word the bodily identity of the person and secondly, the significance of the psychological unity in conceiving a person. The view that bodily identity is animal identity is always a necessary condition of personal identity goes back to Bernand William's non-standard corporeal theory of personal identity (1973, pp.1-81). This implies that the identity of a person depends on the continuity of one's own body that is body in the unitary spatio-temporal framework. However this bodily concept is not to be understood in terms of Cartesian, Aristotelian concept of a living human organism, as re-vitalized by Wiggins. The essential bodily aspect of personal identity does not so much depend upon the identity of a lump or other quantity of matter' but rather need on the spatio-temporal and causal continuity of personal body. Such view is termed as analytical psychological personalism by Cuypers that is empathically different from mere animalism. According to the animalism, "I am my body; I am just a living human organism which began to exist as single cell a zygote and which will go on existing until its biological death" (Snowdon: 1990; Thomas: 1998; Olson: 1997, cited in Cuypers, p. 77) The animalism concept of bodily identify differed from the analytical personalism of the bodily identity in the sense when we claim that *person is his body*, the animalism refers *is* of identity, whereas analytical personalism refers the *is* of constitution. By using *is* as constitutive, analytical personalism creates the necessary conceptual space to hold that persons transcend their bodies (ibid).

Supposing this argument to be valid, the principle rules out the possibility of solipsistic self-ascription of experience, while at the same time establishing social self-

ascription as the only viable option. The principles institute a semantic symmetry between the case of oneself and others. The first person use of experiential terms would not ask sense without the third person use of those terms. The privileged position abscised to the atomistic theory of personal identify is overthrown and replaced by the third person. This becomes the hallmark of a descriptive metaphysic of the person.

To the theory that mental states are no more than brain states, Strawson responded in 'Scepticism and Naturalism' (1985) "we have no genuine practical use for the concept of [mind-brain] identity here" (ibid.). He would have no truck with the voguish idea that talk of feelings, thoughts and mental life is merely an atavistic theory, which will be superseded by neuroscience. He sarcastically retorted that what materialists disparagingly term folk psychology is "the province of such simple folk as Shakespeare, Tolstoy, Proust and Henry James"(ibid).

To get out of these difficulties, Strawson suggests acknowledging the concept of person as primitive, that is, as a concept that cannot be analyzed further in a certain way or another. That means: "the concept of person is the concept of a type of entity, such that both predicates ascribing states of consciousness and predicates ascribing corporeal characteristics, a physical situation and consciousness are equally applicable to a single individual of that single type" (1959, pp.101-102). The states of consciousness cannot be ascribed at all, unless they are ascribed to persons (in Strawson's sense). It is to this concept of person, not to the pure ego, that the personal pronoun *I* refer. Thus the concept of a person is logically prior to that of an individual consciousness.

Strawson names the predicates ascribing corporeal physical characteristics, M-predicates and those ascribing states of consciousness, P-predicates. All P-predicates may not be said to be ascribing states of consciousness but they all imply the possession of consciousness on the part of that to which they are ascribed. P-predicates are essentially both self ascribable and other-ascribable. One ascribes P-predicates to others on the strength of observation of their behavior, but to oneself, not on the behavior criteria. It is because of the special nature of the P-predicates, or of a class of P-predicates. To learn their use is to learn both the aspects of their use. We speak of *behaving in a depressed way* and of *feeling depressed*. Feelings can only be felt not to have the concept like 'X's depression', the concept must cover both what is felt by X and what is observed by others. "It is not that these predicates have two kinds of meaning. Rather, it is essential to the single kind of meaning that they do have, that both ways of ascribing them should be perfectly in order"(ibid, p.110).

The concept of Person is logically prior to both mind and body. The later are secondary, non-primitive concepts, which are to be analyzed in terms of the primary, primitive concept of a Person. Thus a living human body always presents itself as a personal body and conscious mind always as a personal mind. Since a person had both a bodily aspect and a mental aspect, he can appear either as a bodily person or as a *minded* person, according to which of these aspects is emphasized. There are two implications that follow from his concept of Person. First is the irreducible of person either as mind or body and so the concept of Person as an *agent*.

But though bodily identity is a necessary but it is not sufficient condition of personal identity. Strawson developed the concept of a persona as dynamic agent related

to the public world that is over and above the bodily identity. As constituted by a living organism, a person exhibits a particular mode of activity that marks him off as an agent. It is the intentional agency that distinguishes man from other animals. Hence the second principle is the *reactive attitude and feeling* of person. That the concept of person is irreducible is supported by the claim of person as an agent. Person as an agent draws attention to the fact that action presupposes logically primitive character of its own. For example, an action of writing a letter involves both an intention to act and a bodily movement without the action being reducible to either aspect or to a combination of both. Just as the concept of action is unanalysable, it become intelligible why the concept of the center of agency that is the person should be unanalysable as well.

The primitive concept of person embedded in it the concept of reactive attitude and feeling to which we ourselves are prone to (1962, p.6) It may be mentioned here that Strawson's ideas of reactive attitudes and feeling s very similar to Wittgenstein's ideas of an attitude towards a soul (Cockburn, 1990, p.3-52). According to Strawson, we simply do not act, and act on each other, but also react to each other in accordance with a common human nature. Such reactive attitude is primitive in the sense that it is not founded on any belief about the inner constitution of the person. Strawson is referring here to the moral and emotional reaction that comes out of us immediately without any prior reflection of the bodily aspect of the other person. In other word, we react instinctively to one another. This instinctive reaction is what is mean by the primitive concept of a person. Correspondingly Strawsonian personal identity necessarily comprises agential identity besides bodily identity.

According to Cuypers, the best account for intentional agency in contemporary analytical thought is given by Donald Davidson (1980). According to Davidson's causal theory of action, a bodily movement is an action if and only if the movement is appropriately caused by beliefs and desires (P-predicates with prepositional content or propositional attitudes). Both Strawson and Davidson interpreted actions in terms of propositional attitudes from the *third person* standpoint. That is in the light of rationalization principles; those attitudes should be ascribed to the agent as to provide good reasons for his actions. According to Cuypers, Strawsonian and Davidsonian intentional agency is directed to agential identity, wherein attitudes and actions are intrinsically unified in virtue of the holistic rationalization principle (2001, pp.78-79). That is in other word, attitudes and actions cannot be identified atomisticaly, on their own, cut off from other attitudes and actions. For instance, if I form the intention to do something in the near future, them my intention is only rationally intelligible if it is a part of a diachronic network of other intentions, beliefs, desires and other prepositional attitudes. Of course the capacity agency depends upon the powers of self-conscious or reflective employment of the intellect, will and memory in producing the actions that owns responsible for the subjective sense of agential identity and the person's ownership of a particular body.

Ayer (1963) and Madell (1976) agree with this view of reflective agential as well as bodily identity in constituting that fact that I produce these bodily movements and the fact that this moving body is my body. Hence Cuypers conclude that the bodily identity determines personal identity from *the outside* or third–person perspectives, agential identity determines it from *the inside* or first-person perspective. In addition first person

provide self-consciousness and memory that makes possible a continuous and immediate presentation of the person to himself. This immediate and continuous self-presence makes self-identification superfluous.

Both agential identities with basic bodily identity not only determine the nature of personal identity, but also establish its importance. Hence the importance of Strawsonian personal identity stems from the identity of the person as a rational and moral agent. Personal identity according to analytic personalism, is constituted by agential and by implication to bodily identity that consist in the narrative unity of the actions of a rational and moral agent in a social setting within a historical traditions (Cuypers, pp.73-81). For Cuypers, the analytical personalism along the line appears to be true, unless we are willing to acquiesce in the dualistic dissolution of our psychological unified nature or even worse, in the empiricist elimination of the significant role of our identity in common practices.

In sum, the portrait of the person, which emerges from Strawson's descriptive metaphysics, pictures the person as a *bodily, public and dynamic agent* who engaged with other persons in the world. This portrait of the person replaces the atomistic self, and the moral agent enters on the scene as a commonsensical reality, where morality will be understood more or less in common sense understanding of the term (that will be contrary to Parfit's doctrine of morality). In 'The Bounds of Sense', a scholarly exposition of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, Strawson used what remained fruitful in Kant to investigate further the "limits to what we can conceive of, or make intelligible to ourselves, as a possible general structure of experience" (O'Grady, 2006)[8]. By using a

[8] ibid 6

Kant-type transcendental argument, his classic 'Freedom and Resentment' (1962) contested that it is impossible in practice to believe in determinism, whatever the philosophical arguments for it. Strawson claimed that human relationships necessarily presuppose that our actions are done out of free will, are seen as revealing kindness, malevolence or indifference, and merit responses such as resentment, forgiveness and gratitude. He conceded that it was possible occasionally to suspend these *normal participant reactive attitudes* for the objective attitude by which we see small children or the psychologically abnormal as exempt from moral responsibility or censure (and, in the worst cases, as objects to be tolerated and controlled). But the reactive attitudes are *too thorough going and deeply rooted*, too essential for inter-personal connectedness, to be suspended wholesale, so that it is useless to ask whether it would not be rational for us to do what it is not in our nature to (be able to) do.

Criticism:

Strawson in his *Individuals* states that:

> "it is ..a conceptual truth…that persons have material bodies" ….. that the concept of a person is "primitive" i.e., that " we are not …to think of it as a secondary kind of entity in relation to two primary kinds *viz*, a particular consciousness and a particular human body"(1959, pp.104-105).

Strawson's notion that *a living human body always presents itself as a personal body and conscious mind always as a personal mind* is criticized by C.B.Martin. To quote Martin:

> "The body of a person is six feet tall and weighed 180 pounds. It seems a needles duplication of effort to say that the person possessing the body

> also is six feet tall and weights 180 pounds. The consciousness of a person is in some conscious state. It seems a needless duplication of effort to say that the person possessing the consciousness is also in that mental state. Indeed, this duplication of effort seems not only needless, but incomprehensible. Surely the physical and conscious state predicates that apply to the person…apply simply in virtue of the fact that they apply to the body and consciousness that (He) possesses otherwise, it would be an incomprehensible coincidence"(cited in Burstein, 1971, p. 449)

If a person is a primary kind of entity which is not to be thought of " as a …compound of two kinds of substance: a subject of experiences (a pure consciousness, an ego) on the one hand and a subject of corporeal attributes on the other" (Strawson, 1959, p.102), then predicate ascribing states of consciousness and predicates ascribing corporeal attributes must be thought of as being applicable to a person himself. If corporal attributes are ascribable to a person himself as well as to the material body which it is a conceptual truth that he possesses it can be said of both for example, John Smith and his body that they have the identical corporeal attributes of occupying a certain spatio-temporal position. Martin argued there is ground for questioning whether it can be said of both John Smith and a material body that they occupy the same place at the same time.

In order to avoid the difficulty noted by Martin, Strawson either must abandon the view that the concept of a person is primitive or he must abandon the view that it is a conceptual truth that a person has a material body. Since he rejects a dualistic analysis of the concept of a person in terms of a body and consciousness, he would not be likely to

follow Matins' suggestion and abandon the view that the concept of a person is primitive. But he perhaps might consider abandoning the view that the concept of a person is that of an entity which has a material body. A person's consciousness, for Strawson, is not an independently identifiable particular, so why could it not be the case that a person's body also is not an independently identifiable particular?

Francis Alakkalkunnel and Christian Kanzian, (2002) make a critical examination of Strawson's theory of person, in their essay *Strawsons Concept of Person – A Critical Discussion*.[9] They argued that Strawson's theory of persons does not meet at least some important aspects of the mind-body problem, although he explicitly pretends to deal with it. His attempt has resulted not in solving the problem, but in escaping it or explaining it away. Francis and Kanzian argued that what Strawson does is only to suggest that there is no problem with the concept of person, so to say, if you consider it like this, that is to say, if you consider the concept in a non-Cartesian and non-physicalistic way, the problem vanishes. In other words, his suggestion to consider the concept of person as primitive does not solve the traditional problem of the relation between mind and body, ontologically considered. So he offers only a conceptual solution to a real problem. And it is the real problem with which philosophers of mind deal with, especially under the influence of modern neurosciences. For instance Strawson's conceptual analysis cannot cover problems in the context of questions concerning mental causation. How should we explain the causal relevance of mental states in the physical world in a Strawsonian way?

In addition to the above-mentioned general semantic problem, even in our ordinary language, the concept of Person, cannot be further analysed. As long as we can

[9] http://sammelpunkt.philo.at:8080/archive/00001349/01/alakka.pdf

conceptually distinguish between M-predicates and P-predicates of persons, are we not analyzing Person? As long as we speak of persons as, for instance, having intentions or making experiences, and of persons as having physical properties like weight or shape or something like that, are we not analyzing them? Furthermore the key idea of ascription of M- predicates and P-predicates are, to be reconsidered. To ascribe is to consider as belonging to. 'Belonging to' can be understood at least in two senses. In the first sense, as we think Strawson does, M-predicates and P-predicates are ascribed to persons, as a kind of underlying substratum of these predicates. In the second sense, one might take it in a more 'Russellian' or 'tropist' way, that is Persons, so to say, as made of M-predicates and P-predicates or properties. In the first Aristotelean sense persons are real subjects of properties; in the second sense persons are a kind of sum total or bundle of properties. Strawson, as a theorist following the first way, must presuppose, that there is, necessarily, something that already exists, before you ascribe M-or P-predicates to it. But: if the concept of person has to be primitive, as Strawsons theory requires, it should not be able to refer to something which exists, at least conceptually, without M-predicates and P-predicates.

Another aspect of criticism may be that Strawson's criteria can be applied to other living beings like animals (perhaps to plants and trees) too, without any modifications. At least a big class of P-predicates can be applied to any sort of animals. No doubt, animals also have experiences; they too feel pain and so on. Even the behavior of plants can be interpreted in a vocabulary using P-predicates. If this is the case, how does Strawson distinguish between animals and plants on the one hand and human persons on the other, if at all he distinguishes? Or does he intend to raise animals and plants to the level of

human beings and to credit them too with personhood? How to argue for this rather radical thesis? These and some similar questions are left open from Strawsons treatment of the concept of persons. One has to admit that Strawson actually does not discuss this question whether animals can be ascribed the status of persons at all. Of course, he shouldn't be accused of what he doesn't deal with, but doing systematic philosophy we think we are to point it out.

In this context it is also worth mentioning that it is difficult to distinguish between Strawson's concept of a person and the concept of a human being, understood as the concept of a member of a biological species. Obviously the concept of a human being can also be analyzed in terms of M-and P-predicates. Is Strawson of the opinion that there should not be such a distinction at all? – then he is confronted with all the problems concerning the traditional concept of persons, which takes Person as synonymous with member of the species of human beings. We just want to call to mind arguments from authors in the field of artificial intelligence research, who regard it as a kind of racism to exclude all sorts of computers or robots from personhood because of conceptual reasons.

To sum up it can be mentioned, that Strawson's theory may be seen as a conclusive theory of the concept Person. However, it cannot solve the main problems of a philosophy of personality or personhood as they are discussed nowadays in philosophy. It is an open question whether we can reformulate Strawson's theory or we must refute it altogether. At any rate we can come to the conclusion that it is short-handed to be applied to a modern theory of personality without more detailed considerations. Strawson's own claims for a special kind of non-Cartesian, non-Rylean conception of self-knowledge is still, no doubt, an epistemological notion in some minimal, seriously under question.

Whatever epistemological significance it has is entirely derivative, it rides entirely piggyback on considerations in moral philosophy. And in epistemology proper, self-knowledge only remains as the last peel of an onion. Nevertheless, Strawson's view of person contributed a richness and abundance of the ideas and images that brings to bear on the question of personal identity.

Apart from the theories of Parfit and Peter Strawson there are other philosophical explorations made in this regard that drew inspiration from Lockean understanding of personal identity, which the present Thesis has failed to incorporate due to space constrain. Otherwise it could have made an interesting observation of different contemporary theories of disembodied existence that have understood and interpreted Locke's theory of ideas from varied perspectives. For example, the red colour of an apple is a quality of the apple, experienced by a human being as a red hue, which, in Locke's terminology, is an idea. Qualities of things cause ideas in people. But it would be wrong to interpret Locke's view as an example of the distinction between what is public, perceivable by anyone, and what is private, perceived by only one person, and to match the former to qualities and the latter to ideas. This assimilation would suggest that there are two realms of the perceptible, the public realm in which there are beings perceivable by anyone, and many private realms, one for each person, in which there are beings perceivable only by the person whose private realm they inhabit.

What is the metaphysical status of the quality 'red', correlative to the idea of red, in the thing? It is not an occurrent property but a power. A red thing has the power to

induce a red idea in a person. It seems that *Chalmer's zombie argument* [10] works in a very similar way to the overall thrust of Locke's analysis. According to Chalmers it just is logically conceivable that there should be two qualitatively identical material entities, each of which fulfilled the biological requirements for being the body of a living human being, but only one of which had an 'inner life', private experiences, 'Lockean ideas'. This is as much as to say that there is no necessity that ties together the material grounding of, say, the human perceptual system, and the power it might have to induce ideas.

The prime objective of the thesis is to attempt a model for an interactive perspective on the bodily origins of the mind. Accordingly, the thesis seeks to propose that from the beginning of life infant experience occurs in interactions. Because the mental and physical aspects of infant's experience are initially not differentiated, these interactions are absolutely body-bound. However, before proceeding into an account of persons that safeguards this relational nature of 'persons' the thesis needs to address the possibility of 'humanoid robotics', the possibility of creating non-DNA based intelligent entities that might serve as substitutes to natural embodied persons. If such experimental research is to lead to super intelligent AI (artificial Intelligence) entities interacting with humans in the real world, then they will require some sort of body and mobility. This leads to the research question, which gave impetus to the present chapter and the chapter

[10] The zombie argument against physicalism in general was most famously developed in detail by David Chalmers in *The Conscious Mind* (1996). According to Chalmers, one can coherently conceive of an entire *zombie world*: a world physically indiscernible from our world, but entirely lacking conscious experience. In such a world, the counterpart of every being that is conscious in *our* world would be a p-zombie.
zombie argument, such as Chalmers, think that conceptual analysis is a central part of (if not the only part of) philosophy, and that it certainly can do a great deal of philosophical work. However, others, such as Dennett, Paul Churchland, W.V.O. Quine and so on, have fundamentally different views from Chalmers about the nature and scope of philosophical analysis. For this reason discussion of the zombie argument remains vigorous in philosophy. See, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie

that follows this: ‘is disembodied consciousness a viable option?’ The following chapter *Mechanised Bodies or Embodied Persons*, is a further exploration in this regard.

Chapter 4

Mechanised Bodies or Embodied Persons?

Artificial Intelligence, Cyborg and Transhuman

As it is shown in the previous chapter there has been a large fascination among philosophers for transcending the limitations of our natural body that was also inspired by different versions of mind body dualism that have led to ontological real distinction between the mind and the body. However, the idea of a non physical mind that lies outside the world of physical sciences is now rejected in favor of a Physicalistic or Naturalistic account of Cartesian dualism. In contemporary philosophy physicalism is most frequently associated with Philosophy of Mind, in particular the mind/body problem, in which it holds that the mind is a physical thing in some sense. Physicalism has evolved with the physical sciences to incorporate far more sophisticated notions of physicality than matter, for example wave/particle relationships and unseen, non-material forces. Some philosophers use the term "materialism" to denote descriptions based on the motions of matter and 'physicalism' for descriptions based on matter and world geometry (see. Stoljar, 2001)[1].

The ontology of physicalism ultimately includes whatever is described by physics, not just matter but energy, space, time, physical forces, structure, physical processes, information, state etc. Without the completeness of physics, there is no compelling reason to identify the mind with the brain and once the completeness of physics became part of established science, scientifically informed philosophers realised

[1] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Physicalism

that this crucial premise could be slotted into the various alternative versions of the causal argument for physicalism. This is not to suggest that the argument for physicalism is uncontroversial but to urge that physicalism deserves to be taken seriously. This is truly supposed by a number of the most influential of late twentieth-century analytic philosophers (Hempel, 1942; Ayer, 1969; Dray, 1957; Winch, 1958; Feigl, 1958; Place, 1956; Smart, 1959; Armstrong, 1968; Davidson, 1963, 1970; Lewis, 1966; Putnam, 1960). Of course, there are those, like Stephen Clark, who think, "no one could seriously, rationally suppose" that empirical considerations could possibly yield a disproof of mind-body dualism (cited in Papineau)[2].

One reason for the support of physicalism by the growing success of the sciences lies in its ability in closing explanatory gaps in our understanding of the world by addressing the problem of how to give a plausible account of the relation between scientific and other sorts of truth. It is a challenge for all varieties of metaphysics and unlike most other theories of being *qua* being, physicalism is meant to be criticisable by way of observational testing. According to contemporary physicalists, the principles of physicalism are to be treated as high-level empirical hypothesis or generalisations. So for physicalist, "thinking is the chemical process of associating moods ('chemistry'), the brain is a chemical computer controlling many functions in the body. The Mind or Thinking is a process executed by part of the body (the brain). In simple shape: using the chemical reaction 'mood' aroused by a rose as 'chemistry' when seeing your daughter".[3] Again, in addition to the problem of natural body and its parts, there now exists a series of artificially produced bodily elements, which make the distinction between natural body

[2] http://www.kcl.ac.uk/ip/davidpapineau/Staff/Papineau/OnlinePapers/Risephys.html
[3] See: http://huizen.daxis.nl/~henkt/the-mind-body-problem.html

and artificial body much harder to pin down. New biotechnologies disaggregate the body, robbing it of its organic unity and encouraging the view of body parts as separate components, which do not sum to anything more than their compilation.

The 'Brain in the Vat' scenario, as we have already discussed in the previous chapter, was an indication of this physicalistic direction of philosophy. Now we are encountering another materialistic version of Descartes' story where the Scientist with computer replaces the Demon and the *Brain in the Vat*. What both the versions of the Vat brain and the evil scientist story entail is that conscious, world-directed thinking can take place even in the null environment, even when there is no directed world at all. Cognitive science proclaims that in one way or another our minds are computers, and this seems so mechanistic, reductionistic, intellectualistic, dry, philistine, unbiological. It leaves out emotion, or what philosophers call *qualia*, or value, or mattering, or the soul. It does not explain what minds are so much as attempt to explain minds away. The notion that computers and robots either have a measure of intelligence, or at least will have at some stage, has firmly taken root in Western culture. It has inspired a slew of science fiction novels and films, and one of these, *The Matrix*, has attained the status of a modern classic. Moreover, it has powerful advocates in the scientific and philosophical fraternities, the most prominent of whom are probably Daniel Dennett and Stephen Pinker.

In this chapter Artificial Intelligence, Cybernetics and Transhumanism are discussed as they force a pragmatic approach to defining and understanding situated embodiment. The concept of human immortality or extended longevity is also

investigated as this further exposes the myths of transcending corporeality and also helps to explain the mission of transhumanism[4].

Artificial Intelligence:

How can the problem of human nature be posed today, a time in which cognition enhancement technologies have become increasingly affordable, customizable, user friendly, networked, portable, and functionally powerful? How should the question of human nature be posed at a time when such technologies actively and reciprocally participate in the co-construction of what counts as "cognitive function"? Rodney Brooks, director of the MIT[5] Artificial Intelligence Lab, the founder of the humanoid robotics group there, seems to have an answer. He lets us know:

> "Suppose that scientists at MIT develop a technique for recording the chemical states, waves and electronic impulses of the human brain. These recordings can be reproduced on a CD-like disc, or on a tape, or on a chip. Every aspect of a person's "mind" is captured in these recordings - all of a person's memories, dreams, tastes and preferences, ambitions or desire can be stored in these recordings. This disc with all the recorded data of a mind can then be inserted in a computer and "played," in the sense that the computer's "mind" would be identical to that of the person whose thoughts had been recorded. It would even be possible to interact with this

[4] Transhumanism as the modern philosophy was created the philosopher Max More, Ph.D.. Dr. More originally defined transhumanism as "Philosophies of life, such as extropy, that seek the continuation and acceleration of the evolution of intelligent life beyond its currently human form and human limitations by means of science and technology, guided by life-promoting principles and values." Other definitions of "transhumanism" have been written over the years, such as "Transhumanism is the philosophy that we can and should develop to higher levels, both physically, mentally and socially using rational methods." (Dr. Anders Sandberg) and "Transhumanism is the idea that new technologies are likely to change the world so much in the next century or two that our descendants will in many ways no longer be 'human'" (Dr. Robin Hanson).

[5] MIT- Massachusetts Institute of Technology

computer, which is able to translate its thoughts into words spoken through a built-in speaker. Indeed, the computer's reactions would be the same, theoretically, as those of the person who originally possessed the mind, which is duplicated"[6]

The notion that computers and robots either have a measure of intelligence, or at least will have at some stage, has firmly taken root in Western culture. The scientistic zeitgeist of modernity makes many people inclined to feel that there is no good reason why, given enough advances in computer technology, robotics, neuroscience etc, some sophisticated artifact 'descended' from our current devices may not become 'one of us'.

The Computational model of mind is a modern descendent of Hume's philosophy of person as 'a bundle or collection' of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement. According to the computer model of the mind, the brain too is a computer, a 'physical symbol system,' and mental processes are carried out by the manipulation of symbolic representations in the brain. That is, in other word, a person is a wholly abstract thing that could in principle be stored on magnetic tape (a common idea in science fiction). Hence according to Computational model of human mind, theoretically the brain is a machine and has a computer (processor) with neural connections, programmed responses, and a data bank. It has sensors in the body that input information into the computer. It has an output to devices that perform actions, and the brain communicates with these devices through electrical and chemical channels. This is akin to the 'materialist' view common among

[6] This may not be science fiction much longer. According to Michael Labosserie, "Ed Berger, a biomedical engineer at the University of Southern California, has developed chips and software that can (in theory) duplicate the function of brain cells." *The Philosopher's Magazine*, issue 29, 1st Quarter, 2005, p. 36.]

neurosurgeons, who typically refrain from the term mind, (simply dismissed mind as a relic of a pre-scientific vocabulary and hence we have no minds) preferring to think only in terms of the brain, which is the only thing that they can work with.

In short, the materialist assumes that the mind is simply the brain 'thinking'. For example, according to the Turing test[7] AI is capable of performing human-like conversation. With the advent of the digital computer in the 1950s, chess enthusiasts and computer engineers have built, with increasing degrees of seriousness and success, chess-playing-machines[8] and computer programs. Some observers extrapolate that computers will consistently beat the best human players by perhaps 2010, and then go on to exceed their abilities to the point where a human versus computer chess match would be as unfair as a human versus automobile race.[9] In experimenting the dimension of thinking, does this mean that computer chess players can think like the way human think? Can *Smith* in the movie Matrix be a thinker? Can *Terminator*, a highly advanced robotic killer in movie *Terminator* be a thinker? that is can machines think? This leads us to the debate of how far computers are human? Where is the line between them? Would the computer and person ever really be the same? Are we simply sophisticated computers?

Any materialist-reductivist account of the mind/brain relation seems to leave out too much that is essential to what we call the mind. One solution to this problem is to say

[7] The Turing Test is a proposal for a test of a machine's capability to demonstrate thought. Described by Professor Alan Turing in the 1950 paper "Computing machinery and intelligence," it proceeds as follows: a human judge engages in a natural language conversation with two other parties, one a human and the other a machine; if the judge cannot reliably tell which is which, then the machine is said to pass the test. It is assumed that both the human and the machine try to appear human. In order to keep the test setting simple and universal (to explicitly test the linguistic capability of the machine instead of its ability to render words into audio), the conversation is usually limited to a text-only channel such as a teletype machine as Turing suggested or, more recently, IRC or instant messaging

[8] The Turk was a chess-playing machine, an automaton of the late 18th century, which was later proved to be an illusionary hoax. Constructed and unveiled in 1770 by the Austrian-Hungarian baron Wolfgang von Kempelen (1734–1804) to impress the Empress Maria Theresa, the mechanism appeared to be able to play a strong game of chess against a human opponent, as well as perform the knight's tour, a puzzle that requires the player to move a knight to occupy every square of a chessboard once and only once.

[9] See, *The future of computer chess*, online, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Computer_chess

that we have no minds. The belief in minds is simply dismissed as a relic of a pre-scientific vocabulary. Now, the question is, if all of my inner life were reproduced on a chip and transferred to a computer, would that computer be me? Among contemporary thinkers, Daniel Dennett, perhaps has the most sophisticated defense of the terms of scientific materialism, or physicaliam (Dennett, 1978, 1991). Dennett argues that since human mental life, and hence the sophisticated propositional states that it requires, seems to have required the massive development of the neo-cortex in humans, those mental states must be identical, in some fashion, with states of human brains. Dennett hypothesizes that:

> "Since any computing machine at all can be imitated by a virtual machine on a von Neumann architecture, it follows that if the brain is a massively parallel processing machine, it too can be perfectly imitated by a von Neumann machine……..Just as you can simulate a parallel brain on a serial von Neumann machine, you can, also, in principle, simulate (something like) a von Neumann machine on parallel hardware… Conscious human minds are more or less serial virtual machines implemented – inefficiently – on the parallel hardware that evolution has provided for us"(1991, pp.217-218).

Baker (1995), following Dennett focuses on brains and brain states, which he calls the 'The Standard View'. *The Standard View* implies that thinking is a matter of computation in a virtual serial processor in my brain, and that processor is (more or less) my conscious mind, a view similar to Dennett.

Dennett goes on to argue for the possibility of true machine personhood. Dennett characterized persons as 'intentional systems'. In *Brainstorms* (1978) Dennett, sets out the notion of three 'stances' one can take to an entity or system – the physical, design and intentional. From the physical stance "our predictions are based on the actual physical state of the particular object, and are worked out by applying whatever knowledge we have of the laws of nature" (1978, p.4). From the design stance, we predict behaviour based on our knowledge of the intended function or purpose of the system or its physical stances when playing against it – it is much more fruitful to treat it as if it had beliefs and desires, that is, from the *intentional stance* parts. Finally, from the intentional stance, we predict behaviour by treating the system as an intelligent agent with its own beliefs and desires.

Dennett's standard example is a chess-playing computer where he argues that it is not practical to treat a chess-playing computer from either the design or physical stances when playing against it – it is much more fruitful to treat it as if it had beliefs and desires, that is, from the *intentional stance.* That is, according to Dennett "particular thing is an intentional system only in relation to the strategies of someone who is trying to explain and predict its behavior" (ibid). He argued that: "lingering doubts about whether the chess-playing computer *really* has beliefs and desires are misplaced … whether one calls what one ascribes to the computer beliefs or belief-analogues or information complexes makes no difference to the nature of the calculation one makes on the basis of the ascriptions" (ibid, p.7). This *instrumentalist* nature of Dennett's intentional stance theory implies that one can combine an explicitly eliminativist approach to such things as

beliefs and desires, or pains, with treating complex systems like persons *as if* they really have them.

Keith Price in his essay, *Why Computer will never be People*, (2003) pointed out that the first, crucial point in Dennett's argument is a dilemma about whether the intentional stance is dispensable without cognitive loss. Dennett points out that "if some version of mechanistic physicalism is true, we will never *need* absolutely to ascribe any intentions to anything…" (1978, p. 273). This seems to imply that the intentional stance is in principle (even if not in practice) dispensable. According to Baker, any system, human or not, may be described exhaustively and its operations explained wholly in terms of its physical constitution.

Price further argues that if as per Dennett, both computers and people are intentional systems then there is no insuperable barrier to computers being people after all. If however, people *really do* have propositional attitudes and it is only convenient sometimes to treat computers as if they do, we need to dig deeper, if we hope to motivate the possibility that they one day might be people. Price argues that computers are, however, artifacts and also intentional systems in a non-psychological sense because the fact that there are computers depends on the fact that there are real intentional states in the world–namely those of the people who design, build, program and run them. Philosophers and Cognitive Scientists have vastly underestimated the significance of this fact. In fact, as Baker argues, non-psychological intentional properties and systems generally deserve a lot more attention but the thesis will not enter into this debate.

The two broad reasons that are mostly given for the failure of this kind of reductionism, which gives comfort to the idea that computers could be people are, the one

that relates to computability and syntactic structure, the other relates to *qualia* or phenomenal qualities. The clearest version of the argument against computability and semantic structure of computer and human mind is best provided by John Searle in his famous 'Chinese Room' [10] thought experiment. Searle strongly believes that for human beings, it is not possible to be Vulcans. None of us can 'control' our emotions, especially when it comes to the most powerful emotions in life, even if we are responsible for them. This does not mean that we must be controlled by those emotions, but it does require that we acknowledge and face them and seek to deal with them intelligently. The very suggestion that thinking can exclude the emotions is incoherent. There is an element of evaluation in all thinking, including dispassionate scientific thinking, so that an "unemotional" mental approach to reality is almost a self-contradiction. Thinking should not be equated with calculation, which is really what machines do. The second argument or the argument of *qualia*[11] refers to our capacity to feel, something that the computer

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[10] The Chinese Room argument is a thought experiment designed by John Searle (1980) as a counterargument to claims made by supporters of strong artificial intelligence (see also functionalism). Searle laid out the Chinese Room argument in his paper "Minds, brains and programs," published in 1980. Ever since, it has been a mainstay of the debate over the possibility of what Searle called strong artificial intelligence. Supporters of strong artificial intelligence believe that an appropriately programmed computer isn't simply a simulation or model of a mind; it actually counts as a mind. That is, it understands, has cognitive states, and can think. Searle's argument against (or more precisely, his thought experiment intended to undermine) this position, the Chinese Room argument, goes as follows:
Suppose that, many years from now, we have constructed a computer that behaves as if it understands Chinese. In other words, the computer takes Chinese characters as input and, following a set of rules (as all computers can be described as doing), correlates them with other Chinese characters, which it presents as output. Suppose that this computer performs this task so convincingly that it easily passes the Turing test. In other words, it convinces a human Chinese speaker that the program is itself a human Chinese speaker. All the questions the human asks are responded to appropriately, such that the Chinese speaker is convinced that he or she is talking to another Chinese-speaking human. The conclusion that proponents of strong AI would like to draw is that the computer understands Chinese, just as the person does.
Now, Searle asks us to suppose that he is sitting inside the computer. In other words, he is in a small room in which he receives Chinese characters, consults a rule book, and returns the Chinese characters that the rules dictate. Searle notes that he doesn't, of course, understand a word of Chinese. Furthermore, he argues that his lack of understanding goes to show that computers don't understand Chinese either, because they are in the same situation as he is. They are mindless manipulators of symbols, just as he is — and they don't understand what they're 'saying', just as he doesn't.

[11] Frank Jackson gives the qualia argument its classic statement (in Jackson 1982 and Jackson 1986). He formulates the argument in terms of Mary, the super-scientist. Her story takes place in the future, when all physical facts have been discovered. These include "everything in completed physics, chemistry, and neurophysiology, and all there is to know about the causal and relational facts consequent upon all this,

would be lacking since it does not have a sensory organs. It could not know-except conceptually, in an abstract way, or by remembering -what it is to feel something that is the question of *qualia*. "Thus, if an attractive young woman were to enter the room, would the computer react as I would? Or would it remain a frozen image of me at a specific time, but without the capacity to feel? Yet I never lacked the capacity to feel, so it could not be me at any time. In fact, it could not ever be classified as a "person," for the *capacity to feel* is essential to being a person, or to being me for that matter"(Menendez, 2006).[12]

What if part of the contents of my mind somehow be transferred to the computer, does this solve the problem? To this question, it can be stated that *my Identity* is just not the same thing as mental life conceived narrowly. Identity is something more complex, something that is also partly social or linguistic, and not merely physical, but still very much embodied and yet shared. Menendez continues: " In this respect, my sense of self, of who I am, cannot be separated from my physical state. I cannot conceive of life as an ape or from the point of view of a dinosaur. If I were 100 feet tall (or maybe just 6 feet tall), my entire mental life would be different. The same would be true, I think, if I lived in the thirteenth century"(ibid).

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including of course functional roles" (Jackson 1982, p. 51). She learns all this by watching lectures on a monochromatic television monitor. But she spends her life in a black-and-white room and has no color experiences. Then she leaves the room and sees colors for the first time. Based on this case, Jackson argues roughly as follows. If physicalism were true, then Mary would know everything about human color vision before leaving the room. But intuitively, it would seem that she learns something new when she leaves. She learns what it's like to see colors, that is, she learns about *qualia*, the properties that characterize what it's like. Her new phenomenal knowledge includes knowledge of truths. Therefore, physicalism is false.

[12]Juan Galis-Menendez, The "Galatea" Scenario and the Mind/Body Problem, in *Critical Vision* February 12, 2006, http://wwwcriticalvision.blogspot.com/2006_02_01_archive.html

For the computer, these things do not matter. It has no way of seeing, listening, feeling pain. It does not get hungry or cold. It has no physical desires. Phenomenologists have always insisted on a point that is still not appreciated by behaviourists, namely that the boundary between inner and outer worlds, between observable external behaviour and the unobservable internal motivations of persons is not all that clear because it is constantly changing. But this does not necessarily make that boundary unreal. It does mean that, for normal persons, there is such a thing as the inner life. This leads again, to the thorny issue of 'intentionality' that will be discussed in details in the later part of the thesis.

What if Cyborg bodies replace some parts of my body without much disturbing the wholeness of my person? This can be understood from two perspectives. One can aspire for a kind of self-transformation that could be best implemented by creating for oneself a paradigm, an idealized model of the person one wants to become. Otherwise this whole process can take place just as an event or a happening that one's natural body part is just replaced by a forceful and dominating machine over which one has no control. It is always better that a person makes decisions in this regard solely by using mere abstract rules, principles, and guidelines, that make one think and decide the way a machine does but it should be the other way round. There should be flexibility even in application of rules and principles since rules are to be applied in a human context that makes thinking situated and dynamic. It must keep room for the fact that it is *we who should decide who we want to become*. It should keep elbow space for us to evolve and to change our priorities accordingly, if there is need for it. This is similar to Nietzsche's

notion of *Ubermensch* that the higher being exists within us as potential waiting to be actualized, the ideal self. To quote Nietzsche:

> "We, however, want to be those who we are the new, the unique, the incomparable, those who give themselves their own law, those who create themselves!" (1882, p. 335)

Life's purpose is not mere survival, for its energies remain once that basic goal is not secured; nor is its purpose a drive to serve or glorify anything external, for then it would be self-alienating. The essence of life is, what Nietzsche called 'the will to power', life's perpetual drive toward its own increase and excellence (cited in More, 1993).

The next section of the chapter discusses the questions of Cyborg Embodiment and the growing issues of Transhumanism that maintain continuity in cognitive, physical, and psychological in self-direction or self transformation.

Cyborg Embodiment:

Weiner (1948) first introduced the concept of Cyborg and coined the word cybernetics. A *Cyborg* means a human being who is technologically complemented by external or internal devices that compliment or regulate various human body functions. In other words a Cyborg organism is constituted by part-machine-part-human systems. Such a chimera of living and mechanized components is immortalized in the movie series "Robocop" (1987). The historical narrative of the Cyborg body means: 'flesh and machine literally coupled into a single organism'. Broadly speaking, we all have Cyborg bodies in so far as we depend on machine in our daily life. Taken in this sense, the first prosthetic bodies could be as early as the 1500s with the invention of the pocket watch or even the 1200s with the invention of eyeglasses. In the modern and post-modern age of

Cyborg embodiment, especially wearable computer, have been applied to areas such as behavioral modeling, health monitoring systems, information technologies and media development. Government organizations, military, and health professionals have all incorporated wearable computers into their daily operations. Wearable computers are especially useful for applications that require computational support while the user's hands, voice, eyes or attention are actively engaged with the physical environment. These devices can be incorporated by the user to act like a prosthetic.

The body is extended with prosthetics, with replacement parts, made from materials that range from the everyday to very sophisticated technology. Although most sense-extending instruments cannot be said to be a part of us, others have come to seem more intimately connected. Those of us wearing glasses or even more, contact lenses, feel a bit lost without them. Contact lenses, sitting closely on the eyeball, feel almost as much part of us as do our natural corneas. Some of this prosthetics provides an extension of the body that increase the ability to communicate, and that create a hybrid body beyond the physical limits of the human scale. In other words, the body may be transformed into a tool or an instrument. For example in Horn's 'Finger gloves (1972)', she is isolated from the environment, on the one hand, but is also able to grasp remote things. The gloves both enable and disable her, and it seems as if she is looking for the possibilities and impossibilities of the extension of her body schema and of her sensitive, sensory body (see, Preester, 2007).[13]

[13] Helena De Preester, To Perform the Layered Body—A Short Exploration of the Body in Performance, in *Janus Head,* 9(2), 349-383, Trivium Publications, Amherst, NY 2007
http://www.janushead.org/9-2/DePreester.pdf

The world of man-machine symbiosis is a direction we are definitely moving towards, amply demonstrated by the recent chip implant on 44-year-old Professor of Cybernetics, Kevin Warwick from the University of Reading, Britain. The implanted chip in his left arm wirelessly linked him to the network, made his office welcome him in the morning. Because of his computer link-up, he turned on his computer, switched on the lights in the office corridor, opened doors and even helped his secretary track him irrespective of where he was on the campus. After a week of this, when the implant was removed from his body terminating the linkup, Professor Warwick experienced a sense of loss as though he was cut off from something, similar to a shared sense of being with the computer network. He later admitted that with the implant he had felt "an affinity to the computer" (cited in Parthan, 2000).[14] This shift in our attitude towards machines and machine intelligence is gradually gaining legitimacy. Identified as *Post-Humanism*, this new ideology endorses the idea that humans need to involve intelligent machines in the evolutionary process. The proponents of Post-Humanism perceive this involvement as using technology to overcome our physical and mental limits.

Technological Transformation and Assimilation:

Technology already allows us to modify and refine our bodies and our senses through dentistry, cosmetic surgery, new clothing materials and styles, contact lenses, make-ups, and steroids. Along with a growing ability to shape our natural body, has come a virtual overlay on our senses. There is a revolution to enhance and extend '*my body, my sensations, my physicality'* .The human body is not a natural organism but a prosthetic

[14] see, Baiju Parthan, *The Cyborgs are…Coming,* http://www.lifepositive.com/mind/evolution/technology/cyborg.asp

effect. Today, the C-LEG[15] system is used to replace human legs that were amputated because of injury or illness.[16] The use of sensors in the artificial leg aids in walking significantly. These are the first real steps towards the next generation of cyborgs. Additionally cochlear implants[17] and magnetic implants[18] provides people with a sense that they would not otherwise have had. They can additionally be thought of as creating cyborgs. We can embrace the sensory qualities of our current bodies while seeking new sensations, a wider perception of the electromagnetic spectrum, more finely tuned senses, upgraded ability to filter incoming sensory data, the ability to see microscopically and telescopically and to perceive through using exosomatic instruments (More, 1997).

We can also celebrate our existing bodies while modifying ourselves for more revealing awareness of the internal functions of our bodies, and while making our physical beings stronger and more beautiful. There is a growing desire and awareness to improve and refine the body and its senses, to transcend its limitations. Here is therefore no inherent rejection of the body and the senses in the drive to technologically alter the body and to add virtual experiences. The truth is, those among us who use a pacemaker to sustain the normal heart functions and be alive, are in effect part- machine and part human, a minor cyborg. But in the vision of the future, presented by people like Gibson, intelligent technology intrudes into the hitherto sacred space of the human body to morph into a tool that offers transformation and transcendence (cited in Parthan, 2000).

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[15] C-Leg: New Generation Leg System Revolutionizes Lower Limb Prostheses

[16] see, http://www.answers.com/topic/cyborg?cat=technology

[17] A cochlear implant is a small, complex electronic device that can help to provide a sense of sound to a person who is profoundly deaf or severely hard-of-hearing.

[18] These magnets give him (Eric Boyd)the ability to directly sense magnetic fields and the presence of ferrite materials. e.g. he can feel the 60Hz pulsing of the inductive security sensors that are at the doors of most shops and libraries. He can feel the electric motors in common things like speakers and electric can openers. And he can directly explore magnets fields in ways us mere humans can only observe via iron filings and their ilk. http://digitalcrusader.ca/archives/2005/07/magnetic_implan.html

The future is no longer seen to be existing out there, where life is full of pain and all-too-human suffering, but within a digitally constructed space, melded with the nerves and guided by all-knowing machines. Virtual Reality as a technology is still in its infancy, but once perfected, we would have individuals with the implants for wireless linkup opting to spend most of their time in designer realities and virtual heavens. The 21st Century, the era of the transition from the human to the transhuman learning new skills, modifying habits, selecting new interests and behaviours is necessary if we are to stay involved in our protean world. Biotechnology, nanotechnology, neural networks, synthetic intelligence, expansion into space, intelligence intensification, and neurochemical modification (plus innovations as yet unforeseen) will ensure the flow of change and the widening field of choice. We are used to associating 'advanced age' (as we now think of it) with lack of vigor, ill health, and senility. Not only will physical illness become practically unknown, we will fully understand the basis of depression and lack of enthusiasm, allowing us to choose to maintain ourselves in a perpetually high-energy condition. With the termination of aging, chronic illness, and depression, advanced age will cease to imply weariness, retirement, or resignation.

How then might technology allow us to make the most of our bodies and our senses? It seems, there are two ways technology can enhance a person, through Cognitive self-transformation and Physical self-transformation.

Cognitive self-transformation:

Present and future technologies will further expand our intellectual capacities, in conjunction with the foregoing means. The current generation of nootropics (smart

drugs)[19] appear to be mildly effective for relatively young, healthy persons, but improved understanding of neurochemistry, synthesis of more powerful compounds, and more precise delivery mechanisms, should allow us to push back our biological and neurological limitations. Our capacities for organizing and presenting information are vastly expanded by use of personal computers, and the 'Net' provides a practically endless source of documents, discussions, and expertise. The appearance, in 1993, of the first generation of Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs) heralds an era of increasingly portable personal computing power and communications flexibility (More). Soon we will be able to contact most people, and access remote databases, no matter where we happen to be. Software agents and knowbots will help us to gather the information that interests us, relieving us of tedious work hunting down and managing information. Recent experiments linking a biological neuron to a field effect transistor point to the day when our computerized assistants will be inside our heads. Eventually our computers will be tightly integrated with our brains, becoming part of us, and abolishing barriers to the attainment of transhuman intelligence. We may also genetically engineer our brains to expand their capacities, and even upload our consciousness to superior hardware, thereby endowing ourselves with the unlimited potential of post- human intelligence (ibid).

Physical self-transformation:

The decades that lie ahead will bring technologies of transformation enabling us to modify, augment, and replace our human, biological bodies with superior vehicles worthy of our evolving intelligence. Increasingly, those of us desiring bodies beyond those evolved by natural processes, will engage in a process of what Max More call

[19] *Smart drugs/nootropics:* Substances that, without negative side-effects, can enhance retention, recall, and concentration.

'transbiomorphosis',[20] the engineering of improved bodies by intervening in biological processes, and by incrementally replacing our biological forms with synthetic life-sustaining bodies. As Nietzsche realized in the late 19th century, humanity is not the end of the story of evolution, when he sates:

> "...Man is a rope, fastened between animal and superman - a rope over an abyss...what is great in man is that he is a bridge and not a goal" (1883, Pt.1, p.3).

Already we can enhance our health and longevity with a multitude of nutritional supplements and drugs. The 1990s have seen the beginning of gene therapy; we can expect genetic engineering to progress from restoring defective systems (today's medical paradigm) to pushing back natural limits (tomorrow's medical paradigm). Much discussed artificial organs will be a temporary measure, merely a stand-in until the arrival of nanotechnological medicine which, without cutting or poisoning will cure disease, regenerate limbs, reverse aging, and will allow us to reinforce our bones, massively strengthen our immune systems, and re-engineer our bodily structure as we please. Apart from structural enhancement, we can anticipate unprecedented control over our appearance, including the possibility of complete and reversible change of gender.

Transbiomorphosis will involve the merging of our machines and technologies with the human body. Recent years have revealed a clear trend toward making our artifacts organic (in the abstract sense), fluid, responsive, and living. While rigidly programmed computers will probably always be used for some purposes (due to their blinding speed at logical computations), we are witnessing the emergence of

[20] The transformation of the human body from a natural, biological organism into a superior, consciously designed vehicle of personality.

connectionist machines neural networks that learn from experience, adapt and solve problems without a human determining the algorithms. Such artificial neural networks are modeled (more or less abstractly) on brain function. The new field of Artificial Life (A-Life) attempts to evolve computational and robot organisms that share the characteristics of our familiar carbon-based life. Software designers are developing knowbots and other software agents that respond to our needs and desires, learning from us and helping us. Fuzzy logic is being implemented in electronic devices, obviating the need for rigid on-off responses. These and other examples illustrate ways in which some technologies are diverging from traditional rigid machine behavior, and evolving towards an organic, flexible, complex function suitable for supplementing our limited brains.

Deepened Self-Perception:

Our senses connect us not only to external reality, but also to our internal states. We are aware of acid stomach, raised body temperature, accelerated heartbeat, and damage resulting in pain. Senses like proprioception (the awareness of the position and motion of our limbs) are less recognized than visions yet are crucial for daily living. Technologically augmented senses will extend not only to our environment but also to our internal bodily and cognitive processes.

We can expect technologically enhanced perception to unfold the mysteries of our bodily and even cognitive processes. How useful it would be to have a natural EKG[21] to make us aware of cardiac irregularity! How beneficial if we had an inbuilt natural

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21 An electrocardiogram (ECG or EKG, abbreviated from the German *Elektrokardiogramm*) is a graphic produced by an electrocardiograph, which records the electrical activity of the heart over time. Analysis of the various waves and normal vectors of depolarization and repolarization yields important diagnostic information.

warning system keyed in to the presence of budding cancer cells! (More, 1997). Implanted micro-machines and nano-machines could monitor all bodily processes, feeding us useful information and setting off alarms when a threshold is reached. The information might be brought to our awareness by a visual signal in our retinal lenses or optic nerve implants, or it might be converted into some other sensory signal that we would recognize. We might, for instance, program our ER (enhanced reality) devices to reveal hypertension as a red haze in our visual field (ibid).

Technologically augmented senses could keep track of our blood pressure, making the numbers instantly available in our visual field. These senses could monitor the regularity of heartbeat, provide feedback on stress hormone levels, signal bodily injury without the sensation of pain, and alert us to challenges to our immune system outside the norm. With the increased ability to monitor and understand our internal processes, perhaps the sense of mind as distinct from body will diminish. The belief that mind and soul are entirely separable probably owes much to our inability to connect with our internal bodily processes.

More radically, technologically enhanced senses should be able to reveal not only states of our torso and limbs, but also states of our brain. Despite a well-developed scientific understanding of much of the external world, we are only beginning to develop comprehensive and accurate models of our brain processes. Our crude old models—Jung's collective unconscious, Freud's id, ego, and superego and our inability to directly detect at a fine level of discrimination what goes on inside our three-pound biological computer make it hard for us to understand and control our minds (More, 1995).

As we develop a neuroscientific understanding of cognition and emotion we will gradually come to employ this new, more penetrating conceptual framework to our everyday thinking and feeling. Perhaps we will cease to talk of "beliefs" and "desires", instead referring to activation vector spaces in a particular layer of the neocortex, or to a firing rate in a certain circuit of the amygdale, or to a surge in levels of a particular hormone or neurotransmitter. Without an accurate understanding of our mental processes we find it hard to control or modify them. We find moods coming and going without our having much influence over them. We surprise ourselves with our reactions, and disappoint ourselves by following old programming that is not in our best interests. Far from being naturally in touch with our inner life, even the more psychologically sophisticated of us have severely limited awareness of our mental life. We are alienated from our deepest processes. Too often we have to treat our brains as black boxes working according to unknown principles.

As Max More wrote in 1997, in his article *From Enhanced Senses to Experience Machines*:

> "By employing the neuroscientific understanding now starting to emerge, and by combining that knowledge with new internal neurological sensors, we may achieve an unprecedented level of self-awareness and self-control. For example, micromachines or nanomachines could monitor levels of neurohormons and neurotransmitters such as noradrenaline, pregnenolone, cortisol, vasopressin and GABA, as well as activation levels of neural layers and subunits. The information about changes in neural activity could be converted into visual, auditory, or somatic signals when we enter

desired or undesired emotional or cognitive states. Through biofeedback mechanisms we may then be able better to modify our moods and thoughts. By tying abstract emotional states to percepts we can more easily monitor and regulate those states."[22]

Over the next couple of decades, then, we can expect technology to increase our sensory contact with reality, both external and internal. Far from cutting us off from the world or "alienating us from ourselves, new technologies will give us more penetrating, discriminating, and illuminating senses" (ibid).

Conclusion:

The evolving advocates of transhumanist philosophy challenge human limits by means of science and technology combined with critical and creative thinking. They challenge the inevitability of aging and death, and we seek continuing enhancements to our intellectual abilities, our physical capacities, and our emotional development. They see humanity as a transitory stage in the evolutionary development of intelligence. They advocate using science to accelerate our move from human to a transhuman or posthuman condition. As physicist Freeman Dyson has said: "Humanity looks to me like a magnificent beginning but not the final word" (cited in Davidson, A)[23]

The history of humanity has been a history of the growth of our ability to define ourselves as individuals. Our future will see the continuation and deepening of this evolutionary process. The primitive life forms from which we evolved were completely defined by forces external to choice, such as genetic and environmental determinants.

[22] Max More *Virtue And Virtuality From Enhanced Senses to Experience Machines* 1997. http://maxmore.com/virtue.htm
[23] Davidson, Aaron., *Evolution of Art by Aesthetic Selection* http://spaz.ca/aaron/SCS/biography/selection.html

The continued importance of these factors manifests itself in the tired "nature verses nurture," or genetic heritage verses environment, debate. Yet we, more than any previous organisms or earlier humans, have the power to define our selves, to choose who and how to be. As Dawkins argued in 'The Selfish Gene (1989)', as conscious beings we can understand and thus allow for the imperatives of our genes. We can rebel against the tyranny of the selfish replicators. This capacity for rebellion against our genetic programming is what allows us to control our reproduction, to redirect our sexual energies, and to rethink and reorganize gender roles and family structures. As our environments have grown more diverse, so our range of choices has grown. Many humans may continue to be programmed by aspects of their environment (incoming information, family upbringing, geographical location, political ideology, predominant morality, religion, etc.), but now they must usually choose between competing programming forces. Here lies the budding of autonomy and with it comes the question of the humanness and dignity, personhood and identity and the ethics of authenticity.

The revolution of Tranhumanist stimulus to set up and discuss an incredible range of ideas from the physiology of the brain to artificial intelligence, from extra-sensory perception to *shamanistic* trance practices, from the Internet to virtual reality installations, from constructed ways of seeing to the role of geometry in painting and how we see. Obviously it refers to the *technological* and our use of technology in cultural production, but it also refers to the *noetic*, or how we know and understand the world and our processes of being actively in it. What is intended is the exploration of 'how the technological is changing our perceptions and our productions, our knowledge of and

modelling of the world'[24]. What is more important is the way all these mechanical ways of understanding real *Life World* issues in terms of its contributions toward non-living and impersonal perspectives. The cyborg body is seen as a step towards the merger of the human body with machine. But rather than placing machines to enhance the body, as the body being fundamentally superior, the current view is to fuse the body into the machine realm so that the body is just a facilitator for the functioning of the cyborg unit. This view leads to an idea of an "Electronic Dissociation" (Wellman, 1997). This dissociation states that the resultant cyborg is more powerful and thus bears no moral obligations to human values because it is seemingly above it. Part machine and part human, the cyborg has the power to destabilize accepted boundaries and open spaces for liberatory action (Hayles, 1996). In this view, the cyborg becomes an alien. It can no longer be seen as human.

The cyborg is thus dehumanized, objectified and virtualized. Such a dehumanization shows a reduction or a simplification of life. There is a commodification of the entire body (Awaya, 1997). Everything is being compared in the concept of a machine. The advent of genetic engineering has made us define an organism as a complicated network of arranged genetic code, comparable to a circuit board. The progress of thought and action is seen as electrical impulses. Therefore, everything is being compared to a basic systematic approach. Every unit of life is being stripped down to its basic chemical units. Life, instead of being understood is being broken down. In the words of Haraway, "Biology here is a kind of cryptography. Microelectronics mediates the translations of labour into robotics and word processing, sex into genetic engineering and reproductive technologies, and mind into artificial intelligence and decision

[24] The answer to this will be discussed in chapter 6 and 7 of the thesis

procedures" (1991. pp. 149-181). In this light, the fundamental and instinctive inclination would be to view the entire human biology as a prison, offered by destiny. Thus, comes the view of neglect and disrespect to the human biology and the surrounding moral, spiritual, social relations that it has.

The next chapter makes an attempt at making a critical review of some implications that all these different models of personhood have posed before us. That will also take one step ahead toward re-affirming the thesis statement that we must aspire to have a correct understanding of the subject as embodied.

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Chapter 5

Implications: Humanism at the Cross Road

Bodies, Commodities and the Crisis in Ethics

> "Is our body only a bundle of genes, tissues and organs? What is a person? A body? What is the essence of owning a body? What is that quintessence that gives us an intensely personal experience of bodily pleasures? In this Cartesian duality of body vs. person, how far one can go in denying existential identity vis-à-vis its proximity with the organic composition?" (Anees, 1995, pp. 36-37).

This chapter examines some philosophical and ethical implications of the mechanistic and the physicalistic models of the embodied person. The chapter concludes by investigating the ethical implications of employing dualistic metaphysics as a legitimizing narrative of media technology and cyber culture and looks foreword to an alternate model of Embodied Person that can also address the *Crisis in our Life World.*

Embodied Person in Biomedicine:

The special focus of this chapter is to show how the mechanistic model of man had serious impact in medicine and health that is solely devoted to the study of the Embodied Person, a person who is solely an *Embodied Person*. Different embodiment studies have made attempts to characterize the body in medicine especially in terms of the Cartesian model of person both from dualistic and physicalistic standpoints. In fact one of the main criticisms of conventional medicine by alternative practitioners is precisely that, it is materialistic, whereas alternative medicine, in contrast, is said to

regard human beings as made up of body, mind and spirit. So the critics feel, the mind-body problem seems to be already settled in medicine in a particular manner. Medicine is concerned with person's body no doubt but the standpoint from which Embodied Person is understood is basically the dualistic, reductionistic or materialistic.

According to Fritjof Capra, "Current medical practice is firmly rooted in Cartesian thinking" (cited in Dossey, 1982). Since modern bio-medical understanding of the embodied patient is firmly grounded in Cartesian thought, it acknowledges strict separation of disembodied-mind and body-machine. A healthy person acts like a well-made clock in perfect mechanical condition; a sick person is more like a clock whose parts were not functioning properly. As a result of mechanization of the Life World, the human body could be referred to as a mere instrument or engine, which acts in accordance with the principles of mechanical and chemical philosophy, the bones being levers, the blood-vessels hydraulic tubes, the soft parts generally the seats of oxidation. Contemporary molecular biologists (Hopwood, 1981, p. 91), who in their own way are just as enamored of Cartesian mechanism, give this model scientific credibility by treating the organism as an integrated machine which has evolved to serve the ends of *survival* and *reproduction*.

The Cartesian machine model of the binary oppositions of human body, along with the idea of medical treatment as repair of the machine, has led to important discoveries and technologies for reducing human suffering. But this approach has also contributed to a narrow-minded focus on physical states inside the body rather than on the body's less easily quantifiable relationships with the surrounding social/natural world. Biomedicine presupposes that man is a part of the biological order or 'machine'. Disease

is a consequence of the machine breaking down; the doctor is a mechanic. A restructuring of medical authority occurring in the name of Cartesian science, sharply distinguished the active, knowing subject from the passive, known object. Advocates of this science identified it with a disembodied, objectifying point of view.

Critics of this mechanistic model of man do feel that in place of the orthodox medical model that focuses narrowly on biological repair, we need a much broader, prevention-oriented, and ecologically aware approach-one that remains scientific while encompassing all the relationships that are essential to human health. All these critical appraisals of the Cartesian model of man are just different versions of one and the same crisis-story, which derives from the fact that we are trying to apply the concepts of an outdated world view-the mechanistic worldview of Cartesian- Newtonian science to a reality that can no longer be understood in terms of these concepts.

According to Doyle, the scientific import of this divorce of mental and physical sciences became clearer later as psychology, began to explore computational characterizations of reasoning and behaviour, and as economics began to cast about for theories that match human capabilities better than its foundational theory of ideal rational choice. Computational formalizations of psychological theories involved motion in "spaces" of mental states that, though very different than physical space, at least proved susceptible to mathematical formalization. Realistic economists grew appreciative of the hard work involved in making choices and of the slowness of the mind to change when subjected to new information or other influences. Popular discourse still spoke of mental forces, work and inertia to reflect these concerns ("I had to force myself concentrate"), much as in the days of Descartes and Newton. People also came to use mechanical

concepts of inertia, force, energy, and pressure informally in describing economic markets and behaviour ("Market forces are putting increasing pressure on oil prices")[1].

The tremendous impact of this new understanding of man has modified our way of understanding what it is that essentially makes us human. Can there be any proper study of man that gives an account of a split -personality helplessly torn between two mutually exclusive domains of facts and values, of disembodied mind and body as machine of man 'here' and nature 'there'. This has also dichotomized man and woman, man as an embodied person, a *one unified whole* and man as a mere combination of cells and organs. Descartes based his view of nature on a fundamental division into two separate and independent realms: that of mind and that of matter. And nature work according to mechanical laws and everything in the material world could be explained in terms of the arrangement and movement of its parts. Descartes extended this mechanistic view of matter to living organisms. Plants and animals were considered simply machines, human beings were inhabited by a rational soul, but the human body was indistinguishable from an animal-machine. In Biomedicine the body became the object of medicalizing concepts and practices. Much of this has already been discussed in the previous chapter, and the central concern of this chapter is primarily to highlight some philosophical implications of the above-mentioned models of 'Human-Person'.

One of the major drawbacks or criticisms of the biomedical models is that it does not view health in a holistic context. It has a compartmentalized view in its approach to providing health care. There are specialists for every aspect of a person's makeup; for

[1] See, Doyle, Joe., Extending Mechanics to Minds: The Mechanical Foundations of Psychology and Economics, Cambridge University Press, 2006, available at: http://books.google.com/books?id=3UD_7jfb_wEC&pg=PP22&lpg=PP22&dq=%22market+forces+are+putting+increasing+pressure+on+oil+prices%22&source=web&ots=6lchnMANhG&sig=iOnKKyVCUMXrc6iPYT1LWFqiOQg

example, one would go to a Psychiatrist for emotional problems, a Physician for medical problems, a Gynecologist for 'female problems', ad-infinitum. Therefore one can have people who have a range of health problems being treated by a range of specialists. They can spend much of their lives waiting in the out-patient departments of these specialty units waiting to have their problems solved. The signs and symptoms of ill health are fitted into *a box labeled with the name of the disease*. Included with the contents of this box is all the associated knowledge on how this disease is to be treated, not unlike a recipe book. This process almost always occurs in isolation from other factors in a person's life.

Accordingly, the lived and animated body of the Embodied Person is reduced to lifeless physical body that itself is part of the physical world, and mechanically governed by the laws of physics. Cell theory, germ theory, gene theory and DNA are all milestones in the search for structural and analytic components of living beings. They take for granted that living beings are nothing more than special combinations of materials and function like machines. In this process of gradual mechanisation the holistic concept of Embodied Person has become transformed to a part of a machine that needs periodical checking and refueling. Stripped of all vitality, the mechanism that once housed an animated being was available for rudimentary exploration, an opportunity to understand the vehicle limitation of these perspectives. The success of this reductionist approach in inventing new diagnostic and therapeutic tools has distracted society from thinking of the human body as a unique person with individual emotions and perceptions. All this evidence and there are still those who believe that the human body does not carry an energetic field. This Cartesian science presumably reveals how the body-now construed

as a marvelously intricate machine-really works, what causes it to malfunction, and what can be done by way of repair. A restructuring of medical authority occurring in the name of Cartesian science, sharply distinguished the active, knowing subject from the passive, known object. Advocates of this science identified it with a disembodied, objectifying point of view.

Like the positivist sciences, medicine tries to change the patient from an experiential reality to an experimental one, moving him from his life-world to the laboratory, reducing him from a molar to a molecular reality and reinterpreting his disease as somatic or psychological rather than psychosomatic. Events that are equally unbelievable have actually become commonplace in modern medicine. The modern hospital is primarily concerned with the shadow patient and compromises the patient's personal and clinical realities. Shadow patient means the patient reconstruction from the pathological test results. The patient's personal and clinical realities are not seen as variables with an intrinsic scientific status. For example in 'biofeedback laboratories' one can hardly be accounted for the traditional learning theory as most subjects are attached to various feedback devices–usually solid state electronic instruments–that measure body events of which one is actually unaware, an that feed back this information to the subject by way of a moving meter, a blinking lights, or available sound that have never had previous experience to which these events can be contrasted and compared (Dossey, p.207). The control of events like shielded magnetometers and interferometer patterns, dream telepathy, remote viewing, biofeedback accomplishments force us to reconsider how human conscious mental activity interacts with the physical world. "Yet they are

capable of exercising control over certain body processes to a degree regarded as impossible only a decade ago" (p.207-8).

The serious philosophical implications of these new models of embodiment, especially in the context of biomedicine, have led to problematise the following areas:

a) *What does it mean to be human?*

As technologies such as genetic and tissue engineering, intelligent and neural prosthesis, human-like machines/robots, or regeneration, replace more and more of our natural biological body, exactly what will be the defining characteristics of a human? Can people 'download' them-selves into a replicated body? Through direct brain-computer connection, will a person connect and merge with the Internet and have a distributed intelligence, or lose self-identity? According to theorists such as Arthur and Marilouise Kroker (1997), the notion of the body is already obsolete. Consistent with this assertion is the widespread belief that we are on the verge of the "post- body", "post-biological"or "post-human" (Bolter, 1984).

b) *How long should a person live, and is there a right (obligation) to die?*

With the advances in understanding the proteins, structures, signaling molecules, and cellular functions involved in cell death and aging, humans will have longer life spans. Perhaps the children of the next generation of surgeons will have a life expectancy of two hundred years or longer. How do humans cope with this extended life span, how do we determine when a person is dying, and should there even be consideration of a right, let alone an obligation, to die? In philosophical terms, the concepts like 'birth' and 'death' are no longer associated with *a sense of wonder*: child-making has become as simple and a matter-of-fact process as 'cake-making'.

c) *How do we implement suspended animation (controlled cellular metabolism)?*

Success in sustaining vital cellular functions at a remarkably reduced rate of physiological activity (e.g., asystole or extreme bradycardia) raises the question whether this can be a revolutionary replacement for anesthesia, and whether it will be possible to extend such a state beyond minutes or hours to years? Can it be possible, and is it practical or ethical, to prolong the existence of terminally ill patients for years in hopes of a cure for their diseases? What are the incredible social, financial, political, and other implications of re-awakening decades in the future with little if any biological increase in age?

d) *How will humans interact with intelligent machines (e.g., computers, robots)?*

While it is not certain, there is high likelihood that the next two to three decades will see computers or robotics with capabilities vastly superior to those of humans, not only in a single area but in a large array of human activities. In addition, research in neural and brain prosthesis and interfaces points to the possibility of direct connection to the brain, initially in some minor way. Will our children rebel by "plugging in" to the Internet or each other, as rebelling children today are fascinated with body piercing? Will these machines be "intelligent"? How will humans control them, or will we interact with them in a form of man-machine direct interface? As we understand and program more and more emotion into the machines, will they assume human-like characteristics? Will it be ethical to unplug ("kill") an intelligent machine? Over a greater time, will the machines even need us any more? As Fukuyama, posits in his book *Our Posthuman Future*, is the next iteration of the human species a combination of man and machine? (2002, p. 19).

e) *What is the direction of nanotechnology?*

As we embark on creating new materials, objects, machines and perhaps life forms by initiating the assembly of them atom by atom, will we be able to control the results of this self-assembly process? Will we create materials that cannot be destroyed or recycled? What will it mean to be able to create literally anything you want, including life forms—would this endow humans with God-like characteristics? Will we need to re-define the attributes of God, perhaps removing some properties (such as the ability to create) from the purview of a divinity?

Besides these implications that are primarily related to the field of science and to biomedicine in particular, this chapter will take special note of some other implications of the mechanistic model of Embodied Person. There are numerous implications and consequences of advanced technologies some of which are already discussed in the section on the biomedical image of man. However, the following examples address some other known issues that fall into several categories like social (what are the societal implications?), behavioural (how will individuals' behavior change?), political (how will the legal and regulatory systems react?), legal and moral (what fundamental moral and ethical precepts are challenged?).

Out of these, the following is a brief outline of the changes that are incorporated into the two important areas of life. The two select- areas are:

a) Ethics in Bio-Medicine and the impact of Globalization

b) Body and Feminism

a) Crisis in Ethics: Commodification and Ownership of Bodies

Organs verses Body as a whole

Bodies are now largely seen as market commodity the way Embodied Persons are understood as mechanical combination of body-organs. The implications of the faulty models of persons, mechanistic or disembodied, have also lead to problematise the moral meaning of the living human body, whether it exists simply as an interchangeable collection of parts, whether it exists merely as a carrier for what really counts (the personal realm of mind or spirit), whether a living human being who lacks cognitive and personal qualities is no longer one of us or is simply the weakest and most needy one of us is a question to be thought about.

Assuming that there is no distinction between objectification and commodification, a large part of what disturbs people about commodification of the body appears to be the way in which it transforms us into objects of property-holding, rather than active human subjects. In the French context, this concern is clearly stated in several opinions of the national ethics commission, which has consistently declared that human dignity and subjectivity are incompatible with selling oneself or parts of oneself as objects. "Trading persons, or parts of persons, or elements of persons in the market place, would turn subjects into objects, that is, subvert the foundations of the social order. Preserving the freedom of subjects involves maintaining (so to speak) all parts and bits of subjects within the realm of persons"(cited in Dickenson, 2007)[2]. The sociologist Dominique Memmi has characterized the French national ethics committee's response to commodification of the body or genome as grounded in fear of a threat "to the totality of

[2] Donna Dickenson, Property in the Body Feminist Perspectives, in *Cambridge Law, Medicine and Ethics* (No. 3), http://www.cambridge.org/uk/catalogue/catalogue.asp?isbn=9780521687324&ss=exc

the subject of an intrusion into what appears to be the most secret and intimate area, that of the body or gene" (ibid). Although some Anglo-American commentators argue that our rights as moral agents and human subjects actually require us to have the free right of disposal over our bodies,[3] the common law posits that something can be either a person or an object – but not both – and that only objects can be regulated by property-holding. The implication is clear: to the extent that persons' body parts can be regulated by property-holding, those body parts are objects, or things. If we are Embodied Persons, then to some extent we become objects too. The question is to what extent.

This core distinction between persons and things is as much philosophical as legal. It has its origins in Kant:

> "Man cannot dispose over himself because he is not a thing; he is not his own property; to say that he is would be self-contradictory; for insofar as he is a person he is a Subject in whom the ownership of things can be vested, and if he were his own property he would be a thing over which he could have ownership. But a person cannot be a property and so cannot be a thing, which can be owned, for it is impossible to be a person and a thing, the proprietor and the property"(cited in Cohen, 1995, p. 211).

Human tissue and human genetic material, however, fall between the two schools, containing elements of person and thing, subject and object. It may well be that our discomfort about commodification of human tissue and genetic material reflects a sense

[3] For arguments in favour of removing or modifying legal prohibitions on commodificationof human tissue, see e.g., David B. Resnik, 'The commercialization of human stem cells:ethical and policy issues' (2002)10 *Health Care Analysis* 127–54, and Stephen Wilkinson,'Commodification arguments for the legal prohibition of organ sale' (2000)8 *Health Care Analysis* 189–201.

that recent developments take us nearer to the object end of the spectrum. In the Kantian formulation, this shift radically undermines our very humanity. Cell theory, germ theory, gene theory and DNA are all milestones in the search for structural and analytic components of living beings. They take for granted that living beings are nothing more than special combinations of materials and function like machines.

As in the old agricultural enclosure movement, "things that were formerly thought to be uncommodifiable, essentially common or outside the market altogether are being turned into private possessions under a new kind of property regime" (Boyle, 2004, p.5). The common law generally assumes that once tissue is separated from the living body, it is either abandoned by its original 'owner', or it is and was always *res nullius*, no one's thing, belonging to no one when removed (see, McHale, 2000, pp. 123–35).

Under previous circumstances, the tissue would have been presumed to have been removed because it was diseased, and thus of no further value to the person from whom it was extracted. Civil law systems such as that of France typically view the body as *une chose hors commerce*, or *res extra commercium*: a thing not subject to contract or exchange.[4] Similarly, under French law, tissue removed during a procedure is considered to be abandoned, *res derelictae*. In both cases, contracts in bodily tissue and materials are difficult or impossible to enforce, although for different reasons. In both systems,

[4] For example, an influential and determinative early report of the French Comite Con-sultatif National d'Ethique (CCNE) (French National Consultative Ethics Committee)states: 'Il faut dresser une digue contre cette merchandisation de la personne, et il n'enest pas d'autre que le principe intangible selon lequel le corps humain est hors com-merce.' ('we must set up a bulwark against such commodification of the person, andthe most fitting is the intangible principle according to which the human body is beyondcommerce.') CCNE, *Recherche biomedicale et respect de la personne humaine* (Paris, DF, 1987), cited in Anne Fagot-Largeault, 'Ownership of the human body: judicial and leg-islative responses in France' in Henk ten Have and Jos Welie (eds.), *Ownership of the Human Body: Philosophical Considerations on the Use of the Human Body and its Parts in Healthcare* (Dordrecht, Kluwer, 1998), pp. 115–40, at p 130.

patients have no further property rights in their tissue once an informed consent to its extraction or donation has been given.[5]

> "When body and subject are equated, the body is inviolable because it is identified with the subject, which makes violation not merely philosophically impermissible but jurisprudentially impossible" (Parisoli, 2002, p. 122).

The body is the substratum of the Person, and thus innate to the subject of law. In other words, there can be no distinction between the person as rights-holding subject and the body as the object of rights. If the subject is sovereign, however, there is no necessary logical link between these two propositions. We might want to maintain that the sovereign individual should have the right to dispose of her body as she wishes and indeed that the right to do so is an important cause for feminists to reclaim; hence the growing literature supporting prostitutes' rights over their own bodies, in a neo-liberal style of argument (see, Davidson, 2006, pp. 43–53).

This is the illicit slide from the assertion that the body is the subject to the claim that the subject does not have the right to dispose of her body as she sees fit. In the extreme cases of slavery or of the sale of life-sustaining organs, we can see the contradiction between disposing of one's body, in the name of free action as a subject and the subsequent extinguishing of the subject in whose name this freedom is supposed to operate. A contract of slavery, for example, is logically invalid because it extinguishes the legal existence of one party to the contract. It is therefore consistent in philosophical

[5] In France, the CCNE Avis on products derived from human materials (no. 9, February 1987) stipulates that products of commercial benefit derived from donated tissues should be sold at a market price which only reflects the researchers' and manufacturers' labour, and that the patient should have no right to any financial benefits. See Fagot-Largeault,'Ownership', p. 131

and legal terms to bar such forms of alienation of the body by sale or other means. The more difficult cases concern disposing of parts of the body, which do not threaten the continued existence of the subject. The twentieth century has witnessed massive transformations in how we deal with individual bodies. Within this discourse, the human body and human life are represented as possessing an innate dignity that is threatened as soon as a part of the body can be assigned an economic value.

The authors of *Sciences of Life: Ethics and Law* (a 1998 report to the French government), observe: "[h] uman dignity forbids that man be given a right to own his own body" (cited in Mitchell, 2001).[6] "We arrive here at one of the limits of the 'objectively necessary appearance' of personhood as a state of self-possessed embodiment demanded by, and normalized through, market transactions" (Palmié, 2006, pp.852-886). Such forms of reasoning are becoming increasingly foundational to the vast commercial possibilities opened up by recent advances in medical technology and biogenetic engineering which have come to redefine the *utility*, individual and social, of human tissue. This becomes immediately clear once we consider the legal dilemmas generated by increasingly routine medical and bio-technological practices that involve the social circulation of human bodily materials. This globalization has de-moralized humanism and it has re-defined morality. Mary Taylor Danforth wrote that, "Such research tends to treat the human body as a commodity - a means to a profitable end. The dignity and sanctity with which we regard the human whole, body as well as mind and soul, are absent when we allow researchers to further their own interests without the

[6] see, Robert Mitchell, Owning Shit: Body, Garbage, and Commodification, in *Bad Subject*, 2001 http://bad.eserver.org/issues/2001/55/mitchell.html

patient's participation by using a patient's cells as the basis for a marketable product" (cited in Brown, 2001).[7]

Again, Kant is often cited as the locus of the assertion that we are barred from using our bodies as mere tools, since that would entail treating ourselves as mere means – although to our own ends rather than those of another subject. While Kant clearly states that we are not authorised to sell any parts of our bodies, he seems to make exceptions for non-vital elements such as hair, although he is uneasy even about that. In other situations, for example in the permissible amputation of a diseased foot, Kant does appear to draw the dualistic distinction between body as object and moral person as subject, so that we are entitled to 'use'[8] the body in such a way as to preserve the person.

So although Kant at first denies that the person can be separated from the body, or that the body can be treated as a thing without injuring the person, he makes exceptions for certain parts of the body, particularly those which are not vital to life. One might think that DNA swabs used in genetic and genomic analysis, or tissue slides containing microscopic samples, would be among those modern-day exceptions that could be justified on a Kantian basis. Oddly, however, it seems that these forms of tissue extraction have often occasioned the strongest protest. [9]

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[7] Barry Brown, The Case for Caution Being Protective of Human Dignity in the Face of Corporate Forces Taking Title to Our DNA, in *The Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics* (JLME) **vol:**29 **no:**2 ,2001, https://www.aslme.org/aslmesecure/shop/show_product.php?prod_id=388

[8] 'use' in the sense that amputating a diseased foot does not seem to be 'using' the body as a tool in the same way as selling a part of the body, even selling a body part in order to keep body and soul together

[9] in a case example from Tonga, there was deep public resistance to an Australian biotechnology firm's agreement with the government to collect tissue samples for the purpose of genomic research into diabetes. As the director of the successful protest group put it, 'They came for sandalwood, now the b . . . s are after our genes.' a case example from Tonga, where there was deep public resistance to an Australian biotechnology firm's agreement with the government to

Here the real issue is not whether the rich have a right to treat bodily parts/organs of the poor only as commodities. Whether we like it or not, it is already there, the organs are ready for sale and people have accepted new vocabularies and new ways of looking at human flesh and human relations based on that bond of flesh and blood. The thesis here intends to shed light to point out, the legal and the social/political angle of this whole organ-trade in order to give legal protection to those who are needy and who are ready to part with their very own body parts just in case it will give some other relief somewhere else. May be one organ is sacrificed for the life and well-being or for the very survival of the whole body in stead. If we have to make a choice for the lesser evil, at least an appeal can be made that there should be scope for a fare deal and the organ-sellers should get the fare price for which they have taken so much risk.

About the moral and the religious dimension of the whole exercise, the thesis is at a loss to support anything definite in this direction of dehumanization of the Embodied Person. Maybe we still have to compromise with something like a lesser evil in order to avoid a greater evil, but with this cautious reminder that there should always be a human and a better way of making a deal, even to making a deal with one's own flesh and blood.

b) The Female Body and Sexual Harassment and Abuse:

This understanding of body as object/ things also keeps room for the dichotomy of nature/nurture, reason/feeling, body as male/body as lived. The identification of nature with female and reason with male, gives a glimpse of maleness as clear determinate mode of thought while femaleness as the vague and the indeterminate need a re-investigation. Given the long history of reducing women to their bodies, it is no wonder that feminist

collect tissue samples for the purpose of genomic research into diabetes. As the director of the successful protest group put it, 'They came for sandalwood, now the b . . . s are after our genes.' In Senituli, 'They came for sandalwood', p. 1.

accounts have often held body at arm's length. "We have examined the ways science inscribed markers of inferiority onto woman's body – her smaller brain size, her role in reproduction her skeletal structure and the ways in which these theories were intricately interwoven with theories of racial inferiority" (cited in Tuana, 1996)[10]. It needed the courage of a feminist scholar like Simone de Beauvoir to raise her voice against this scientific bias that woman's fragility and bodily inferiority is a scientific fact. She wrote in her book the *Second Sex* (1949), 'women are made, not born'.

It is found that there is now an added dimension to this traditional male-female dichotomous ways of identifying the Embodied Person. The 'new enclosures' of the genetic commons or of forms of human tissue threaten to extend the objectification and commodification of the body to both sexes. What we are witnessing is fear of *the feminisation of the body*. It can be said that everyone has a female body now, or, more properly, a *feminised body*: while men do not have bodies that are biologically female, both male and female bodies are now subject to the objectification that was previously largely confined to women's experience.[11] However, it is true that in some cases the feminisation of property in the body takes specific forms that can only apply to women: for example, the developing global trade in human ova.

> "Fear of feminisation and the sense of losing a property in the body are most pronounced where both men and women are the 'sources' of tissue,

[10] See, e.g., Anne Fausto-Sterling, *Myths of Gender* (New York: Basic Books, 1985); Londa Schiebinger, *The Mind Has No Sex? Women in the Origins of Modern Science* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989); Nancy Leys Stephan, "Race and Gender: The Role of Analogy in Science," *Isis* 77 (1986): 261-277.

[11] Michel Foucault has famously argued that all bodies are now subject to surveillance by modern medicine and cultural proscriptions; my argument differs from Foucault's, however, in that I focus on commodification and objectification, and in that I do not claim that all bodies are equally subject to these processes. Furthermore, my thesis is specifically feminist. While Foucault is widely regarded as the 'father' of 'body politics', this is to ignore the feminist 'mothers' (Lynda Birke, *Feminism and the Biological Body* (Edinburgh, University of Edinburgh Press, 1999), p. 33).

as in genetic patenting and biobanking. The taking of solely female tissue does not provoke such widespread coverage and concern. In other words, objectification and commodification of the body continue to be perceived as more 'normal' for women's bodies; the only difference is that what is objectified and commodified now takes new and disturbing forms, as in the 'harvesting' of ova, or the private banking of umbilical cord blood" (see, Dikenson, 2007).[12]

But even though those procedures are more invasive and far riskier than the processes involved in genetic patenting and biobanking, the comparatively small affronts involved in patenting and biobanking technologies cause greater public concern. "The crux of the claim is that commodification of human tissue and the human genome affects both sexes, and thus appears to feminise men, by threatening to reduce both men and women to the role of objects – the physical matter on which medical interventions, patenting or experimentation takes place, and which serves as the raw material from which added value can be extracted"[13] (ibid). Some Bio-ethicists and Sociologists even view the body as a *tabula rasa* on which the subject can now inscribe whatever identity he wills[14]. For example the punishing workout routines (of the body builder) and routines use of steroids transformed body from outside/in (but also inside/out)[15].

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[12] See, Dikenson, Property in theBody: Feminist Perspectives, in *Cambridge Law, Medicine and Ethics* (No. 3), Cambridge University Press 2007

[13] This, too, is a feminine role, as feminist theorists such as Donna Haraway (1988) and Sandra Harding(1984).

[14] Bernard Andrieu, 'La sante biotechnologique du corps-sujet' (2004) 3 *Revue philoso-phique* 339–44: 'Les transformations biotechnologiques de son corps seront comprises ici comme l'invention d'un corps incarnant le sujet.' ('Biological transformations of one's body will be understood here as the invention of a body that incarnates the subject.' (p. 339), and again on p. 343: 'La mati`ere biologique peutetre construite par le sujet lui-meme' as cited in Dickenson, 2007

As it is already pointed out, bodies of both the sexes are now reduced to commodities that are owned by 'powerful' others. While the laws were revised and reformed in order to correct the vulnerable situation of female bodies that were treated as the weaker sex of the two, in many countries the extension of abortion and contraception rights in the 1960s gave women increasing control over their bodies, elevating them to the status of subjects which only men had previously enjoyed. "The new enclosures throw the process into reverse. But whereas the new reproductive rights functioned mainly to raise *women* to the level of autonomy men had enjoyed – despite some commentators' view that what happened in the 1960s was that everyone gained new powers over their own bodies – the 'new enclosures' threaten both sexes" (ibid) [16]. "Commodification has also (particular) ramifications for people in the global South, particularly indigenous peoples; it may well be viewed by those peoples as part of disempowering, and arguably feminising, neo-colonialism. Since the 'new enclosures' are global in scale, they require some attempt at a global analysis" .[17]

The whole point of the feminist body argument is to illustrate how the 'bundle' concept of property concerns relationships, obviously among people, of exclusion and inclusion: common-law jurisprudence typically views property as a set of relationships between persons, not as a thing in itself. To what extent commodification of body affect

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[15] Body builders not only transform their own bodies, but they have also participated in a transformation of cultural attitudes towards male bodies

[16] They do not threaten both sexes equally: female tissue is more valuable.But because they also threaten *men*, they provoke a more pointed debate. In some cases, the feminisation of property in the body takes specific forms that can only apply to women: for example, the developing global trade in human ova. The forms of corporeal commodification which only affect women are under-researched and little noticed, so that part of the task of this book is to draw attention to them. see. Donna Dickenson, 'The threatened trade in human ova' (2004) 5(2) *Nature Reviews Genetics* 167.

[17] Such an analysis has been undertaken for whole organs by Nancy Scheper-Hughes: see e.g., 'Bodies for sale – whole or in parts' (2002) 7 *Body and Society* 1–8.

person to person relationships will be made more explicit in the section (ethics) that follows.

The presumption underlying much current discourse and debate over the ethics, law and politics of human tissue, is particularly in the areas of genetic patenting and biobanks. It has been rightly said: "what we are witnessing is nothing less than a new gold rush, and the territory is the human body" (Holland, 2001, p. 283). "An eBay auction for a healthy human kidney attracted global bids up to US$5.75 billion. A criminal ring stole the leg bones of the late broadcaster Alistair Cooke as his body lay in a New York funeral home, and subsequently sold, like those of an estimated 1,800 others, for processing into dental implants. Advertisements regularly circulate in US college newspapers, offering egg 'donors' amounts varying between US$5,000–$50,000, (Schneider, 2001) depending on 'desirability': blond, tall, athletic and musical donors command the higher prices, at considerable risk to themselves. Another, the international trade for beauty treatments of fetuses from Ukrainian women paid £100 to have an abortion"[18].

Although this chapter has dealt in mostly the Mechanical and the Cartesian model of the Embodied Person and its implications in different fields, it must be admitted that following the footsteps of Rene Descartes and others, modern medicine has made progress beyond Descartes. Despite the fact that disease became a malfunction within dualistic and physicalistic models of man, Descartes kept room for a soul in his scheme

[18] Tom Parfit, 'Beauty salons fuel trade in aborted babies', *Guardian Unlimited*, 17 April 2005, available at www.guardian.co.uk. The report alleged that women were paid extra to have late abortions, since fetuses at an advanced stage of development were thought to have greater restorative powers. In a context where abortion was, until recently, the normal mode of 'contraception', vulnerable women may feel fewer qualms about this procedure; corrupt doctors, it is alleged, are even advising women to have a termination on grounds of fetal abnormality where none exists. An illicit trade between Ukraine and Russia provides the fetuses to Moscow beauty salons, where they are sold for up to £5,000 each, as cited in Dickenson

that could name the location of the soul stuff in this machine body, modern medicine rejects this as a *non-scientific hypothesis*.

But medicine could have accepted instead a philosophy such as Spinoza's that takes mind and body to be complementary attributes of a unified, essentially social being, a being bound up with all others in relationships of mutual dependence. "Medicine could have approached holistic model that could have safeguarded the relational and Embodied Nature of man. In the realm of the ordinary, the body is the self, the site of my experiences, the fulcrum of my movements, the source of my perspectives. I experience myself as embodied" (Herman, 1998)[19]. A metaphor that has been used to represent the uniqueness of each of us is that of a Bonsai tree (Allen, 2005). There is incredible intelligence behind the way our bodies express themselves.

Toward a Phenomenological Perspective:

The search for an alternate model of the 'embodied person'

In this post Cartesian scenario there is readiness for accommodating new changes in one's understanding about the status of Embodied Person and its essentially relational nature. The conceptual revolution in modern physics foreshadows an imminent revolution in all sciences and a profound transformation of our worldview and values. The Quantum model of reality is definitely a shift from the mechanistic and the individualistic models of reality that separated man-nature and environment. "In the past decade, researchers Richard Wilkinson, Michael Marmot, and Nancy Adler, among many others, have documented high correlations between economic inequality and rates of

[19] http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2342/is_3_32/ai_55082389

illness in modern societies" (cited in Barglow, 2002)[20]. Limited access to professional health care services partly explains this correlation, but most of it is due to literally sickening life circumstances. Addressing these circumstances, which include unsanitary living conditions, unsafe workplaces and meaningless work, toxic environments, inadequate nutrition, and social isolation, is not nearly as profitable as biomedical, individual-centered care and is therefore neglected by mainstream medicine.

Larry Dossey discusses the dramatic shift in the conceptual basis of medicine and its relation to the new concepts of subatomic physics not from an abstract, theoretical point of view, but rather from the perspective of concrete clinical experience. In doing so, Dr. Dossey focuses particularly on the relation between our health and our perception of time. " Many illness, perhaps most", he writes, "may be caused either wholly or in part by our misperception of time" (pp. x-xi). The uniqueness of each individual person means that the generalisations of science may not be applicable. Awareness of such limitations has now resulted in an ever-increasing emphasis on the 'whole man'. This holistic approach views disease as the result of an interaction between many factors (genes, environment, biology, and psychology), which cannot be broken down like the parts of a machine.

The following chapter is an exploration for an alternate model of embodied person that would provide a corrective measure to the ones that have failed to recover the embodied subjectivity through a re-evaluation of perception that goes beyond the duality

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[20] Raymond Barglow, Medicine at the Millennium: Still Caught between Descartes and Spinoza, Published in *Tikkun Magazine*, March 2002, http://www.barglow.com/medicine_at_the_millennium.htm

of the Cartesian metaphysics. In so doing, the chapter would identify Maurice Merleau-Ponty as one of the key figures in the whole phenomenological movement out of which new attempts emerged not only for challenging the unjustified division between the body and self, but also for recovering the context dependent and relational nature of embodied subjectivity.

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Chapter 6

Phenomenology of the Embodied Person

This chapter would discuss the Phenomenological approach to *The Problem of the Embodied Person* and its implications especially to the Life World issues some of which are already discussed in the previous chapter. In order to explore significance of the body in phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty, this chapter makes an attempt at introducing phenomenology with special emphasis on Edmund Husserl and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. This, it is hoped, will provide the necessary background for understanding what is meant by the phenomenological model of the embodied person and in what sense this one in particular, appears to have better impact than some others of its kind.

The Post Cartesian situation and the search for an alternate way of doing philosophy:

Although it took some while for philosophers and Cognitive scientists to acknowledge the importance of the body in academic discussions, the denigration of the body governed most metaphysical thought, and perhaps even most philosophical thought, until at least Nietzsche (Reynolds, 2002). If biotechnologies have paradoxically resulted in undermining the tradition mind-body-dualism, the question arising of how to conceive the newly discovered unity of man shows the importance of the phenomenological approach to the mind-body-problem, especially because the naturalistic model of the mind-body-identity is not able to explain all aspects of this unity. The main theme of the present chapter centers round the concepts of embodiment within a phenomenological perspective.

In our contemporary time, on the one hand one can witness this unique phenomenon of an apparently explicit and nearly universal rejection of Cartesian dualism in academic discussions on *embodiment*, yet it seems that Cartesianism is not that easy to escape (Gallagher, 1995). Even at this point there are many Cognitive scientists, who are ready to willingly reduce all mental events to brain processes thereby replacing intentional explanations with neurophysiological accounts. In such a view, the body is reduced to a mental process. A good example of this disembodiment is the image of the *brain in the vat* (Dennett xxx; see Gallagher, 1995). Although the 20th postmodern century has succeeded in replacing the image of the brain in the vat, with the image of *a* disembodied person, the embodied person is somehow resurrected in a modified of a *digital body* in a *digital space*. Hence, the same question, as centuries ago, is committed for trial once again. This time again we have to look in the eye of Descartes. It appears that many technology-theories will celebrate the final and total disembodiment of the virtual body. From their point of view the new technology is ultimately liberating us because in cyberspace we can leave our age, sex and race behind and interact in a disembodied space. To a large extent, the new technology has succeeded in creating the ultimate, invisible body or the anti-gravitational body, the multi-layered, the vanishing, the inside-out bodies.

Is it possible to forget the physical, materialised body when we fly in digitalized space? In other words, is it possible to exist disembodied (the underlying assumption of many of the technology-theories)? In its search for an alternate model of an embodied person this chapter seeks to safeguard 'embodied subjectivity' that keeps bodily identity as central. Following Maurice Merleau-Ponty, this chapter opts for a rejection of any

claim that makes a distinction between Disembodiment and Embodiment simply because, as Merleau-Ponty lets us know: *I am just my body*. Any distinction between 'I' and 'my body' would necessary lead to the conclusion that I can also have a non-body.

The omnipresence of the body, in terms of Merleau-Ponty, excludes any pure non-physical state. This is a crucial step. As long as one makes a distinction between disembodiment and embodiment, even when they are intimately related and connected, one falls into the trap of body-mind duality. In the phenomenological perspective, cognition depends on experience that is informed by a body with various perceptual and motor capacities are supported (see, Gallagher, 1995). In this notion, the concept of 'flesh' becomes relevant. Merleau-Ponty uses the word 'flesh', as the domain in which experiences exist. Experiences are the mode of functioning by which we, inevitably, participate in the flesh.

Merleau-Ponty re-names the lived body as 'human flesh'. In terms of the 'flesh' we are able to have direct, immediate contact with others and the world. This is the immediate contact of seer and seen, both of which are made of the same stuff, that is, flesh.

> "My body is not able to forget its flesh. Although not always consciously, my body is always present and is involved in every action I undertake, even when I dream, invent or imagine things. Notice that my imagined bodily appearance can take a completely different appearance than my 'real' or materialised body. Imagining to be somewhere or to be someone else, does not mean that I leave my own, materialized body behind and escape via the back of my head, since this imagination is located in and

originating from my body. I cannot leave my 'real' body behind because I am always with my body. That is*, I am my body* "(Hermans, 2002)[1].

Phenomenology seeks to safeguard a natural embodied and an embedded person in terms of the intentionality of the lived-body. From a phenomenological point of view the naturalistic position is not very satisfying because it is not able to explain the fundamental psychic activity, that is, "intentionality." "Intentionality" here means the "correlations-apriori" of "*noesis*" and "*noema*," that is, those psychic acts always refer to an object. To think, means always to think of something. The materialistic theories are not able to do justice to the mental, because all they can do is detect a concomitance of mental phenomena and certain biochemical processes. The mental as such cannot even be detected in this model. Maybe, someday, Physiology will be able to describe exactly what biochemical processes happen, when I see something red, and also gives information about what it means for me to see this colour, without which, the phenomenon as such remains outside this description. The two aspects the naturalistic[2] model of the mind-body-unity namely, "intentionality" and "phenomenality," which fail to explain the phenomenon as such, are the very core of the phenomenology of the body, that represent a more convincing concept of mind-body-unity. Phenomenology of the body, inaugurated by Husserl and developed by Jean-Paul Sartre, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Hermann Schmitz and Bernhard Waldenfels, does not try to reduce the mind to an *epiphenomenon*

[1] Carolien Hermans, *Embodiment: the flesh and bones of my body,*August 2002 Amsterdam, http://www.du.ahk.nl/mijnsite/papers/embodiment.htm

[2] A strong version of the naturalistic conception can be found in the "Identity-Theory," which stresses the identity of "mental states" with biochemical processes of the brain. Smart, J.C.C., "Sensations and brain process" in The Philosophical Review 68 (1959),141-156; Lewis, D. K., "An argument for the identity theory" in The Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966), 17-25; Pitcher, G., Theory of Perception (Princeton 1971); Armstrong, D. M., Perception and the Physical World (London & New York: Brill Academic Publishers, 1961); Armstrong, D. M., A Materialist Theory of the Mind (London & New York: Routledge, 1993);

of the body,[3] like the materialistic theories, but conceives the 'living body' (*Leib*) as the way in which the human being exists. From a phenomenological point of view the body is the medium of our existence - human acts as well as the place where the world appears. The description of the Body as medium of existence also clarifies how it is possible to be a body and at the same time to have a body (cited in Weiss)[4].

In order to understand Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of the embodied person we have to understand the background from which Merleau-Ponty derived inspiration for safeguarding the relational nature of body-mind and values. It needs a re-appraisal of some of the basic ideas of his predecessors, Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger and others that all originated from the desire to do philosophy differently and phenomenologically. What follows is a brief outline of some of the basic ideas of phenomenology of Edmund Husserl.

Edmund Husserl and the Phenomenological Movement:

The *Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy* defines phenomenology as "one among the many contemporary philosophical conceptions that have a clearly delineated body of doctrines and whose essential characteristics can be expressed by a set of well chosen statement" (Blackburn, 1996, p.578). Herbert Spiegelberg offers the following definition of Phenomenology, in the 'Encyclopedia Britannica':

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[3] epiphenomenona of the body, a mere spin-off from an organism as soon as it has reached a stage of adequate complexity. This position was repeatedly affirmed by Thomas Henry Huxley (1825 - 1895) in London. He observed, "Thoughts are the expression of molecular changes in that material of life which is the source of our other vital phenomena." (1870, p. 152.) And again, "Mind is a function of matter when that matter has attained a certain degree of organization." (1871,p. 464.) And once more, "Thought is as much a function of matter as motion is." (1870, p. 371.) In short, man is wholly accountable in terms of molecules. When he dies, he returns to the dust, and there is in man no such thing as an independent soul or spirit, which survives the disintegration of the body. The vital distinction between man and animal, which is displayed in the divergent destinies of their spirits, is entirely undermined by this line of reasoning.

[4] Weiss,G, Martin ., *The Body of Phenomenology; Unforeseen Phenomenological Outcomes of Biotechnologies*, http://newschool.edu/GF/phil/husserl/Future/Part%20Two/Weiss.html

> "Phenomenology is, in the 20th century, mainly the name for a philosophical movement whose primary objective is the direct investigation and description of phenomena as consciously experienced, without theories about their causal explanation and as free as possible from unexamined preconceptions and presuppositions" (1998, vol. 9, pp. 360-361)

According to Husserl, "Phenomenology is primarily a methodology of philosophy. Phenomenology makes philosophy a matter of the experience and description of conscious human behaviour, in its subjective and objective aspects"(cited in Pettit, 1972, p. 242). Phenomenology is concerned only with the Consciousness aspect of experience and subject (bracketing the natural attitude-*epoche*) and it is in this sense that phenomenology helps philosophy in understanding the matter of experience and description of conscious human behavior/ experience. Husserl's idea is that on the typical phenomenological view, philosophy is a mater of description, as distinct from physiology and psycho-analysis, which may indeed involve explanation. Philosophy tries to explain any experience or essence in a non-reductive manner. In other words philosophy confines itself to the direct evidence of intuition, which cannot be, explained using deductive theory.

Husserl establishes a separate field for research in logic, philosophy and phenomenology, independently from the empirical sciences. Husserl pointed out that the conceptualization of appearance and the meaning of experience (*eidos*) is to be found in the phenomena themselves. Phenomenology has been mistaken with psychologism from its beginning in the early twentieth century. Robert Sokolowski notes, "psychologism was

the foil against which phenomenology defined itself" (2000, p.113). The basic difference between phenomenology and psychologism is that the latter claims that things like logic, truth, verification, evidence, and reasoning are simply empirical activities of our psyche or laws of our mind. Psychologism [5] is the philosophical position that regards empirical psychology as the most basic philosophical discipline. "Phenomenology has waged a heroic struggle against psychologism from the beginning and it tries to show that the activity of achieving meaning, truth, and logical reasoning is not just a feature of our psychological or biological makeup, but that it enters into a new domain of rationality, a domain that goes beyond the psychological" (ibid, p.115).

Husserl's point is that though meaning and truth have their empirical dimension, to understand them simply in term of psychological sense is to leave out something important. Meaning and truth can be interpreted both in term of empirical and transcendental and one can even limit one's consideration to the empirical side of things. Nevertheless there is another aspect, which could not be negated altogether. And it is the task of phenomenologist to show what that extra something is. Husserl claims that humans live encountering each other and co-exist in what he calls the 'natural attitude',[6] where in inter-subjectivity is taken for granted. It is phenomenology, which struggles to go beyond the natural attitude, a broader perspective than just psychologism or

[5] Psychologism is a generic type of position in philosophy according to which psychology plays a central role in grounding or explaining some other, non-psychological type of fact or law. Psychologism was famously criticized by Frege in his *The Foundations of Arithmetic*, and many of his works and essays, including his review of Husserl's *Philosophy of Arithmetic*. Edmund Husserl, in the first volume of his *Logical Investigations*, called "The Prolegomena of Pure Logic", criticized psychologism thoroughly and sought to distance himself from it. The "Prolegomena" is considered a more concise, fair, and thorough refutation of psychologism than the criticisms made by Frege, and also it is considered today by many as being a memorable refutation for its decisive blow to psychologism.

[6] Husserl proposed that the world of objects and ways in which we direct ourselves toward and perceive those objects is normally conceived of in what he called the "natural standpoint", which is characterized by a belief that objects materially exist and exhibit properties that we see as emanating from them

naturalism, which attempts to apply the methods of the natural sciences to all other domains of knowledge and investigation, including the realm of consciousness.

In naturalism or psychologism, human reason becomes naturalised. Husserl in his avoidance and dismissal of psychologism, hinted at or looked more deeply at the intentionality of consciousness.[7] As J.N.Mohanty states that:

> "Husserl faced the 'mystery' of the relation of the ideal structures that found logic and knowledge to the mind that 'grasps' them. He was able to give an account of this relation, which was not psychologistic. For this one needs- Husserl provides us with – a sufficiently rich theory of intentionality and a concept of the mental, which is not psychologistic"(1982, p. 116).

Intentionality:

Intentionality is the salient structure of our conscious experience, since any conscious experience, according to Husserl, is always experience of or about this or that (Spiegelberg, 1982). The term 'intentionality' indicates the inseparable connectedness of the human being to the world. Every conscious experience is bi-polar: there is an object that presents itself to a subject or ego. This means that all thinking (imagining, perceiving, remembering, etc.) is always thinking about something. The same is true for actions: grasping is grasping for something, hearing is hearing something, pointing is pointing at something. All human activity is always oriented activity, directed by that which orients it.

[7] that consciousness is consciousness of a certain entity

This form of inner awareness has been a topic of considerable debate centuries after the issue arose with Locke's notion of self-consciousness on the heels of Descartes' sense of consciousness. It is said that the history of philosophy from Cartesian, Hobbesian and Lockean tradition has understood consciousness as awareness of ourselves or our own ideas, imagination, etc. which does not direct towards the things 'outside'. But the importance of Husserl's intentionality is to have a common world where we are not enclosed in the circle of our own conscious existence and the states of that consciousness. The phenomenon of intentionality shows that the mind is also public, that it can act and manifest itself out in the open and not just confine itself inside its own isolated inner domain.

Even then, Husserlian phenomenological movement is based upon the important contributions that his philosophical predecessors have made in this regard. Looking back at Descartes, Husserl stated he was like Columbus who discovered a new world without realizing it, the realm of pure subjectivity. Husserl proposes that Descartes was correct in suggesting that the external world may not exist.[8] However unlike Descartes who attempted to deduce the existence of the God and the world from the thinking mind, Husserl suggests that it is the thinking mind itself that our inquiry ought to be directed towards. The defining characteristic of Husserls' phenomenology is intentionality of consciousness and the task of a theory according to Husserl, is to sustain and attentive description of the phenomena given to consciousness. This description for Husserl is phenomenological because the relationship between the 'given' and consciousness is not a physical relationship as holds between a person's body and other physical objects, or a

[8] Husserl states: 'Historically we find the seed of transcendental philosophy in Descartes' (Erste Philosopghie, Huav111 4).

relationship between a person's ego and the physical objects. The relation to the 'given' belongs to the experiencing itself, whether the object actually exists or not.

This has important methodological consequences. In every case of intentionality, the important question for Husserl is what is the phenomenological structure of the intending act by virtue of which it is an intentional experience directed towards a given object in a specific way? In the 'Logical Investigations', vol.2, Husserl lets us know, that a presentation relates to a certain object in a certain way is not due to anything external to the presentation but to its own inner pecularity alone. This has important methodological consequences. In every case of intentionality, the important question for Husserl is not what short of object must we say is intended in this act, but rather what is the phenomenological structure of this act by virtue of which it is an intentional experience direted towards a given object in a specific way? Husserl thus abandons the object-approach to intentionality and adoptd a new conception of it, a conception which may be marked as 'phenomenological' because it attempts to explain intentionality in terms of the intentional experiences as opposed to their objects. Broadly defined, phenomenology is a description of the intrinsic structure of consciousness or contents of experiences.

Transcendental Phenomenology after the *Ideen* (1913):

In *Ideas I* (Book One, 1913) Husserl made some key elaborations, which led him to the distinction between the act of consciousness (*noesis*) and the phenomena at which it is directed (*noemata*). Husserl introduced two Greek words to capture his version of the Bolzanoan distinction: *noesis* and *noema*[9] as being two poles of one act of consciousness – the object perceived and the manner in which it was perceived. The intentional process

[9] *noesis* and *noema* from the Greek verb *noéaw*, meaning to perceive, think, intend, whence the noun *nous* or mind

of consciousness is called *noesis*, while its ideal content is called *noema*. The noema of an act of consciousness Husserl characterized both as an ideal meaning and as 'the object *as* intended'. That is :

- "noetic" refers to the intentional act of consciousness (believing, willing, hating and loving)
- "noematic" refers to the object or content (*noema*) which appears in the noetic acts (respectively the believed, wanted, hated and loved).

Thus the phenomenon, or object-as-it-appears, becomes the *noema*, or object-as-it-is-intended. Husserl asserted that each intentional experience has a *noema* and in it a sense through which it relates to the object. It is through intentionality that we are able to see that these are two sides of the same coin- without a *noema* (a sense), there would be no *noesis* (reference) and similarly vice versa. Husserl says that the acts[10] - the *noesen* have different meaning-structure- different *noemata*[11]. Husserlian phenomenology claims that the analysis of acts is the avenue to the analysis of though. What we observe is not the object as it is in itself, but how and in as much it is given in the intentional acts. In other word, the meaning-structure of objects varies depending upon intuition[12].

Husserl considers intuition as the highest stage of knowledge akin to mathematics and thought that similar intuitive fulfillments occurred in many types of experience and so not just restricted to the truths of mathematics. There are different kinds of intuitive experience and Husserl attempted to develop a classification of all conscious experience,

[10] acts -,which are taking place in time and space are an intentional phenomena filled with meaning that the phenomenologist tries to excavate
[11] *noemata* - the way we are directed towards the world in seeing, smelling, touching, talking and thinking
[12] Intuition is the mode of *givenness*

with an eye to considering their essential natures and the kinds of intuitive fulfillment, which were proper to them. He announced his *Principle of all Principle* in 'Ideas I':

> "That every originary presentive intuition is a legitimizing source of cognition, that everything originarily offered to us in " intuition" is to be accepted simply as what it is presented as being, but also within the limits in which it is presented there" (pp. 43-44).

Husserl calls this intuitions 'originary giving' or 'presentive intuitions' and claim that every originary presentive intuition is to be accepted simply as *what it is presented as being*, but also within the limits in which it is presented there. For example to think of a book and to look at a book represent two different types of acts: that is, the mode of givenness of the book is different in each case, although the acts could be directed towards the same book. Again to look at a book and to look at a lion are two different acts and the meaning-structure of the objects involved are different. This does not just have to do with colour and shape (that is sensation) but it has to do with the fact that we expect very different things from a book and a lion. They have a different meaning-structure as parts of the same meaningful world of experience.

However the similarity between them is that, both things are given to perception in space and time with a specific colour and form. Again the object of an act in a dream or a fantasy has yet another mode of existence - but the act still has a meaning-structure, and it is an intentional phenomenon, which can be studied. This concept of originary presentive intuition is the very core of Husserl's philosophy. Husserl is aware of the fact that in our manner of engagement with experience on ordinary life, our practical concerns, folk assumptions, and smattering of scientific knowledge, got in the way of a

pure consideration of experience as it is given to us. But whatever be the mode of existence or givenness, the claims of phenomenology is that, the meaning of every phenomenon- every act - could be studied by the systematical change in our attention. Knowledge of essences would only be possible by 'bracketing'[13] all assumptions about the existence of an external world and the inessential (subjective) aspects of how the object is concretely given to us. The reduction as Husserl envisages it, proceeds in three levels, each of which is itself characterised as a reduction.

The first step, that is, psychological reduction yields a study of the ego and its acts by means of natural or psychological reflection, a reflection that takes place within the 'natural attitude'. Natural attitude includes the viewpoint of ordinary life. These presuppositions of our common sense attitude makeup what Husserl calls the 'general thesis' of the natural attitude. The natural attitude and its general thesis are suspended and set aside in his psychological reduction. The suspension of these presuppositions is what Husserl calls 'e*poché*' or 'bracketing' the general thesis of the natural attitude so that one can attend to a phenomenon as it shows itself.

Secondly, Husserl extends the methods of 'e*poché*' to the ego and its cogitations. The bracketing of the empirical elements in consciousness, involved what is called the phenomenological attitude. In phenomenological attitude we look at and describe, analytically, all the particular intentionalities and their correlates and world belief as well with the world as its correlative, which are found in the natural attitude. In other word we 'freeze' the natural objects for the time being as freezing of the object leads us to the first step of phenomenological attitude which is also known as phenomenological reduction.

[13] Bracketing (also called epoche or the phenomenological reduction) is a term derived from Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) for the act of suspending judgement about the natural world

In phenomenological reflection/ reduction, for instance, I need not give a visual experience of a tree. We concern ourselves with *how* the object appears to me. For example, I see an Eucalyptus tree, not a Yucca tree; I see that object as an Eucalyptus, with a certain shape, with bark stripping off, etc. Thus, bracketing the tree itself, we turn our attention to our experience of the tree, and specifically to the content or meaning in my experience. This tree-as-perceived Husserl calls the noema or noematic sense of the experience (see, Smith,2003).

Reflection is the most important part of Husserl's methodological devices, because it explicitly reveals the structures of consciousness that are the subject matter of phenomenlogy as Husserl conceives it. Phenomenological description of the ego captures only those transcendental features of the ego that are essential to it as the subject of intentional experiences. Similarly, phenomenological theory of experience is concerned with the essential, not the idiosyncratic features of the ego acts. These essential features of the ego and its acts are isolated by means of 'eidetic reduction'.

By 'essence' or 'eidos' Husserl means properties, kinds or types, the ideal species, – that entities may exemplify. With respect to entities of a given type, or essence, eidetic reduction is the methodological procedure of 'bracketing' the particular individuals that exemplify the essence, so ignoring their individual peculiarities. Eidetic reduction proceed by a process of generalization which Husserl called 'free variation of imagination' .We cannot imagine a colour without an extended area which has the colour and vice-versa, or a sound which has no pitch; if we are now perceiving a house from the front we can imagine its backside to be made of wood or concrete, but we cannot imagine

to have no backside without its ceasing to be what it is.Eidetic characteristics thus express conditions for the possibility of the type of object in question.

According to Husserl any domain of entities whatsoever can be subjected to an eidetic reduction, which will uncover essential truths about things of that domain, physical objects, mathematical entities, other persons, aesthetic objects and so on. It is not surprising, therefore that Husserl's method of eidetic redcution has received considerable attention in disicplines outside philosophy proper and that may be seen by some as potentially the most important methodological contribution of Husserl to the natural and human sciences.The aim of the reduction or bracketing or *epoché* is to reactive direct and primitive contact with the world as we experience it rather than as we conceptualize it.

Phenomenology and its Critics:

After Husserl's publication of the *Ideen* in 1913, many phenomenologists took a critical stance towards his new theories of phenomenology as speculation on transcendental subjectivity. Especially the members of the Munich[14] group distanced themselves from his new transcendental phenomenology and preferred the earlier realist phenomenology of the first edition of the *Logical Investigations*. Existential phenomenology Heidegger in contrast with his former mentor Edmund Husserl, put ontology before epistemology and thought that phenomenology would have to be based on an observation and analysis of *Dasein* ('being-there'). Hiedegger thinks of conscious being as always and already in the world. German philosopher Theodor Adorno criticised

[14] Munich Phenomenology refers to the group of philosophers, psychologists and phenomenologists that studied and worked in Munich at the beginning of the twentieth century, when Edmund Husserl published his masterwork, the *Logical Investigations* and began the phenomenological movement

Husserl's concept of phenomenological epistemology in his metacritique 'Against Epistemology', which is anti-foundationalist in its stance (see, Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia)[15].

Philosophers succeeding Husserl debated the proper characterisation of phenomenology, arguing over its results and its methods. While within the phenomenologist movement as a whole there are several related currents, they too, are by no means homogeneous. Though these currents have a common point of departure, they do not project towards the same destination. The thinking of most phenomenologists has changed so greatly that their respective views can be presented adequately only showing them in their gradual development. This is true not only for Husserl, the founder of the phenomenological movement, but also for such later phenomenologists as Heidegger (1889-19770), Sartre (1905-80) and Merleau-Ponty (1908-61).

Nevertheless all those who consider themselves phenomenologists subscribe, for instance, to his watchword, *Zu den Sachen selbst* ('To the things themselves'), by which they meant the taking of a fresh approach to concretely experienced phenomena, an approach, as free as possible from conceptual presuppositions and the attempt to describe them as faithfully as possible. Moreover, most adherents to Phenomenology, holds that, it is possible to obtain insights into the essential structures and the essential relationships of these phenomena on the basis of a careful study of concrete examples supplied by experience or imagination and by a systematic variation of these examples in imagination. Some phenomenologists also stress the need for studying the ways in which the phenomena appear in man's object-directed ('intentional') consciousness.

[15] Phenomenology, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phenomenology

Beyond this merely static aspect of appearance, some also want to investigate its genetic aspect, exploring, for instance, how the phenomenon intended-for example, a book--shapes ('constitutes') itself in the typical unfolding of experience. Husserl himself believed that such studies require a previous suspension of belief in the reality of these phenomena, whereas others consider it not indispensable but helpful. Finally, in existential phenomenology, the meanings of certain phenomena (such as anxiety) are explored by a special interpretive ('hermeneutic') phenomenology, the methodology of which needs further clarification (see also *epoché*). Phenomenology was not founded, it grew. The chapter that follows will center round the basic ideas of Maurice Merleau Ponty and his introduction of a new model of the Embodied Person.

Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology and Critical Psychology:

In his effort to reconstruct the epistemology, Merleau-Ponty takes into various aspects of his phenomenology that cannot be viewed alone, but rather needs to take whole perspectives of his phenomenological epistemology. The thesis will consider only those aspects of his phenomenological project that will have the most significant bearing on our understanding of his 'Philosophy of Embodiment'. This needed an exploration into an introductory note on some rudimentary ideas of Husserl's phenomenology that is already taken care of. This is because the very idea of a 'Phenomenology of Perception' would be unthinkable outside the phenomenological movement, of course, and like Heidegger before him, Merleau-Ponty was at pains to acknowledge his debt to the founder of the movement. But his enthusiasm for the spirit of phenomenology undoubtedly led him to overestimate the affinities between Husserl's conception of intentionality and his own. Even though any careful reading of the two also reveals some

subtle differences between them Merleau-Ponty needs to be understood in the background of Husserlian phenomenology.

The manuscript later published as 'Ideas II', the manuscripts composed between 1912 and 1928 that makeup the Second Book of Husserl's 'Ideas', clearly made a profound impression on Merleau-Ponty, so much so that he once described studying it as 'an almost voluptuous experience'. Husserl's theory of bodily intentionality is predicated on what he considers "the privilege of the localization of touch sensations" (Ideas II, p. 150), that is, the double aspect of tactile sensation that he thinks grounds our bodily intentionality. This immediate sense of one's own concrete agency is what Schopenhauer calls "will" without which one would be, he says, "nothing more than the purely knowing subject (a winged cherub without a body)" (1851,p.18). For Schopenhauer, consequently, "My body and my will are one," (ibid) and the immediate familiarity I have with my own concrete agency differs fundamentally from the representational knowledge I have of objects, including my body in its external aspect. Like Schopenhauer and Merleau-Ponty, Husserl appreciates the constitutive role of free bodily movement in our perception of the environment Meditations. For example, he writes in his 'Cartesian Meditation (1960)':

> "Among the ... bodies (*Körper*) of this nature I then find uniquely singled out my body (*Leib*) ... the only one in which I immediately have free rein (*schalte und walte*), and in particular govern in each of its organs —. I perceive with my hands, touching kinesthetically, seeing with my eyes, etc., and can so perceive at any time, while these kinestheses of the organs proceed in the I am doing and are subject to my I can; furthermore, putting

these kinestheses into play, I can push, shove, etc., and thereby directly, and then indirectly, act corporeally (*leiblich*)" (p. 97).

Husserl's emphasis on the significant distinction between *Leib* and *Korper*, between prereflecively lived body or the subjectivity of the embodied person and the body as object are pointers in this direction. Merleau-Ponty put it in this way; "an infant will understand the affective meaning of a smile long before it has seen its own face in a mirror" (1964,pp. 96-155). It is only through the medium of the body that we get to 'experience' and 'perceive' the world, "our own body is in the world as the heart is in the organism: it keeps the visible spectacle constantly alive, it breathes life into it and sustains it inwardly, and with it forms a system" (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p.203).

Phenomenology of Perception:

Following Husserl, Merleau-Ponty affirmed the philosophy of 'intentionality', which simply means 'toward-ness' or 'directed-ness'. He agrees with Husserl that *all consciousness is consciousness of something* which implies a distinction between 'acts of thought' (the *noesis*) and 'intentional objects of thought' (the *noema*). Thus, the correlation between *noesis* and *noema* becomes the first step in the constitution of analyses of consciousness. "This means that my knowledge is not simply knowledge qua knowledge, but it is knowledge of something. Similarly, my perception is not simply perception qua perception, but it is a perception of something" (ibid, p.203). That is for any perception, there is a knower and something that is known. Merleau-Ponty thus defines consciousness in terms of perceptual consciousness that takes a significant turn in the development of phenomenology, indicating that its conceptualisations should be re-

examined in the light of the *Primacy of Perception*. Merleau-Ponty posits meaning to the object itself.

Perception plays a fundamental role in Merleau-Ponty's work for it challengingly overrides the entire concept of consciousness, a notion that is crucial to both Cartesian and phenomenological epistemology. As such and insofar as we understand and perceive the world via our body, perception can only be embodied, hence, the production of knowledge, whether subjective or objective, can only exist within a corporeal reality that is itself embedded within an implosion of specific contexts and situations. Merleau-Ponty did not however, posit that meaning with any cosmic significance in mind. It is likened to one portion of a work of art having meaning with respect to the whole.

Merleau-Ponty was very much in tune with the meaning in which our context can colour our perception and our knowing. Perceptual meaning, he contends, is inaccessible to reflection; it cannot be separated from the sensible object, which has it, not even ideally or in theory. In studying the posthumous manuscripts of Husserl, Merleau-Ponty remarked that, in their evolution, Husserl's work brings to light phenomena which are not assimilable to *noetic-noematic* correlation. This is particularly the case when one attends to the phenomena of the body (which is at once body-subject and body-object), subjective time (the consciousness of time is neither an act of consciousness nor an object of thought) and the other (the first considerations of the other in Husserl led to solipsism). Hence the distinction between 'acts of thought' (*noesis*) and 'intentional objects of thought' (*noema*) does not seem, therefore, to constitute an irreducible ground. It appears rather at a higher level of analysis.

Merleau Ponty's *Primacy of Perception*, published in 1964, explains his theory of perception as:

> "Our experience of perception comes from our being present...at the moment when things, truths, and values are constituted for us; that perception is a nascent logos; that it teaches us, outside of all dogmatism, the true conditions of objectivity itself; that is summons us to the tasks of knowledge and action. It is not a question of reducing human knowledge to sensation, but of assisting at the birth of this knowledge, to make it as sensible as the sensible, to recover the consciousness of rationality. This experience of rationality is lost when we take it for granted as self-evident, but is, on the contrary, rediscovered when it is made to appear against the background of non-human nature" (p. 25).

He believed that perception has a primacy to it that has been ignored or undervalued by previous philosophers. He sees with clarity the myth of Cartesian certainty that can never cognitively possess and exhaust an object. In the preface to the *Phenomenology of Perception,* he states:

> " Perception is not a science of the world, it is not even an act, a deliberate taking up of a position, rather it is a background from which all acts stand out, and is presupposed by them" (p. x-xi).

As Merleau-Ponty states in his 'Primacy of Perception', "we must say that at each moment our ideas express not only the truth but our capacity to attain it at that given moment. Skepticism begins of we conclude from this that our ideas are false. But this can only happen with reference to some idol of absolute knowledge" (1964, p.21). He notes,

in *Phenomenology of Perception*: " the cogito that I receive is a meaning-laden cogito. When I read it and appropriate it to myself, I have given it new shades of meaning with respect to my own 'intentional arc', my own situation, time, space, history, etc which is now an approximation of what the cogito was for Descartes himself" (pp.369-409). There is a sense in which perception is transcendentally necessary for Merleau-Ponty. It is that which is necessary for the epistemic process to take place. Hence it is Primary. His *Primacy of Perception* is especially true of the manner in which we are embodied, a significant contribution he made to the philosophical scene of the twentieth century. Merleau-Ponty himself describes it this way:

> " The perceiving mind is an incarnate mind. I have tried, first of all, to re-establish the roots of the mind in its body and in its world, going against the doctrines that treat perception as simple result of the action of external things on our body as well as against those which insist on the autonomy of consciousness. These philosophies commonly forget-in favor of a pure exteriority or of a pure interiority- the insertion of the mind in corporeality, the ambiguous relationship which we entertain with our body and, correlatively, with perceived things" (1945, p.15)

The above quotation makes it clear that the emergence of any perceptual behavior depends not only on the working of isolated pure cogito but also in relation to a particular situation and to a particular environment. With reference to this, Merleau-Ponty made a distinction between the 'geographical environment' and the 'behavioral environment', just as he distinguished between 'geographical behaviour'[16] and behaviour in the proper

[16] the sum of the movement actually executed by the animal in their objective relation with the physical world

sense of the term, that is, the kinetic melody gifted with a meaning. These kinetic meaning movement is not simply a sequence of events within the world of things since they carry within themselves an immanent intelligibility. Similarly, one can recognize a face without being explicitly aware of particular details of the face, the colour of the eyes or of the hair, for example:

> " the human signification is given before the alleged sensible signs. A face is a center of human expression, the transparent envelop of the attitudes and desires of others, the place of manifestation, the barely material support for a multitude of intention. This is why it seems impossible for us to treat a face or a body, even a dead body, likes a thing. They are sacred entities, not the ' givens of sight" (1942, p.167).

Phenomenology for Merleau-Ponty too, like that of his predecessor Husserl, consisted in forgetting the theoretical construction of science that is in the word of Husserl, "the pre-predicative life of consciousness" (cited in Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p.x) and replacing ourselves in the world as we actually experience it, experience not yet articulated in positional form of subject/predicate form. Such pre-predicative experience of the world does not consist a collection of discrete, atomistic and fully determined sense-data, which acquire unity only because it is imposed upon them by our own minds. Rather, it is the experience of a being with a body caught up in a finite and limited situation but nevertheless with the experience of possibilities within that situation.

Merleau-Ponty's 'Phenomenology of Perception', is attempted in showing perception as having an active dimension of a primordial openness to the life- world as opposed to the idea of perception as causal product of atomic sensation . The conception

of perception as atomistic causal, drove the tradition beginning with John Locke, and was being perpetuated in certain psychological currents of the time, particularly in behaviourist psychology. In his first book, 'The Structure of Behavior', Merleau-Ponty was critical of the reductionalist scientific account of animal and human experience, found in certain form of empiricism (e.g. Mill), reflex physiology (Pavlov) and behaviourism (Watson). Merleau-Ponty criticised the popularly misunderstood relation between consciousness and nature. Physics, biology or psychology attempts to explain the relation between consciousness and nature in terms of causes and effects that acts mechanically.[17] Merleau-Ponty in his 'The Structure of Behaviour' tries to analyze behaviour with the aim of 'defining a-new' traditional distinction between the mental and the physiological.

Already in 'The Structure of Behaviour', Merleau-Ponty, was focusing on the nature of perception, which he was trying to define in an organic manner. He particularly attacked the empiricist claim of the "hypothesis of sensation" (1942, p.166), that all knowledge is composed out of a bedrock of simple sensation, as for example like Hume's impression. Against the theory of Hume's impressionism, Merelau-Ponty illustrates the example of newborn infant. "The new born infant is oriented immediately towards his or her mother's face, not towards a bundle of sensations or towards objects in the world" (ibid, p.166). The first object infant see are smiles. For Merleau-Ponty the perception of a particular colour depends on the mode of the existence of the primitive objects of perception be it a figures or a ground that is the 'lived realities' rather than just the known as 'true objects'. Merleau-Ponty gave the following example to illustrate this point:

[17] nature designates the multiplicity of events that are external to each other, and bound together by causal relations

" for the player in action the field is not an ' object', this is, the ideal term which can give rise to an indefinite multiplicity of perspective views and remains equivalent under its apparent transformations. It is pervade with lines of force the yard lines; those which demarcate the 'penalty area' and articulated in sectors for example, the 'opening between the adversaries which call for a certain mode of action and which initiate and guide the action as if the player were unaware of it. The field itself is not given to him, but present as the immanent term of his practical intentions; the player becomes one with it and feels the direction of the 'goal', for example, just as immediately as the vertical and the horizontal; plabnes of his own body. It would not be sufficient to say that consciousness inhabits this milieu. At this moment consciousness is nothing other than the dialectic of milieu and action. Each maneuver undertaken by the player modifies the character of the field and establishes in it new lines of force in which the action in turn unfolds and is accomplished, again altering the phenomenal field" (Hughson and Englis, 2002, pp. 4-5).

However, the intellectualist, like the empiricist deals with the world is the same objective manner. After giving the negative philosophy of the empiricist, Merleau-Ponty, devotes to a critique of what he labeled the 'intellectualists' who sought a place of genesis of reality in the mind, best represented by Descartes and Kant. According to the intellectualist, it is the mind that imposes structure and reality. Again, the body is neither an internal subject nor a fully external object of experience. Moreover, as embodied

perceivers, we do not typically understand ourselves as pure egos standing in a merely external relation to our bodies, for example by "having" or "owning" them, instead the body is itself already the concrete agent of all our perceptual acts (1964, p. 90–94). It is here that Merleau-Ponty in the light of the findings of the Gestalt-psychologists[18] employs an evolution of the presuppositions of intellectualism, in order to show how far removed the intellectualists are from the world that we inhabit. Merleau-Ponty laments that the Gestalt psychologists have arrived at great conclusions, that perception is always perception as having a certain figure or form against a background. Thus the "grayness which, when I close my eyes, surrounds me, leaving no distance between me and it" (ibid, pp 3-9) may be considered to be the closest thing in our experience to a pure sensation, "it is already laden with meaning so what we see is not just a 'red' colour on the carpet by a specific 'woolly red'"(ibid, pp. 5-10).

This is what Merleau-Ponty took form Gestalt psychology and further developed it by describing phenomenologically just how we experience the world visually. However, he was critical of the Gestalt way of squeezing all their findings to fit into the laws of physics and thus still assuming that physical laws were sufficient to explain all behaviour, falling back into a "scientistic or positivistic ontology"(ibid, pp. 23-24). The 'natural signs' mediating our embodied perceptual experience, then, are neither

[18] Gestalt psychology began as a reaction to the behaviorism of Watson and the introspectionism of Titchner. Gestalt's argument with behaviorism was the focus on systematic collection and analysis of data from the bottom up; investigating the elements individually without an appreciation for their importance as a whole that was greater than the sum of their parts. This concept, of an integrated whole, is described by the German word *Gestalt*, for which there is no English equivalent. Gestalt psychologists apply this concept to relationships between people, citing the group dynamic of a common enterprise where each individual puts forth his gifts to create something more meaningful than each member could individually.

transparent mental contents interior to consciousness nor objective external events, but lie instead in our pre-cognitive bodily engagement with the world.

Following Gestalt psychology, Merleau-Ponty argues that the structure of experience and behaviour cannot be effectively surpassed under the alternative of the for-itself or the in-itself, because the very structure of behaviour or the perceptual experience is neither things nor conscious. Behaviour, Merleau-Ponty argued, is neither a thing of *nature*[19] nor consciousness, but rather a form. Form[20] is a configuration in which the elements of sensations are determined by their function in the larger context of a perceptual whole. The notion of 'Form' overcomes the opposition "between materialism and mentalism" (1942, p.131) in the internal working of a system that depends on the functioning of the whole "upon its value and its significance with respect to the structure which the system is tending to realize" (ibid, p.131). Merleau-Ponty wanted to study human behaviour in a way, which is neutral with respect to classical distinction between the mental and the physical. The aim of his 'The Structure of Behaviour' was to understand the relation between the realm of nature, which is grounded on fixed law and the realm of human culture. True Behaviour for him was a Structure, neither a thing nor a consciousness (ibid, p. 127).

The 'Phenomenology of Perception', gives a full-fledged argument on his theory of perception that is phenomenological in nature. It may be noted that while his 'The Structure of Behaviour' had focused on animal behaviour generally, with only the last chapter devoted to humans, ' Phenomenology of Perception' treats solely of humans

[19] By nature, Ponty understand those sphere of events that obeys strict causal laws that reduces behaviors only to a system of reflexes responding to stimuli excluding the role of conscious human experience. By consciousness Ponty understood the possibility of pure cogito

[20] as per gestalt psychology and so also for Merleau Ponty

(Moran, 2000, p.417). The aim of his 'Phenomenology of Perception' is 'to restore the world of perception' through phenomenological description by getting close to the 'present and living reality' of perception as basis for studying complex issues such as the relation of humans to each other in language, culture and society (Merleau-Ponty, 1945, p.25). According to Merleau-Ponty (1962, p.298), to be a subject of perception is to have a world; in other words, to be a body is to have a space where the materiality of this body can be endowed and where its existential potentiality of movements and hence actions can be exercised. As such, neither experience nor knowledge can be perceived as being 'out there' but rather, as emerging out of the inextricability of the body and its spatiality.

As we have seen in the previous section phenomenologists will say that we have an innate access to our experienced life that is first-personal. This phenomenal stance is but an intrinsic feature of our experience that is revealed in *noetma-noesis* structure. Interestingly similar findings are reported in some different areas that is, other than phenomenology. According to some developmental psychologists like Neisser, Rochat and others, an infant is in possession of self experience from birth and these group of psychologists thus reject the view, originally defended by Piaget that in the infant no distinction between self, world and other. Neisser comments: "Every movement of the perceiver produces a systematic pattern in the visual field that provides her with awareness of her own movements and postures, and thereby with a weak, or primitive, form of ecological self awareness" (cited in Gibbson, 1979, p.86). As perceivers, we are embodied and embedded agents. It amounts to saying that all healthy infants have an innate rooting response. This rudimentary sense of the ecological self, that is, having

some sense of their own bodies prior to being able to pass any mirror self-recognition tasks, can be equated with idea of what it amounts to posses a bodily self.

These are positive contributions from the field of psychology based on empirical observations that have philosophical implications that body awareness constitutes genuine self-experience. Although in this account the embodied person becomes an object of observation, phenomenology has emphasized on the first person experience that provides us with an immediate and innate access to ourselves as embodied and embedded subjects. As such and insofar as we understand and perceive the world via our body, perception can only be embodied, hence, the production of knowledge, whether subjective or objective, can only exist within a corporeal reality, that is itself embedded within an implosion of specific contexts and situations. In so believing, Merleau-Ponty extols the body as the "subject of perception" (1962, p.206), demystifying Descartes' maxim 'I think, therefore I am' and almost overriding it by what could be termed as 'I perceive, therefore I am' (see, Ajana, 2005)[21].

In this scheme then, to have an identity is to have a body. It is by the *Principle of Embodiment* that Merleau-Ponty seeks to discount both the empiricist who believes that perception is a matter of external things and the intellectualist who thinks that perception is a result of the autonomous consciousness of the human subject. His phenomenology tries to mediate the gulf between extreme forms of subjectivism and extreme objectivism. And it is in this work that the themes of the present thesis, namely *The Problems of the Embodied Person*, comes to the fore, by challenging those positions that conceive of the

[21] Btihaj Ajana, Disembodiment and Cyberspace: A Phenomenological Approach, *Electronic Journal of Sociology* (2005)ISSN: 1198 3655,
http://www.sociology.org/content/2005/tier1/ajana.html

body and the world purely in objective terms. As in the case with behaviour, when we understand the body solely as a thing among things, we cannot account for the way the lived body inhabits the world. Merleau-Ponty goes on to explore the way bodily intentionality informs among other things, like spatiality and motality, perception, and inter-subjectivity. The present chapter therefore finds Merleau-Ponty's appropriate contributions highly significant in corpus on embodied subjectivity. Merleau-Ponty talks about our ability to execute movements without thinking about them simply because they are part of our functioning intentionally. The body is presented *as myself*.

From *Korper* to the *Leib*:

Embodied Person in Husserl and Merleau-Ponty

On Husserl's account, however, those bodily acts in no way constitute the body as a body for the embodied subject. The body is itself constituted intentionally only in the reflexive relation it acquires to itself when it perceives one of its organs by means of another. Husserl continues:

> "As perceptually active, I experience my own corporeity (*Leiblichkeit*), which is thereby related back to itself. This becomes possible inasmuch as I can in each case perceive the one hand by means of the other, an eye by means of a hand, etc., so that the functioning organ must become an object, the object a functioning organ" (1960,p.97).

However, Husserl argues, this intentional reflexivity of the body, far from being a primitive or ubiquitous feature of perception, depends uniquely on the double aspect peculiar to the sense of touch: "The body as such can be constituted originally only in tactuality and in everything localized within the sensations of touch, such as warmth,

cold, pain, and the like" (Id II, p.150). Consequently, "A subject with eyes only could not have an appearing body at all" (ibid). Indeed, the body "becomes a body only through the introduction of sensations in touch, the introduction of pain sensations, etc., in short, through the localization of sensations qua sensations" (ibid, p. 151).

Merleau-Ponty relies heavily on Husserl's insights into the role of free bodily movement in perceptual awareness. Indeed, he cites with approval Husserl's notion of "motivation" in describing the unity of movement and perception, arguing that our bodily movements are neither reasons nor causes, but "motives" informing structural changes in the order of perceptual appearances as a whole (see, 1962, p.47–50). However, although he explicitly credits Husserl with the concept (ibid, p.49), Merleau-Ponty conceives of perceptual motivation in a way that can be put to different philosophical uses. Husserl introduces the concept of motivation in 'Logical Investigations' in his account of signs and indication, but it comes to play a central role in his theory of perception generally. Indication, Husserl argues, is neither rational nor causal, but a phenomenal 'interweaving' of acts of judgment in a single act of judgment. In 'Ideas I' Husserl widens the notion to generalization of that concept of motivation with respect to which we can say, for example, "willing the end motivates willing the means" (*Id I*, p. 89). Motivation thus remains a kind of inference, rational or not.

Merleau-Ponty comes close to Husserl when finally, in 'Ideas II' Husserl extends the concept further to cover kinesthetic sensations, which he says likewise motivate, or hypothetically anticipate, sensations linked to externally perceived objects: "if the eye turns thus, then the "image" changes thus; if it turns in a certain way otherwise, the image does so otherwise, accordingly. Here we constantly find this double articulation:

kinesthetic sensations on the one side, the motivating; sensations of features on the other, the motivated" (Id II, p. 58). As this passage reveals, however, Husserl tends to equivocate between an empiricist and a cognitivist, or what Merleau-Ponty would call an 'intellectualist', account of motivation.

Although Husserl's discussion in 'Logical Investigations', like the first of the two sentences in the passage above, retains its intellectual flavor, Merleau-Ponty comments with satisfaction in 'Phenomenology of Perception': "The greatest lesson of the reduction is the impossibility of a complete reduction" (pp. xiv–xv). Although many find these remarks as more Heideggerian in spirit than Husserlian, they also amount to an attempt on Merleau-Ponty's part to reconcile Husserl's conception of transcendental subjectivity with Heidegger's analytic of *Dasein*, an effort that becomes fully explicit when Merleau-Ponty writes, "Far from being, as has been believed, the formula for an idealistic philosophy, the phenomenological reduction belongs to existential philosophy" (ibid, pp. xiii-xiv). Merleau-Ponty concedes that in his early and middle periods, prior to his supposed conversion to existentialism, Husserl was committed to the sort of intellectualism that in effect renders embodied consciousness metaphysically unintelligible (ibid, p. 152), our eyes and head, looking out across it. "A subject whose ocular-motor muscles have been paralyzed sees the entire landscape shift to the left when he thinks he is turning his eyes in that direction" (ibid, p. 47).

Merleau-Ponty rejects both cognitivist and associationist accounts of the illusion: the subject does not infer the movement of the landscape from beliefs about the position of his eyes and the position of the landscape in relation to his eyes, nor is the stationary retinal image a mere cause of the ensuing perceptual effect. "The turning of my gaze is

neither a reason nor a cause, but a sign that "motivates" my apprehension of my orientation among things in the environment" (ibid). Our body is instead "the spontaneous, self-correcting, precognitive background of intentionality: our body is not the object of an 'I think': it is an ensemble of lived meanings that finds its equilibrium" (ibid, p.153). In his posthumous works Husserl calls attention to the role of the body in perception, but he takes it for granted that cognitive attitudes rather than bodily skills must bridge the intentional gap between mind and world.

Heidegger's 'Being-in-the-World' appears only on the basis of the phenomenological reduction" (ibid, p. xiv). Like Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty looks beyond the subject-object divide to try to gain insight into the concrete structures of worldly experience. But whereas Heidegger does little more than mention the problem of embodiment in passing, Merleau-Ponty bases his entire phenomenological project on an account of bodily intentionality and the challenge it poses to any adequate concept of mind. Embodiment thus has a philosophical significance for Merleau-Ponty.

Merleau-Ponty never doubts or denies the existence of mental phenomena, of course, but he insists, for example, that thought and sensation as such occur only against a background of perceptual activity that we always already understand in bodily terms, by engaging in it. "It was in his final period," Merleau-Ponty suggests, "that Husserl himself became fully aware of what the return to the phenomenon meant, and tacitly broke with the philosophy of essences" (ibid, p. 49), having composed the First Book of Ideas "at a time when he was still distinguishing fact and essence" (ibid, p. 51). Finally, Merleau-Ponty credits Husserl with the discovery of a form of intentionality "that others have called existence" (ibid, p.121) and describes "the second period of Husserlian

phenomenology" as marking a "transition from the eidetic method or logicism of the beginning phase to the existentialism of the final period" (ibid, p.274).

Localization of subjective tactile sensations in the body alluding with approval to Husserl's observation that one's own body never appears as a discrete object of perception. As Husserl puts it, "I do not have the possibility of distancing myself from my body, nor it from me," since "the same body that serves me as a means of all perception stands in my way in the perception of itself and is a remarkably incompletely constituted thing" (Id II, p. 159). The moment of perception excludes the perceiving organ itself from the domain of objects perceived. Merleau-Ponty agrees: "as for my body, I do not observe it itself: to be able to do so, I would need the use of a second body, which would not itself be observable" (1962, p. 91). He thus concludes, "Insofar as it sees or touches the world, my body can therefore be neither seen nor touched. What prevents its ever being an object, ever being 'completely constituted,' is that it is that by which there are objects" (ibid, p.92). For Merleau-Ponty, that is, the body plays a constitutive role in experience precisely by grounding, making possible, and yet remaining peripheral in the horizons of our perceptual awareness: "my body is constantly perceived," Merleau-Ponty writes, yet "it remains marginal to all my perceptions" (ibid, p. 90).

Notwithstanding their basic similarities in many areas, then, and in spite of the undeniable influence Husserl's later writings exerted on Merleau-Ponty, their positive accounts of the body and its role in perceptual experience have subtle differences. The differences are evident in fine points of phenomenological detail, but more importantly in the broad outlines of their respective conceptions of intentionality, subjectivity, and

philosophic method. The body is not itself constitutive of intentionality, for Husserl, but is instead a *noetic* achievement of transcendental subjectivity. For Merleau-Ponty, the body is a primitive constituent of perceptual awareness as such, which in turn forms the permanent background of intentionality at large. The intentional constitution of the body is not the product of a cognitive process whose steps we might trace back to the founding acts of a *pure I*. Rather, the body in its perceptual capacity just is the *I* in its most primordial aspect. For Merleau-Ponty, then, strictly speaking, we do not have bodies, rather "we are our body," which is to say, "we are in the world through our body, and insofar as we perceive the world with our body" (ibid, p. 206). In effect, "the body is a natural self and, as it were, the subject of perception" (ibid).

Despite these differences in their positions, Merleau-Ponty is more sympathatic to the hitherto unearthed the 'New Husserl', (see, Welton,2003) who himself posed a serious critic of some of his own earlier themes. That way, Merleau-Ponty should not have much distance from Husserlian stand on the Embodied Person. In studying the posthumous manuscripts of Husserl, Merleau-Ponty remarked that, in their evolution, Husserl's work brings to light phenomena which are not assimilable to *noetic-noematic* correlation. This is particularly the case when one attends to the phenomena of the body (which is at once body-subject and body-object), subjective time (the consciousness of time is neither an act of consciousness nor an object of thought) and the other (the first considerations of the other in Husserl led to solipsism). Hence the distinction between 'acts of thought' (*noesis*) and 'intentional objects of thought' (*noema*) does not seem, therefore, to constitute an irreducible ground. It appears rather at a higher level of analysis.

Thus, Merleau-Ponty does not postulate that 'all consciousness is consciousness of something', which supposes at the outset a *noetic-noematic* ground. Instead, he develops the thesis according to which 'all consciousness is perceptual consciousness'. Merleau-Ponty affirmed the philosophy of 'intentionality', which simply means 'toward-ness', or 'directed-ness'. He agrees with Husserl 'all consciousness is consciousness of something' which implies a distinction between 'acts of thought' (the *noesis*) and 'intentional objects of thought' (the *noema*). Thus, the correlation between *noesis* and *noema* becomes the first step in the constitution of analyses of consciousness. This means that my knowledge is not simply *knowledge qua knowledge*, but it is knowledge of something. Similarly, my perception is not simply *perception qua perception*, but it is a perception of something. That is for any perception, there is a knower and something that is known.

But Husserl had to distinguish between the "Transcendental Ego" as different from the "lived- body". For him, the Transcendental Ego is the source of all intentional acts, and the condition of all intentionality. But it is not identical to the lived body. The transcendental ego cannot have any 'mindness', 'owness', anything that is personal. And that is the problem. Therefore, the concept of Husserl's lived body seems to at least provide another level at the transcendental level, which corresponds to physical body, but at the same time it is maintaining both-a lived and a transcendental body. This is precisely how Merleau-Ponty is able to overcome the problem of body, by no longer arguing for a transcendental ego, but arguing only for lived body.

Merleau-Ponty concepts of: "My body as a physical object has it's own material and spatio-temporal objects. It is not like any other object in the nature, is a physical

object with many intentional acts, perception, conception, and memory. However, it is also, a sensuous being, in which my own body is a subject. This sensuousness makes my body a unique object within other objects. It is a human body, which Husserl calls, the *Leib* or the *living body* "(cited in Mohassel, 1999).[22] David Bell provides the following phenomenological characteristics to define Husserl's *Leib.* For Husserl, he argues that the concept of *Leib* comprises that *'*my living body*'* is immediately expressive, sensitive, has motility, and lastly, functions as a center where all spatial relations are experienced as oriented.

Perceptual experience incorporates the movements of the body and spontaneously takes them into account in opening us onto a stable external world. Perception is always informed, that is, by what Merleau-Ponty calls a "body schema" (*schéma corporel*), which consists neither in a mental attitude nor in a mere physiological state. The understanding Merleau-Ponty's concept of the body schema therefore presupposes some understanding of the Kantian schematism, the point of which is that the application of concepts rests on a kind of action, a procedure unfolding in time. Of course, Merleau-Ponty rejects Kant's intellectualist conception of schemata as explicit formal rules, since of course the very intelligibility of such rules would in turn depend on precisely the kind of embodied perceptual experience whose phenomenological features Merleau-Ponty is trying to describe. What is essential to the concept of the body schema, and what it shares with its Kantian predecessor, rather, is the notion of an integrated set of skills poised and ready to anticipate and incorporate a world prior to the application of concepts and the formation of thoughts and judgments. This kind of embodied poise or readiness, which

[22] Mohassel, Parviz , *The Phenomenology of Body in Robert Irwin's Work*, 20 May 1999 http://ehusserl.com/article3.htm

Merleau-Ponty calls “habit,” consists in a kind of noncognitive, preconceptual “motor intentionality” (1962, p.110). “Habit is not a function of reflective thought, nor is it transparently accessible to reflection in pure consciousness, rather it manifests itself in the perceptual body as such: it is the body that ‘understands’ in the acquisition of habit” (ibid, p. 144).

As Merleau-Ponty conceives it, then, the body schema is not a product but a condition of cognition, for only by being embodied am I a subject in the world at all: “I am conscious of my body via the world,” he says, just as “I am conscious of the world through the medium of my body” (ibid, p. 82). “My body is not a mere container or instrument of my agency, rather it comprises stable organs and pre-established circuits”, (ibid, p. 87) that function according to their own logic, as it were, below the threshold of conscious intention. And it is a practical background familiarity with the world itself that informs our intentional familiarity with our bodies. One’s actual identification with one’s own body is a psychological accomplishment that occurs in the first few months of life, and its details are best left to empirical research in developmental psychology. Our mature understanding of ourselves as embodied agents, by contrast, is not merely an on going cognitive achievement, as Husserl supposes, but a primitive and abiding structure of perceptual experience. For the phenomenological issue has to do not with the causal conditions of our acquisition of intentional attitudes toward our own bodies in infancy, but with the intelligible structure of our perceptual self-understanding once we have mastered and taken for granted a fully developed sense of embodied agency.

Thus it is from the soil of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological sancta that new attempts emerged, attempts to reconcile the division between the body and self, and

recover the embodied subjectivity through a re-evaluation of perception that goes beyond the duality of the Cartesian metaphysics. In Merleau-Ponty's last and incomplete work 'The Visible and the Invisible', (1968) the notion of "flesh" is introduced. In that work it sheds its accustomed meaning to become an elementary term which seems to have no counterpart in Western thought, but which may not be entirely foreign to some other cultural traditions. "Flesh" is a basic term describing the phenomenon of perceiving, and of being the object of perception, of reciprocal tactile contact, of mutual mingling.

Whereas in the 'Phenomenology of Perception', the author had emphasized the intermingling of subject and world as intelligent embodiment, his final work involved a study of the interrelationship of inner and outer - the "crises-crossing" of the touching and the tangible, of seer and seen, of toucher and touched, and of the indeterminacy of the 'boundaries' of each of the senses and their inherent transposability. The next chapter is a continuation of Merleau-Ponty's understanding of the embodied person that, the Thesis looks forward to, presenting as an alternate and a viable alternative for understanding Embodied Person in the context of a Life World. Is that modified version of human-person firmly rooted in the Life World? These are some of the key questions for the chapters that follow this.

Chapter 7

Toward a New Concept of Life in a Life World

Embodiment: Signs of Life in the Self:

> **"**My body is not something additional to me, an appendage. It is not something, which I, as a disembodied spirit, reflect upon. It is what I am."
>
> (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p.150)

The *body-lived* as the modality of experience constitutes the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty's existential analysis of the person. This chapter focuses on this new model of the Embodied Person within phenomenology of Maurice Merleau-Ponty that keeps centrality of life and the living with his innovative catch words: bodies of *flesh* and the world of *flesh*. The following are some distinctive features of this new model of the Embodied Person, of the *flesh-body rooted in a flesh world.*

Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology-Body Model:

What follows is an examination of the embodied person from the phenomenological perspective of Maurice Merleau-Ponty in order to restore the relational and worldly nature of the *bodily-person*. Merleau-Ponty's (1945,1981) analysis of the body in the two modalities of *body as corpse* and *body as lived* constitute a major part of his magnum opus, *Phe'nome'nologie de la perception*. In part one, called *Le Corps* (The Body), of this book, there are six chapters devoted to the following categories of phenomenological analysis: (1) The Body as Object and Mechanistic Physiology; (2) The Experience of the Body and Classical Psychology; (3) The Spatiality of the Lived-Body

and Its Motility; (4) The Synthesis of the Lived Body; (5) The Body as Sexual Being; and, (6) The Body as Expression and Speaking. Out of these, this chapter puts special emphasis on the last four categories that are directly related to the lived body in a life-world. An attempt has been made here to have a glimpse of what it is to be person-like, or more specifically, an Embodied-Person like, within Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological scheme.

The Lived -body in Life World:

This whole process of looking for a Merleau-Pontian model of Embodied Person is also sought to be identified as a process of looking for *'new life within life words',* that keeps room for wider and a more flexible framework of ecological, extended and relational aspects of the embodied person.

a) The Spatiality of the Lived-Body:

Embodied Person in Social Landscape

Merleau-Ponty lets us know the spatiality of the lived-body with these strong words: "My body as a unity, an organic whole, is function of 'motility'. The various parts of my bodies are known to me "through their functional value", as means of accomplishing their acts in the world of my own bodily space. I do not have to learn to coordinate their multiple features, because I have body schemata that will coordinate all my muscles and movements for me"(cited in Mohassel, 1999)[1]. In "The Synthesis of One's Own Body", Merleau-Ponty concludes:

[1] http://ehusserl.com/article3.htm

> "Thus the connecting link between the parts of our body, and that between our visual and tactile experience, are not forged gradually and cumulatively...I do not translate the 'data of touch into the language of seeing, or vice versa-I do not bring together one by one the parts of my body.....w do not merely hold as spectators the relations between the parts of our body, and the correlations between the visual and tactile body; we are ourselves the unifier of these arms and legs, the person who both sees and touches them. The body is, to use Leibniz's term, the 'effective law' of its changes"(1962, p.439).

For a good understanding of the body, this chapter concentrates more on the way Merleau-Ponty perceives his own body and the world around him, as per the basic guidelines of the 'Phenomenology of Perception' (first published in French 1945, English translation in 1962). First of all *embodiment* refers to the actual shape and innate capacities of the human body-that it has arms and legs, a certain size, certain abilities.

> "In so far as I have hands, feet, a body, I sustain around me intentions which are not dependent upon my decisions and which affect my surroundings in a way which I do not choose. These intentions are general... they originate from other than myself, and I am not surprised to find them in all psycho-physical subjects organized as I am" (1962, p.440).

Merleau-Ponty, by opposing Kant's concept of space as 'a pure space', 'in the mind', argues that spatiality is integrally associated with "Lived-Body" as a joint contributor and embedded in the existence. Merleau-Ponty does not make the body the

Cartesian *corpus*, but *the kinesthetic body* in action. The Lived-Body is compounded with spatiality as an active partner. He states: "To be a body, is to be tied to a certain world…..our body is not primarily *in* space: it is of it" (ibid, p.148). However, to be "of space", is to be an active partner in constitution of the space. Thus, Merleau-Ponty connects spatiality and motility, where space and our capacity to move are inseparable. "My movement is known to me without my being aware of its objective position. There is no movement without moving body" (ibid, pp. 137-38).

"I am given, that is, I find myself already situated and involved in a physical and social world-I am given to myself, which means that this situation is never hidden from me, it is never round about me as an alien necessity, and I am never in effect enclosed in it like an object in a box" (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 360). For Merleau-Ponty, vision has been privileged in the "Eye and Mind"[2]. He started by saying "it is correct that the painter "takes his body with him" to paint, but without vision and mobility, it cannot see or "holds things in a circle around itself". Vision is a requirement, not a gift" (see, E+M, 162-167, cited in Mohassel, 1999)[3].

b) 'My Body Inhabits Space and Time':

The Temporal Man

> "...space and time are not, for me, a connection of adjacent points nor are they a limitless number of relations synthesized by my consciousness, I

[2] in the theoretical framework of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty's methodology of "Eye and Mind" in application to "Cezanne's Doubt", Merelau-Ponty attempted to look at the work of Art from the artists' point of view. Through the notion of lived-body, he developed his ideas of "reversibility": the relationship between seeing and seen, touching and touched, I and other, hand and hand, sense and sensibility.

[3] See, Mohassel, Parviz **,** ***The Phenomenology of Body in Robert Irwin's Work*****,** 20 May 1999 http://ehusserl.com/article3.htm

am not in space and time, not I conceive space and time: I belong to them, my body combines with them and includes them" (1962, p.140).

There is the concept of temporality in Merleau-Ponty, but it is not based on a concept of a "now" point; rather it is based on a future and a past, what he calls the "Protension-Retention"[4]. So the past is interwoven in the future and the past involves the future. The knowing self is already embodied in relation to the known, and the known is already interwoven with the knowing. In the concept of the seeing and the seen, the seer and the seen are intertwined, so that the seeing is not separate from the seen, and none of these can be thought of as apart from our bodies.

c) The Moved Mover:

In his interpretation, phenomenology involves setting aside the abstract theoretical structures of our thought in favour of a return to the direct experience on the basis of which those theories are constructed .We experience people, in Merleau-Ponty's view, as unified wholes, not as conjunctions of two substances, and we experience their thoughts, feelings, etc., as inseparable, except by abstraction, from the physical movements that express them. They are 'body-subjects' or 'embodied subjectivities'. Merleau-Ponty's articulation of the 'body-subject' was well known than his concept of 'flesh'.

Merleau-Ponty's understanding that lived experience encompasses not only "styles" of bodily movement, grasp, "customary spatial level for operating on the world" and so on, but also, social and political dimensions, is crucial in the attempt to theorize a subjectivity which is neither a private consciousness nor a mere effect of discourse. This

[4] Protension-Retension,characterized the significant difference that time is no longer so much constituted for and by a consciousness, or even by an ex-sistence, as it is temporalized from out of the twofold horizon of the event of being

is why knowledge of the causal antecedents of the disorder (in this case, the occipital injury) will not help us to make sense of what has gone wrong; for that, we need to 'read' the phenomena, that is, to grasp the meaning, which is to "(treat) them as modalities and variations of the subject's total being" (Merleau-Ponty, 1989, p. 108).

Under this broad category of body in space one can also have a sub-heading of:

d) Body-Subject as Place–Constructed Immersed in Environment, and the Notion of "Ecological Subjectivity":

Merleau-Ponty's account of the relationship of humans to the world presents body-subjects and environments as synonymous for the purpose of everyday living. Although the material world provides the individual with images of himself or herself, that world is not, however, "outside" the person. On the contrary it is experienced as inextricably bound up in a quite concrete sense with the embodied ("enfleshed") subject. It seems to me, therefore, that, in Merleau-Ponty's account, body-subjects are always in an important sense "place construed" in the same way that all knowledge and everything in the world is so construed.

The "body-subject" is an intelligent, holistic process, which directs behaviours in a fluid, integrative fashion, thereby coordinating relations between behaviour and environment. Being fully aware that, in the dominant cognitive mode, the world is an objective entity for a "thinking subject," Merleau-Ponty is more concerned with the moments of daily living in which as subjects we interpenetrate the world and are fused with it. So, for him, there are no ontological "cracks" between persons and nature, the self and world, between what exists (the issue for traditional philosophy) and what we say about what exists (what has become the key issue for postmodernism). They are one

and the same. Merleau-Ponty's account of body- subject and "flesh" demands that we pay attention to the connectedness of body- subject to world and to the immersion-in-world that is the reality of human existence. This new relationship is expressed in Merleau-Ponty's account of the body and world as being of the "same fabric". It is to that idea which the chapter now turns in addressing the notion of 'ecological subjectivity'.

The definition of things, their discontinuities with all other realities, and the habit of referring to borders which demarcate oneself and all possible others is just one way of talking about experience. It is the one most familiar to us. But "realities" alter dramatically when different aspects of human existence are fore grounded, (for example the aspect of place or locatedness within environment). We can focus on the notion of subject as rationality, or the self as an arrangement of bodily parts, thoughts and feelings, or on "subjects" inscribed within gendered discourses. It is a conceptualization of materiality which does not demand a split between human corporeality and the corporeality of "nature". Ultimately this conception of materiality, which clearly has a cosmological dimension, includes everything in and of the world.

It may be mentioned in this connection that *tattooing* itself can be seen as a process of renewing this intertwining of body and the world. It is found that a growing camp of mostly young believers is choosing tattoos and body art not as a mark of rebellion, they say, but of spiritual conversion.

d) The Body as Expression and Speaking:

The body-piercing or the tattoos of these 'modern primitives' are legitimated through the idea that they are somehow more pure, honest and true, because they reflect the more positive aspects of these so-called 'simpler' societies. The subtext of such an

argument is that a certain sector of our society feel that they cannot adequately express themselves through the more conventional means of visual expression, be it clothes or art. The notion that other cultures will provide us with a visual language that will release us from this emphasis is, however, not new. In art alone, it can be traced back through the major canon of western artist, through Jackson Pollock, Picasso, Gauguin, Van Gogh, and back into the depths of the eighteenth century at least. What is new is the transition from the canvas and the gallery, to the body and the street.

While there is, for Merleau-Ponty, acceptance of the socially constructed nature of experience, he focuses, nevertheless, on the pre-reflective knowledge of the body - on its psychical interiority and schemas. There is a creative power in the body to which we fail to do justice when we persist in seeing it as the handmaiden of consciousness. The same is true when we ignore the body's intelligent connections with the world at hand in order to draw attention to the linguistic construction of social structures and the symbolic features attached to "subject positions" within discourse. *In my view*, both accounts fall prey to extreme forms of intellectualization.

It is the expressive and the intelligent animated body, not an occupying consciousness, which understands its world. And; *I would add*, it is bodies, male and female, which have, in the same way, in them the intentional threads that run out towards their worlds. While some philosophers still speak of having a certain kind of body, including the body as sexual being, post- modern feminists write of our being embodied within discourse as masculine or feminine. Now, we are well aware in this day, bodies are not merely the means or instrument of the mind. But neither, *I would argue*, is subjectivity fully explained in terms of positions within phallocentric discourse, since on

that sort of view, experience is ignored altogether. Like later post-modern and feminist critics of the tradition, Merleau-Ponty worked to undermine dichotomies of reason/emotion, mind/body, and the demand for epistemological foundations. As critics of the philosophical tradition have pointed out in recent years, the subject-object distinction, the "man and the world" separation has functioned discursively as an elaborate but powerful fiction supporting a reality, in which man has dominated women, other men, and nature. The results have been disastrous for all but the few.

In late 19th century France, women and men were seen as polar opposites: women were creatures of nature and emotion, while men were the embodiment of reason, culture and science. These documents influenced the representation of men and women in the work of the most important Impressionist artists of the period: Gustave Caillebotte, James Tissot, Georges Seurat, Pierre Auguste Renoir and Paul Cezanne. It is remarkable how this temperament was also conducive to promote the male body-building movement. James Tissot's "Women of Paris", for example, strengthened the stereotyped man-woman dichotomous roles of man of reason and woman of passion. The following is self-illustrative: "Women of Paris: The Circus Lover series is a catalogue of contemporary images of modern femininity - decorative, seductive, yet tinged with menace. A detailed examination of Seurat's "Young Woman Powdering Herself" discusses this work in relation to contemporary views of the "woman at the toilette", while Renoir's rejection of modernity in favour of a nostalgic fantasy of earthy femininity is exposed as an important

strain in modernist painting. Finally, the androgynous figures in Cezanne's late bather paintings are shown to be the least secure in their sexual identity"(Tamar Grab, 1998)[5].

According to Cézanne, colour is the visible texture of the world, in such way; nature generates its own view in the colour. The painter shapes on the canvas and by means of the colour his inner, immanent, vision of things. That is because, according to Merleau-Ponty, the human body and the world are tied by the visible. Cézanne gives his vision of reality, as a painter, when he thinks the world in a pictorial way. Cognition does not, somehow, screen the world at hand; that world is the body's directly. In his account of experience, Merleau-Ponty articulated a notion of place, of lived space, which is in an important sense in bodies whether they are marked as "masculine" or "feminine". The body-subject's lived experience is necessarily of location because its language is that of gestures, movements and action.

One may wonder why Cézanne is an exception here with his discovery of a reality that transcends conventional male-female dichotomy. That way Cézanne's deeper vision of reality comes closer to Merleau-Ponty's 'eye of the mind's discovery of the invisible in the visible. This is why perspective in art was a discovery–if we saw the world exactly as it was, a child drawing a table would draw the rhombus that actually appears on his retinas, not the rectangle that he knows the top of the table to be. This is why an examination of Cézanne's use of colour, especially in comparison to the impressionists, is philosophically, as well as artistically, interesting.

[5] Tamar Garb, *Bodies of Modernity: Figure and Flesh in Fin-de-Siecle France,* 1998, http://www.reddotbooks.co.uk/bodies-modernity-figure-flesh-findesiecle-france-p-757.html

We may recall what Plato had said long ago: "we don't see the world directly–we see what we think we ought to see" (cited in Lopatto, 2006)[6]. As Merleau-Ponty says in the posthumous 'The Visible and the Invisible', it is our embodiment or our flesh that gives us access to the world and its embodiment. This does not mean that the world senses us the way that we sense it, but it does mean that we are encrusted in the world through our bodies, that there is no clear distinction between where it ends and where we begin, that we belong to each other inextricably, that our perception of nature is ultimately its perception of itself through the human body, for the human body is a development and expression of it. From this discussion of flesh comes the insight that everyone who sees is simultaneously in view as it were, to another. The artist sees a landscape but the landscape, in an important sense, also "sees" the artist. But this is not anthropomorphism at work. On the contrary, what it amounts to is a major claim about a non-entitative, non-identical materiality shared by both the subjects and the objects of perception.

The account of "flesh" in Merleau-Ponty's work undermines the dichotomous structure of the mind/matter dualism, doing away with the separation between animate and inanimate, between species, between observer and object of investigation. Thus subject and object are inherently open to each other for they are "constituted" in the one stroke separating the flesh into its distinct modalities. Thought, for Merleau-Ponty, is rooted in the "flesh" common to our bodies and the perceptible world. As much as perception may be shaped and colored by thought, and as much as the two may be intertwined in complex ways, it is not the case that the "density" of the flesh is in turn

[6] Liz Lopatto, *Cézanne*, October 3rd, 2006, http://kenyonreview.org/blog/?p=130

rooted in the transparency of reflection. The relation between them is surely reciprocal, not symmetrical. "Flesh" furnishes the capacity for turning the world back on itself, to bring into play its reflexivity. Thus subject and object are inherently open to each other for they are "constituted" in the one stroke separating the flesh into its distinct modalities.

e) The Synthesis of Man, Machine and the Life-World:

Embodiment: the Flesh and Bones of my Body

Can this 'flesh' be separated into two distinct modalities, the *lived body* and the *corpe body*, the *embodied man* and the *extended self*, the *man* and the *machine*? This is a question that is posed to the modern man who is now accommodating the virtual/digital body as a possible extension of the real, materialized body. It is a continuous process of incorporating technology to our life world although Merleau-Pontian embodied man re-defines this relationship in terms of 'flesh bodies' and 'flesh world.' In terms of 'the flesh' we are able to have direct, immediate contact with others and the world. To quote Merleau-Ponty:

> "My body is not able to forget its flesh. Although not always consciously, my body is always present and is involved in every action. The body is our general medium for having a world. Sometimes it is restricted to the actions necessary for the conservation of life, and accordingly it posits around us a biological world; at other times, elaborating upon these primary actions and moving from their literal to a figurative meaning, it manifests through them a core of new significance: this is true of motor habits (sic) such as dancing" (1962, p.146).

We have already discussed at length how for centuries, technology has been extending the range of our senses. The telescopic discoveries led to a revolutionary shift in our worldview. Spectroscopy uncovered the structure of DNA. In the 20th century, prosthetic devices are a part of our daily life. Although most sense-extending instruments cannot be said to be a part of us, others have come to seem more intimately connected (More, 1995). Glasses and contact lenses extend the range of one's eyes. Contact lenses, sitting closely on the eyeball, feel almost as much part of us as do our natural corneas. Technology now provides many new prosthetic tools for extending our perception: virtual reality is one of them.

This is a strong example, especially when we compare this with the personal, virtual experiences of Susan Kozel (1994):

> "In the interactive dance performance *Telematic Dreaming*, an intimate virtual bedroom was created for interaction between visitors and performer (Suzan Kozel). Real-time communication with the visitors took place by the use of a technology called telepresence. Using video projectors and monitors people in two separate rooms were drawn together. The body image of Kozel was projected onto the bed in the room, which was open to visitors, where they had the option to join her. The bed became the virtual performance space. …..At one time a visitor elbowed Kozel hard in the stomach. Kozel: "Someone elbowed me hard in the stomach and I doubled over, wondering why since I didn't actually feel

it. But I felt something and she physically doubled over" (p.2) (cited in Hermans, 2002)[7]

Merleau-Ponty calls this the "reversibility" of the body, its capacity to be both sentient and sensible. We can also think and perceive from the point of view of the virtual body. These physical sensations are really present and not merely the result of a mental construct. Simply because "I am my body" and every sensation has a physical origin. The virtual body is in this case the extension of the real body. In virtual reality (VR) the virtual body becomes the scope and active radius of the touch. The virtual body (parts) are incorporated in the body schema. Just as a car is absorbed into the body schema of the car-driver, the virtual body part has become an area of sensitivity. With this virtual body part we can touch and be touched in a mutual, corresponding way. This again refers to Merleau-Ponty. For him the human body can alternate the role of "touching" and "being touching":

> "If I touch with my left hand my right hand while it touches an object, the right hand object is not the right hand touching: the first is an intertwining of bones, muscles and flesh bearing down on a point in space, the second traverses space as a rocket in order to discover the exterior object in its place" (1962, p. 92)

Studies of phantom-limb phenomena offer some evidence for this claim. "Phantom limb refers to an experience not infrequently reported by amputees. The patient with a phantom continues to experience the limb, and even to incorporate it into the movements of his body. For instance, when a man with an amputated leg stumbled, he

[77] http://www.du.ahk.nl/mijnsite/papers/embodiment.htm

felt himself extend his missing phantom leg, as it were, to save him from falling" (Kinsbourne, 1995, p.216). This cannot be explained by physiological factors. The phantom that was once a real body part has now become an invisible, but still presents body part. The phantom limb is not consciously registered in the body-image: when the man stumbled and fell, he suddenly and painfully comes to the conclusion, that the leg is no longer there. However, the phantom-limb is still incorporated in the subconscious body schema. In the phantom-limb phenomena the visible and invisible body parts meet each other in a curious and rare way.

Although phantoms are usually considered as pathological, Ramachandran and Hirstein (1997) showed that it is relatively easy to generate such "illusions" in otherwise normal individuals. Ramachandran and Hirstein describe the "phantom nose": "The subject sits in a chair blindfolded, with an accomplice sitting in front of him, facing the same direction. The experimenter takes the subject's left fingers and uses it to tap and stroke the nose of the accomplice repeatedly and randomly, while at the same time, using his right hand, he taps and strokes the subject's nose in precisely the same manner, and in perfect synchrony" (cited in Hermans, 2002)[8]. After a few seconds, 12 out of the 18 subjects feel that their noses have either been dislocated, or have been stretched out several feet forwards. This demonstrates the plasticity of the body image and body schema. Similar research findings have been found by Lackner 1988 and Botvinik and Cohen, 1998 (ibid).

Ramachandran and Hirstein (1997) found that it is even possible to incorporate objects such as tables or shoes in the body schema. In this research project the subject's

[8] Carolien Hermans, *Embodiment: the flesh and bones of my body,* August 2002 Amsterdam, http://www.du.ahk.nl/mijnsite/papers/embodiment.htm

right hand is placed below a table surface so that he cannot see it. The experimenter then randomly strokes and taps the subject's right hand (under the table) and simultaneously strokes a shoe placed on the table in perfect synchrony. Fifty percent of the subjects feel as if the sensations derive from the shoe (instead of the hidden hand). The shoe has become part of the body schema. How real is this sensation? To check this out, Ramachandran et al. (1998) waited for the moment that the subject starts to project his sensations on the shoe and then the experimenter simply hits the shoe with a giant rubber hammer. The subjects not only wince visible but they also show a strong increase in skin conductance.

But how can a shoe, a phantom limb or an electronic device become a part of one's body? If I look to myself, I perceive my own boundaries very clearly. The left arm is mine, but the handbag is not. The right feet are mine, but the shoe is not. The thing is that we have a one-to-one relation with our body. We cannot see our bodies in the same way as we see other bodies, since we experience our bodies from inside. I will call this a sense of ownership. "When I feel an ache in my ankle, the ankle that feels hurt to me, does not feel like an ankle belonging to some body or other. Rather, the ankle feels to me to be part of my body"(Martin, 1995, p.269, cited in Hermans, 2002).[9]

In the case of phantom limbs and other prosthetic devices, one must wonder how they are related to the owned body. Perceptual experiences must be grounded in *my body*. This invites the following hypothesis: in order to feel and perceive prosthetic devices from the inside, these devices must fall within one of the boundaries of *my body*. The devices must be enclosed in the body. When an amputee feels a pain three inches below

[9] http://www.du.ahk.nl/mijnsite/papers/embodiment.htm

the knee, that location may well fall outside the actual limits of the body. Is this a real sensation or an illusory experience? The distinction is crucial. If the pain from a phantom limb is considered to be illusory, then this pain is an imagined, mental pain. If the pain from the phantom limb is a real sensation, then it is seen as a bodily, materialized pain.

For a good understanding of the physicality of our perceptive nature, we need to re-capitulate our discussions on the concepts of body schema and body image. The body image is a conscious experience of the body at a particular time: it is the knowledge of one's own specific appearance and the human body in general. The body image is also involved with emotional attitudes towards one's own body (for a deeper explanation of body image and body scheme, see the paper Body and Self). Walking is a trained and automatic movement (one does not have to think to put the right leg in front of the left leg) and this body information will only come into awareness, for example, when someone stumbles. In that case, bodily information comes into awareness, by means of the body image. A body schema works on a subconscious level. The body schema is not conscious and backs up our locomotion and a considerable part of our conscious activities, it is not personal, it functions rather globally and the interaction with the environment is very often central.

Example1:

While driving a car, "we are intimately aware of how a particular car's gearshift needs to be treated, its ability to turn, accelerate, brake etc, and importantly, also of the dimensions of the vehicle. When we reflect on our own parking, it is remarkable that there are so few little bumps considering how many times we are actually forced to come very close. The car is absorbed into our body schema with almost the same precision that

we have regarding our own spatiality. It becomes an "area of sensitivity" which extends "the scope and active radius of the touch" (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p.143) and rather than thinking about the car, it is more accurate to suggest that we think from the point of view of the car, and consequently also perceive our environment in a different way (see Reynolds, 2002).

According to Merleau-Ponty, it is precisely through the body that we have access to the world. There is a strong interconnection between action and perception. Embodiment plays a central role in structuring experience, cognition, and action. It is the prenoetic function of the body schemas (1962), which makes perception possible. Body schemas contain the possibility of actions that we have not actually undertaken: the floor affords walking; the chair affords sitting, and so forth, only in conjunction with the possibilities of particular postural models (Gallagher, 1995).

This means that there can only be a digital or virtual body as long as there is a real, materialised body. According to Gallagher (1995) prosthetic devices can be absorbed in the body schema. Just as a hammer in the carpenter's hand is incorporated into his body schema, any virtual body part or interface (keyboard, mouse, joystick) can become part of the body schema in a temporary or long-lasting way. Merleau-Ponty shows us the way how to accommodate the virtual body into our body schema and thereby make it also a part of the *body- flesh*, an extension of the real, materialised body and can be seen as a prosthetic device.

f) The Lived Body in the Life World:

Bodies of Flesh and the World as Flesh

Merleau-Ponty shifted his focus from embodied consciousness to a notion of 'inter-corporeal being', what he termed 'flesh'. This identity, which extends beyond the immediate body to a relation with the interrelated dynamics of one's surroundings, is what Merleau-Ponty, in his later writings, had come to call the "the Flesh". The embodied man is basically a relational man who is firmly embedded in a life world. The life-world is our immediate experience as we continually live it; a complex world of continual and spontaneous interactions with an ever emerging unfoldment of meaning.

> "The life-world is the world of our immediately lived experience, as we live it, prior to all our thoughts about it. It is that which is present to us in our everyday tasks and enjoyments—reality as it engages us before being analyzed by our theories and our science. The life-world is the world that we count on without necessarily paying it much attention, the world of the clouds overhead and the ground underfoot, of getting out of bed and preparing food and turning on the tap for water. Easily overlooked, this primordial world is always already there when we begin to reflect or philosophize. It is not a private, but a collective, dimension—the common field of our lives and the other lives with which ours are entwined—and yet it is profoundly ambiguous and indeterminate, since our experience of this field is always relative to our situation within it" (Abram, 1996, p. 40).

Merleau-Ponty follows Husserl in highlighting the participatory nature of the life-world, experienced not in an analytical consciousness, but primarily through sensory (and contextual) cognitive perception. This is a world, which has us engaged in life, and engaged in an unfoldment of meaning as we live. Because of the complex interactions and unpredictable emergent qualities experienced in the life-world, meaning is never fixed or static except in the illusions of abstracted conceptual structures. Because of the non-analytical nature of the life world, the life world often goes unnoticed, or it is taken for granted, for it cannot exist in totality. The whole meaning is always "absent", yet always "implicit", because it is always "inter-subjective" and within an "ongoing dynamic". According to Merleau-Ponty, we are thoroughly intertwined in the life-world through "the mindful life of the body" (ibid, p. 44).

The mindful body is "the very means of entering into relation with all things" - it is the means in which we are in the world and how we communicate with it - in this sense it is "the very subject of awareness" (ibid, p.47). Discussing an embodied reality, Merleau-Ponty completely immerses us into the inter-subjective. He demolishes any possibilities of interpreting the world explicitly and in totality from the outside because our bodies and hence, ourselves, survive, communicate, interact and create reality and meaning within the world through " (our) power of responding to other bodies, of touching, hearing, and seeing things, resonating with things" (Abram, 1988, p. 103, cited in, Crowley, 2001)[10]. Therefore, our whole sensual experience and mindful feelings are aspects of our intrinsic nature, which inform our cognitive sensory perception -our minds are not separate from our bodies.

[10]Michael Crowley, Experiencing Ecology: Toward a Participatory Ecopsychology, http://www.scumachercollege.org.uk/HolisticScience/Misha.html

The Embodied Person is embedded in a life world, that is "One for whom this world is lost in some crisis he is out of the system. As such: he /she "does not live (the situation) and is not caught up in it" (Merleau-Ponty, 1989, p. 156). The Embodied man here within this lived world, the flesh-body in a world of flesh, is at-ease with his body and his situation. That way, a dis-eased body is out of this tuning. In a normal subject, Merelau-Ponty argues, one's own body is not experienced simply as another object in the world, but as the vehicle through which one participates in the world. In phenomenological account of health and disease, one realizes that the causal antecedents of the disorder (in this case, the occipital injury) will not help us to *make sense of what has gone wrong*; for that, we need to 'read' the phenomena, that is, to grasp the meaning, which is to treat them "as modalities and variations of the subject's total being"(ibid, p. 108).

One can expand upon some of the stereo-typed observations about depression from this point of view. Even for ordinary purposes of psychiatric diagnosis, depression has to be characterized in terms of the patient's thoughts, feelings, moods, abilities to act, sense of self-worth, and so on. In this respect, clinical depression is not different from 'depression' in the ordinary, non-clinical sense, that is, the much milder versions of the same kinds of thoughts and moods that we all have in the face of traumatic life-experiences, such as the death of someone we love or the break-up of a relationship. But what is primary is that the 'behaviour is above all that of the person', rather than that of her brain and nervous system—the neurological processes themselves can be understood once they are seen as part of the expression of the person's mode of being in the world .In cases of such non-clinical depression, we are able, because of our common humanity, to

understand such thoughts and moods in others, even if we have never experienced them ourselves—they are shared human responses to these sorts of situation. Those with greater sensitivity and imagination can even help others to get over such passing states of 'normal' depression; often, such help may be found in 'Cezanne, Painter of the Flesh' (see, Vivaldi, 2002)

Rooting the intellect-cognitive sensory perception within the whole body therefore reveals the qualitative and sensory dynamics of life. In this manner the quest for the phenomenological model of the lived-body also becomes an orientation toward a new concept of life in a life-world**.** The body cannot be a pre-programmed machine or an atomized robot, because it, or rather, we, need to be spontaneous and creative as we are engaged in the complexity of the world and its ever-emergent relations and phenomena.

The creative person is at ease with his own body and is embedded in an environment, natural, cultural, spiritual, or otherwise, in a most spontaneous and comfortable manner. In fact there should be no dichotomy between the instinctive and the intelligent, between nature and culture, between corpse body and lived body, there is only a difference in degree that keeps room for meaningful dialogue between the two. In his later thought Merleau-Ponty talked of the body as "flesh", made of the same flesh as the world, and it is because the flesh of the body is of the flesh of the world that we can know or understand the world. The phenomenologist, says Merleau-Ponty, returns "to-the-world" which precedes (scientific description), the world of which science always speaks, and in relation to which every scientific characterization is an abstract and derivative sign language as is geography in relation to the countryside. The Body as it is lived is an experiential body, a body that opens onto a world and allows the world to be for us. The

body is both transcendent and immanent. It is the "third term" between subject and object.

What Merleau-Ponty aimed to attain by the reduction was to reach pre-conscious intention, which he called the "operative intention". This is actually the primordial form of life's movement in the Paradigm. He tried to grasp the 'wild being' of life as it can be seen through the phenomenal body, avoiding idealistic processing using the acknowledged concepts. He made an effort to excavate directly the 'wild being' with all its depth. He thinks such conventional concepts are easy to be transferred by our conventional thinking to flat and horizontal meanings**.**

For Merleau-Ponty this "flesh-body" in a world of flesh is itself a mystery and a gift, it is that which is very near us and at the same time, is beyond our reach. The mystery of our own situated existence and our own bodily mode of being and knowing is also the most wonderful vision that Merleau-Ponty has left for us, it is at the same time a quest for the known and the unknown, the visible and the invisible, the never ending quest for lived dimension of our embodied existence. Merleau-Ponty puts it beautifully: "I know that transcendent things exist because I can touch them, see them, hear them. But most importantly, I never know things in their totality, but always from an embodied perspective. Because I am a body, I can only see things from a certain perspective, and yet, because I am a body, I can also experience the thing as being more than that partial perspective" (cited in, Brent, 2004).[11]

[11] see, Brent Dean Robbins, Maurice Merleau Ponty,2004, http://www.mattbarton.net/tikiwiki/tiki-index.php?page=Maurice+Merleau-Ponty

Chapter 8
Conclusion

In this concluding chapter an attempt is made to do the following: 1) brief summary of the major findings of the chapters, 2) a fresh look at Merleau-Ponty's interpretation of Phenomenology of Edmund Husserl, 3) an understanding of Merleau-Pontian Phenomenology Body-Model via Husserl and Heidegger, 4) an analysis of some positive implications of the Phenomenology-Body Model specially in areas related to doctor-patient relationship and its ethical impact on the life world.

What follows is a humble attempt on my part to touch upon the points mentioned above in order to make a comparative study of the two models of person, the mechanical model of Cartesian dualism and of reductionism as well as its counter model, the Phenomenological model of the Embodied Person.

1) Brief summary of the major findings of the chapters:

At a very basic level, many accept the idea that human beings come into existence as physical, sensing entities that gradually mature and acquire attributes that make them persons. As we have already traced out in the history of dualism and of physicalism, the list of personhood attributes within one camp gives priority to the consciousness and intentionality of the mind while within the other domain the body-centric attributes get priority. According to Plato's dualist view, a human being is a soul imprisoned temporarily in a body. The soul is immaterial and eternal, and accounts for human consciousness. Plato believed the soul to have three parts: 1) reason; 2) the spirited element, which initiates action; 3) and the drives and appetites.

Plato's dualist conception of the person fits well with his dualist conception of reality in general. Beside this imperfect and corruptible physical world, there is the transcendental realm of the *Forms* or *Ideas*, which is perfect and eternal. According to Plato, the soul's true home is in the realm of the Forms. Nancey Murphy traces this philosophy-theology link in her book *Theology in an Age of Scientific Reasoning* (1990) in the following manner:

> " Plato's philosophy had a significant impact on the development of early Christian thought, largely through the Neoplatonists who elaborated his ideas and incorporated them into religious systems. Augustine (354-430 CE), who has been called the most influential theologian since the Apostle Paul, made great use of Neoplatonists philosophy for treating theological issues. However, Augustine was compelled to make some modifications to the Platonic conception of the soul. According to Augustine, a human being is a rational soul using a mortal and material body, so it is not imprisoned in the body. Like Plato, Augustine's view of the soul is tri-partite, but there are some slight differences between the two thinkers. Whereas Plato saw reason as the highest attribute, Augustine thought that the will was the highest or dominant aspect. Finally, while the soul is immortal for Augustine, it does not exist eternally before incarnation, as it does for Plato." [1]

In contrast to Plato, the Greek philosopher Aristotle thought of the soul not so much as an entity, but more as a life principle-the aspect of the person that provides the

[1] http://www.counterbalance.net/neuro/greek-body.html

powers or attributes characteristic of the human being. Therefore, plants and animals have souls as well—that is, nutritive and sensitive souls. Our souls incorporate the nutritive and sensitive powers, but also include rational powers. Because the soul is a principle of the functioning body, it dies with the body (although Aristotle speculated that perhaps some aspect of rationality survives death). Aristotle's conception of the soul and body also fits well into his general conception of reality. All material things are comprised of matter and form. The form is an immanent principle that gives things their essential characteristics and powers. So the soul is but one type of form. In general, what we see in Greek philosophical speculation is the recognition of the matter-form combination in an incarnated or an embodied person that keeps the possibility of the living principle animating the non living (ibid). Later this animating principle that was more spiritual in Plato and Augustine, or more vital and animating in Aristotle, gave way to a complete mechanical 'force' in Newtonian and Descartean understanding of person as a mechanical combination of cells and organs in a body machine.

Accordingly we have models of Persons that could accommodate disembodied minds or mindless body machines, an artificial combination of mind-matter duality. As against these dichotomous ways of understanding persons, Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology has sought to posit an alternate model of person that could equally be embodied and mindful at one and the same time. This shift toward the embodied person is definitely an attempt at explaining and evaluating the continuing place of spontaneous, physical experience in our development of mind. The argument is that although our mind may be active in any experience of the world, the mind is not just an inner function of the

body. Instead, we should acknowledge that we are first and foremost embodied, so that mind pervades our corporeal existence and is not somehow added on.

Understanding person as one unified whole that could not be torn apart artificially Merleau-Pontian phenomenological model of person accommodates both body and mind in a harmonious manner. As against these dichotomous ways of understanding persons, Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology seeks to posit an alternate model of person that could equally be embodied and mindful at one and the same time. This is an attempt at explaining and evaluating the continuing place of spontaneous, physical experience in our development of mind. The argument is that although our mind may be active in any experience of the world, the mind is not just an inner function of the body. Instead, we should acknowledge that we are first and foremost embodied, so that mind pervades our corporeal existence and is not somehow added on.

This is not to make a shift from 'mindfulness' to 'bodiliness', but to make it explicit that our corporeal way of relating to the world is prior and that objectifying and rationalizing about the world should be seen as secondary and utterly dependent upon this more fundamental way of encountering the world. To quote Merleau-Ponty:

> "All my knowledge of the world, even my scientific knowledge, is gained from my own particular point of view, or from some experience of the world without which the symbols of science would be meaningless. The whole universe of science is built upon the world as directly experienced, and if we want to subject science itself to rigorous scrutiny and arrive at a precise assessment of its meaning and scope, we must begin by reawakening the basic experience of the world, of which science is the

second-order expression. To return to things themselves is to return to that world which precedes knowledge (and) of which knowledge always speaks" (1962, p.viii).

Or to put this more succinctly, "Our spontaneous experience of the world, charged with subjective, emotional, and intuitive content, remains the vital and dark ground of all our objectivity…… which largely goes unnoticed or unacknowledged in scientific culture" (Abrams, 1996, p. 34).

It is seen that Phenomenological model of Embodied Person could reform the Western mechanical model of the body by humanising it through reflection of the nature of human embodiment. Rather than reducing the person into atomic elements or abstracting the person in terms of universals, the phenomenologists embrace the person as creating a *Life-World*, in Husserlian terms, or as *Being-in-the-world*, in Heideggerian terms. A person, then, is physically embodied as a self in a unique life-world. The Phenomenological life-world is not the physical universe that science depicts, rather, it is the world that is lived bodily, through which we impart meaning to our lives.

The Person, then, is Embodied concretely in the here and now and not abstractly in a universal world that occupies no specific place and occurs at no particular time. As Embodied Persons, we create our individual life-worlds. The Body is personalised in a lived context or environment. The Person is not composed of separate body parts or of a mind-body dualism, as the Cartesian model, but is an integrated bodily unit that is situated in a specific location and time. To quote Eliot Deutsch:

"Persons have bodies to the degree to which they appropriate the physical conditions of their individuality and become integrated (and not merely unified) psychological beings " (1993, pp 5-19).

This means that at the pre-reflective level, the person 'ex-ists' the body: "I am "embodied" in the sense … that I am my body" (Merleau-Ponty, cited in Toombs, 1993, p. 52).

How far this model of Embodied Person is Husserlian in the strict sense of the word, or Heideggerian? Or is it Merleau-Ponty's own individual effort at re- defining persons as embodied and embedded? This needs a re-appraisal of Merleau-Ponty's relation to phenomenology in general and to Husserlian or Heideggerian phenomenology in particular, specially with reference to his position regarding some vital life-world issues like bodiliness, intentionality, personhood, life world and so on.

3) **Phenomenological Quest for the Body:**

From Husserl to Merleau-Ponty

Merleau-Ponty drew inspiration not only from phenomenology associated with Edmund Husserl, Martin Hiedegger and the existentialism of his time, he was also equally indebted to contemporary teachings of psychology, ethnology and some other related areas. The chapter related to Merleau-Pontian approach to phenomenology has already highlighted some important features of Pontian brand of phenomenology and its relation to Edmund Husserl's basic ideas. In a sense, Husserlian phenomenolpgy is re-discovered by Merleau-Ponty that could accommodate the existential and concrete dimension of our situated existence of a Heideggerian *Dasein*-like *embodied and embedded* being even within a Husserlian framework. This re-reading of phenomenology

in general and Husserlian phenomenology in particular has made him an explorer of the concrete and the bodily dimension of phenomenology. Phenomenology is an inquiry whose overarching goal is to understand the world as it is experienced by persons. It questions the Western philosophical presumption of 'objectivity' or mind-independent truth. Two important features of this tradition are worth noting here. The first involves how phenomenology understands and pursues 'knowledge' and 'truth.' The second pertains to the 'corporeality of the world' and 'human experience'. In this background, Merleau-Ponty understood man to be essentially embodied that can accommodate both 'corpse body' and the 'flesh body' in a harmonious manner.

Diana Coole writes: "As argued by Edmund Husserl, the first systematic phenomenologist,' rather than attempting to verify or uncover 'truths' that are by definition unverifiable or in-accessible to human perception, one must take the perceiving, conscious individual as the starting point for knowledge" (2001)[2]. This is not to say that scientific (objective) inquiry is futile, but rather that no amount of scientific evidence can undermine the reality of one's personal experiences, however contradictory the two may be. This position differs considerably from that of rationalists like Descartes and Kant, for whom the objects of one's perception have dubious existence until corroborated by more 'reliable' evidence, such as pure reason (ibid).

Husserl's commitment to returning to the things themselves suggested a route back to experience. This was especially welcome to thinkers like Merleau-Ponty and Sartre, who were frustrated that the abstractions of the prevailing Kantianism in France had proven of little relevance in confronting the traumatic events of the war and its

[2] see, http://www.radicalphilosophy.com/default.asp?channel_id=2188&editorial_id=9901

aftermath. This had provided little scope for a study of the world itself as a source of meaning and this was what Merleau-Ponty hoped to gain from Husserl. Even reading Husserl's work was, however, fraught with political difficulties. Not only was most of it still untranslated and unpublished, existing largely as a great mass of shorthand and longhand pages that Husserl's followers would gradually transcribe after his death, but the Jewish philosopher had his work banned, even destroyed, once the Nazis came to power. While many of his manuscripts did eventually find their way to Louvain in Belgium, where an archive was established, access was then determined by political events in a very direct way as the shifting geography of the occupation in Europe precluded free travel across borders (cited in Coole, 2001).[3]

Merleau-Ponty was in fact the first foreign scholar to visit the archives, in 1939. Thereafter he gained only piecemeal and sporadic access to Husserl's writings, and confessed that without a project of translation and publication his thought would remain more a style of thinking than a philosophy. The unsystematic way in which Merleau-Ponty gained access to Husserl's work, which nevertheless placed him in a privileged position as its interlocutor, together with Husserl's own proclivity for presenting himself as a perpetual beginner, invited an ongoing reinterpretation of a thinking in progress rather than fidelity to a master. Merleau-Ponty always maintained that phenomenology remains more a style of approaching the world than a set of rigid formulae. He ascribed the status of Phenomenologist *avant la lettre* to thinkers like Hegel, Nietzsche, Marx and Freud as well as to artists and writers like Cézanne and Proust since they, like Husserl,

[3] http://www.radicalphilosophy.com/default.asp?channel_id=2188&editorial_id=9901

had suspended conventional understandings about existence to explore afresh the way meaning emerges there (ibid).

The main effect of Merleau-Ponty's creative interpretation of Husserl would be to push phenomenology in a more existentialist, materialist and political direction. For despite its appeal to experience, Husserl's own work, especially in its earlier forms, retained a distinctly Cartesian orientation. In appealing to the things themselves it was concerned with the way they appear to consciousness, with phenomenology being presented as a rigorous science of this consciousness. Husserl often spoke as if Descartes and Kant had merely been insufficiently radical in thinking through subjectivity. By suspending naturalistic assumptions and theoretical presuppositions about experience, as well as psychological explanations of consciousness, he now intended to discover the inner core of subjectivity in its meaning-bestowing acts. Husserl thus spoke of a transcendental phenomenology that would describe the intentional structures and essences of a purified transcendental ego. In doing so, he relied upon a notion of intuition whose privileged mode was that of perception. As Levinas summarized it in 1930 (focusing primarily on *Ideas I*), that "in intuition we relate directly to the presence of intuitive contents in the mind rather than real objects, with consciousness thus remaining representational and the retrieval of the things themselves, a theoretical act" (ibid).

Under Heidegger's influence, Merleau-Ponty asked whether the world is not rather presented in its very being as a centre of action, as a field of activity or of care. Merleau-Ponty was similarly determined to wrest phenomenology away from idealism. Here he deployed a number of strategies. First, his reading was consistently inflected through what, from the perspective of the late 1950s, he would define as the two essential

philosophical themes of the twentieth century: existence and dialectics. From the beginning, he identified phenomenology as a philosophy of existence. In an early essay, Merleau-Ponty had summarized existentialism's key question as "that of man's relationship to his natural or social surroundings" (ibid). Existence here expressed a phenomenal milieu rather than the objective realm of things or a subjective domain of consciousness. To exist means to live as an *embodied, inter-subjective, expressive being* that subtends and discovers significance in all its acts, to be 'condemned to meaning'.

It is this level of lived experience that Merleau-Ponty then explores phenomenologically, struggling to think about it, with it, from within it. It is the irreducible interweaving (the 'chiasm' as he will later put it) of mind and body, subject and object that he finds in existence, that will eventually yield and be supported by a non-Cartesian ontology of the flesh, that 'emblem' of Being. Grasping the essential ambiguity of the phenomena moreover demands that we forsake the rigorous aspirations of traditional metaphysics and epistemology in favor of what Merleau-Ponty calls the "non-philosophy" of post-Hegelian thinkers like Marx, Kierkegaard, and Nietzsche. The grand aspirations of systematic philosophers such as Kant and Hegel, must give way to a new kind of concrete, descriptive, perhaps merely evocative inquiry situated essentially if uneasily between the empirical and the transcendental, or in Heideggerian emphasis on being in the world. For Merleau-Ponty, this concrete and experiential dimension of reality gets prime emphasis even in Husserl. "According to Husserl, direct engagement in the life-world is becoming subverted in Cartesian influenced Western civilization by what he saw as a compulsive need to objectify the unpredictable aspects life-world" (Abram, 1996, p. 34).

4) Understanding Phenomenology Body-Model via Husserl, Hiedegger and Merleau-Ponty:

A phenomenological framework hinges on how we should make attempts at conceptualizing something that is beyond conceptualization? What could be the theoretical framework for conceptualizing a very familiar item: the human body, for example? Phenomenology lets us know that our reflection of the body-model or whatsoever, is derived from a non-reflective domain of 'living the body' or 'being the person' one is without giving any thought about it. Later, at the reflective level only, the body may be grasped as an object distinct from the self, but it is still an object within a life-world. In other words, the body is the medium in which the person carries out intentionally daily tasks and activities, and we come to know the body not through abstracting but by living the body.

The body is not some thing that the person possesses as an object; rather, it is a lived, integrated unity that is not readily discernable into a body on the one hand and a mind (or self) on the other. It is not an object in terms of being a scientific object, that is, as a theoretical or an abstract thing. In other words, we do not experience our bodies as molecules, cells, tissues, etc. Rather, the body is an integrated unity through which a person 'in-habits' a life-world. Leder makes a similar point when he says: "(skills and habits) are enveloped within the structure of the taken-for-granted body from which I inhabit the world" (1990, p 32).

To be human is to dwell in a particular world of embodied capacities, concerns and relationships. Without this situated-ness in the life world, one loses the ability to feel at home. Animals get diseases, but only man falls radically into sickness. Human life

worlds are structured by care. Our embodied capacities give us the sense of "I can" or "I cannot" do or be something or someone. The word I inhabit is experienced differently when I am prone or walking, standing or running. Perception is an embodied capacity that changes with experience over time. Learning to see distinctions is a skill governed by life world concerns and physical environment. For example, the field of threats, harm and possibilities that I experience daily is expressed in my skillful habitual body. I dread traffic, have a health respect and intermittent fear of earthquakes, and count on mostly pleasant weather. I can extend the sense of my embodiment through the use of a ski pole, a cane, prosthesis, or an instrument. I can predict what levels of exertion will make me short of breath or fatigued. I know first hand the vulnerabilities and possibilities of embodiment as in the experience or fear of pain (see, Benner, 1994)[4]. Jean Johnson's (1973) research demonstrated that rehearsal of actual perceptual sensations such as the noise, the heat, and vibration of a cast cutting device are more effective preparation in terms of diminishing anxiety distress during a procedure of removing a cast than verbal descriptions alone (pp.261-175).

Accordingly, phenomenology offers a model of the physically Embodied Person as a self in a unique Life-World. The phenomenological life-world is not the physical universe that science depicts, rather, it is the world that is lived bodily, through which we impart meaning to our lives. The Person, then, is Embodied concretely in the here and now and not abstractly in a universal world that occupies no specific place and occurs at no particular time. As Embodied Persons, we create our individual life-worlds. The body is personalized in a lived context or environment. The person is not composed of separate

[4] Patricia Benner , *A phenomenology of caring practices in health and illness.* http://nurseweb.ucsf.edu/public/shobe/pdf/6%20phencarebenner.pdf

body parts or of a mind-body dualism, as the Cartesian model, but is an integrated bodily unit that is situated in a specific location and time. To quote Eliot Deutsch: "Persons have bodies to the degree to which they appropriate the physical conditions of their individuality and become integrated (and not merely unified) psychological beings"[5]. This means that at the pre-reflective level, the person 'ex-ists' the body: "I am "embodied" in the sense … that I am my body" (ibid).

This can be better illustrated in terms of Heidegger's *Da-sein*, person as a Being-in-the-world and Being-with-others. Martin Hiedegger describes the Paradox of Embodiment without directly discussing embodiment. He considered the Body to be the most difficult problem (Cerbone, 2000, pp.209-230). Hiedegger uses the term *Da-sein* (there-being) instead of 'human' to try and define what is the essence of human being, of human existence. *Da-sein* is an entity for whom its own existence is an issue

> " I am not just alive and existing. *Dasein* always exists in the world, somewhere, some specific there as three terms - facticity, thrownness, and state-of-mind. Facticity designates the irreducible specificity and always already ness of *Dasein's* 'being-in-the-world'. The body I have is always unavoidably and specifically mine. The concept of facticity also implies that *Dasein* is meaningfully bound to the conditions of its existence and the entities it encounters. 'The specifics of my "there" mean something to me. Whether I have red hair or yellow skin or grow up in a brick veneer house are not just random, objective facts: they are important to me and to

[5] Eliot Deutsch, "The Concept of the Body," in *Self as Body in Asian Theory and Practice*, ed. Thomas P. Kasulis , Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1993, pp.5-19, 5.

others (but I don't get to choose them). I think the 'there' of my existence is always and most proximally, my body. My bodily particularities are part of facticity, they constitute the 'mineness' of my existence: it is the inheritance, which I do not choose, and can therefore choose to choose" (see, Gronda, 2002) [6].

Heidegger uses the evocative term, 'throwness,' to connote this inescapable submission to existence itself. We are beings thrown into existence. *Da-sein* is always and already "delivered over to the Being which, in existing, it has to be" (ibid). For Heidegger we are forced to confront this 'throwness' most powerfully in state-of-mind. State-of-mind, or mood, discloses existence prior and beyond either cognition or will. Heidegger says:

" the mood brings *Dasein* before the "that-it-is" of its "there", which as such, stares it in the face with the inexorability of an enigma"(Being and Time). At this point *Da-sein* has the opportunity to grasp hold of its throwness, to choose its enigmatic, unexplainable specificity and inhabit the possibilities of its there. In just this way the practice of Contact Improvisation forces me over and over to confront my mood, to pay attention to my bodily state, to notice the body I actually have and to dance with it. But Heidegger argues that for the most part, *Da-sein* turns away from facing the enigma of its throwness. And I think we are even expert at turning away from the moods, themselves - how often have you

[6] Hellene Gronda , *Dance with the body you have,*
http://users.bigpond.net.au/dcorbet/proximity/v_five/v5e3a2.htm

said – “I am just not sure how I feel”? Grasping hold of the ‘there’ – the facticity of Dasein’s throwness – is not an easy task”(ibid).

We always “find ourselves” in a mood just as, I would add, we find ourselves in a body while knowledge and intention comes later (see, Hanley, 1999, pp.19-28).

Within this model, person’s normal and spontaneous rootedness bestows in him/her a sense of dwelling, as the healthy man is a habitual dweller in his life world. The world is not alien nor is the person a stranger to the world that is his place of dwelling. Reflection on the body is a later phase; it is based on pre-reflective habitual awareness of the body. At the reflective level, the body announces itself objectively in terms of its disruption of the normal course of the life-world. As a broken tool thwarts the builder’s plans so the ill body disrupts the patient’s plans.

> “this is not to say that the body is a tool and that the ill body is a broken tool, but the analogy of the ill body as a broken tool does capture the impact illness has on the patient’s experience of the body: “it would be wrong to call the body parts tools since they are also part of *Da-sein* as self. They are not only a part of the totality of tools, but also, as lived (leibliche), they belong to the projective power of the self ” (see, Marcum, 2004, pp. 125-137).

Merleau-Ponty focuses more on the distinction that one comes across in the German language, which, like so many German expressions, resists direct translation into English, crystallizes the two models discussed here. The word *body* in German is referenced by two words, *Leib* and *Körper*. Despite their apparent synonymy, the words carry distinct connotations. To speak of a *Körper* is to speak of a material thing: a “body”

a corpse, a specimen, a machine. A *Körper* is composed of limbs and muscles, organs and veins – nothing more. *Körper* gives rise to German expressions describing the merely physical: *Körpermasse* (measurements) and *Körperpflege* (hygiene) are examples. In his interpretation, phenomenology involves setting aside the abstract theoretical structures of our thought in favour of a return to the direct experience on the basis of which those theories are constructed. We experience people, in Merleau-Ponty's view, as unified wholes, not as conjunctions of two substances, and we experience their thoughts, feelings, etc., as inseparable, except by abstraction, from the physical movements that express them. They are 'body-subjects' or 'embodied subjectivities'. In his view of body as flesh both these lived body and the corpse body are unified as two perspectives on one unified whole, namely, the 'embodied person'.

5) Implications of the Phenomenology-Body Model Particularly in Doctor-Patient Relationship and its Ethical Impact on the Life World:

As the previous chapters have made it clear, historically, Western medicine has approached the patient and his or her body as distinct entities. The conception of the body *Körper*, as a machine–a material, non-animated substance, distinct from the intangible, ani-mated 'self' is often described as 'Cartesian' because of its most influential articulation by Rene Descartes in the 17th century. While classical dualism has been challenged over the centuries by many schools of philosophical thought, the biomechanical model of the body is so entrenched in Western medical practice as to be nearly invisible.

As we have seen, the type of model used to represent the patient's body has a significant impact on the meaning of the illness itself and the clinical encounter between

the patient and the physician, including the healthcare system. For the mechanised body model, the patient is a machine and the physician a mechanic, who attends to the pain associated with a broken or missing body part in order to relieve that pain by mending or replacing the part. Both the patient and physician are cogs within a medical machine-world. Simultaneously, in the mechanized body model, the self as mind is separate from and above the experience of the body's disease state; and, the pain associated with the disease state, as experienced by the patient, is imposed from outside by the damaged or broken body part.

The ultimate impact of this model upon the patient is fragmentation, both in terms of the patient's personhood and relationship to a lived context. For the mechanised body, the meaning of the disease is confined simply or exclusively to the defective or impaired body part. The result of this fragmentation is alienation and estrangement of the diseased body part both from the patient's self and from the patient's life-world. Moreover, the physician generally provides the meaning for the patient's disease state, especially in terms of body parts, as a dysfunction of the body-machine. Unless the diseased body part is cured, the physician has failed and cannot heal the patient–for healing is equated with curing the diseased body part.

Besides reducing the patient to a mechanised body, scientific medicine has also reduced the patient to a textual body that often replaces the physical presence of the patient. The medical history represents the patient as a text in which the physician asks the questions and the patient answers them, with little extraneous input from the patient. The medical exams also represents the patient as a set of numbers obtained from laboratory tests and as a set of written descriptive phrases obtained from the physician's

prodding and poking the patient's body. As Svenaeus argues: "If the body is a meaningful phenomenon … this is so because it is lived, an aspect of our being-in-the-world, and not because it is written" (2000, p. 49). As it has already been shown in previous chapters, "illness results in an awareness of the body as separate and foreign that stands out over and against *(ek-stasis*) the normal course of life" (ibid). Illness often expands the temporal scale and collapses the spatial domain in which the body is lived. For example, routine activities, such as combing one's hair that took little time take relatively longer, when an arm is broken.

The objectification of the ill-body at the reflective level differs from the objectification credited to science. In the former, the patient is an object but one that is situated in a unique *life-world as an embodied person*, while in the latter, the patient is an object located in a common *machine-world as a disembodied person*. Everyone is happy to feel his or her body when it feels good. But in case of headache, we take aspirin, and if pain persists? We all know what to do. It would be easy to scold ourselves, as Nietzsche; another famous philosopher does, for having become someone who "sometimes holds his nose in his own presence"(cited in Gronda, 2002). But what if the body I have is paralyzed, or if my capacity to be touched is marred by sexual abuse? What if the body I have is judged to be less than human due to its colour? Can I still accept the body I have? Should I bear it? How to deal with that specificity is a political question.

For a phenomenologist, an important question that the physician must address is: Why does the patient suffer? The answer revolves around the meaning the patient attaches to illness. A second trajectory is to transform the textual body – as represented by the texts obtained from the medical history and exam – into a lived body. Curiously,

under this latter model the patient may be healed without necessarily having the diseased body part cured. However, this does not mean to disregard the importance of the manipulability of the mechanized body which is certainly important for addressing the material issues–such as pain–associated with disease, but it is to point out that the mechanical model is in itself inadequate for understanding the suffering associated with the patient's illness.

Contrary, in the *embodied person model*, the patient is look upon as an integrated bodily unit within a life-world, as is the physician, who attends empathetically to the patient's illness and suffering. To speak of a *Leib*, by contrast, is to speak of a living body, usually one's own. It denotes, beyond the physical aspects of a particular substance, the aspects of the individual. "Derived from the word for "life" (*Leben*), *Leib* is the source of human experience, in that the physical and non-physical dimensions of personhood are inseparable" (Bialystok, 2006, p.55). There are other ways of conceptualizing the body, but this distinction is useful because it cuts to the essence of a centuries-old debate in Western philosophy. What or where, exactly, is the 'self'? Is the self an intangible entity, a soul trapped inside a material body? Or is the self composed of both material and non-material elements? If so, how do they communicate with and affect one another? Phenomenology examines the relationship between the self and the body.

A phenomenological understanding of the body, and of the self can offer a medical model that resonates better with some patients' experiences than the historical biomechanical approach. The phenomenological model of the human body has important implications for the patient's experience of illness. Illness according to this model is not simply a dysfunction of a mechaniSed body or body part within a machine-world but a

disruption of an embodied person's life-world: "illness must be understood not simply as the physical dysfunction of the mechanistic, biological body but as the disorder of body, self and world (of one's being-in-the-world)" (Toombs, 1993, p. 52).

Simultaneously, in the mechanised body model, the self as mind is separate from and above the experience of the body's disease state, and the pain associated with the disease state, as experienced by the patient, is imposed from outside by the damaged or broken body part. The ultimate impact of this model upon the patient is fragmentation, both in terms of the patient 's personhood and relationship to a lived context. For the mechanised body, the meaning of the disease is confined simply or exclusively to the defective or impaired body part. The result of this fragmentation is alienation and estrangement of the diseased body part both from the patient's self and from the patient's life-world. Moreover, the physician generally provides the meaning for the patient's disease state, especially in terms of body parts, as a dysfunction of the body-machine. Unless the diseased body part is cured, the physician has failed and cannot heal the patient–for healing is equated with curing the diseased body part.

Hence, the trajectory of the embodied person is two-fold. As we have seen in the preceding sections, the type of model used to represent the patient's body has a significant impact on the meaning of the illness itself and the clinical encounter between the patient and the physician, including the healthcare system The first is towards transformation of the mechanised body–whether in its molecular or cyborg manifestations – into a lived body. It is done by transforming organs into cohesive whole. That is, the notion of *embodiment* is stretched to include the artificial enhancements of or prosthetic extension or additions to the body. As the mechanical body becomes more

artificial, the Embodied Person strives to incorporate modifications of and additions to the body into a unique life-world. For the mechanised body model, the patient is a machine and the physician a mechanic, who attends to the pain associated with a broken or missing body part in order to relieve that pain by mending or replacing the part. Both the patient and physician are cogs within a medical machine-world.

The Changing Scenario and its Ethical Dimension:

The Contemporary scene in medical ethics is more for safeguarding the embodied and relational nature of persons that is closer in spirit to the phenomenological model of embodied person. In fact, the medical management of heart transplantation is so advanced that much of the research now focuses on how to improve recipients' quality of life.

> " the medical science that enables heart transplantation not only relies upon, but might be said to epitomize, the bio-mechanical model of the body .The deft exchange of human organs in the service of extending natural life is a triumph of contemporary Western medicine. It displays an intimate understanding of the parts and processes that fuel the human machine, and moreover, effectively quells the skeptic's intuitions that there is more to the body than the blood and tissues familiar to surgeons. Contrary to idealist threads in popular culture and parlance, transplantation seems to prove that the heart is just a pump; replace a swollen, beleaguered, sickly one with a working version, and morbidly-ill patients might enjoy near-perfect health"(Marcum, 2004, pp.311-20).

Why then, should many heart transplant recipients feel that Cartesian dualism completely misses the point? The challenges associated with recovering from heart transplant surgery are numerous and complex.

> "The literature on this topic abounds, from the risk of rejection and higher rates of cancer, to psychosocial adaptation and the likelihood of returning to work, the changes in the life of a transplant recipient are well-documented and extend farther than the obvious impact of a major surgery. But a closer inspection of heart recipients' experiences suggests that something less transparent might also be at work. Studies and anecdotal evidence show that a significant number of patients – approximately 20% on most counts–suffer from a form of psychological or emotional distress post-transplant that is uncorrelated to clinical measures of health, and may appear or be exacerbated at any time, often to the detriment of the patient's functionality, relationships, and hap- piness" (Bunzel, Schmidl, Grundbock, Wollenek, 1992, pp.251-56).

While insights into the sources of such distress are limited and scattered at best, the evidence for its existence is uncontroversial. This negative outcome is hardly investigated in the leading journals and publications on transplant medicine, possibly because of its apparent immunity to clinical interventions and physiological explanations. Nonetheless, some sociologists and anthropologists, approaching the study of heart transplantation with non- medical paradigms, have shown great interest in recording and understanding recipients' experiences. Their studies contain recurring accounts of patients believing things about their bodies that seem to defy the mechanistic model.

Specifically, many heart transplant recipients are unwilling or unable to accept that their diseased organ was replaced with a "spare part," the way a true machine would be fixed. They feel that the transplant, far from being a strictly material intervention, was simultaneously an intrusion into their very identity (Bialystok, 2006, p.56).

The most obvious evidence for this conflation of bodily and non-bodily sequel is found in several reports of heart transplant recipients taking on characteristics of their donors. These reports are found in medical journals, anecdotal evidence at transplants centers, and first-person accounts. Psychiatric and psychosocial studies of heart trans-plantation have begun to expose the prevalence of these experiences.

> " In one Israeli study of 35 male heart recipients, over half of the participants were found to "(endorse) fantasies and (display) magical thinking." Although "all recipients possessed a scientific knowledge of the anatomy and physiological significance of the heart," almost 50% of the recipients "had an overt or covert notion of potentially acquiring some of the donor's personality characteristics along with the heart." In another study of 47 heart recipients, 21% of respondents said their personality had changed post-operatively, attributing this to either the trauma of nearly dying (15%) or the grafted heart itself 1 6%). The investigators concluded "there seem to be severe problems regarding graft incorporation, which are based on the age-old idea of the heart as a centre that houses feelings and forms the personality" (Bobak, Hense, Kark, Kuch,Vojtisek,Sinnreich,

Gostomzyk, Bui, Eckardstein, Junker, Fobker, Schulte, Assmann and Marmot, 1999, pp. 437-444).[7]

These types of studies begin to identify a mismatch between the model of the body proffered by transplant physicians, and the actual experiences of heart transplant recipients. It is first-person testimonies that make the extent of the disjunction most apparent. Heart transplant recipients describe "a range of unexpected changes resulting from their operation, from new appetites and dispositions to anxieties and nightmares, which quantitative self-reporting measures fail to capture in their complexity. Convinced of a kinship that transcends mechanical replacements, some recipients search out their donor's families and attempt to form relationships with them, and vice-versa, despite efforts to keep both anonymous. Still others actively integrate the real or imagined personality of the donor into their new post-transplant identity"(Bunzel, Schmidl, Grundbock, Wollenek, 1992, pp.251-56).

It is clear that the strictly physical and impersonal explanation of heart replacement, and the associated expectation that recipients will resume "normal" lives post-transplant, fails to account for many recipients whose experiences involve metaphysical and interpersonal dimensions, as well. Claire Sylvia catalogues a litany of such experiences in her autobiography, 'A Change of Heart (1997)'. The phenomenological model of realizing that we are an embodied person brings meaning to our life-world–whether in health or in illness. Reducing the body at any time to a body part is to lose the integrity of lived experience as an Embodied Person. Hence, at root, the

[7] cited in Bialystok, Lauren, My Heart, Myself: using a phenomenological model to understand the body, The University of Toronto Medical Journal, (UTMJ), vol. 84, no. 1, dec, 2006 , http://www.utmj.org/issues/84.1/Phenomenon.pdf

meaning of illness is an ontological issue, that is, illness involves making possible or articulating a patient's life-world or being-in-the-world (Claire, 1997)[8].

In terms of Heidegger's notion of *sorge* (care), the meaning-structure of illness as Being-in-the World, is made possible or articulated with respect to a person's concern as a Being-thrown-into-a-World that is often strangely unfamiliar or unhomelikeness. This is certainly the case, when a person is diagnosed with a fatal illness or must live with a debilitating illness. As an Embodied Person, the patient comes to know the authentic and genuine self as limited and finite, especially in the face of death or chronic illness. The face of death or illness and the anxiety (*angst*) over them are the bases of the patient's *life-world* or *being-in-the-world*. By resolving the anxiety surrounding the patient's illness through reestablishing the patient's Homelikeness, the patient is healed even though the diseased body part is not cured.

It is expected that physicians would learn to utilize effectively in the healing process the patient's anxious care about bodily existence. The question facing us today is whether it is too late to humanize the mechanized body in terms of the embodied person, in order to address the crisis of care facing modern medical practice. My Body is one place where the pain of difference can and must be borne. The body practice of affirming the facts of your existence–physical, psychological, cultural, and political specificities – and finding what you can do with them is the only resources to resist a normalising power. And bearing your actual weight is not just a personal issue. The global distribution of body mass is a literal indicator of world inequities. To bear my actual

[8] Claire Sylvia , *Features My Heart, Myself: Using A Phenomenological Model To Understand The Body,* 1997.
http://www.utmj.org/issues/84.1/Phenomenon.pdf

weight is in part to accept that Westerners are more likely to die of obesity than starvation (ibid).

What about the objection that the body is plastic, malleable–not inescapable at all? Does not surgical interventions and technological enhancements mean that we can transcend the body we have? Yet these technologies cannot evade the irreducible moment of confronting the specificity of the body's mineness. The body's plasticity does not free me from the particular possibilities of my existence. If I replace this hinge joint of my elbow with a ball joint, I still confront a specific set of movements, merely a different range. And when bodies are constantly positioned with respect to the norm, and particularities are tolerated as distributions around the mean, then finding out what you can do with your given body is a form of activism. This model of politics based on confronting your physical body-vulnerable, flawed and uniquely yours-might also be the opening of compassion lung transplant, she had vivid dreams about her donor (his name, his age, how he died), which revealed information that was subsequently verified, and she developed new tastes and interests that paralleled her donor's. Despite the protestations of her transplant doctor, she located her donor's family, with whom she forged deep and long-lasting bonds (see, Gronda, 2002; Mol, 2002).

> "Indeed her donor's family, the parents and siblings of a reckless 18 year-old boy, confirmed that the 47 year-old dancer's new appreciation of beer, green peppers, and Kentucky Fried Chicken were characteristics of their deceased relative. But not all of Sylvia's post-operative changes were thereby explained. Immediately after her transplant, she experienced a period of depression and alienation that the assurances of health care

practitioners did nothing to appease: I didn't know who I was or what I was doing here. My body, the nurses assured me, was doing fine...But it wasn't my body that concerned me. It was everything else...I was going through the early stages of an identity crisis" (Claire, 1997, p.57).

In her subsequent work as a support group organizer for other heart transplant recipients, Sylvia discovered that her experiences were far from anomalous, many fellow recipients she met had experienced troubling ruptures in their personal identity, dreaming scenes that appeared to belong to another person's life, and struggling to incorporate a stranger's organ into their psychic worlds, as well as into their bodies. "In different ways," she summarized, "we all believed that receiving a new heart had affected and even changed our identities"(ibid).

The personal disruption wrought by heart transplantation can take numerous forms. For contemporary French philosopher and heart transplant recipient, Jean-Luc Nancy, the procedure and its aftermath were characterized by feelings of "strangeness" and "foreignness." It is interesting to note that while transplant patients are encouraged to think about their organs as "spare-parts," large-scale campaigns promote organ donation by employing gift metaphors and appealing to beliefs about the deceased donor "living on" in recipients. Furthermore, as pointed out by various anthropologists including Leslie Sharp, lay persons' intuitions about the body that are at odds with medical models are exploited for the purposes of public awareness, resulting in contradictions within the medical institution itself (Tuana, 2000). Tuana also comments:

" The phenomenological view is not a panacea: it will not, on its own, cure the distress that many transplant recipients experience, nor can it prevent

> any unwanted outcomes of the procedure. But, in contrast to the biomedical model, it offers the possibility of greater insight into life with a grafted heart, improved communication between physicians and patients, and the philosophical versatility to learn fromemerging medical knowledge that challenges accepted norms. As Nancy eloquently remarks: "the debate I saw unfolding, between those who consider (heart transplanta- tion) to be a metaphysical adventure and those who would see it as a technical performance, is vain: it is a matter of both, one in the other" (cited in Bialystok, 2006, p.570).

The doctors who perform heart transplants and care for recipients could benefit from widening their approach to include the less "technical" implications of their work. Of course there is already recognition that something more is at stake: as cultural anthrax-pologists remind us, medical institutions use "metaphysical" themes to their benefit in public awareness campaigns, even while denying them in other contexts.

All these above illustrations are pointers toward Merleau-Ponty's notion of lived meaning, of embodied engagement, that, brings us irremissibly into an *aporia*, an ambiguity, that cannot be dismissed but is the very condition of our all too human and also more-than-human existences. To participate in nature is to find oneself under interrogation. One does not simply walk out and expose oneself to a hurricane as it approaches our Atlantic shores, although some foolhardy souls will insist on running about the beaches as if they have become one with such a titanic force. Nor does one hide in one's basement and plot the overthrow of a world of hurricanes, as if they were a temporary phenomenon, a sinister conspiracy, which one-day we might overcome.

We have no choice but to participate in hurricanes, forest fires, grizzly bears, honeybees, invasive trees, and even smallpox. But this participation involves a doubled interrogation that cannot be brought to a close. Or any other natural disasters question our sense of being human, even as our humanity highlights and so questions the significance of hurricanes. What is meant by the destructiveness or the creativity of a hurricane is not so much known from afar as it is experienced as a series of replies on my and our part to what hurricanes effect both in my life and the lives of all my fellow creatures—both human and more-than-human. The meaning of hurricanes cannot simply be observed from afar, nor can it be absorbed from within—one must live with them in a reciprocal and incongruent interrogation (see, Youngner, Fox, Connell, 1996).

Animate Witness in Merleau-Ponty:

One can term this situation of incongruent interrogation—to be both a part and not a part of some other animate entity, to be questioned in one's very sense of the world precisely by one's becoming aware of one's inevitable involvement in living others—witnessing. Merleau-Ponty uses this terms in 'The Visible and the Invisible', his final, although incomplete philosophic testament, precisely in conjunction with that of participation. What then would express by these terms might be helpful in understanding what is involved in the practice of participation, of reciprocal interrogation that goes on between myself and an animate environment. Merleau-Ponty introduces his notion of witness in the following situation.

> " The other is born in the body (of the other) by an overhanging of that body, its investment in a Verhalten [behavior, demeanor, and attitude], its interior transformation which I witness. The coupling of the bodies, that is,

the adjustment of their intentions to one sole Erfüllung [fulfillment, accomplishment, performance], to one sole wall they run into from two sides, is latent in the consideration of one" (vi, 233, cited in Hatley, p. 9).

In many ways, Merleau-Ponty was a thinker ahead of his time. The 21st Century readers of his work 'The Phenomenology of Perception' will easily interpret his statements about understanding and experience in terms of the technological blurring of a real-conceptual boundary. "However, this is not part of the tradition that has grown up around his works. In the four decades separating the appearance of 'Phenomenology of Perception' from our world shot-through with computers, the ideas of Maurice Merleau-Ponty as they relate to the human sciences have resurfaced on a number of occasions. Since we come into the world as embodied (rather than as say, incorporeal spirits or disembodied brains), human experience is necessarily corporeal" (Leder, 1990, p.229).

Our experience of embodiment is thus constitutive of both our identities and our understanding of the world around us. To modify the body is tantamount to modifying the self. The physical and non-physical elements of life are inextricably integrated, to the point that even making the distinction might seem spurious. For Merleau- Ponty, "the flesh of the world is not *self-sensing*…. as is my flesh—it is sensible and not sentient—I call it flesh, nonetheless … in order to say that it is … absolutely not an ob-ject" (1968, p.250). Merelau-Ponty's notions of flesh and reversibility are in the first place aimed at emphasising the fact that man is made of the flesh of the world, and it is this fact that entails my direct contact with the world, my primordial relation with, or better, in it. A relation, which entails that the world is absolutely not an object for me. The flesh, is the third element that binds man and world together, that guarantees their cohesion but also

their relative opposition for it is the one irrelative of which the two relatives man and world are made, that is, *man and world and flesh are not simply one and the same* (see, De Jonge, 2002).

Merelau-Ponty's phenomenology describes our actual being in the world, our actual incorporatedness in the flesh of the world. However, the world—or the Earth—represents everything it can contain as phenomenology is meant to describe our life, our being wherever it takes place or however it looks. *The horizon of my office or my city is as much part of my world as the sky or mountains around the city. They are all part of the same Earth in which I am incorporated—that is, they are all relatives of the one irrelative that Merleau - Ponty aims to describe.*

Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology embodies the development of such sensitivity. For as *irrelative* Merleau- Ponty *s*tates himself.

> "(Phenomenology) is as painstaking as the works of Balzac, Proust, Valéry or Cézanne—by reason of the same kind of attentiveness and wonder, the same demand for awareness, the same will to seize the meaning of the world or of history as that meaning comes into being" (1945, p.24).

This thesis has, hopefully, made attempt to clarify some positions regarding Merleau-Ponty's relation to the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl and to that of Martin Heidegger and has made attempt at showing that man is essentially *embodied and embedded* in a *life world* that keeps room for accommodating the relational and the intentional character of human-Da-sein, who is in continuous dialogue with the body as *corpse* and the body as *lived* as these two are but two different aspects of the one unified

whole, namely, *The Embodied Person* . However, I cannot finish this thesis without stressing that Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology opens up the ways and means to focus not only on the embodied nature of man's situated existence but it also opens up on the many alternative relations and intense experiences that an embodied man can have of the natural and the cultural world around us.

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Lists of Publications

Journals:

1. "**An Essay on Philosophy and Medicine**", ed., Darrly Macer, in *Eubios Journal of Asian and International Bioethics* (EJAIB) vol. 17 (1) January 2007, UNESCO Bangkok, Thailand (pp. 26-31)

2. "**Exploitation in the Human Body- Trade and Some Ethical Issues**", ed., Darrly Macer, in *Eubios Journal of Asian and International Bioethics* (EJAIB) vol. 17 (1) January 2007, UNESCO Bangkok, Thailand (pp.16-21)

3. "**Philosophy of the Body**" ed., Geoffrey Klempner in *Philosophy Pathways***.** Issue number 121, 11th October 2006, United Kingdom, available at: http://www.philosophypathways.com/newsletter/

Souvenir:

4. "**Vaisnavism in Assam & Manipur: A Comparative Study***"*, *Bhakti movement & Shrimanta Shankaradeva*, organized by Asom Kalatirtha & Assamese Department Pragjyotish College Guwahati, Assam, March 2007.

5. "**Negotiating Religious Discourses Towards Peace: Philosophical Perspectives**," *Peace in Dialogue in India's North-East*, IIT Guwahati, February 2007.

6. "**Dance in Worship: with Special References to Meitei Ritual Dance**", *81st World Philosophy Congress* (Religion Section), New Delhi, December 2006.

7. **"Nirrti -The Dark Goddess",** *World Association for Vedic Studies, Inc.WAVES 8th India Conference on Science, Consciousness & Vedic Heritage*, Bangalore, 2004, see:http://www.ece.osu.edu/~calyama/nvak/publications/8th_WAVESConf_Intro.pdf

Under-Publication:

1. "**Language and Life World: Wittgensteinian & Heideggerian Perspective**", National Seminar on *Postmodernism: Modernism and its Discontents*, held from 14-16 March 2007, at NEHU Shillong (Processing under ICPR publication).

2. "**Negotiating Religious Discourses Towards Peace: Philosophical Perspectives**", for the National seminar on *Peace in Dialogue in India's North-East* held in IIT Guwahati, from 1st-2nd February 2007, (Processing under SAGE publication).