

SARTRE AND SĀṆKHYA-YOGA : A COMPARATIVE STUDY

By

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Sartre and *Sāṅkhya* –Yoga: A Comparative Study

A Thesis

Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

By

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November, 2008**



*Dedicated
to
My most important and enduring teacher
Dr Archana Barua
and
My daughter
Varsha*



INDIAN INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, GUWAHATI

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Statement

I do hereby declare that the matter written in this Thesis is the result of investigations carried out by me in the Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, Indian Institute of Technology, Guwahati, Assam (India). I have carried out my work under the guidance of Dr Archana Barua, Professor, Department of Humanities and Social Sciences.

In keeping with the general practice of reporting observations, due acknowledgement have been made wherever the work described is based on the findings of other investigations.

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*(**Namita Kalita**)*

Abstract


As the new millennium dawns, there are still millions of individuals that continue their intellectual and emotional pilgrimages to find the meaning of life. It is often difficult to pose the question seriously in order to warrant a formidable answer when the “meaning of life” is taunted as the wrong approach. But what, in fact, do we mean when we ask the question, “What is the meaning of life?” Typically, the lay person seeks to find their niche in society either through a sense of accomplishment or through a sense of contribution. Thus people desire to determine the meaning of their lives and not the mere abstract notion of “life” as *Existence*. Philosophers throughout the ages have approached the question from an intellectual perspective. It is my endeavor to elucidate the great Existentialist movement and its contribution to the intellectual approach in attempting to find out the meaning to this human predicament.

Existentialism was a widely discussed term and enjoyed a brief period of popularity during the post-war era. This philosophical movement, mainly through the works of Jean Paul Sartre, reached its peak during the 1940's. However, Sartre was not the first to touch on this fundamental question of human existence. Before him there were individual thinkers who had unconventionally responded to this essential question and explored existentialist themes, thereby paving the way for Sartrean Existentialism in the mid-twentieth century. Among the most well known predecessors, Soren Kierkegaard, Karl Jasper, and Martin Heidegger are especially noted. Jean Paul Sartre, one of the most famous existentialists, indeed inherited many ideas from his predecessors. His personal experiences, combined with his philosophical training eventually made his existential theory an Atheistic Humanism, stressing choice, commitment and responsibility.

Although not directly affiliated to the philosophical brand of Existentialism, as evident in the European existentialist Philosophy, *Sāṅkhya* school of thought, along with its philosophical counterpart *Yoga*, made similar observations related to

human existence and suffering, feeling of Nothingness, Atheism and many other similar issues related to the riddle of Existence that made *Sāṅkhya-Yoga* thinkers, theoretical knower and practical doers, looking for ways of salvation.

Can there be a dialogue between these two diverse philosophical traditions that gave prime importance to the Existential quest for meaning of life and its significance? Could there be a harmonious reconciliation between the man of contemplation and the man of action either in *Sāṅkhya-Yoga Darśana* or in Sartrean Existentialism? While addressing some such issues the Thesis attempts to compare the central ideas behind the Western and Eastern concepts of human existence.



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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

BN.	Being and Nothingness
Brh. Up.	Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad
Ch. Up.	Chāndogya Upaniṣad
En.	Ethical notebooks
Mand.Up.	Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad
Mhb.	Mahābhārata
N	Nausea
SK	<i>Sāṅkhya-Kārikā</i>
Svet. Up.	Svetāsvatara Upaniṣad
TE	The Transcendence of the Ego
Up.	Upaniṣad
YS	<i>Yoga-Sūtra</i>

CHAPTER – 1

Introduction

- 1.1** General Introduction
- 1.2** Research Questions and the Research Problem
- 1.3** Aims and Objectives
- 1.4** Literature Review
- 1.5** Methodology
- 1.6** Summary of Chapters

Chapter 1

Introduction

1. 1 General Introduction

“Has existence significance at all? [This is] the question which will require a couple of centuries even to be completely heard in all its profundity.”

-Fredrich Nietzsche

At a time when our growing understanding of the brain sciences and other related areas have made us familiar with the deeper mystery of the human subjectivity and human consciousness, there is need for understanding the human species or life itself in many modalities. Today’s complex civilization forces man to seek his or her true place in the expanding networks of relations *Vis a Vis* the world and others. The new achievements of the life sciences allow the breeding of a new man. The alternatives include not only the reductionistic proposals of natural scientists but also the adolescent speculations about the superior artificial intelligence of future generations of robots. We are now looking for a new kind of humanity and re-defining man in light of recent findings in the field of both science and philosophy. The Thesis is motivated by the desire to address relevant questions that face humanity at one point of time or other. We often wonder: ‘what does it mean to be a human being? What’s the essence of this being in contrast to other beings, animals for instance? Is there an intrinsic value to this being which constitutes certain rights and obligations? What is a man?’ A key aspect of being human is the desire to know who we are and why we behave the way we do. That we are now at an important crossroads in intellectual understanding with respect to what Feurbach once called on human *Gattungsbegriff* (that is the “species notion”, “species understanding” or simply the self understanding we have about ourselves as human beings), an important intellectual task before us is to rethink our *Gattungsbegriff* in light of what we now know about the cosmos in which we find ourselves.

Interestingly, both *Sāṅkhya-Yoga Darśana* and Sartrean Existentialism are initiated by a desire for restoring concreteness of life and *facticity* of the existential human

being who is helplessly thrown into a situation. In both these philosophical systems, man's existence is shown to be problematic as it leads to a tension between the essence and the existence. The question of subjectivity is central in the philosophy of Jean Paul Sartre. His intellectual journey essentially responds to the mystery of being human. The human subject is one who struggles to be. This is because there seems to be a disjuncting between human consciousness and its incarnate existence. The effort to live well thus becomes difficult. To live one's subjectivity means to understand the meaning of one's "being-in-the-world." On the other hand *Sāṅkhya-Yoga Darśana* basically deals with the deeper Subjectivity of man and his/her existential suffering. Is the problem faced by Sartre similar to the ones that made 'Yoga' bring back a missing God into the *Sāṅkhya-Yoga* skeleton? The Thesis wonders. Perhaps Sartre explored another possibility: 'man should learn to survive without God and should become a kind of God himself' (Marx, Nietzsche, Sartre, Camus etc.).

The present Thesis "Sartre and *Sāṅkhya-Yoga*: A Comparative Study", centers round the following key themes, i.e. the problems of cross-cultural comparison and the issue of addressing a new kind of humanism. The present discussion is confined to the thought of Jean Paul Sartre and *Sāṅkhya-Yoga Darśana*.

1.2 Research Questions and the Research Problem

In the above background a couple of research questions are formulated in the following manner: a) is this journey toward a deeper dimension of human subjectivity significant? Is this a quest for the self in terms of consciousness? Is it a study of brain, mind, and self-etc.? When we speak of self awareness, do we then necessarily also speak of a Self? b) Is *Sāṅkhya* atheistic in nature? What is theism in *Yoga Darśana*? How does Sartre and *Sāṅkhya-Yoga* reconcile atheism and man's urge for salvation? How is it related to the existentially personal question, "who am I"? c) What is the mystery of consciousness? Is consciousness essentially free, spontaneous and essentially disembodied or it can be concretized with more emphasis in man's social and material world? Is there a dichotomy between theory and *praxis*? What is subjectivity and inter-subjectivity in Sartrean Existentialism

and *Sāṅkhya-Yoga Darśana*? Is man essentially free, or a helpless victim of situation? Can one reconcile between the two? d) What is the meaning of philosophical humanism? What is Sartre to his critics? e) Is it necessary to compare between Western and Indian conception of consciousness and vice versa, *Sāṅkhya* and Sartrean conceptions of the conscious realm of subjectivity?

1.3 Aims and Objectives

While some comparisons have been made between *Vedānta* and Phenomenology there are not many works done in the field of a comparative study of *Sāṅkhya-Yoga* and Phenomenology in general and of Sartrean Existential Phenomenology in particular. Besides, most of these studies have taken a different direction from the present study. Earlier, comparative studies have been concerned more with the thought of Edmund Husserl, and the consonance between the transcendental aspects of his earlier thought and that of the more idealist schools of classical *Sāṅkhya* that has similarity with the school of Non Dual *Vedānta* of Saṅkara. The objective of the present work is to present a more non-idealist and realistic position of both *Sāṅkhya* and *Yoga* and specially the *Yoga-Sūtra* of Patañjali that has retained its theistic and anti-idealist position throughout. The Thesis aims at focusing this orientation of *Sāṅkhya-Yoga* and of Existential Phenomenology of Jean Paul Sartre.

The purpose of the Thesis is to establish whether the question of subjectivity is central in these two philosophical schools. The Thesis aims at addressing the question of ‘Defining “Humanity” in a *Postmodern Age*.’ While there is scope for re-defining man in terms of species content in the ‘Atheistic Existentialism’ of Jean Paul Sartre, the *Sāṅkhya Darśana* takes man beyond the empirical and physical complex to the realm of pure consciousness that transcends empirical *jīva*. For Jean Paul Sartre, any definition of man is inconclusive: “Man is the being through whom nothingness comes to the world (Sartre, 1943:59).”¹

¹ Earnshaw, Steven. , *Existentialism: A Guide for the Perplexed*, Continuum, pp.147, (2006). Sartre, J. P., *On Negations*, pp.59,(1943).

The purpose of this Thesis is to comparatively study the concepts of Consciousness, Freedom, Authenticity, Nothingness and Existential suffering, in *Sāṅkhya-Yoga* Philosophy and in Sartrean Existentialism, both in its early and the late phase of development. Set in the philosophical perspectives of Existential Phenomenology of Jean Paul Sartre and the existential quest for salvation in the philosophy of *Sāṅkhya-Yoga*, the Thesis aims at a contemporary picture of man.

1.4 Literature Review

A selected literature review has provided the necessary guideline for the research work. This has helped in understanding the research problem from different perspectives and also to identify the research gap that keeps room for fresh look at the research problem.

D.P. Chattopadhyaya edited *History of Science, Philosophy and Culture in Indian civilization* which has helped me initially in proceeding methodologically in my research area. Sartre's *The Transcendence of the Ego: An Existentialist Theory of Consciousness* has provided the background for identifying the research problem. This book shows to what extent Sartre is closer to Husserl and Heidegger in his attempt at understanding human person in terms of consciousness that differs from the 'Cartesian *cogito*'. Although there are many books authored by J.P. Sartre, a list of which is recorded in the bibliography, some books which are directly relevant to the literature review are: (a) Sartre's famous novel *Nausea* that has helped me in identifying the research topic i.e. the comparative study of Sartre and *Sāṅkhya-Yoga*. There is a scope for holistic comparison between *Sāṅkhya* and Sartre with special reference to Sartre's novel *Nausea* and Patañjali's *Yoga-Darśana*. Granting the fact that what Roquentin in Sartre's novel experiences as nauseating is nothing but the more inauthentic and dehumanizing phase of existence, what Ashok Malhotra's book has pointed out, it needs to be strongly highlighted that one undergoes similar nauseating experience when the *Sāṅkhya* man becomes forgetful of one's own authentic and enlightened state of existence. This becomes man's mechanical phase of existence in terms of *prakṛti*: human's become inauthentic and are pushed and pulled by the mere *guṇas* i.e. *Sattva, Rajas*

and *Tamas*. (b) There are scholars who have found close similarity between Sartre's *Nausea* and *Sāṅkhya*-Yoga system specially Patañjali's *Yoga Darśana*. These books are: *The Philosophy of Sartre versus Sāṅkhya Yoga*, by Ashok Kumar Malhotra, Gerald James Larson's *Interpreting Across Boundaries: New Essays in Comparative Philosophy*, *Fundamentals of Indian Philosophy* by Ramakrishna Puligandla, among others. While Larson endeavours to demonstrate significant parallels between the ontologies of Jean Paul Sartre and classical *Sāṅkhya*-Yoga, Puligandla's book emphasizes the affinity of the *Yoga* method to Husserl's Phenomenology. The author asserts, however, that while Patañjali presents concrete techniques to perform the *epoché*, Husserl and other Phenomenologists, including Sartre, have failed to do so. Although there is much worth in his analysis, Puligandla's discussion is partial in some aspects. (c) Ashoke Kumar Malhotra's *The Philosophy Of Sartre Versus Sāṅkhya-Yoga* is a supplementary to the studies of both Larson and Puligandla's observations. Malhotra has provided some new inputs that are essential for a proper comparative study. (d) Karel Werner's book *Yoga and Indian philosophy* is a pointer in this direction. This is an attempt at pointing out the basic similarities in the structure of life as the individual experiences it in different times and cultures.

Another important book is (e) Mircea Eliade's *Yoga: Immortality and Freedom*. Eliade draws attention to another theme that is relevant in this comparison. This book shows the close relation between the Phenomenology of the West and the Phenomenological approach taken by Indian thinkers, both classical and modern. It illustrates that the underlying spirit of Phenomenology and Hermeneutics has been consciously followed by Indian philosophers for centuries when seers and thinkers sought to explore personal experience of deeper mystical perceptual states of consciousness. This book rightly points out that both these philosophies identify existential suffering and need for salvation and cessation of suffering as the key themes, of their philosophical speculation. Inspired by Eliade's observation the Thesis gives central focus on suffering and salvation quest for salvation.

(f) Kwee Swan Liat observes how with the development of E. Husserl's 'Phenomenological Method', opened the way to the most popular trend in modern philosophy, known as Existentialism. How important this approach may be in comparative philosophy can be realized when we bear in mind that the so-called intuitive approach in Eastern Philosophy, and especially in Buddhism, is much akin to Phenomenological research as applied by Heidegger and Husserl. Significant results may be expected from a Phenomenological evaluation of Buddhism, especially of Zen. (g) J. N. Mohanty, one of the most prominent representatives of the Phenomenological philosophy and Phenomenological interpretation of Indian Philosophy, has contributed to the establishment of a rigorous scientific tradition in modern comparative studies. Mohanty's *Phenomenology and Ontology* (1970) and *Between Two Worlds, East and West: An Autobiography* (2002) are particularly relevant to the present work.

I am much benefited by all these different works although I have made some departures from these works in order to focus my attention more on *Sāṅkhya*-Yoga and Sartre than on *Sāṅkhya* and Sartre or Phenomenology and *Vedānta*, in order to highlight a more adequate picture of Sartrean and *Sāṅkhya*-Yogic concepts of 'man'. The present Thesis is an attempt at highlighting many other common themes in both these traditions. Some of these themes are: bad faith and *māya*, Consciousness and body, *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*, atheism, nihilism and *mokṣa* or salvation.

1.5 Methodology

Both the quantitative methods used in human sciences of man and the qualitative methods in philosophy of man are trying to answer the same question, "What is Man?" but are going about it in different ways. The noted philosopher Sir Karl Raimund Popper (1902-1994) theorized that man concurrently exists in three distinct worlds: namely, 1) the physical world of nature, 2) the internal world of ideas, thoughts and emotions, and 3) the social world of inter-subjectivity. The physical world of nature more properly belongs to the natural sciences, but the internal worlds of ideas, thoughts and emotions, as well as the social world of

inter-subjectivity belong to the jurisdiction of philosophy. Hence, the philosophy of the human person does not study only the human person, but also includes the investigations into such person's internal worlds of ideas, thoughts and emotions, as well as such person's social world of inter-subjectivity. However, there is general type of science that is similar to the philosophy of the human person in the sense that it also has the human person as well as his internal and social worlds as its object of inquiry.

This Thesis in its present form is much benefited by the adoption of the Phenomenological Methodology introduced by Edmund Husserl and later adopted by Heidegger, Jean Paul Sartre, among others, though in a modified form that is now more hermeneutical in nature. Phenomenology became primarily a set of methods and attitudes for the study of the conscious experience of others. The people in question tell their own story, in their own terms. So “fidelity to the phenomenon as it is lived” means apprehending and understanding it in the lived context of the person living through the situation. The Phenomenological Methodology aims at the following:

BRACKETING: is suspending or setting aside our biases, everyday understandings, theories, beliefs, habitual modes of thought, and judgments. Part of the larger process of *epoche*.

EPOCHE: Learning to look at things in a way such that we see only what stands before our eyes, only what we can describe and define.

FACTICITY: a belief in factual characteristics of real objects. In Phenomenology, by bracketing our facticity, we transfer our focus from assumed things “out there” to our experience.

FIRST OPENING: A direct experience of a person, object, or event, before any of our mental screens of filters change it.

Since comparative philosophy aims at “forging of a common universe of discourse in the encounter among people,” there are some philosophers like Paul Masson Oursel, Kwee Swan Liat, and F.S.C. Northrop who preferred to approach Comparative Philosophy from the Phenomenological point of view. It is Max

Scheler who first grasps the methodological similarities between some characteristic techniques used in both Phenomenology and Indian philosophy. J. Kwee Swan Liat, in his contribution to the methods applicable in Comparative Philosophy, defines Phenomenological method as one of the most powerful means for expert dealing with Eastern philosophy.

1. 6 Summary of Chapters

Chapter-1: Introduction

Chapter-1: Introduction is a general introduction of the research problem. The research problem centers round the key question: “what is the meaning of philosophical humanism?” Kant’s question “What is man?” has a special status not only because in contrast to the empirical question, “What are men like?” the question, “what is man?”, is a properly transcendental one. By abandoning Kant’s distinction between the transcendental and empirical dimensions of human experience, his successors were forced to re-think the relationship between Anthropology of Man and Anthropology of Men. Hegel resolves this difficulty by treating individuals as accidental abstractions of the Spirit while for Kierkegaard, only individuals exist; ‘man’ as such does not. Therefore, instead of addressing Kant’s question about the being of man, he urges his readers to ask themselves the existentially personal question, ‘Who am I?’ Thinkers such as Fanon, Levi-Strauss and Foucault, for whom the peculiarly European sense of the category of man comes into question, open up a different approach to the question of humanism. Basically, the focal point of the *Sāṅkhya Darśana* is man and his/her existential suffering. On the other hand Sartre was also talking about man and his/her existential suffering. The Thesis re-addresses the irreducible nature of Consciousness and Subjectivity from the philosophical perspectives of Sartre and *Sāṅkhya*.

Chapter-2: Introducing Jean Paul Sartre

Chapter-2: Introducing Jean Paul Sartre, focuses specific introduction of Jean Paul Sartre, the philosopher and the literary genius. This chapter begins with an

introduction of the Existential Phenomenology of Jean Paul Sartre in order to elucidate the Sartrean picture of man as ‘species being’ that has no essence. As philosopher, dramatist, novelist, critic and moralist, Sartre’s major pre occupation was, throughout his life, always the same, i.e., freedom, its implications and its obstacles. Sartre was basically a political before 1939. The Second World War was the dividing point between the Phenomenological Existentialist Sartre and his Marxist Existentialist *avatār*. The war instilled in Sartre the increased awareness of the pressure of history on individual lives and accordingly there are marked changes in the development of his philosophical thinking especially in his late writings, interviews, war diary, and other fictions. His experience of society during this war and post-war period forced him to shift his loyalty from a philosophy of consciousness to one of *praxis*, understood roughly as human action in its material, socio historical environment. Man is what he does. Sartre always sought to articulate his philosophy in the plots and personae of his literary and theatrical productions, in such a way that the philosophical problems of the human condition emerges not out of some speculative abstraction, but out of the concrete situation of human existence itself. This chapter makes an attempt at understanding the multifaceted personality of Jean Paul Sartre from many nuanced perspectives.

Chapter-3: Some Key Themes of Sartrean Existentialism

Chapter-3: Some Key Themes of Sartrean Existentialism, tries to show how the categories of “for-itself,” Freedom, Consciousness, Nothingness on the one hand and its opposite ones, “in-itself,” Existence, Being, etc. give rise to sharp dualism of Being and Becoming, and how these two realms could be reconciled in terms of *facticity*, dread, anguish, nihilism, etc. The central focus of Sartrean consciousness is a shift from Egoistic to ‘Egoless consciousness.’ One is under the illusion or bad faith when man understands him either as a self centered ‘cogito’, the little ego, the “I” who is different from others. Equally important is the inauthentic dimension of life that makes man forgetful of his true essence. It is sheer ‘bad faith’ that man ignores the deeper Consciousness and understands oneself only as a thing or a body i.e. always an object not a subject. Bad faith makes man forgetful of the true

nature of “what makes man”; man is neither a little ego, nor a body but beyond that.

Freedom is also another key theme under discussion. The early Sartre (for convenience, up to the mid 1950’s) is concerned primarily with the individual and his freedom and authenticity. In his post war writings human freedom has to come to terms with society, ‘pre-destination’ and the ‘practico-inert’ that at times makes life mechanical and ritualistic. The early phase of his philosophy has come under severe attack by the post modernists, structuralists, deconstructionists like Derrida, Foucault and others. This chapter also highlights the gradual change in the formation of some of his key concepts like freedom, *facticity*, bad faith, authenticity etc., that makes Sartre more a philosopher of *praxis* with a shift in his philosophising that is more critical than some of his critics. For Sartre, the slogan ‘existence precedes essence’ adumbrates important ethical as well as metaphysical propositions. It suggests, ‘there is no explaining things away by reference to a fixed and given human nature’; and because ‘there is no determinism, man is free, man is freedom.’ Thus humanity, ‘with no support and no aid, is condemned every moment to invent (humanity)’. The structure and characteristics of the “for-itself” are the main focal point of the Phenomenological analyses of ‘being-in-the-worlds’, of man as essentially an incomplete being who has to re-make and re-define oneself continuously and consistently. We have to deal with human reality as a being that is what it is not and which is not what it is (Sartre, BN: 58). ‘We have the constant obligation to make ourselves what we are.’² (Sartre, 1943: 59).

Chapter-4: The Aesthetics of Salvation in Sartre’s Existentialism

Existentialism defines man as a being cast in the world characterized by *facticity*, fallenness and project, the ultimate project being death. The sorrows of human life and its self-contradictions have been constant themes since ancient times. But many people do not face this fact deeply. When this fact of the sorrow of life is faced, the problem of religion arises for us. Indeed, the problem of Philosophy also

² Mooney, Tim. and Moran, Dermot., *The Phenomenology Reader*, pp. 414, (2000).

arises from this point. Through a deep confrontation with the sorrows and Self-contradictions of life we can reach the standpoint of total freedom and Self-authenticity. The confrontation with the sorrows and Self-contradictions of life is a standard characteristic of Existentialist Philosophy. Sartre depicts the helpless situation of the fallen man in his nauseating realisation of contingency and absurdity of a de-humanised world, indirectly; this Godless world becomes a disclosure of a religious truth.

This chapter focuses the significance of the statement made by Nietzsche: “God is Dead”. There are philosophers like Nietzsche who is a nihilist for whom there is no need for a God. Man alone has to face life and his troubles. Without God we can save man. This helpless situation made Nietzsche a rebel. Like Nietzsche, Sartre also accepts the death of God but Sartre continues his search for dismissing God in different ways. Ultimately, Sartre’s writings and his love of music become tools for attaining salvation. Following Dostoevsky and Nietzsche, Sartre accepts the nihilism of his time, but he is one with Kafka in his non-tiring effort for re-locating that missing center. This chapter highlights the centrality of the tragic sense of life in Sartrean Existentialism that keeps room for man’s quest for salvation in a Godless world.

Chapter-5: *Sāṅkhya–Yoga*: An Introduction

The term *Sāṅkhya* is derived from the Sanskr̥t root ‘khya’, meaning ‘to know’, and the prefix ‘san’, ‘exact’. No distinct *Sāṅkhya* Text prior to Īśvarakṛṣṇa’s *Sāṅkhya-kārikā* is extant although basic *Sāṅkhya* models and terms appear in some *Upaniṣads* and underlie important portions of the Epic *Mahābhārata*, especially the *Bhāgavad Gītā* and *Mokṣadharmā*. Kautilya in his *Arthaśāstra* mentions both *Sāṅkhya* and *Yoga*, and describes them to be the *anviksakis*, i.e., the system which tries to establish defects and merits of something by means of reasoning. After a brief introduction of *Sāṅkhya* till its development in the *Sāṅkhya-Kārikā* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa, a brief introduction of its supplementary doctrine, philosophical significance of *Yoga* is clarified.

Chapter-6: Some Key Concepts of *Sāṅkhya*–Yoga

Sartre defines man, as a species being that has no essence. Tracing the same theme between the *Sāṅkhya*, the next stage in the development of the Thesis is *Sāṅkhya*-Yoga conception of Freedom, Consciousness, Being, Facticity, and the problem of ‘Bad-faith’ or *Igorance*, *Avidyā* or *Māya*. While Sartre finally defines man as a dialectical being having no essence but destined to choose its own existence, *Sāṅkhya* makes it obvious that a human person consists of *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* that includes minds, mental states the body, to which it is linked, and the environment within which the mind body complex is set. The Sanskrit noun *puruṣa* is translated loosely as “man” or “self,” but it takes on a specific technical meaning within the linguistic context of *Sāṅkhya*. *Puruṣa* is the essential core of human consciousness, the free, non-agentative “witness” of human experiences. The *puruṣa* is individual, yet is not reflectively self-identifying; hence *puruṣa* functions essentially, not as the self, but rather as an inactive witness.

Prakṛti is permeated by the three *guṇas*, the unmanifested agents of all. *Sāṅkhya* explores the relationship between the *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*, more specifically, the lack of causal relationship between the *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*, and how this affects the role of *dhārmic* action achieving *mokṣa*. *Prakṛti* is the primordial “stuff” of the entire unmanifest and manifest world, whereas *puruṣa* is the presupposition of individual consciousness. Thus, there is only one *prakṛti* but a plurality of *puruṣas*. The term *puruṣa* originally meant ‘person’ and is used in the *Ṛgveda* to signify the primordial, cosmic person from whom the universe is created (*Puruṣasukta* 10.90). As *Ṛgveda* states, ‘Two birds’ inseparable companions, have found refuge in the same sheltering tree. One incessantly eats from the peepul-tree; the other, just ‘looks on’. This image of an inseparable dyad; one part actively engaging its appetites and desires and the other passively observing the activity of the first part, prefigures the notion of *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*.

Chapter-7: God and Salvation in *Sāṅkhya* -Yoga

All of Indian thought is ‘practical in its motive’. If it seeks truth, it is not for the sake of the truth as an abstract end in itself; it is for the sake of the salvation that

truth is believed to bring with it. In ancient Indian thought, several different ways or methods of salvation were developed. There is teleology inherent in *prakṛti* that has a reference to the purposes of *puruṣas*. Both these philosophical doctrines finally agree that the historical conditions can be overcome by human effort and freedom engrained in the Ontology of man be achieved. The ideal man, the *puruṣa* in *Sāṅkhya-Yoga*, is detached and aloof individual whose virtues of knowledge, freedom, independence covers all the distinct traits of human existence proposed by existential thinkers. More importantly, the *Sāṅkhyan* concepts of *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* and *mokṣa* are as sound in comparison to Existentialism with respect to Ethics. It starts with the proposition that the world is full of miseries of three kinds.

Chapter-8: Reflections and Comparison

The entire Thesis highlights the ways in which the Sartrean and *Sāṅkhyan* subject improves upon the praxis centric or instrumental view of the subject that dominates the modernist outlook. Sartrean notions of consciousness as “for itself” in contrast to Being and Facticity, the “in-itself” is sought to be worked out in comparison with similar ideas found in the basic themes of *Sāṅkhya Darśana*, that the *Puruṣa* or consciousness is the authentic phase of existence that differs from *Prakṛti* and the realm of becoming. From a radically free consciousness of *Being and Nothingness*, Sartre takes us to the more ‘encumbered subject’ of his later work. It is found that Sartre’s idea of a contingent, non essential subject has much in common with, and indeed prefigures, the decentered subject theorized by post structuralists and post modernists. *Sāṅkhya* accepts the reality of *prakṛti* and admits both these philosophical doctrines finally agree that the historical conditions can be overcome by human effort and freedom engrained in the Ontology of man be achieved. Man can achieve emancipation only in a free society.

General Observations:

There are some basic Ontological differences and similarities, which determine their specific solutions:

- Unlike *Sāṅkhya*'s *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*, Sartre's "being-for-itself" and "being-in-itself" are not two separate realities. They are two distinct aspects of the same being.
- Unlike *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*, the "for-itself" is completely dependent on the in- itself for its existence. On the other hand, the "in-itself" does not require the "for-itself" for its existence but only for its meaning.
- Contrary to the *Sāṅkhya* view, the "for-itself" is active and productive whereas the "in-itself" defies the attributes of activity or passivity.
- Contrary to the *Sāṅkhya* view, the "for-itself" characterizes desire, i.e., desire constitutes its basic ontological structure. Thus, without desire the "for-itself" cannot exist.
- There is common emphasis upon the "science of experience" as the point of contact between Being and Consciousness (intentionality). There is elevation of the place of human beings in its philosophical reflection.
- For Sartre, "condition humane" is given within the very facticity of our existence, and it is only by freely choosing to transcend ourselves that we can be authentic in our freedom. Authentic Subjectivity is to be identified with Consciousness itself. *Sāṅkhya puruṣa* can regain its lost freedom by practicing *Yogic* techniques. The realization of authenticity appears thus as a victory of humanness over the thingness in the appropriation of our own situation. Sartrean man is confused about his/her priorities and wrongly identifies his or her 'personhood' in something else which makes him or her "thing-like". Because we negate that which would assume the deterministic character of an "essence," an *en-sui*, we become what we are. The *Sāṅkhya puruṣa* has to dissociate itself from its own inauthentic identification of humanness with thingness.

Special Comparison of Sartre's *Nausea* and Patañjali's *Yoga*

In *La Nausée* the center of the world is not man or human consciousness, but the massive extra mental universe as it is symbolized in the seemingly most insignificant objects of everyday life. Sartre's notion of bad faith, as the renunciation of human freedom in the service of self-deception, contributes to our

understanding of selfhood. The attitude attributed to Rouquentin in *Nausea* discloses the dominant preoccupation of Sartre's thought: the paradox that the real material world is both the very stuff of our lives and a repulsive alien to the other. It is beyond us, outside our immediate self-possession, yet totally captivating. It is at once, a frightening turmoil and our home.

The *Nausea* is the realization of our inescapable dependence upon a capricious world. It is the recognition of a dependence, which violates our innate self-possession. What strikes and overwhelms Antoine Roquentin is the brutal reality of existing things, in contrast to the phantomlike reality of ideas. The experience that makes him aware of the naked "being-there" of existents is *La Nausée*, the "great disgusts" (Nietzsche). And what makes this experience so terrifying is the fact that dead objects actually have the power of limiting the freedom of a human being to deal with them at will. As this world of "dead" objects confronts man with silent and stubborn hostility, there arises in the human Consciousness a horrible, oppressive fear of the obscene nakedness of the "being-there" of things. *Nausea* reveals the Phenomenology of the world. Man alone is man's repose, the source of stability against vulnerability.

In order to achieve the realm of *Puruṣa*, and Consciousness, Freedom and Authenticity, *Sāṅkhya* uses, the *neti-neti* and the *tat-tvam-asi* techniques. *Tat tvam asi* is a principle of identification with the primordial being; the ultimate goal of the first step in the Phenomenological Reduction is the achievement of the proper "Self". The key theme for both Sartre and Patañjali is existential suffering as their distinctive methodologies are intended to eliminate suffering through enlightenment. Patañjali holds that suffering is a consequence of the lack of salvation knowledge. This knowledge consists in comprehending *Puruṣa* as distinct from *Prakṛti*. The method of *Yoga* purposes to unveil this knowledge to the aspirant. On the other hand, Sartre uses the term "Nausea" to characterize metaphysical suffering. Sartre's hero wants to be enlightened about the condition of his *Nausea* in order that he may escape from it. Unlike Patañjali's aspirant, Roquentin's *Nausea* is not caused by the ignorance of salvation knowledge, but results from the nature of reality itself. Sartre's method aims at helping Roquentin

obtain the absolute experience of existence and thus enlighten him about the condition of his suffering. Once Roquentin's illumination occurs, he reflects upon various means to save his unsalvaged existence. Therefore, by enlightening the aspirants, both methods intend to eliminate suffering.

Sāṅkhya-Yoga leads to similar disclosure of our inauthentic phase of existence, that we are like a light bulb (consciousness) covered with several layers, levels, or lampshades. The lampshades or sheaths are called *koṣas*.

The *Yogis* speak of five sheaths or *koṣas*:

- *Annamaya koṣa* = Physical body; literally the food sheath
- *Pranamaya koṣa* = Energy sheath, made up of *prāna*
- *Manomaya koṣa* = Sheath or level of mind, as sensory-motor mind
- *Vijñānamaya koṣa* = Level of intellect, knowing, or mind in its witness form
- *Ānandamaya koṣa* = Sheath of bliss or *ānanda*, where mind and thoughts are still.


For Sartre, the self is not the owner of Consciousness. Like the *Yogi*, Roquentin experiences the meaning of reality but finds it impossible to describe the experience through the sense intellect concepts. During the enlightenment, both are plunged into it, both are delivered by it, both recognize its absolute nature, but neither can characterize it as such, it is beyond one's final grasp, "not this, not this." The process is not one of attaining something we do not have, but rather is one of removing the clouds.

Chapter-9: Conclusion

Both *Sāṅkhya* and Sartre look for a deeper realm of Authentic Subjectivity in terms of Consciousness, Freedom and Subjectivity. Sartrean Existentialism ends with a happy note that man can overcome the nauseating state of inauthenticity by overcoming bad faith thereby attaining perfect balance between the two poles of its own existence. Man is both "for-itself" and "in-itself;" the two are complementary to one another. Sartre argued that the influence of modern society over the individual

is so great as to produce serialization, by which he meant loss of Self. For Sartre, this could be rectified only free and conscious pathway into the totality of the humanism.

According to *Sāṅkhya-Yoga*, there exists a multiplicity of individual souls denominated by the term *Puruṣa*, which, though bearers of the individual personality, are divested of all the characteristics which are thought of as constituting human personality. Pure Consciousness or the pure field is the absolute state and it forms the basis of all relative experience. The pure field is also the field of all possibilities. It is a state of pure balance between the *Puruṣa* and the *Prakṛti*, the ideal man attains maturity and stability not by overcoming becoming for the sake of being but by reconciling both harmoniously.



CHAPTER – 2

Introducing Jean Paul Sartre

- 2.1 Jean Paul Sartre: A Life
- 2.2 Quest for Authenticity, Freedom and Morality
- 2.3 Jean Paul Sartre and Existentialist Politics
- 2.4 Jean Paul Sartre and His Quest for Authenticity
- 2.5 Jean Paul Sartre: The Literary Genius
- 2.6 Sartre: The Philosopher
- 2.7 Quest for Meaningful Life: Sartre as Biographer

Chapter 2

Introducing Jean Paul Sartre

2. 1 Jean Paul Sartre: A Life

Jean Paul Sartre was one of the major thinkers of the twentieth century, doubtless the greatest of his immediate generation in France. In the words of Sartrean scholars Michel Contat and Michel Rybalka in *The Writings of Jean-Paul Sartre*, he was ‘uncontestably the most outstanding philosopher and writer of our time.’¹ The eminent scholar Henri Peyre, in his preface *The Condemned of Altona*, called Sartre the ‘Picasso of literature,’² one of the most powerful intellectuals at work in the literature of Western Europe. Since his death in 1980, Sartre’s reputation has not waned, and with perspective it has become clear that he represented his age much as, in different ways, Voltaire (1694-1778), Victor Hugo (1802- 1885), and Andre Gide (1869-1951) represented theirs. ‘To understand Jean-Paul Sartre,’ wrote the novelist Iris Murdoch in *Sartre: Romantic Rationalist*, “is to understand something important about the present time.”³

Jean Paul Sartre, the literary genius, and Sartre, the Existentialist Philosopher, often oscillates between Existentialism and Phenomenology, between Ethics and Aesthetics, between Literature and Politics, in his authentic search for defining man on these very terms, i.e., man’s essence is to be defined in terms of the roles man plays in these diverse fields of his/her existence. Man is an incomplete being who is torn between his/her essence and existence, between his or her ideal for freedom and liberty and his/her *factual* limitations. If there are contradictions in

¹ Contat, M. and Rybalka, M., (Compilers), *A Bibliographical life (The Writings of Jean Paul Sartre, Vol.1,* Publisher, Northwestern University Press, Evanston, IL, U.S.A., (1974).
www.alibris.com/search/books/isbn/081010430X, <http://people.brandeis.edu/~teuber/sartrebio.html> accessed on 09/08/07.

² Peyre, Henri, preface Sartre, J.P., *The Condemned of Altona*, Trans., Sylvia and George, Leeson., New York: Alfred Knopf, (1961). <http://people.brandeis.edu/~teuber/sartrebio.html> accessed on 12/05/08.

³ Murdoch, Iris., *Sartre: Romantic Rationalist*, Yale University Press, (1953).
<http://people.brandeis.edu/~teuber/sartrebio.html> accessed on 07/10/07.

Sartre's Philosophy it is because there are contradictions in life. Life is not one essential whole, it is a fragmentation of different and at times, irreconcilable parts and as a result, man makes his way searching for a way out of all these apparently secure compartments of life, socio-political, literary, moral and religious, philosophical and metaphysical. In Philosophy, Sartre refrained from taking a final position and his philosophy retained its adventurous spirit of a postmodern deconstructionist. One often comes across paradoxes in his Ontology that looks for an intermediate position between the Self and the World, the way he favours an in between position between realism and idealism in his epistemic quest.

In this background an attempt is made here to introduce Jean Paul Sartre, the man, philosopher, and the creative genius, whose basic drive has remained the same: to undertake the journey of life as an unending and untiring quest for safeguarding human freedom without qualification, initially, or, with qualification, ultimately. What follows is an introduction of the situations and circumstances that have made Sartre what he emerged to be, a crusader for human freedom and emancipation.

Sartre was born in June 1905. His father Jean-Baptiste (a naval officer) died when Sartre was still an infant, an event which instilled a feeling of permanent absence in his later life. His mother Anne Marie, became completely dependent on her parents and she herself came to be treated like an older child by her parents. After two years of preparation, Sartre gained entrance to the prestigious *Ecole Normale Supérieure*, where, from 1924 to 1929, he came into contact with Raymond Aron, Simone de Beauvoir, Maurice Merleau Ponty, and other notable figures of his time. Sartre passed the 'Agrégation' on his second attempt, by adapting the content and style of his writing to the rather traditional requirements of the examiners. This was his passport to a teaching career. After obtaining the Agrégation in philosophy he taught philosophy at the *Lycées* in Le Havre, Laon and then Paris.

Sartre's grandfather Charles Schweitzer, preached the serious values of the bourgeoisie and tried to motivate him away from any such career that could be precarious and unsuitable for stable middle class people. As a reaction, Sartre

proposed to take his passion for writing seriously, to adopt it as the center of his life and values. Sartre recalls his grandfather's last futile attempt to lay bare other meaningful career avenues before Sartre. Sartre writes: "In short, he drove me into literature by the care he took to divert me from it, to such an extent that even now I sometimes wonder, when I am in a bad mood, whether I have not consumed so many days and nights, covered so many pages with ink, thrown on the market so many books that nobody wanted, solely in the mad hope of pleasing my grandfather."⁴ Sartre succinctly recollects this growing anxious phase of his childhood in the following manner: "Feminized by maternal tendencies, dulled by the absence of the stern Moses who has begotten me, puffed with pride by my grandfather's adoration, I was a pure object, doomed par excellence to masochism if only I could have believed in the family play-acting. But no. It perturbed me only on the surface, and the depths remained cold, unjustified. The system horrified me".⁵

However, the system also provided luxury for reflection and re-creation and provided best education possible for a child of his time that facilitated him for perusing a career of his choice, that of an academician and a creative writer. In 1933, Sartre obtained a grant to study at the French Institute in Berlin, where, with the help of his friend R. Aron, he got acquainted with Husserl's Phenomenology. It was when he was at Le Havre that Sartre started writing *Nausea* and that is how the literary philosophical journey of a rare genius began who remained a votary of liberty, freedom and authenticity all his life. In his last years, Sartre, who had lost the use of one eye in childhood, became almost totally blind. Yet he continued to work with the help of a tape recorder, producing with Benny Lévy, portions of a "co-authored" ethics, the published parts of which indicate that its value is more biographical than philosophical. On March 20, 1980, he was hospitalized for edema of the lungs. After more than a month at the hospital, he went into coma on

⁴ Sartre, J.P., *The Words*, Frechtman, Bernard., trans., New York: Braziller, (1964).
<http://www.geocities.com/sartresite/quotes5.html> accessed on 24/08/07

⁵ Sartre, J.P., *The Words*, Frechtman, Bernard., trans., New York: Braziller, pp.95, (1964).
<http://www.geocities.com/sartresite/quotes5.html> accessed on 24/08/07

April 13 and died two days later. His ashes were buried at the cemetery of Montparnasse on April 19. After his death, thousands spontaneously joined his funeral cortège in a memorable tribute to his respect and esteem among the public at large. As the headline of one Parisian newspaper lamented: “France has lost its conscience.”⁶

If we become interested in understanding the background context which contributed immensely to making Jean Paul Sartre what he emerged to be, one of the greatest literary minds of our time, we can not ignore the fact that the drama of Sartre’s life is as paradoxical as his thoughts. Sartre grew up as a lonely introvert child with a vivid sense of imagination for creative interaction with life and its hassles. He also chooses it as a kind of self-justification in a world where a child was not taken seriously. “By writing I was existing. I was escaping from the grown-ups,”⁷ he wrote in *The Words*. Sartre’s attachment to writing fulfilled a twofold advantage. First, he claimed he enjoyed his obscurity and thus wanted to prolong it. Second, it presented him an avenue for a kind of existence, which he had not experienced before, an existence devoid of the artificiality of grownups. What Sartre said in his autobiography captures the loneliness of his growing up days: “I grew older in the darkness; I became a lonely adult, without father and mother, without home or hearth, almost without a name.”⁸

For all the fame he gained in his life, Sartre has remained a man of simple tastes, a man committed to a principle worth dying for, a man capable have empathize with the oppressed of the world. When interviewed five years before his death on how he would like people to remember him, Sartre replied:

“I would like them to remember *Nausea*, one or two plays, *No Exit* and *The Devil* and the *Good Lord*, and then my two philosophical works, more particularly the second one, *Critique of Dialectical Reason*. Then

⁶ <http://hubpages.com/hub/The-Only-World-A-Brief-Overview-of-Jean-Paul-Sartres-Philosophy> accessed on 15/01/07.

⁷ Sartre, J.P., *The Words*, Bernard, Frechtman., trans., New York: Braziller, pp.95, (1964).

⁸ Ibid.
<http://www.geocities.com/sartresite/quotes5.html> accessed on 15/01/06.

my essay on *Genet, Saint Genet*, which I wrote quite a long time ago. If these are remembered, that would be quite an achievement, and I don't ask for more. As a man, if a certain Jean-Paul Sartre is remembered, I would like people to remember the milieu or the historical situation in which I lived, the general characteristics of this milieu, how I lived in it, in terms of all the aspirations, which I tried to gather up within myself. This is how I would like to be remembered.”⁹

2.2 Quest for Authenticity, Freedom and Morality

Seen as a whole, Sartre's career reveals numerous contradictions. A bourgeois, he hated the middle classes and wanted to chastise them; “I became a traitor and remained one,” he wrote in *The Words*. Yet he was not a true proletarian writer. An individualist in many ways and completely opposed to regimentation, he nevertheless attacked the individualistic tradition and insisted on the importance of the collectivity; he moved from the extremely solitary position of an existentialist to concern for society above all. A writer possessed of an outstanding ear for language and other literary skills, he came to suspect literature as inauthentic and wrote a superb autobiography to denounce writing. An atheist, he often spoke with the fervour of an evangelist and repeated that man was responsible for his own errors and must mend his ways. A reformer and moralist, he led an existence that would seem to many, decidedly immoral.

Of such contradictions, he was of course, aware. His whole life is an unending quest for meaning and authenticity that made his life an adventurous journey exploring ways for bridging the gap between freedom and *facticity*. This is evident in all his endeavours for exploring and actualizing the forgotten and fallen spirit of freedom arousing it out of its dogmatic slumber of mistaken identity. This has remained the driving spirit for harmoniously playing all such diverse roles at one and the same time, from man of literature to the philosopher of being, from a man of contemplation to a man in the crowd one can have a glimpse of the multifaceted

⁹ Sartre, J.P., *The Words*, Bernard, Frechtman, trans., New York: Braziller, (1964).

personality of Jean Paul Sartre in all these diverse modalities. Sartre's philosophical views, which he related to life, literature, psychology, and political action, stimulated so much popular interest that Existentialism became a worldwide movement. The clue to the story of his life and his philosophy of life and existence is reflected in the following quotation. "We could say that authenticity is fundamentally living this ontological truth of one's situation, namely, that one is never identical with one's current state but remains responsible sustaining it. Thus, the claim 'that's just the way 'I am' would constitute a form of self-deception or bad faith as would all forms of determinism, since both instances involve lying to oneself about the ontological fact of one's nonself-coincidence and the flight from concomitant responsibility for 'choosing' to remain that way."¹⁰ What follows is an attempt at having a glimpse of some of these diverse ways of understanding Sartre.

2.3 Jean-Paul Sartre and Existentialist Politics

Freedom is the pivot of Sartre's writings; in the domain of Politics, Psychology and Ethics, the question of freedom is most elaborately addressed. Sartre's thesis is that freedom is the implicit object of any choice, a claim he makes but does not adequately defend in his *Humanism* lecture. There is a full acceptance that individuals are free to choose their own path and an associated declaration that individuals must accept the risk and responsibility of following their commitment wherever it leads. Man made choices tend to establish the subsequent pattern of individual's lives and also profoundly influence the ensuing nature and aspect of the person who makes them. Even choosing not to make a choice is a form of choice bringing with it consequences. People are inevitably faced with choice in very many contexts. One of the life choices Kierkegaard thought that people could make, and the one that he chose for himself, was a life fully aligned with faith. Sartre made his choice to remain authentic always.

¹⁰ Sartre, J.P., *Hope, Now: The 1989 Interviews*, tr. Adrian van den Hoven, intro, Ronald, Aronson. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, (1996).

Authenticity is not entirely a style, there is a general content and that content is freedom. Sartre's whole life is a passionate journey for attaining a goal; the passion remained although the aims and aspirations have differed. The first and best known Existentialist Ethics is one of dis-alienation and authenticity. It assumes that we live in a society of oppression and exploitation. Sartre talks about two kinds of freedom, personal and socio-political. The former is primary and personal, the later structural and impersonal. While he enters into extended polemics in various essays and journal articles of the late 1940's and 1950's concerning the systematic explanation of people in capitalist and colonialist institutions, Sartre always sought a way to bring the responsibility home to individuals who could in principle be named. As Merleau Ponty observed, Sartre stressed oppression over exploitation, individual moral responsibility over structural causation but without denying the importance of the latter. With time, Sartre's interest in politics and other social issues made him curious about the political affairs of his time and the related ideologies, to an extent that Sartre commenced to evolve into a mature political thinker. Though critical of its bourgeois variety, Sartre does support an Existentialist Humanism the motto of which could well be his remark that "you can always make something out of what you've been made into."¹¹

In fact, his entire career could be summarized in these words that carry an ethical as well as a critical message. The first part of his professional life focused on the freedom of the existential individual (you can always make something out of...); the second concentrated on the socio-economic and historical conditions which limited and modified that freedom (what you've been made into), once freedom ceased to be merely the definition of "man" and included the possibility of genuine options in concrete situations. That phase corresponded to Sartre's political commitment and active involvement in public debates, always in search of the exploitative "systems" such as capitalism, colonialism and racism at work in society and the oppressive practices of individuals who sustained them. As he grew more cognizant of the social dimension of individual life, the political and the ethical tended to coalesce. In fact, he explicitly rejected "Machiavellianism" that

¹¹ <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/sartre/> accessed on 27/08/07.

keeps no room for ethics in politics. The early Sartre (upto mid 1950's) is concerned primarily with the individual, his situation and his *facticity*, with the sole objective of providing some kind of emancipation of the individual. The antinomies of subjectivity and history, freedom and conditioning, *praxis* and process have always fascinated him and in all his endeavours, social, political, literary or philosophical. He hoped to be able to solve some of these unresolved mysteries of life. He pondered deeply into the circumstances that turned sober and peace lover law abiding citizens into rebels and at times, to pathological cases, when man alone seeks to control the tyranny of time and history. Particularly impressive is the title story, *The Wall*, which recounts an episode from the Spanish Civil War, and the final one, "The Childhood of a Leader," which, while autobiographical to a considerable degree, has as its main plot thread the making of a Fascist. His was a very obvious case in point, a choice which all Frenchmen faced at the time: collaboration, resistance, or quiet self-preservation.

During that phase, on July 14, 1935, Sartre joined the Popular Front demonstration from the Bastille to the Porte de Vincennes. After his brief stint at Berlin, he did some research at the University of Freiburg. From 1929 to 1931, he was engaged in military service. In the prewar years, he had been generally uninterested in politics. While despising Fascist parties and the bourgeoisie from which they and he came, Sartre had not participated in political action, nor even bothered to vote. He considered then that his fiction and philosophic texts were sufficient expressions of his unfavourable views of society. But he eventually became thoroughly politicized, speaking out on such issues as the French presence in Indochina, which he opposed, and even participating in a leftist, but non-Communist, postwar political movement. During the early fifties, his intimate companion and co- philosopher, Simone de Beauvoir observed that Sartre had undergone a change in lifestyle. Moreover, the next decade saw the active political involvement of Sartre.

Thus we find that lately in his life Sartre became preoccupied with society, 'pre-destination' and the '*practico-inert*'. In his later philosophic work, *Critique of*

Dialectical Reason (1960), Sartre's emphasis shifted from existentialist freedom and subjectivity to Marxist social determinism, here he tried to reconcile Existentialist concepts with a Marxist analysis of society and history. Christina Howells observes: "Sartre, then became a convert to Marxism; but a convert whose initial enthusiasm quickly gave way to a critical and constructive attempt to revitalize what he believed to have become static and *sclérosé* (hidebound), and whose final position involved a disillusioned rejection of historical materialism in favour of a Maoist theory of spontaneity."¹² Although the enthusiasm of the young rebellious phase of his life that aspired to make man the sole author of his life, gave way to a somehow compromised position in his post war philosophical phase. In the *Critique*, a matured Sartre makes a bare statement: 'man both makes and is made by history'. Sartre's World War II experience is an example of what Existentialists see as the ever-present necessity for individual choice. After the Second World War, there was a most notable resurgence of enthusiasm amongst substantial sections of the rising generation and the intelligentsia for philosophic ideas concerned with Existential approaches to life. However Sartre emerged more reflecting and philosophical than before.

After the war, though considerably lionized and taken by many youthful readers to be the preeminent spokesman for their generation, Sartre continued to develop intellectually and undergo changes that were to have far reaching effects on his work. In fact, as his concept of freedom thickened from the ontological to the social and historical in the mid 1940's, his appreciation of the influence of *factual* conditions in the exercise of freedom grew apace. His book *L'Imagination* was published in 1936. *The Critique of Dialectical Reason*, his second major philosophic work, is essential to the understanding of all he wrote after his radicalization and is so closely connected to certain of his other texts that whole sections were transferred from one to another. Intended as a synthesis of Existentialist Philosophy and Marxism, the *Critique*, calls on and belongs to disciplines as various as Anthropology, History, Psychology, Economics, and

¹² Howells, Christina., *Sartre: The Necessity of freedom*, Cambridge, pp.97, (1988).

Philosophy. Its aim is to give a philosophical basis to Marxism and, on that basis, to investigate further the dialectic of history and its intelligibility.

2.4 Jean Paul Sartre and His Quest for Authenticity

In the domain of Psychology and Ethics, the question of human subjectivity, individuality and *facticity*, is most elaborately dealt with. The man of emotion and passion fascinated Sartre. Emotion is not a rational response to a situation. It is a way of apprehending the world which aims to transform it. Sartre revealed himself to be a master psychologist in his next fictional work, the short story collection. Sartre's suspicion of Freudian Psychoanalysis became quite nuanced in his later years. His appeal to "the lived" (*le vécu*) and to pre-theoretical comprehension, especially in his Flaubert study, for example, incorporated many features of the "unconscious" drives and relations proper to psychoanalytic discourse. And while he was familiar with Saussure and structural linguistics, to which he occasionally referred, he admitted that he had never formulated an explicit philosophy of language but insisted that one could be reconstructed from elements employed throughout his work. Though Sartre resolutely insisted on the primacy of "free organic praxis" methodologically, ontologically, and ethically, on which he based the freedom and responsibility that define his humanism, he respected what his critic Louis Althusser called "structural causality" and made allowance for it with his concept of the practico-inert. But it is the primacy awarded to consciousness over praxis in this regard that strikes structuralist and poststructuralist critics as naive and simply wrong. Added to this is Sartre's passion for "totalizing" thought, whether individually in terms of a life project or collectively in terms of dialectical rationality that counters the fragmenting and anti-teleological claims of post-structuralist authors. And then, there is his famous denial of the Freudian unconscious, and his neglect of semiotics, and the philosophy of language in general.

2.5 Jean Paul Sartre: The Literary Genius

In his aesthetics and literary criticism, the central focus is the creative imagination as synonymous with the freedom of human consciousness. Even in literature it is the same urge for freedom that could provide an alternative avenue for escaping the harsh reality by providing elbowroom. An only child, Sartre decided at an early age to be a writer. According to *The Words*, the autobiography of his youth, this decision was made in conscious opposition to the wishes of his grandfather, Charles Schweitzer. Schweitzer, a domineering old Protestant who was nevertheless very fond of his grandson and extremely indulgent with him, appeared to young Sartre as insincere, a consummate charlatan. As a creative writer Sartre opted for fictions, the world of free consciousness. At the beginning of the decade Sartre began work on a fictional piece first called “A Pamphlet on Contingency” (contingency being lack of foundation), which developed into his first novel, *Nausea*. It illustrates what Simone de Beauvoir called his “opposition to aesthetics”, his desire to use literature as a critical tool. Sartre said in *The Words*, “at the age of thirty, I executed the masterstroke of writing in *Nausea* quite sincerely, believe me about the bitter unjustified existence of my fellow men and of exonerating my own.”¹³

The novel’s title indicates the hero’s reaction toward existence, when he discovers that life is absurd, he feels repulsed. Nothing, it would seem, can save him, except the discovery that he might be able to write a novel that would have internal necessity and be a rival to life, he proposes to save himself through an act of aesthetic creation. In his aesthetics and literary criticism too, the central focus is the creative imagination as synonymous with the freedom of human consciousness. *Nausea* was received with praise and had considerable success. In his 1938 *Esprit Review*, for instance, Armand Robin wrote that *Nausea* “is undoubtedly one of the

¹³ Sartre, J.P., and Benny, Levy., *Hope Now: The 1980 interviews*, translated by Adrian van den Hoven, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996.
People.brandeis.edu/~teuber/sartrebio.html accessed on 11/07/06.

distinctive works of our time.” Later, “Sartre, A Philosophic Study,” Anthony Richards Manser called it “that rare thing: a genuinely philosophic novel.”

Sartre’s conception of the novel is centered very much on the role of the reader. It is the reader who brings the work into existence, who recreates it, who is an essential collaborator in its production. Some philosophical themes like reason, freedom, authenticity, praxis and morality etc. are addressed in different novels, dramas etc., the prominent ones of which are the following, *The Age of Reason*, *The Reprieve*, and *Troubled Sleep* collectively called *Roads to Freedom* and *What Is Literature?* Although fiction was his first passion, Sartre started making trials at play-acting besides devoting considerable time in reading and writing fictions. Sartre published and saw into production two theatrical adaptations and three original plays, two of which are surely among his greatest. *The Devil and the Good Lord*, his personal preferred, are, like the volume on *Genet*, concerned with values, absolutely and pragmatically. An uncompromising statement of atheism, the play explores in a historical context (sixteenth century Reformation Germany) the interdependency of good and evil and illustrates the necessity of adopting means that suit the ends.

A second major play of the 1950’s is the lengthy *The Condemned of Altona*, which concerns a German World War II veteran who has barricaded himself in his room for years. Tended only by his sister, the veteran has persuaded himself that Germany won the war. The play impugns Nazi Germany and the type of men it produced not just soldiers but also members of the upper bourgeoisie who found Nazism useful because it served their economic interests. More generally, it condemns capitalist Europe, whose conflicts over markets and expansion had caused two world wars. The very popular *The Flies*, which retells the Greek story of the murder of Clytemnestra by her children Orestes and Electra, emphasizes man’s fundamental freedom, against which even the gods are powerless. *No Exit* often anthologized and perhaps the best known of all of Sartre’s works, deals with the absence of freedom when one allows oneself to exist through and for others, rather than living authentically. Sartre stated in *L’Express* that its famous

conclusion, “Hell is other people,” did not describe what had to be true concerning human relationships, but what was true when relationships with others became corrupt or twisted.

His plays show a clear evolution away from drama of the individual and his existential dilemma. His plays embody the tragic destiny of characters that are condemned to be free. The theme of freedom may be even more elaborately treated in less famous Sartre plays of the 1940's. *Morts Sans Sepulture* (usually translated as *The Victors*), which shocked the sensibilities of many theater goers because it dealt with torture during the Occupation, indicates how extreme the Sartrean view of freedom could be. The neither play offers the view that even under torture and threat of death, one is free to choose; that this choice cannot be evaded, nor can it be made other than in utter loneliness; and that one is responsible for all its consequences. *Les Mains Sales* (sometimes translated as *Dirty Hands*), treats the difficulty of political choice, the necessity of political compromise, and the refusal to let one's freedom be alienated or appropriated by others. This discovery led to profound transformations in Sartre as a writer. Although he continued to regard his earlier works as well as written, he also now viewed them as inauthentic because they had resulted from a bourgeois decision to write, a decision based on personal rebellion and on the idolatry of words. Moreover, he came to believe that fiction could no longer serve his purpose. He even abandoned drama, although he had argued earlier that theatre is an ideal means of showing characters in situations where they must commit themselves wholly to their actions and thereby create values. After the war Sartre also published many articles on literature and politics, notably the important essay “What Is Literature?” in *Situations II*. Here he stated that all prose literature is necessarily committed to making a political and social statement and is directed to one's own contemporaries, the practice of literature, he insisted, is built on freedom (the writer's, the reader's).

2.6 Sartre: The Philosopher

At the end of the 1930's, Sartre was known as a promising writer but he was not yet considered an important philosopher. This assessment changed in 1943 when during the Second World War, Sartre wrote his existentialist magnum opus *Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology*, the major philosophical works of the first half of his career. During the war period only Sartre dared to teach the difficult philosophical thoughts of Martin Heidegger to a group of prison inmates in a war camp. He was briefly involved in a Resistance group and taught in a lycée until the end of the war. *Being and Nothingness* was published in 1943 and *Existentialism and Humanism* in 1946. His study of Baudelaire was published in 1947 and that of the actor *Jean Genet* in 1952. While closely related to his treatises on imagination and to the views of experience he had expressed in his fiction, *Being and Nothingness* is not confined to these subjects. Rather, in defining being, or what is, as what appears, it explores all phenomena. The essay examines man, the being who questions being, and concludes that he is both his body occupying a place in the world that is, an object among objects and a subject or a consciousness reflecting on objects.

Sartre attempted to expand upon *Being and Nothingness* with *Truth and Existence*, which, although completed in 1948, did not see print until 1989. In the essay, the philosopher explores the connections between ethics, truth and ignorance, and the panorama of history, and portrays bad faith among men and women as the intentional choice to remain ignorant by abrogating hard work in favour of reliance upon fate and destiny. In *Being and Nothingness*, Sartre wrote that one of the most important characteristics of consciousness is its freedom. He soon drew explicitly the corollary that ontological freedom, in which man is “condemned to be free,” as he wrote in *Being and Nothingness*, must entail political freedom also. That is, freedom is a goal as well as a given and must be embodied in praxis (practical action). Sartre thus came to be identified as one of the leading figures of the Existentialistic Movement that had more of a following in mainland Europe (especially Germany and France) than in English speaking countries. Sartre came

to be recognized as the most famous of the French Existentialists. During this time only, Sartre published *Transcendence de l'ego*.

In Existential Phenomenology or in any kind of Philosophy, Sartre often looked for a dialogue between freedom and *facticity*, between initial optimism and the uncompromising quest for absolute freedom toward pessimism of a destiny stricken factual man. Given the fundamental division of the human situation into facticity and transcendence, bad faith or inauthenticity can assume two principal forms, one that denies the freedom or transcendence component “I can't do anything about it” and the other that ignores the factual dimension of every situation “I can do anything by just wishing it”. The former is the more prevalent form of self-deception but the latter is common to people who lack a sense of the real in their lives. Sartre sometimes talks as if any choice could be authentic so long as it is lived with a clear awareness of its contingency and responsibility.

Existence is prior to essence. “Man is nothing at birth and throughout his life he is no more than the sum of his past commitments. To believe in anything outside his own will is to be guilty of ‘bad Faith.’ Existentialist despair and anguish is the acknowledgement that man is condemned to freedom. There is no God, so man must rely upon his own fallible will and moral insight. He cannot escape choosing.”¹⁴ Man has to choose, he is ‘condemned to be free’ and to search for his authenticity even when he finds him in the midst of anonymity and usual averageness. The existence of Antoine Requentin gravitates towards the café madly with its glittering atmosphere of bohemian libertinage. In 1945, in a conversation with the French philosopher Roger Troisfontaines, Sartre frankly admitted that he was passing most of his days, “from morning till night,” in the café. Accused by Tyroisfontaines of mistaking the atmosphere of the café for that of normal human living, Sartre replied, “Your interpretation is all wrong; in the café I am more absorbed (*engage*) than at home. In my room I feel the desire to stretch out on my bed. In the café, I work. It is there that I have composed all my

¹⁴ Kaufmann, Walter., *Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre*, NY, The World Publishing Co., (1956).

books.”¹⁵ Asked what in particular attracted him to the café, the author added, “It is this atmosphere of indifference; the others are there without bothering about me, and I do not care about them. The burden of a family would be intolerable for me.”¹⁶ The Philosophy of Existentialism depicts man, alone and afraid.

Existentialism and Phenomenology are essentially concrete, situated philosophies expressed through example and illustration as much as exposition and analysis. Sartre would not go so far as those who wish to break down the philosophy/literature distinction entirely, though his work can be seen as a progressively more concerted attempt to undermine such binary oppositions. Conversely, in Sartre’s view, novels are necessarily expressive of the novelist’s worldview or philosophy. By metaphysics too, Sartre does not mean a lifeless abstraction, rather an exploration of man’s situation in the world. Sartre thus takes over the Kantian notion of the Categorical Imperative and transfers it from the ethical to the aesthetic domain. The work of art is a pure call to be brought into existence through imagination. Sartre’s concept of authenticity, occasionally cited as the only existentialist ‘virtue,’ is often criticized as denoting more a style than content. Admittedly, it does seem compatible with a wide variety of life choices. Its foundation, again, is ontological, the basic ambiguity of human reality that “is what it is not” (that is, its future as possibility) and “is not what it is” (its past as facticity, including its ego or self, to which we have seen it is related via an internal negation). If Sartre’s first and best known *Ethics* corresponds to the Ontology of *Being and Nothingness*, his second, “Dialectical” Ethics builds on the Philosophy of history developed in the *Critique of Dialectical Reason*. In a series of unpublished notes for lectures in the 1960s, some of which were never delivered, Sartre sketched a theory of ethics based on the concepts of human need and the ideal of “integral man” in contrast with its counter concept, the ‘subhuman.’ What this adds to his published *Ethics* is a more specific content and a keener sense of the social conditions for living a properly human life.

¹⁵ Sartre, J.P., *Bibliography*, 1980-199, Bowling Green, OH: Philosophy Documentation Center; Paris: CNRS Editions, (1993).

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

2.7 Quest for Meaningful Life: Sartre as Biographer

Sartre's literary and philosophic careers were inextricably bound together and are best understood in relation to one another and to their biographic context. It could be argued that all his biographies and his autobiography are a contribution to a continuing epistemological inquiry into the nature of freedom. Some of his Biographical themes are selected from characters that reflect the ideologies of burgeon society against which Sartre launches his polemical attack. In the field of biography, Sartre published in 1947 a short volume on the poet Charles Baudelaire. Using what in *Being and Nothingness* he called existential psychoanalysis, Sartre explains Baudelaire's character and career as an original conscious choice, the choice to remain infantile, narcissistic, and dependent on his mother, a failure. In opposition to Freud, Sartre shows that the poet's choice reveals psychological freedom, not psychological determinism. The next biography, *Saint Genet: Actor and Martyr*, is a masterly analysis of the writer Jean Genet, a convicted thief and multiple offenders. The biography ascribes Genet's career as a thief to a conscious decision made in childhood to be what others accused him of being. To Sartre, Genet is a splendid example of a man who made himself, as he wanted to be by inverting other people's values.

Some twelve years later, Sartre published his autobiography, a self-accusatory work. The title, *The Words*, refers to the idolatry of literature he had practiced up to about 1950. The autobiography was judged by Francis Jeanson in Sartre *dans sa vie* as "the most accessible, and doubtless the most successful, of all the non philosophical works of Sartre."¹⁷ The book was, Sartre says within its pages, the fruit of an awakening from "a long, bitter, and sweet delusion." *The Words* reads almost like fiction, it is brief and its style is witty, aphoristic, penetrating classical, in a word, although its method is dialectical. At the opposite extreme is Sartre's final biographic work, *The Family Idiot*, a 2,800, page analysis of Gustave Flaubert. Flaubert had long interested Sartre, both attracting him and repulsing him. Sartre wanted to explore chiefly the particular circumstances and the

¹⁷ Molesky.blogspot.com/2005/01/jean-paul-sartres-words.html accessed on 06/02/07.

dialectical relationships that made Flaubert into a bourgeois who hated the bourgeoisie, a passive man incapable of pursuing an ordinary career, and, generally, a misfit and a neurotic, as well as a great writer. “Of course, the *Critique, Idiot* and Sartre’s ‘Later Interviews’ have taught us the extent to which man is predestined: not simply unable to escape his/her class, nation and family, but actually. “his freedom defined as the little gap (d é calage) between internalization and externalization. But the gap remains, it is explored and exploited in the cases of Genet and Flaubert, a hole in the heart of being through which genius can be invented.¹⁸ .

As his health deteriorated, Sartre wrote less but gave lengthy interviews that are a sort of intellectual autobiography. He remained fascinated with himself and his career, perhaps more so than other great writers, but more surprisingly so, since he had wished to move away from the cult of the individual to the idea of the general man, “anyone at all,” as he put it in *The Words*. He was, as Josette Pacaly declared in *Sartre au miroir*, “a Narcissus who does not like himself.”

¹⁸ Howells, Christina., *Sartre: The Necessity of freedom*, Cambridge, pp.181, (1988).

CHAPTER – 3

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Chapter 3

Some Key Themes of Sartrean Existentialism

3.1 Existential Phenomenology of Jean Paul Sartre: *Existence precedes essence*

From the time of Plato, essence has been said to precede existence. Sartre moves away from this statement by asserting that existence precedes essence. Sartre extends the thought of his predecessors and turns Phenomenology in some new directions. On the appearance of *Being and Nothingness* some readers, struck by the presence of the major themes of Heidegger's thought, believed that Sartre had limited himself to "translating" or paraphrasing *Sein und Zeit*. However, a proper understanding of Sartrean Existentialist Phenomenology reveals the fact that, in light of Husserl's late and recently published manuscripts, Sartre is more Husserlian than Heideggerian. One can safely claim that despite some basic differences in their interpretations of Phenomenology, there are certain similarities in Sartrean and Husserlian positions in Consciousness.

We find that, Sartre, following Husserl, admits two kinds of unity of consciousness. There is, first, a unity among all those conscious acts, which are directed toward the same object, for example, among all operations of adding two and two to make four. According to Sartre, this unity exists in regard to the identical object upon which every one of the acts in question bears, so that all of them must be characterized as consciousness of this object. This unity exists only in this respect; the acts may be separated in any way whatsoever. Hence it is not real unity. It depends upon the intentionality of consciousness; that is, conscious acts are unified by their intentional reference to self-identical, temporally continuous objects. That is why Sartre says, "it is in the object that the unity of consciousness is found."¹ Sartre is thus closer to Husserl in spirit that intentionality is the mark of consciousness although what exactly is meant by intentionality takes different positions in their respective philosophies.

¹ Sartre, J.P., *Transcendental Ego*, pp. 38, (1965).

3.2 Intentionality of Consciousness: A Phenomenological approach

We can say that all consciousness, as Husserl has shown, is consciousness of something. Intentionality shows Sartre's view of the significance of Phenomenology. Consciousness is defined by intentionality; all Consciousness is a revealing intuition of something. Husserl's theory of intentionality has been modified in Sartre's philosophy. Whereas for Husserl intentionality is one essential feature of any consciousness, for Sartre intentionality is Consciousness. Consciousness is not self-enclosed; it is intentional. Consciousness aims at things beyond it; it directs itself outwards. In the article entitled "Intentionality: A Fundamental Idea of Husserl's Phenomenology,"² Sartre clearly says: "To be is to fly out into the world, to spring from the nothingness of the world and of consciousness in order suddenly to burst out as consciousness-in-the-world."³

The intentionality of consciousness establishes firstly the contentless, empty and transparent character of consciousness (consciousness has no 'inside', and no substantiality) and secondly the dependence of consciousness on reality. For Sartre, when consciousness is conscious of something, it is implicitly conscious of itself as not being that thing. In the case of a perceptual consciousness of a chair, for instance, there is the apprehension of the chair as the "in-itself" which consciousness is not. By self-consciousness, consciousness is aware of itself as not-being-the-chair. Consciousness is either pre-reflective or reflective. Sartre sometimes uses the term non-thetic consciousness or non-positional self-consciousness to 'pre-reflexive consciousnesses' in discussing this kind of consciousness. It refers to the *cogito* prior to all forms of reflection. What we have here is not knowledge, but an implicit consciousness of being consciousness of an object. The basic datum of Sartrean Phenomenology is basically this kind of consciousness which is prior to all forms of reflection. On the other hand, 'reflective consciousness,' which he sometimes terms 'thetic consciousness,' is the 'consciousness of the reflecting *cogito*.'

² Gallimard, "Une Idee Fondamentale de la phenomenologie de Huserl: L'intentionnalite", *Situations I*, (1947).

³ *Ibid.*, pp.31.

Sartre rejects Husserl's theory that the Ego is the Transcendental Subject living in consciousness. For Sartre, there is only the empirical Ego as an object outside consciousness. Sartre, however, does not attack the demand that consciousness must be construed as unified and individualized, but he attacks the conviction that the Transcendental Ego has to be introduced to meet such a demand. For Husserl the Ego is a Phenomenological datum. Sartre is aware of this point of view, for he says that the Ego for Husserl is "accessible to each of us as soon as the reduction is performed."⁴ Sartre then denies that the Transcendental Ego remains as a residue after the reduction. Unlike Husserl, Sartre thinks that what remains after the Reduction is not the Transcendental Ego, but the transcendental sphere of consciousness purified of all egological structure.

Sartre's objective in *Transcendence of the Ego* is to establish a picture of the person or self as non-substantial, as dependent for its being on the world, and as essentially a public, objective item in the world in all three respects, an anti Cartesian conception. Sartre attacks the view of the Self or Ego as the foundation of consciousness. Sartre claims that consciousness is prior to the Self or Ego, and that the Self or Ego is a product or construction out of Consciousness. So far we have shown how Sartre attempts to deny that the Transcendental Ego is necessary for the unity of consciousness. Sartre, however, does not offer a new solution to the problem of the unity of consciousness. To account for such unity, Sartre makes use of Husserl's own notion of 'temporality of consciousness.' Gradually, the descriptive method of Sartrean Existential Phenomenology moves from the most abstract to the highly concrete, from individualistic, toward socio-political and relational dimension of our worldly existence.

3.3 Two Types of Being: The Ontology of *Being and Nothingness*

Sartre subtitles *Being and Nothingness* a "Phenomenological Ontology." Sartre preferred Ontology to Metaphysics because although Ontology denotes the study of Being, it "does not revive the ghosts of substance, soul, and God."⁵ Like Husserl

⁴ Sartre, J.P., *Transcendental Ego*, pp. 35. (1965).

⁵ www.geocities.com/sartresite/sartre_theses1.html accessed on 17/09/07.

and Heidegger, Sartre distinguished Ontology from Metaphysics and favoured the former. Unlike Heidegger, however, Sartre does not try to combat Metaphysics as a deleterious undertaking. In his case, Ontology is primarily descriptive and classificatory, whereas Metaphysics purports to be causally explanatory he simply notes in a Kantian manner that it raises questions we cannot answer.

For Sartre, not only that existence precedes essence in all occasions, there are only two basic categories of being, “being-in-itself” (*être en-sui*) and “being-for-itself” (*être pour-sui*). Sartre makes a clear distinction between these two categories of Being, “in-itself” and “for-itself.” “In-itself,” the object, reveals its essence (a thing, its nature) to the observer, but “for-itself” stands for human consciousness and it is only applicable to human beings. Sartre applied the French *en-sui*, which loosely means “in-self,” to describe the state of being of objects, i.e., things without self-awareness. Sartre’s “being-in-itself” represents the idea that only concrete phenomena have any ontological status; only the concrete is real. This is not a “two substance” ontology like the thinking thing and the extended thing (mind and matter) of Descartes. Sartre begins by analyzing two distinct and irreducible categories or kinds of being: the “in-itself” (*en-sui*) and the “for-itself” (*pour-sui*), roughly the non-conscious and the conscious respectively, adding a third, the for-others (*pour-autrui*), later in the book, and concludes with a sketch of the practice of “existential psychoanalysis” that interprets our actions to uncover the fundamental project that unifies our lives. The *pour-sui* (for-itself) is that being which is aware of itself: man. Its structure is different from that of the *en-sui*.

Since Sartrean understanding of consciousness has taken a Phenomenological turn with his emphasis on intentionality of consciousness we may have a fresh look of *en-sui* and *pour-sui* relation in Sartre’s Existential Phenomenology. Sartrean existential exploration embraced Husserl’s approach to Phenomenology. Sartre’s goal is to make consciousness the sole cause of its own existence, but to do so he must identify consciousness as pure appearance: “But it is precisely because consciousness is pure appearance, because it is total emptiness (since the entire world is outside it) and it is because of this identity of appearance and existence

within it that it can be considered as the absolute.”⁶ Consciousness is not instantaneous; it is an *ekstatic* unity of past, present and future. Temporality constitutes another aspect of the way in which negation is at work within the “for-itself.” These temporal *ecstasies* also map into fundamental features of the “for-itself.” And this “nothing” neither separates the two phenomena to such an extent that they can neither cover nor become entirely separate and independent. They are both linked and held apart by an “abyss of nothingness” which is unbridgeable. Owing to this split in his or her consciousness, man, Sartre concludes, ‘is divided in himself, never fully himself.’ The *en-sui*, that is, the objective world of things, on the other hand, is undivided, impregnable, massive, and unshakable. In the *en-sui*, the fullness and security of being manifests itself.

Confronted with the massively and ontological integrity of the *en-sui*, man experiences himself not only as discordant and fragmentary but also as free. The being of consciousness is called the “for-itself” which is described as “being what it is not, and not being what it is.” It is a negation of the being of the object or the “in-itself” which is “what it is?” The “for-itself” is fluid, nonself-identical, and dynamic. It is the internal negation or “nihilation” of the “in-itself,” on which it depends. Described negatively, “for-itself” is the negation of “in-itself,” *pour-sui* needs “in-itself” to wrongly identify it with “in-itself” in bad faith and then to retreat back to itself. But, understanding himself as thus divided and incomplete, man strives to fill this lacuna in his being: he aspires to the plenitude of the *en-sui*, but in doing so he wants to retain the consciousness of his own self, his prerogative as a *pour-sui*. For what good would it do him to attain to the fullness of Being without being conscious of it and thus without being able to enjoy it? Sartre wonders.

⁶ Sartre, J.P., *Being and Nothingness*, Trans. Barnes, E. Hazel., Introduction by Mary, Warnock., Philosophical Library, pp.xxxvii, (1996).

Table 3.1: Differences between *pour-sui* and *en-sui*

For-itself (<i>pour-sui</i>)		In-itself (<i>en-sui</i>)	
1	Conscious	1	Being
2	Being-for-itself	2	Being-in-itself
3	Transcendent	3	Factic
4	Reflexive consciousness	4	Non-reflexive
5	Nothingness	5	Things/thingness
6	Conscious without essence	6	Non-Conscious
7	Contentless	7	Contentful
8	Pure spontaneous	8	Not spontaneous
9	Dynamic	9	Static
10	Subjectivity, Object –oriented	10	Subject-dependant, Objectivity
11	Fluid	11	Passive, Stagnant
12	Self-luminous	12	Non-luminous

Coming back to “for-itself” is like coming back to its original position of negating it from “in-itself”; it is a continuous reminder of the fact that consciousness is not a thing and a being. The analysis of nothingness provides the key to the phenomenological understanding of the “for-itself.”

3.4 Consciousness as Nothingness

One of the most original contributions of Sartre’s philosophy lies in his analysis of the notion of Nothingness and the claim that it plays a central role at the heart of Being. Without referring to Nothingness, Sartre cannot account for the notions of freedom, temporality and desire. Emptied of all egological structure, consciousness in Sartrean analysis retains its independence from beings and things by reducing itself to the status of ‘Nothing.’ The human being is not only the being by whom negatives are disclosed in the world; she or he is also the one who can take negative attitudes with respect to him or her. If freedom is the very being of

consciousness, what form does the consciousness of freedom assume? Sartre defined consciousness as “a being such that in its being, its being is in question in so far as this being implies a being other than itself.”⁷ To be responsible for this negative life is to ask the question ‘why?’ But now that we have examined the meaning of ‘the question,’ we can at present also write the formula thus: “consciousness is a being, the nature of which is to be conscious of the nothingness of its being.”⁸ Consciousness is contentless; neither object nor image is in consciousness. For Sartre, consciousness is freedom because it is not a thing “in-itself” and is thus exempted from the causal order of the world. Consciousness is not anything in the world. It follows from the distinction between Being and “for-itself,” between *en-sui* and *pour-sui*, between the ‘tree I perceive’ and the ‘tree there’, although the one differs from the other, ‘my perception of the tree’ and ‘my being conscious of this perception’ are neither two entirely different things nor are they entirely identical. What then lies in between these two phenomena: ‘my perception, and the consciousness of my perception?’ ‘Nothing’, replies Sartre. Owing to this split in his consciousness, man, Sartre concludes, is divided in himself, never fully himself.

Consciousness that has lapsed into the past is not self-conscious. “Man is the being through whom nothingness comes to the world.”⁹ Since all being is on the side of the object, consciousness is a total emptiness or ‘nothingness.’ The being by which Nothingness comes to the world must be its own Nothingness.¹⁰ Human reality therefore is its own Nothingness.¹¹ This does not imply that Consciousness and the “in-itself” are mutually dependent. The “in-itself” has no need of consciousness in order to be. Sartre’s description of the appearance of ‘nothingness’ in the world can be summarized in the following statement: since the “in-itself” is so full of itself that it does not admit any negative element, nothingness must be brought to things by the being which is not the “in-itself” and that being is consciousness. This amounts to saying that consciousness is nothingness, for the term ‘human

⁷ Sartre, J.P., *Being and Nothingness*, Trans. Barnes, E. Hazel, Introduction by Mary, Warnock., Philosophical Library, pp.xxxviii, (1996).

⁸ www.geocities.com/sartresite/sartre_theses1.html - 27k accessed on 29/03/06

⁹ Sartre, J.P., BN, trans. Barnes, E. Hazel, Introduction by Warnock, Mary., pp. 24, (1969).

¹⁰ Ibid., pp. 57-8.

¹¹ Sartre, J. P., BN, trans. Barnes, E. Hazel, Introduction by Warnock, Mary., pp. 567,138, (1969). Catalano, S. Joseph., *A Commentary on Jean Paul Sartre’s “Being and Nothingness”*, pp. 100, (1985).

reality' is used as a synonym for consciousness. Here we find the close connection between two Sartrean notions: nothingness and self-consciousness. We may assume that consciousness for Sartre is nothingness because it is necessarily self-conscious. Unless it was self-conscious, consciousness would not be able to tear itself away from its object, it would not be aware of itself as not being the object. Consciousness is the negation of being because it introduces a split into the "being-in-itself."

On the one side there is 'being,' the fullness that is everything (being-in-itself), on the other is 'consciousness,' which breaks itself away from being, which becomes unstuck, which is nothingness or "being-for-itself." In *Being and Nothingness* the theme of consciousness's power of negation is explored in its different ramifications. Consciousness, by nihilation, tears itself away from the world in a single jerk. One can find an answer to these questions in *La Nausée* and in subsequent writings. In *La Nausée*, Roquentin exemplifies the pure consciousness of the "for-itself" as active self-questioning of the self and its environment. He seems to be stumbling endlessly in a world he did not shape, did not fashion, and is merely observing. Roquentin conceives of himself as a prisoner of a world in which he is able to reflect his essence, but from which he remains separate. Sartre defines the world of free individuals as filled with obstacles and illusions, alien and terrifying. "What we call freedom is impossible to distinguish from the being of human reality. Man does not exist first in order to be free subsequently; there is no difference between the being of man and his being-free."¹²

Without the "in-itself" to be revealed, consciousness cannot be self-conscious and thereby ceases to exist as "pure appearance." From this it follows that the "in-itself" is ontologically prior to consciousness and establishes the ground for it. Consciousness without the "in-itself" is a kind of abstraction; it could not exist any more than a color could exist without form. Consciousness is a total emptiness, because the entire world is outside it. It is the nihilation of a particular being, and therefore has only a borrowed existence. "Being-for-itself" and "being-in-itself"

¹² Chen, Xunwu., *Being and Authenticity*, Value enquiry book series, pp.47, (2004).

have mutually exclusive characteristics and yet we (human reality) are entities that combine both, which is the Ontological root of our ambiguity. The autonomy of Consciousness is not a cosmic freedom, without a world. The Reduction nihilates the world; it does not annihilate it. It does not suppress “Being-in-itself” it makes it possible to recapture it differently. It does not detach consciousness; it engages it by bringing it to be consciousness of world, consciousness of situation. He states that non-being does not come to things by a negative judgment; rather, it is a negative judgment which is conditioned and supported by a prejudicial comprehension of a non-being: “The necessary condition for our saying ‘no’ is that non-being be a perpetual presence in us and outside, that nothingness haunts being.”¹³

Sartre denies that the negative judgment arises when our expectations end in failure. He, however, concedes that expectations have something to do with the negative judgment; they lead us to discover non-being. “It is evident,” says Sartre, “that non-being always appears within the limits of a human expectation.”¹⁴ Consciousness can exist simultaneously in the dimensions of past, present and future because at present it is not and has to be its past and its future. And finally, consciousness is the ‘desire to be’, since it is a lack of being, i.e. Nothingness. We find in the *Being and Nothingness*: “Freedom, choice, nihilation, temporalization are all one and the same thing.”¹⁵

3.5 Temporality and Consciousness: *Being and Nothingness* in Jean Paul Sartre

Sartre, therefore, maintains that Consciousness unifies itself in the manner that has been described by Husserl in the *Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness*.¹⁶ In this work Husserl talks of time-consciousness as a fact of experience, being constituted in the flux of consciousness. Time-consciousness is unity growing out of the inseparable relation between the different phases of consciousness. For Husserl, every present moment of consciousness contains a

¹³ Sartre, J. P., BN, trans. Barnes, E. Hazel, Introduction by Warnock, Mary., pp. 11, (1969).

¹⁴ Ibid., pp. 7.

¹⁵ Ibid., pp. 465.

¹⁶ Husserl, E., *Phenomenology of Internal Time consciousness*, trans. By Churchill, James, S., Indiana University Press, (1966).

horizon of the immediate past and a horizon of the anticipated future. This is to say that the actual present is modified by the ‘retention’ of what has been and the ‘protention’ of what is about to become now. The retention of the immediate past is called “primary remembrance” and the retention of relatively remote events is called “secondary remembrance.” These retentions are what Sartre means by “transversal intentionalities,” for he says that transversal intentionalities “are concrete and real retentions of past consciousness.”¹⁷

Even for Sartrean Existentialism the starting point must be the *Cogito*, or “the absolute truth of consciousness becoming aware of itself.” This “absolute” and directly experienced truth is, for Sartre, the condition of all other (probable) truths. This sounds extremely Cartesian, with only one qualification: Existentialism takes human subjectivity as its starting point albeit not in its neutral, washed out form. Subjectivity is not a vacuous I of Descartes but the embodied consciousness as experienced in really defining existential situations (anxiety, despair, bad faith, etc.). Quentin Lauer and Dan Zahavi show the existential nature of Sartrean ego that is more concrete, existing individual and the individual’s own sense of self and world in comparison to more detached and abstract position of self in Husserl’s phenomenology.

For Husserl, the ego is a phenomenological datum. Sartre is aware of this point of view, for he says that the ego for Husserl is “accessible to each of us as soon as the reduction is performed.”¹⁸ Sartre then denies that the Transcendental Ego remains as a residue after the Reduction. Unlike Husserl, Sartre thinks that what remains after the Reduction is not the Transcendental Ego, but the transcendental sphere of consciousness purified of all egological structure. To understand Sartre’s position, we must first understand the distinction between pre-reflective consciousness and reflective consciousness. Consciousness is either pre-reflective or reflective. The basic datum of Sartrean Phenomenology is basically this kind of pre-reflective consciousness which is prior to all forms of reflection. On the other hand,

¹⁷ Sartre, J.P., *Transcendental Ego*, pp. 39.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 35.

Moran, Dermot. and Mooney, Timothy., ed., *The Phenomenology Reader*, pp.387, (2000).

reflective consciousness, which he sometimes termsthetic consciousness, is the consciousness of the reflecting cogito. What Sartre means to say is that if the Transcendental Ego existed, three characteristics of consciousness, namely, absoluteness, transparency and spontaneity, would be destroyed. Sartre's main interest in rejecting Husserl's doctrine of the Transcendental Ego is to empty consciousness of all contents. Purified of all egological structure, the pure field of consciousness recovers its primary transparency. The self-transparency of consciousness excludes the possibility that anything is in consciousness. Hence the radical consequence of Sartre's rejection of the transcendental ego is that consciousness has no contents; all content is on the side of the object.

3.6 Consciousness as Freedom

Sartrean analysis of original temporality leads him to another structure of consciousness, i.e. freedom. Freedom, for Sartre, is not merely a description of external conditions wherein humanity confronts alternative possibilities. Freedom is the state of being to which "being-for-itself" is condemned. We make choices, but "we are not free to cease being free."¹⁹ If freedom is the very being of consciousness, what form does the consciousness of freedom assume? According to Sartre, "... it is in *anguish* that man gets the consciousness of his freedom, or if you prefer, *anguish* is the mode of being of freedom as consciousness of being; it is in *anguish* that freedom is, in its being, in question for itself."²⁰ Man reclaims his own freedom going through a situation of crisis, undergoing an experience of anguish. Sartre asserts that it is in anguish that man gets his consciousness of freedom. In *Being and Nothingness*, he cites Kierkegaard as characterizing *anguish* in the face of what one lacks as *anguish* in the face of freedom. He also notes that Heidegger, who was greatly influenced by Kierkegaard, considers *anguish* as the apprehension of nothingness. In Sartre's view, these two descriptions of *anguish* are not contradictory. In *anguish* we confront our utter freedom as a consciousness

¹⁹ Sartre, J.P., *Essays in Existentialism*, pp.35, Ccbs.ntu.edu.tw/FULLTEXT/JR-PHIL/brian1.htm - 49k – accessed on 30/012/07

²⁰ Sartre, J.P., *Being and Nothingness*, Trans. Barnes, E. Hazel., Introduction by Mary, Warnock., Philosophical Library, pp.29, (1996).

which is intrinsically obliged “to be its own nothingness” or which incessantly experiences itself as the “nihilation” of its past being.

In choosing freedom, Sartre has chosen nothingness, for freedom is nothingness, it has no essence; it is subject to no logical necessity. To the extent that the ‘for-itself’ wishes to hide its own nothingness from itself and to incorporate the ‘in-itself’ as its true mode of being, it is trying also to hide its freedom from itself. For Sartre, freedom (the very “being of consciousness”) becomes problematic to itself in its self-consciousness. In freedom, the human being is both his and her past and future, but only in the form of “nihilation.” Humans become self-conscious of “being both this past and future and as not being them.”²¹ Sartre finds that the very being of consciousness becomes problematic when we are self-conscious of the self-contradictions of the self. The self-contradiction cited above consists in the self both being and not being its past and future. This self-contradiction emerges for Sartre because it is in freedom that human reality separates its present from its past and future by “secreting” its own “nothingness.” Thus, Sartre is also speaking here of the self-consciousness of freedom. Freedom, for Sartre, is not merely a description of external conditions wherein humanity confronts alternative possibilities. Freedom is the state of being to which ‘being-for-itself’ is condemned. We make choices, but “being both this past and future and as not being them. We are not free to cease being free.”²²

According to Sartre, “nihilation, temporalization, freedom and choice are one and the same thing.”²³ Consciousness, says Sartre, “has appeared to us as freedom.” Here Freedom is not a property subsisting in consciousness, but rather the inner structure of consciousness. Freedom is the stuff of the being of man. “Man cannot be sometimes slave and sometimes free; he is wholly and forever free or he is not free at all.”²⁴ Man is forever free, for “man is condemned to be free.”²⁵ An absolute

²¹ Sartre, J.P., *Being and Nothingness*, Trans. Barnes, E. Hazel., Introduction by Mary, Warnock., Philosophical Library, pp. 567, (1996).

²² <http://plato.Stanford.edu/entries/freewill/> accessed on 21/06/07

²³ Bhadra, M.K., *A Critical Study of Sartre's Ontology of Consciousness* The University of Burdwan, pp.129, (1976).

²⁴ Arlun, B. Dallery., Stephen, H. Watson. and E. Marya, Bower., ed. *Transitions in Continental Philosophy*, pp.229, (1994).
Sartre, J. P., BN, pp. 599.

freedom is an ideal but in actuality freedom is to be achieved by acting freely. We get absolute freedom in aesthetic field. For Sartre, freedom is the dislocation of consciousness from its object, the fundamental “nihilation” or negation by means of which consciousness can grasp its object without losing itself in it: to be conscious of something is to be conscious of not being it, a “not” that arises in the very structure of consciousness as being “for-itself.” Because “nothingness” (or nihilation) is just what consciousness is, there can be no objects in Consciousness, but only objects for consciousness. This means that consciousness is radically free, since its structure precludes that it either contains or be acted on by things.

Being aware of its own freedom, consciousness feels *anguish* and tries to flee it by putting itself in bad faith. As a lack of being, consciousness desires to fill itself with the in-itself. Its ideal is to be the “in-itself-for-itself.” But this ideal is unrealizable. Its desire becomes a useless passion. Being unable to realize its ideal, consciousness is subject to constant frustration and suffering; it is unhappy consciousness with no possibility of surpassing its unhappy. But, understanding himself as thus divided and incomplete, man strives to fill this lacuna in his being: he aspires to the plenitude of the *en-sui*, but in doing so he wants to retain the consciousness of his own self, his prerogative as a *pour-sui*.

Sartre writes: “Who I am depends on what I make of my “properties”; they matter to me in a way that is impossible for merely available and occurrent entities. As Heidegger puts it, existence is “care” (Sorge). To exist, is not simply to be, but to be an issue for oneself.”²⁵ In Sartre’s terms, while other entities exist “in-themselves” (*en-sui*) and “are what they are,” human reality is also “for-itself” (*pour-sui*) and thus is not exhausted by any of its determinations. It is what it is not and is not what it is. Human existence, then, cannot be thought through categories appropriate to things: substance, event, process. There is something of an internal distinction in existence that undermines such attempts, a distinction that existential philosophers try to capture in the categories of *facticity* and “transcendence.” To be is to co-ordinate these opposed moments in some way, and

²⁵ Sartre, J.P., BN, pp. 60.

²⁶ “Existentialism”, Stanford Encyclopedia, 23rd august, (2004).; plato.stanford.edu/entries/existentialism/ -accessed on 23/08/07.

who I am, my essence, is nothing but my manner of coordinating them. In this sense human beings make themselves in situation: what I am cannot be separated from what I take myself to be. In Charles Taylor's phrase, human beings are "self-interpreting animals" (Taylor 1985:45), where the interpretation is constitutive of the interpreter. One has to decide how to make one's way out of limitations and out of his *facticity*. Man learns his freedom through his action; hence freedom can be best understood by describing the structure of human actions. The "for-itself" is the being which is defined by action. Action, as opposed to mere happening, is defined by intention.²⁷ The careless smoker who has, through negligence, caused the explosion of a powder magazine has not acted. Man is said to be acting only when he has an intention. By intention Sartre understands "a choice of the end."²⁸ The "givens" of our situation such as our language, our environment, our previous choices and our very selves in their function as "in-itself", constitute our *facticity*. Not merely the situation as such, but also the individual's own body is relegated to the sphere of immanence that threatens, if one's will is not strong enough, to lead one to abandon the movement of transcendence. Indeed, the claims Simone de Beauvoir makes about woman's bodies, for instance, in "The Data of Biology" chapter of *The Second Sex*, frequently relegate their bodies to the status of immanent objects that represent an ongoing threat to their transcendence as this latter is apprehended both by the individual herself and by others. As conscious individuals, we transcend (surpass) this *facticity* in what constitutes our "situation." In other words, we are always beings "in situation," but the precise mixture of transcendence and facticity that forms any situation remains indeterminable, at least while we are engaged in it. Hence Sartre concludes that we are always "more" than our situation and that this is the ontological foundation of our freedom. We are "condemned" to be free, in his hyperbolic phrase, only by clearing our way through the obstacles that are given to us. Some such givens are:

²⁷ Sartre, J. P., BN, trans. Barnes, E. Hazel, Introduction by Warnock, Mary., pp. 584., (1969).

²⁸ Ibid., pp. 566.

3.6.1 My Place

Sartre writes: “ ‘My place’ is the present place I live in. It presupposes different places in which I lived going back to the place of my birth. It is from this original place that I shift to other places.”²⁹ The determinist says that the choice of one place excludes the choice of other places. Sartre points out that freedom can exist only in restricted form since freedom is choice. “Every choice implies elimination and selection; that is, every choice is a choice of finitude.”³⁰

“Thus freedom can be truly free only by constituting facticity as its own restriction. Some may say that the occupation of a place restricts my freedom of traveling; I am not free to go to Chicago because of the fact that I am a minor government official at Bangkok.”³¹ According to Sartre, place in itself is neutral. It is revealed as an obstacle or as help only in the light of my project towards a certain end. “Thus our freedom itself creates the obstacles from which we suffer.”³² It is freedom which causes our place to appear as a resistance by positing its end.

3.6.2 My Past

Sartrean man is a being in the world constrained by time and space. “My past is what I have been. In so far as I exist, I cannot lack having a past. The “for-itself” ‘comes into the world with a past.’³³ ‘Our acts,’ says the proverb, ‘follow after us.’ Does this mean that the past determines ‘my action?’ It appears to the determinists that man is not free because his present existence is determined and influenced by his past.”³⁴ This view is not acceptable to Sartre. According to him, the past is perpetually ‘in suspense,’ because, “I can freely give a new meaning to it. And the meaning I give depends upon my present project. By projecting myself towards my ends, I preserve the past with me, and by action I decide its meaning. Hence it is

²⁹ “Sartre’s Existentialism and Early Buddhism” oldwww.mcu.ac.th/e-book/English/manual/Sartre accessed on 21/04/07.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Wayne, P. Pomerleau., *Twelve Great Philosophers: A Historical Introduction to Human Nature*, pp. 442, (1997). ;BN, pp. 629.

³² Sartre Warnock, J. P., BN, trans. Barnes, E. Hazel, Introduction by, Mary, pp.495, (1969).

³³ Ibid., pp.629.

³⁴ Ibid., pp. 629,498.(1969).

my choice of the future goal that decides the meaning of my past. And it is within the compass of my project that the past is manifested as the motivation of my present action.”³⁵ Sartre has further pointed out:

“Thus like place, the past is integrated with the situation when the “for-itself” by its choice of future confers on its past facticity a value in terms of which this facticity motivates the act and conduct of the “for-itself.””³⁶

3.6.3 My Environment

To quote Sartre “My environments are not the place which I occupy but the instrumental things which surround me with their coefficients of adversity and utility. They are tools which have their value and resistance. The synthetic organization of the tools constitutes the unity of my Unwill, and this Unwill can be revealed only within the limits of a free project.”³⁷ A tool is in itself indifferent; it offers neither help nor resistance. “It is only within my project that the tool becomes my adversity or utility. Suppose I wish to arrive at the next town as quickly as possible and I plan to go there by bicycle. Since the bicycle has a flat tire, it offers resistance. This bicycle is revealed as resistance because I have chosen it for a ride; it is included in my project.”³⁸ This illustration shows that the end chosen in general illuminates the adversity of things and their potentialities. Thus Sartre’s position regarding environments is the same as that of place; both are neutral. “it is my free project which makes them an aid or a resistance.”³⁹

3.6.4 My Fellowmen

Sartre writes: “It is not by me alone that meanings come to instrumental things. Living in the world, I encounter my fellowmen who also put meanings into things. I find myself engaged in an already meaningful world which reflects to me meanings which my free project has not given to them. I come across instruction, directions, orders, and prohibitions which are addressed to me and which I have to

³⁵ Sartre Warnock, J. P., BN, trans. Barnes, E. Hazel, Introduction by, Mary, pp.495, (1969).

³⁶ Ibid., pp.504,(1969).

³⁷ Sartre, J. P., BN, trans. Barnes, E. Hazel, Introduction by Warnock, Mary, pp.197, (1969).

³⁸ Ibid.,pp. 508.

³⁹ Ibid.

obey if I do not want to take the wrong street, to miss the train, to be arrested, etc. My freedom seems to be limited by the existence of the other. Moreover, through the other arise certain determinations which I am without having chosen; that is, for the Other I am Asian, rich, ugly, etc. Thus the true limit of my freedom lies in the fact that the other apprehends me as the other-as-object, and that my situation becomes for him an objective form.”⁴⁰

For Sartre, “These two characteristic limits represent the boundaries of my freedom.”⁴¹ Sartre, however, points out that by “my free recognition of the Other’s freedom I recover my being as object. If, on the contrary, I consider the other as pure object, then all determinations from the other disappear immediately. Since I can apprehend the other as a freedom only within the free project of apprehending him as such, it is nothing but my freedom which allows the other’s freedom to impose limit on it.”⁴² Sartre, therefore, admits that there is limit of freedom—the limit which comes from freedom itself. “Just as thought, according to Spinoza, can be limited only by thought, so freedom can be limited only by freedom.”⁴³

It is interesting to note that even in his earlier writings, Sartre was already willing to admit the possibility of consciousness arising from a confrontation with others. Just as humanity becomes an ‘us-object’ in the presence of the gaze of a God, so can a class become a ‘we-subject’ when confronted by an oppressor. Indeed, conflict is the original meaning of “being-for-others.”

3.6.5 My Death

The realists consider death as a door opening upon the nothingness of human reality, as something non-human. This realistic conception of death is not acceptable to Sartre who regards death as a human phenomenon. “It is the phenomenon of my personal life which makes of this life a unique life—that is, a life which does not begin again, a life in which one never recovers his stroke.”⁴⁴ Heidegger also accepts this humanization of death and defines *Dasein* as being-

⁴⁰ Sartre, J. P., BN, trans. Barnes, E. Hazel, Introduction by Warnock, Mary, pp.,629,498, (1969).

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Sartre, J. P., BN, trans. Barnes, E. Hazel, Introduction by Warnock, Mary, pp.197, (1969).

⁴³ Ibid., pp. 525.

⁴⁴ Ibid., pp.532,498.

towards-death (*Sein-zum-Tode*).⁴⁵ “Thus death reveals itself as that possibility which is one’s own most.”⁴⁶ Death is, for Dasein, the capital possibility from which all other possibilities derive their status. Unlike Heidegger, Sartre does not consider death to be a possibility of the “for-itself.” For him death is “the nihilation of all my possibilities.”⁴⁷ Death as the external limit of life does not make limit of my freedom. The freedom which is my freedom remains total and infinite. Death is not an obstacle to my projects; it is only a destiny of these projects elsewhere.”⁴⁸ *Facticity* includes all those properties that third-person investigation can establish about us :natural properties such as weight, height, and skin color; social facts such as race, class, and nationality; psychological properties such as web of belief, desires, and character traits; historical facts such as past actions, family background, and broader historical milieu; and so on. Facticity in this third person way is manifest in one’s moods as a kind of burden, the weight of “having to be.” From an existential point of view, however, this would be an error because ‘the kind of being that I am cannot be defined in factual, or third person, terms.’

Sartre makes a distinction between finite and infinite freedom although it is basically man’s freedom to choose, and to intend. Man’s freedom may remain pure and undiluted state throughout his entire life, if he so wills it. Even if man were absolutely free at the beginning of his life each subsequent decision would serve to further limit him. His essence which a particular man has created for himself through choice and the actions, can not be discarded as such, they follow and haunt him/her throughout his or her life. Although autonomy of man’s choice is not independent of external conditions, but we can have freedom of choice.

Bad faith occurs when we refuse to carry the burden of making a decision about a particular situation. Bad faith turns individuals into a kind of robot where the individual can carry out a particular function only. Society pressures man to remain within the confine of his roles and that is how many people live in a state of bad faith, in self-deception about one’s own capability. Final project is to restore

⁴⁵ Sartre, J. P., BN, trans. Barnes, E. Hazel, Introduction by Warnock, Mary, pp.652, (1969).

⁴⁶ Heidegger, Martin, *Being and Time: A translation of Sein und Zeit*, pp.294, (1978).

Sartre, J. P., BN, trans. Barnes, E. Hazel, Introduction by Warnock, Mary., pp.672, (1969).

⁴⁷ Sartre, J. P., BN, trans. Barnes, E. Hazel, Introduction by Warnock, Mary., pp. 540 498., (1969).

⁴⁸ Ibid.,pp. 547.

authenticity through a “self conscious choice in the face of anguish, through acting in the world of contingent and modal realities.”⁴⁹

3.7 Anxiety, Nothingness, the Absurd: Existential Suffering of the *Factual Man*

Both Heidegger and Sartre believe that, phenomenological analysis of the kind of intentionality that belongs to moods does not merely register a passing modification of the psyche but reveals fundamental aspects of the self. Fear, for instance, reveals some region of the world as threatening, some element in it as a threat, and myself as vulnerable. Unlike fear, anxiety has no direct object, there is nothing in the world that is threatening. For Heidegger and also for Sartre, since the identity bound up with such roles and practices is always typical and public, the collapse of this identity reveals an ultimately first-personal aspect of myself that is irreducible to *das Man*. This sort of stance is also solidly supported by the Phenomenology (or moral psychology) of first-person experience.

As Sartre points out in great detail, *anguish*, as the consciousness of freedom, is not something that human beings welcome. We are “condemned to be free,” which means that we can never simply be who we are but are separated from ourselves by the nothingness of having perpetually to re-choose, or re-commit, ourselves to what we do. Characteristic of the existentialist outlook is the idea that we spend much of lives devising strategies for denying or evading the anguish of freedom. One of these strategies is “bad faith.” Another is the appeal to values.

Sartre would agree with the Buddhist view that desire gives rise to suffering. Consciousness, as the desire to be, has a permanent attention towards identification with the being of the object. As consciousness always desires to realize this unrealizable ideal, it is regarded as a “useless passion.” And this passion is a constant cause of frustration and suffering. It is not possible for man to overcome this suffering because his desire for the ideal is neither satiable nor destructible. For Sartre, desire cannot be eliminated from consciousness because it is the inner structure of consciousness. The elimination of desire would require the

⁴⁹ Mc, Bride., and William, L., *Existentialist Ontology and Human Consciousness*, .NewYork,Garland, pp.375, (1978).

disappearance of consciousness. Since consciousness always has desire, it is subject to suffering forever. The complete cessation of suffering is impossible in Sartre's philosophy. That is why Sartre says that so long as consciousness appears in the world, it is "by nature an unhappy consciousness with no possibility of surpassing its unhappy state."⁵⁰

3.8 Authenticity, Freedom, and the Ethical Dimension

By responsibility Sartre simply means "consciousness of being the incontestable author of an event or of an object."⁵¹ "I am responsible for giving meanings to things, i.e. for being the "author" of the situation, the world and the value. In fact, I am responsible for all things except for my responsibility, because I am not the foundation of my being"⁵² Sartre writes:

"Therefore everything takes place as if I were compelled to be responsible. I am abandoned in the world . . . in the sense that I find myself suddenly alone and without help, engaged in a world for which I bear the whole responsibility without being able, whatever I do, to tear myself away from this responsibility for an instant"⁵³

It is precisely this constant awareness of responsibility that plunges the "for-itself" into *anguish*. From the perspective of Humanistic Ethics, it is most significant that in *Being and Nothingness* Sartre frequently identifies human reality with freedom, or more accurately, with free spontaneous consciousness (being-for-itself). Thus he states that "there is no difference between the being of man and his being free"⁵⁴ and that "freedom is the being of consciousness"⁵⁵ In addition, the early Sartre so greatly minimizes the internal and external limitations to human freedom that he repeatedly claims "man is wholly free"⁵⁶ Furthermore, the desire to be God has

⁵⁰ Sartre, J. P., BN, trans. Barnes, E. Hazel., Introduction by Warnock, Mary., pp.498,90., (1969).

⁵¹ Yiwei, Zheng, *Ontology and Ethics in Sartre's Early Philosophy*, pp.138,(2005).

⁵² Wayne, P. Pomerleau., *Twelve Great Philosophers: A Historical Introduction to Human Nature*, pp. 442, (1997)., BN. 629.

⁵³ Sartre, J. P., BN, trans. Barnes, E. Hazel., Introduction by Warnock, Mary., pp.498,673, (1969).

⁵⁴ EN, pp. 61; BN, pp.25.

⁵⁵ EN, pp. 65; BN, pp.29.

⁵⁶ Arlun, B. Dallery., Stephen H. Watson. and E. Marya, Bower., ed. *Transitions in Continental Philosophy*, pp.229, (1994).

disastrous consequences for human relations. “Insofar as other free human subjects grasp me as an object,” Sartre explains, “they confer on me a meaning and a dimension of being that I do not cause myself to have and cannot control. In so doing they inevitably frustrate my desire to be the cause of myself, an *en sui causa sui*. Of course, I do the same to them.” The result, which Sartre describes in detail in *Being and Nothingness*, is that each of us attempts in various ways either to gain control of other free subjects or to eliminate them, in order to control or to eliminate the meaning and objective they give us. Needless to say, conflict is inevitable in such a situation and so Sartre asserts that “the essence of the relations between consciousnesses is not the *Mitsein*, it is conflict”⁵⁷ Again, if human relations are inevitably *conflictual*, one might wonder what could be the point of an ethics.

“Authenticity”, refers to the characteristic of one who acts in full awareness of her anguish and forlornness, not relying on any false “excuses” for her own decisions. Unlike his earlier works where it was very individualistic,⁵⁸ in the *Notebooks*, and other works of the late 1940s, Sartre’s concept of authenticity has acquired a strongly social dimension.


3.9 Conclusion:

Jean Paul Sartre, the atheist ‘existentialist,’ unlike earlier existentialists such as Kierkegaard, believed in no heaven and no pre-given moral order. All he wanted to do was to develop a moral system of his own that could restore good faith of an authentic individual who is not a blind victim of situation but one who is ‘more to his situation.’ He has just jotted down some ideas of his own about how we should strive to live without self-deception and thereby to live ‘authentically’, aware of our own freedom and our own inescapable responsibility for all of our actions. To deny our own freedom is a way of being in ‘bad faith, which was one of his key concepts. It follows, then, that human existence is not inevitably a useless passion

⁵⁷ Solomon, C. Robert., *The Rationalism to Existentialism: The Existentialists and their Nineteenth-Century Background*, pp.311, (2001).

⁵⁸ Ronald. Santoni., *Bad Faith, Good Faith and Authenticity in Sartre’s Early Philosophy*, Philadelphia: Temple University Press, pp.89-96, (1995).

or doomed to failure. Our desire for a valuable and meaningful existence can be met in some degree, not by adhering to objective values, for there are none, but by our freely choosing to value and thereby to create meaning for our life. If I do, Sartre states, I thereby “justify” my existence: “It is me, that nothing (objective) justifies, that justifies myself inwardly”⁵⁹ Is there scope for authentic spiritual and religious quest for the Sartrean man who has to struggle his or her way through a nauseating phase of existence? The next chapter “The Aesthetics of Salvation in Sartre’s Existentialism” seeks to address some such issues.



⁵⁹ CM, pp. 498; NE, pp.482.

John, J. Drummond., and Leser, E. Embru., *Phenomenological Approaches to Moral*, pp. 374, (2002).

CHAPTER – 4

The Aesthetics of Salvation in Sartre's Existentialism

- 4.1 The Aesthetics of Salvation in Sartre's Existentialism
- 4.2 Need for Salvation: Sartrean Response to the "Problem of the Self"
- 4.3 God is Man's Project
- 4.4 Existential Suffering is the Root Cause of Man's Quest for Salvation and the Moral Dimension of Life
- 4.5 Salvation Quest at the Face of Absurdity, Nausea and Bad Faith

Chapter 4

The Aesthetics of Salvation in Sartre's Existentialism

4.1 The Aesthetics of Salvation in Sartre's Existentialism

Possibly the best known quote from the works of Dostoevsky is from *The Brothers Karamazov*:

“If God does not exist, everything is permitted.”

Jean Paul Sartre shared a common fate with other intellectuals like Nietzsche, Dostoevsky, and Kafka and others, that atheism has become integral to their distinctive style of philosophizing. Dostoevsky and Kafka, though not they philosophers, had a major influence on the twentieth century philosophical movement which came to be known as Existentialism. Both writers explored themes which are central to the existentialist thought. Perhaps no prominent twentieth century writer has experienced Dostoevsky's presence more acutely than Sartre. Jean Paul Sartre shares Dostoevsky's struggle to providing clues to the mystery of what it means to be human. Sartre writes in “Existentialism is Humanism”: Dostoevsky once wrote, “if God did not exist, everything would be permitted”¹ and that, for Existentialism, is the starting point. Everything is indeed permitted if God does not exist, and man is in consequence forlorn, for he cannot find anything to depend upon either within or outside himself. He discovers forthwith, that he is without excuse. For if indeed existence precedes essence, one will never be able to explain one's action by reference to a given and specific human nature; in other words, there is no determinism-man is free” Sartre continues: Nor, on the other hand, if God does not exist, are we provided with any values or commands that could legitimize our behaviour. Thus we have neither

¹ David, E. Cortesi, *Dostoevsky Didn't Say It, Exploring a widely-propagated misattribution*, (2000).
www.infidels.org/library/modern/features/2000/cortesi1.html accessed on 09/02/08.

behind us, nor before us a luminous realm of values, any means of justification or excuse. We are left alone, without excuse. That is what I mean when I say that man is condemned to be free. Condemned, because he did not create himself, yet is nevertheless at liberty, and from the moment that he is thrown into this world he is responsible for everything he does.”²

People who have encountered Sartre for the first time recall nothing more of his philosophy than his claims on absolute freedom and the nonexistence of God. Indeed, Sartrean atheism is so well known that it really needs no further elaboration here. It was also the time when people became suspicious of any kind of uncritical loyalty to pet theories and group-ideologies. During the aftermath of the Second World War, any kind of totalism was suspected. Even Kantian humanism could seem to risk an idolatry of a moral law under which human beings are cases, albeit with equal indefeasible rights. In such a nihilistic atmosphere Sartrean Existentialism makes a heroic effort at addressing this nihilistic phase existentially and philosophically. Confronted with the growth of nihilism in the first half of the twentieth century, Sartre has adopted to address this nihilistic situation of his time. The young Sartre’s existential determination in the face of a Godless world and the older Sartre’s strategy of Marxist dogmatism are some such responses. Did he become a complete atheist in turn? Let us hear from Sartre’s own mouth: “Illusion has been smashed to bits; martyrdom, salvation and immortality are falling to pieces; the edifice is going to rack and ruin; I collared the Holy Ghost in the basement and threw him out.”³

Some points need to be stated in order to have better understanding of Sartrean philosophy and this also needs some clarifications regarding what is meant by nihilism in general in order to trace its existential root. Nihilism comes from the Latin *nihil*, or ‘nothing’, which means ‘not anything that does not exist’. It appears in the verb “annihilate,” meaning to bring to nothing, to destroy completely. Early in the nineteenth century, Friedrich Jacobi used the word to negatively characterize transcendental idealism. It only became popularized, however, after its appearance

² Sartre, J. P., *Existentialism is Humanism*, 1946. , Engel, S. Morris., *The Study of Philosophy*, 5th edition, pp380.

³ Sartre, J. P., *The words*, (1964).

in Ivan Turgenev's novel *Fathers and Sons* (1862) where he used "nihilism" to describe the crude science espoused by his character Bazarov who preaches a creed of total negation. While few philosophers would claim to be nihilists, nihilism is most often associated with Friedrich Nietzsche who argued that its corrosive effects would eventually destroy all moral, religious, and metaphysical convictions and precipitate the greatest crisis in human history.

In his lecture, "Existentialism is Humanism", Sartre confesses himself to be an atheist, or a representative of atheistic existentialism. Rather, Sartre, sought to redress the failure of humanism by renewing one's hope in human dignity. His claim of the precedence of existence over essence is but a logical consequence of his atheism. To quote John Llewelyn: "The existentialist road to the protection of human singularity and freedom all too often begins and ends with the first person singular, whether as the *me, me, me* of Kierkegaard, fixated on the salvation of his soul, or as an egotism, if not egoism, where I am required to assume within the circle of my own, projecting the contingency of my being hurled into existence alongside others, and where this assuming is a subjective existentialist *re-jigging* of objective-idealist and objectivist materialist *aufheben*. But by what, or by whom is this assumption required? By nothing other than myself who, on Sartre's account at any rate, am nothing but nothingness."⁴ This is a typical Sartrean response to the post-modern situation of absurdity, nihilism and in- authenticity and the alienation of man from his situated and lived context toward the image of a universal man who 'views from nowhere.' Existentialism itself was a response to this dichotomy between essence and existence, between the abstract and the concrete images of man.

This phenomenological atheism, which has nothing in common with the indifference of Heidegger, is enriched by the Nietzschean theme of the 'God is dead.' Once more the concreteness and uniqueness of this and that human being are endangered. Although 'atheism' was an essential ingredient in Sartre's existentialism, it was also an attempt on his part to safeguard freedom and authenticity of an individual that retains its subjectivity at all costs. The theme of

⁴ Llewelyn, John., "Editorial Foreword" in *Introduction French Existentialism Consciousness, Ethics, and Relations with Others*, Giles, James., Editor, Amsterdam/Atlanta, GA, vol. VI, pp.219, (1999).

the absence of God has added significance for other vital issues like the need for defining man, freedom, humanism in a nihilistic atmosphere. God is put in parentheses and Sartre speaks of the “death of God” on the authority of Nietzsche and by interpreting this death not in the sense of a murder committed by man (as was the case in Nietzsche), but in the sense of absence.

Sartre asserts that God does not exist for the reason that the concept of God entails self-contradiction. Sartre defines God as a ‘being-in-itself-for-itself.’ He is an ‘in-itself’ in so far as the concept of the divine presupposes that He is an existing entity, complete in himself and totally unrelated. On the other hand, God must likewise be a ‘for-itself’ in so far as He must be completely free and not beholden to anything else. Since such a synthesis is impossible for the reason that it involves a contradiction, then the logical conclusion must be to deny the existence of such a Being. It is thus somehow ironic for him to prove the non-existence of God, as if it is a necessary implication of a more primordial principle. Fr. Magin Borrajo, O.P. says: “In spite of the fact that atheism is Sartre’s point of departure, colouring his whole life and directing the attitudes he has adopted towards others and towards himself, he has not met squarely the problem of God’s existence. Sartrean atheism is not a conclusion arrived at after a detailed investigation: it is rather a postulate or in the words of Merleau Ponty, an “état d’âme,” or as Sartre himself says, an “accident,” the result of the circumstances of his education and the spiritual indigence of the environment in which he lived.”⁵

If the logical analysis fails here, is it possible to proceed toward salvation in a creative and a mystical manner? Sartre wonders. Sartre now inquires into the mystic’s way of merging with God and resolving the tension of extreme dualism of ‘for-itself’ and ‘in-itself’ for a possible way out of the unresolved tension. Sartre asserts, “To be man means to reach toward being God. Or if you prefer, man fundamentally is the desire to be God.”⁶ For Sartre, however, God is the

⁵ Borrajo, Magin. and O, P, Manila., *Moral Perspectives in Jean-Paul Sartre’s Existentialism*, UST Publications, (1968). Sartre Online-The Ultimate Sartrean Resource: Sartrean Atheism, http://www.Geocities.com/sartresite/sartre_theses3.html accessed on 20/06/07.

⁶ Sartre, J. P, *Being and Nothingness*, trans., Hazel, E. Barnes., Introduction by Mary, Warnock., New York: Washington Square Press, (1956).; Sherman, David., *Sartre and Adorno: The dialectics of Subjectivity*, pp.143, (2007).

impossible but ideal synthesis of the ‘in-itself-for-itself’ (*en-sui-pour-sui*). The Godlessness of the world in all its strata and categories becomes, paradoxically and by dialectic of negation, the signature of God and yields a mystical atheism, a theology of divine absence and non-being, of divine impotence, divine non-intervention, and divine indifference. Man inverts the relationship between the sacred and the profane, elevating the profane to the level of the sacred, and reducing the sacred to the level of the profane. Thereby, any mystical exposition has to imbibe negativity and dread and anguish of meaninglessness and absurdity of sheer dehumanized existence.

In this background this chapter makes an attempt at understanding Sartrean position regarding some basic issues of our existence, the issues related to God, faith, and salvation. If we follow Sartre throughout his writings and literature we find that there are various positions adopted by him in this regard. We may briefly summarize some such positions adopted by Sartre in his assessment of man-God relationship and then follow in details some of the implications of Sartrean philosophical approach to the aesthetics of salvation in a Godless world.

- a) It has been said that the world is too small for more than one free reality. This implies that either God is free or human beings are, but not both. To say that both God and human beings are free leads to intolerable problems of theology and contradictions while to deny to freedom to both leads to an intolerably meaningless and actually impossible world. This assumption is shared by a strange, diverse group of thinkers. Calvin and Spinoza said human beings are determined, in order to do justice to the freedom of God. Sartre does justice to man’s freedom and authenticity over God’s. God talk is meaningful in terms of self-talk, i.e., the talk about the “problem of himself.”
- b) God is ‘man’s project.’
- c) Existential suffering is the root cause of man’s quest for salvation and the moral dimension of life.
- d) Bondage is due to ignorance and bad faith. More conscious man is more the changed perspective on the existential issues of life. It is a journey toward more

authenticity and self-consciousness away from the nauseating phase of ignorance and bad faith.

- e) Acceptance of the absurdity of life and existence justifies man's quest for salvation even in a Godless world.
- f) Salvation is the recovery of good faith. Freedom is in deeds than in being. A free and authentic man acts freely and authentically. Individual separation and isolation of the solitary philosopher is overcome by the man of *praxis* for whom both theory and *praxis*, both 'for-itself' and 'in-itself', are in balance. This is the phase that is religiously described as salvation. More than reason and critical thinking, it is art and aesthetics of the creative man that leads to the recovery of the good faith.

The following is an illustration of some of these points summarized here.

4.2 Need for Salvation: Sartrean Response to the "Problem of the Self":

Sartrean rejection of God is significant in diverse manners. On all these accounts, freedom and subjectivity must be the point of departure because human beings are self-consciously problematic to themselves, because: "it is impossible for man to transcend human subjectivity."⁷ Sartre believes that "*existence* comes before *essence* or, if you will, that we must begin from the subjective."⁸ This implies that each individual "cannot pass beyond human subjectivity,"⁹ i.e. that the recognition and constitution of one's subjectivity represent the highest point in the achievement of freedom, for there is no divine beyond, no transcendent *Other* whose being can define the *essence* of humanity.¹⁰ Human reality is characterized by 'contingency', and the identity of the self hinges upon the total sum and interpretation of the product of these 'accidents'.

⁷ Sartre, J. P., *Essays in Existentialism*, pp. 37.

Sartre, J.P., *A Selection from Existentialism and Human Emotions*, trans. Bernard Frechtman, pp.9-16, (1957).

⁸ Sartre, J.P., *Essays in Existentialism*, pp.37. , www.btinternet.com/~glynhughes/squashed/sartre.htm - 24k - on 12/ accessed on 12/11/07.

⁹ Sartre, J.P., *Existentialism and Humanism*, trans. Philip Mairet., London: Methuen, pp.29, (1970).

¹⁰ Ibid.

Although God is impossible, the religious ideal is basic to being human; hence human beings have abundant religious experiences. However, Sartre is very much concerned with the “problem of the self.” The problem of the self, for Sartre, is tragically religious in character. In a sense, Sartre equates the religious question and the ‘problem of the self.’ He also tends to characterize the self as nothingness. Sartre, for his part, does not allow for the possibility of an autonomous religious mode of consciousness. The phenomenon of so-called “religious consciousness” still reflects the structure of consciousness as conceived by his ontology. Salvation is the goal toward which we move.

Sartrean humanism may have also contributed to his atheism. The existence of a God limits man’s freedom. As Fr. Borrajo puts it, “God’s existence would turn our freedom to a mere illusion.”¹¹ It is the dream of actualising all our potentialities, to be more conscious and more authentic. It is one strategy for restoring freedom of man and to avoid any confrontation with an ‘alien look’ that makes man an object. The look of God objectifies man, and this objectification takes away from man his capacity to be self-creative. Sartre relates a story encapsulating his relationship with God: “For several years more, I maintained public relations with the Almighty. But privately, I ceased to associate with Him. Only once did I have the feeling that He existed. I had been playing with matches and burned a small rug. I was in the process of covering up my crime when suddenly God saw me. I felt His gaze inside my head and on my hands. I whirled about in the bathroom, horribly visible, a live target. Indignation saved me. I flew into a rage against so crude an indiscretion, I blasphemed, I muttered like my grandfather: ‘God damn it, God damn it, God damns it.’ He never looked at me again.”¹² In “Existentialism and Humanism”, Sartre states, “if God does not exist there is at least one being whose existence comes before its essence, a being which exists before it can be defined by any conception of it. That being is man or as Heidegger has it the human reality.”¹³

¹¹ Copleston, Charles, Frederick., *A History of Philosophy*, Vol-4, *Descartes to Leibnitz*, pp.60, (1999). Sartre Online-The Ultimate sartrean Resource: Sartrean Atheism, http://www.Geocities.com/sartresite/sartre_theses3.html accessed on 31/03/07.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Harrison, Charty. and Wood, Paul., ed., *Art in Theory, 1900-2000, An anthology of Changing Ideas*, Blackwill publishing, pp.601. Original from the essay “Existentialism and Humanism”

Sartre has opted for man's freedom as against God's. Here is one of the greatest disagreements among existentialists, testifying perhaps to the inescapable vagueness of the field of life within which human beings must make decisions that create meaning. Though the nature of that field of life and its ground are dramatically contested, all existentialists hold that a decision in relation to it is the key issue for human beings. It is clearly apparent that Sartre's deepest concern throughout his work is the preservation of human freedom, but so great is the threat of the sheer reality of the world that ontologically this can be accomplished only by drawing an absolute distinction between man and being. If man is simply "is", like a thing 'is', or a 'stone is', then he need not talk about salvation. Salvation means man's "isness" includes not "this isness", to negate this static non-progressive thing-like existence. Salvation liberates one from 'thingness'. This itself is a religious urge. This negativity and nihilism of life leads him to define consciousness in terms of nothingness and void, consciousness alone is impotent and bare, hole like that alone is zero but interpreted creatively it can add value to any hopelessly negating situation. The conscious man is transformed to a creative one who recreates his own destiny. Sartre ultimately takes recourse to art and aesthetics as his road to salvation.

4.3 God is Man's Project:

To be conscious is to avoid, bad faith. Here, Sartre's thought is genuinely dialectical: freedom is posited by dialectic of negation, by a nihilation of everything that lies outside itself. His vision is genuinely tragic: man's project of freedom is doomed to frustration and defeat. Because fundamentally and tragically man is the desire to be God. The fundamental value which presides over project is exactly the in-itself-for-itself; that is, the ideal of a consciousness which would be the foundation of its own being-in-itself by the pure consciousness which it would have of itself. It is this ideal which can be called God. Thus the best way to conceive of the fundamental project of human reality is to say that man is the being whose project is to be God. Sartre writes: "To be man means to reach toward being

God. Or if you prefer, man fundamentally is the desire to be God.”¹⁴ Being simply is nothing more can be said about it. Moreover, Sartre’s idea of nihilation is fully dialectical, it is a genuinely dialectical negation of being, and thus it is not to be equated with annihilation, for it is an inversion and a reversal of being. Only thereby can it be identified with the project of freedom. Freedom is the reversal of being-hence, it is nothingness. But freedom is only a project. Sartre turns his doctrine of existential choice into a doctrine of engagement. Social action is a logical extension of individual subjective life because the individual exists only as a series of active choices. There is no individual reality except in deeds; there are no unused possibilities within a man. To live is to draw one’s own portrait, by all that one does. Similarly, there is no social reality except in the agreement of individuals acting in concert; it is useless to theorize about social laws dictated by abstract human nature or historical necessity. Therefore, personal life and social action coincide as a series of free undertakings or commitments.

Moreover, Sartre came to the point of positing that man invents God in order to account for meaning in the world. Man is haunted by cosmic meaninglessness, which he alone cannot solve. Then it becomes necessary for man to invent a concept which can explain the unexplainable, including the origin of the world. God is no longer the foundation of man, but he subsists integrally as the intention of man. The theme of the absence of God is now seen, as a man made project that is necessary for defining man, freedom and humanism. Sartre’s existentialism is based on the conviction that God does not exist and that, therefore, man is “on his own,” thrown into and abandoned in a purposeless world where he must create his own meanings and values, or learn to live without meanings and values, or, if he chooses, commit suicide. According to Sartre, the non-existence of God is a great tragedy for mankind. Man is a being who reaches beyond himself and his world toward God. In fact, “the best way to conceive of the fundamental project of human reality is to say that man is the being whose project is to be God”¹⁵ The object of man’s passion is the obliteration of his freedom in a

¹⁴ Sartre, J.P., *Being and Nothingness*, trans. Hazel E. Barnes., introduction by Mary, Warnock., New York: Washington Square Press, (1956).

¹⁵ Sartre, J.P., *Being and Nothingness*, trans. Hazel E. Barnes., introduction by Mary, Warnock., New York: Washington Square Press, pp.566, (1956).

fusion with God, in whom freedom and absolute truth are united. Thus, the religious resort to God marks a form of escapism, an attempt to avoid one's freedom and responsibility, a futile effort to resolve the dialectical tension between 'being-in-itself' and 'being-for-itself' (since God is the "synthetic fusion of the 'in-itself' with the 'for-itself'"¹⁶ But since this project is "doomed to failure," man is "condemned to despair."¹⁷

Employing his own language we could say that Sartre's ontological nihilism is the consequence of his original choice of freedom. Freedom is his "project," it is the choice of freedom that necessitates his creation of an ontological system which identifies consciousness and nothingness; for to identify man and being is to allow men to be swallowed up by the brute reality of the world. Belief in God is not only a falsifying rationalization for one's existence, but also a form of futile hope: there can be no ultimate fulfilment, no final escape from the human condition. Human existence "intends" God; but since God does not exist, the project of human existence is futile. "Man is a useless passion."¹⁸

Belief in God is one of many forms of "bad faith" (*mauvais foi*). Bad faith, according to Sartre, is the human attempt to escape from freedom and responsibility and from the anguish, forlornness, and despair that are the existential consequences of freedom and responsibility in a world without God.

4.4 Existential Suffering is the Root Cause of Man's Quest for Salvation and the Moral Dimension of Life

Without a God as such, one can still continue one's quest for deeper meaning of life that is religiously significant. Sartre continues his quest for authenticity

¹⁶ Sartre, J.P., *Being and Nothingness*, trans. Hazel E. Barnes., introduction by Mary, Warnock., New York: Washington Square Press, pp.626, (1956).

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid., pp.615, 91956).

Sherman, David, *Sartre and Adorno: The dialectics of Subjectivity*, pp.143.

Sartre, J.P., *Existentialism and Human Emotion*, Philosophical Library, New York, pp.63,(1957).

aesthetically, and phenomenologically, pondering over the tragic sense of life that also unveils the mystery of a hidden depth in our subjectivity. The confrontation with the sorrows and self-contradictions of life is a standard characteristic of existentialist philosophy. Sartre replaces a rational subject, a subject who autonomously sets aside his or her personal desires and inclinations to act in a way that should be accepted by any rational being, with a creative subject, a subject who can, under his or her own stream, choose or fail to choose to assume his or her own self responsibility. This brings about a shift from Kantian universalism to a Kierkeggarian existential exploration, a shift made from the logical subject to an existential creative person. Here Sartre as an man is close to Kierkeggarian *anguish* stricken man, it is the experience of a concrete dimension of suffering and anxiety, of meaninglessness and nothingness than an abstract rule follower ‘man of reason’ that we come across in Kant’s morality. Sartrean perspective is shifted to the existential man in crisis situation who undergoes anguish and suffering in a strange and alien world. It is this *anguish* that Kierkeggard called ‘the *anguish* of Abraham’. What Sartre intends to pick up on in this reference to Kierkegaard’s reading of the Biblical story of Abraham and Isaac is that when we are confronted with a choice or a dilemma we are ‘essentially alone.’ That each one of us is alone in deciding what to do becomes clear in Sartre’s understanding of the ethical significance of existentialism, that every step we take along the way is an Abrahamic moment. “I myself must decide, the scene is one in which it comes to pass that God did tempt Abraham, and said unto him, ‘Abraham’: and said, ‘Behold, here I am.’ It is a scene in which man assumes responsibility for his own “here I am.”¹⁹

This agony of decision follows from the non-existence of God. As indicated above, if God does not exist, then there can be no absolute standards or moral guidelines which might give shape to our freedom. In the absence of God and God’s moral law, the individual is thrown back on himself; he is faced with the awful necessity of inventing his own values and of action on the basis of his own evaluation of himself and of the world in which he lives. “Every man ought to say to himself, Am I really the kind of man who has the right to act in such a way that humanity

¹⁹ Glendinning, Simon., *In The Name of Phenomenology*, Routouledge, USA, pp.14, (2007).

might guide itself by my actions?”²⁰ This question must, after all, be answered by the questioner himself and by no one else, and, given the human tendency toward self-deception which is greatly emphasized by Sartre, it is highly likely that this Sartrean version of Kant’s categorical imperative will be used to justify almost any value or action. Recognition of this instability in the human project of valuing, choosing, and acting is the ground of *anguish*, the experience of being left on one’s own, to define for oneself the nature of the good and the right. Existential forlornness is closely related to existential anguish. It is a result of “facing up” to the full consequences of the nonexistence of God.

4.5 Salvation Quest at the Face of Absurdity, *Nausea* and Bad Faith

Already a mystical response, although a negative one, to the Godlessness of the world is present in Sartre’s first and most important novel, *Nausea*. This novel revolves about a primal experience of *nausea* produced by man’s naked encounter with the world, an experience of deep revulsion against the sheer ‘isness’ of the world. What is the expectation of this fallen state when the world is robbed of a centre that takes away the human dimension of meaning? In Sartre’s famous novel *Nausea*, the solitary hero Roquentin stands alone searching for meaning and his own authentic self at a time when ‘God is dead’ and life is nauseating. Antoine Roquentin, the diarist who is the hero or the anti-hero of the novel (and who is at least an unconscious repetition of Dostoevsky’s underground man), has a dread of touching objects, because they are not alive, they are only to be used, not lived among. His first real experience of *nausea* comes when he holds a stone, thus reversing archaic man’s experience of the sacred stone: “Now I see: I recall better what I felt the other day at the seashore when I held a pebble. It was a sort of sweetish sickness. How unpleasant it was! It came from the stone, I’m sure of it; it passed from the stone to my hand. Yes, that’s it, that’s just it a sort of nausea in the hands.”²¹

²⁰ Sartre, J. P., *The Humanism of Existentialism II*, (1946).

Lawrence, E., *From Modernity to Post modernity: An Anthology*, Blackwell publishing, pp.170. (2003).

²¹ Hart, Jeffrey., “Burke and Radical freedom”, *The Review of Politics*, Cambridge University Press, vol. 29, no.2, pp. 221-238, April, (1967).

This nauseating experience prevails. “The nausea is not inside me: I feel it out there in the wall, in the suspenders, everywhere around me. It makes itself one with the café; I am the one who is within it.”²² In this novel, Sartre introduces one of his most important philosophical categories, *de trop* (too much), to characterize human existence in its relation to the world: “But my place is nowhere; I am unwanted, *de trop*.” This experience brings Roquentin not the idea, but the actual feeling, of the absurdity of existence: “And without formulating anything clearly, I understood that I had found the key to existence, the key to my nausea, to my own life.”²³ Roquentin ultimately discovers at least the possibility of a way out of the emptiness that consumes him. He has decided to leave Bouville and return to Paris, and, sitting in a café, he is moved by the sublime melody of a jazz recording. As Sartre emphasizes time and again, the human condition is that of complete freedom: we are our own maker. Through creatively exercising the freedom that man is condemned to, Roquentin can perhaps find a cure for his nausea, the atheistic mystical way that could also lead him to a kind of liberation. Surprisingly, liberty comes out of darkness of ‘hell’ when one creatively re-creates the situation. This is the aestheticized dimension of Sartrean quest for salvation.

The ethical ideal of Sartre’s philosophy is “a freedom which wills itself freedom”, the free choice of the human situation, the recognition of one’s responsibility for oneself and for one’s world. The person who renounces bad faith and who lives in “good faith” fully recognizes and accepts the truth that man is “a being-which-is-not-what-it-is and which-is-what-it-is-not, and which chooses the ideal of being, being-what-it-is-not and not-being-what-it-is.”²⁴ Sartre is not so much concerned with the specific qualities of anguish as with its other face for him, the attainment of “authenticity.” This is the consummation of existence and the basis for all moral judgment. Self-deception tries to bar the way, impelling a man to adopt the mask of some external role or to plead that he is driven by some overwhelming passion, or by fate, or by some other deterministic force. Such special pleading is not only erroneous but also morally culpable.

²² Sartre, J.P., *Nausea*, Gerassi, John., J.P. Sartre: *Hated Conscience of His century*, Vol-I, pp. 119, (1957).

²³ Solomon, c. Robert., *Dark Feelings, Grim Thought: Experience and Reflection in Camus and Sartre*, Oxford University Press, pp.79,(2006).

²⁴ Sartre, J.P., *Being and Nothingness*, trans. Hazel E. Barnes., introduction by Mary, Warnock., New York: Washington Square Press, pp. 627, (1956).

Existential choice is self-conscious choice which we actively determine. With all supports taken away, man still has to courageously recreate his own destiny actively interacting with the adverse surroundings. An escape from one's own responsibility is a kind of cowardice, an act of bad Faith. So this urge for salvation springs from one's own absurd situatedness, that man is a mixture of both God and beast, that he/she is trapped in a situation that he himself or she herself can negate and reject if he or she has courage to say no. William Barrett gives a very good summary of Sartrean atheism: Sartre's atheism states candidly. "... that man is an alien in the universe, unjustified and unjustifiable, absurd in the simple sense that there is no Leibnizian reason sufficient to explain why he or his universe exists."²⁵

Overcoming the bad faith, the man of good faith ultimately restores the religious dimension of life even if "God is dead" and nihilism and nausea is the prevailing order. Man's freedom and authenticity make him or her responsible for what he or she could do with his or her freedom. Authenticity demands the wholehearted acceptance of freedom as the *sine qua non* of a man's own existence and that of mankind. Everything else is permitted, but there is one absolute moral law: that every action be taken in the name of freedom. When the choice is made, or the absurdity of life recognized, or the dread converted, or the responsibility assumed, existence is felt as a value in itself.

In their different ways the existentialists find their reason for existence in both effort and accomplishment. In Sartre's view, the recognition and acceptance of one's freedom and responsibility and of the consequent experiences of anguish, forlornness, and despair is good faith. And the refusal to recognize and accept the reality and consequences of human freedom and responsibility is bad faith or self-deception. The man of good faith will thus take charge of his or her own existence, defining its meaning, value, and direction for himself, and he or she will act courageously and with a "tragic sense of life" would now face the ultimate finitude and contingency of all existence. Good faith, then, is the decision to live on the basis of reality and in light of the fact that God does not exist. Camus uses

²⁵ William Barrett., *The Irrational Man: A Study in Existential Philosophy*, Anchor Book Edition, pp. 239, (1958).

Sisyphus, endlessly pushing his stone up the hill only to have it roll down again, for his example of the hero who recognizes futility and scorns it. Sisyphus is the owner of his days and finds the struggle upward enough to fill his heart. Camus comes sharply to the paradox that underlies his version of existentialist thought: "One must imagine Sisyphus happy."²⁶ Existentialist philosophers like Albert Camus give different portrayals of the absurd situation of life and the existentialist's struggle to accept the absurdness as one of the givens. Camus sees a man arriving, through admission of absurdity, at an affirmation of his own worth. By emptying himself of illusion, by abandoning hope and the quest for ultimate meaning, the absurd man is enabled to realize the peculiar meaning of his very condition. For, if his life is hopeless and meaningless, he is at once liberated and put in a position to exercise his freedom in a revolt against absurdity. He no longer would have it otherwise; he keeps the absurd alive as the context of his individual effort to make sense.

Sartrean man takes recourse to arts and aesthetics, to creative writing and a taste for art and music as some possible avenues for escaping from the *nausea* of inauthenticity and nihilism. Man can creatively reinterpret a situation and restore its concreteness and authenticity. Man is always more to the situation and remains the creative author of his or her own life re-interpreting life, socio-politically, morally, and if one is permitted to say, even religiously.

In this background an attempt is made to comparing the foundations of Western and Eastern philosophical thought in the light of a comparison of the basic tenets of the systems of the traditions of Sartrean Existentialism and some basic ideas of *Sāṅkhya-Yoga Darśana*. Interestingly, Sartrean solution to the problem of how freedom is possible resembles *Sāṅkhya-Yoga* theory of human consciousness to some extent. Sartre makes freedom the essential nature of man. Man for him is necessarily free, because his consciousness is basically a 'nothing.' So, it cannot, because of its very nature, become a 'something', an object, or be determined by

²⁶ Sartre, J. P., *Notebooks for an Ethics*, Trans., Pellauer, David, (1992).

anything, including one's own past, since one's own past is also a something. To become something and to be determined by it seems to be the same for Sartre. Thus, no matter how much one may deceive oneself that one is constrained in his action, he is constrained only because he chose to be constrained. According to Sartre we become aware of our essential freedom in our 'anxiety'. In *Sāṅkhya-Yoga*, too, the 'passive self-awareness' is at its best in moments of stress, when our whole mental life is in a state of shock. Both Sartre and *Sāṅkhya-Yoga* seem to be pointing to the ever self-alienating nature of our consciousness as the basis for the explanation of human freedom, and thus appear as collaborators in contributing something new to the solution of the traditional problem of the freedom of the will. Sartre's solution consists in adding a new kind of entity, viz. the human consciousness, to the entities accepted in the traditional ontologies. Human consciousness is in a way a 'nothing' and yet somehow a something, since it chooses, acts and creates its own 'essence'. Consciousness for Sartre is by nature 'intentional', i.e., it is never without an object. It is itself always a subject and can never become an object. However, it constantly strives to become an object, laboring under the self-deception that it can become the object. *Sāṅkhya-Yoga* makes attempt at showing the path of liberation by a process of dissociation from false identification of consciousness with things and beings. Although the dominant trend in philosophy in the West is basically different from the trend in India in so far as the latter is based on some sort of mysticism or other, the basic differences between the dominant trends in the two traditions are not a bar to comparative studying. The remaining chapters are explorations in this direction.

CHAPTER – 5

Sāñkhya -Yoga: An Introduction

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Chapter 5

Sāṅkhya -Yoga: An Introduction

5.1 *Sāṅkhya -Yoga: An Introduction*

Strictly speaking *Sāṅkhya* and *Yoga* are distinct philosophical systems, two of the six schools (*saddarśana*) of orthodox Hindu philosophy (*Āstika darśana*), having allegiance to the *Vedic* authority. However, a venerable Indian tradition (dating from early in the Common Era, if not before) views them as sister systems, a complementary pair, with *Sāṅkhya* articulating the metaphysics and *Yoga* the practice. *Sāṅkhya-Yoga* are not only in fundamental agreement on most ontological matters, they are also in agreement on the nature of the *summum bonum*.

5.2 The Intimate Relationship between *Sāṅkhya-Yoga* is Explained by Heinrich Zimmer

In Indian philosophy, *Sāṅkhya* (*samyak akhyate*) means, “that which explains the whole.” *Yoga* is the name of one of the six orthodox philosophical schools. The *Yoga* philosophical system is closely allied with the *Sāṅkhya* school. The *Yoga* school as expounded by Patañjali accepts the *Sāṅkhya* psychology and metaphysics, but is more theistic than the, *Sāṅkhya* as evidenced by the addition of a divine entity to the *Sāṅkhya*'s twenty-five elements of reality. The parallels between *Yoga* and *Sāṅkhya* were so close that Max Muller says that “the two philosophies were in popular parlance distinguished from each other as *Sāṅkhya* with and *Sāṅkhya* without a Lord....”¹ According to Zimmer, these two systems are regarded in India as the two aspects of a single discipline. *Sāṅkhya* provides a basic theoretical exposition of human nature, enumerating and defining its elements, analyzing their manner of co-operation in a state of bondage (*bandha*), and describing their state of disentanglement or separation in release (*mokṣa*), while *Yoga* treats specifically of the dynamics of the process for the disentanglement, out outlines practical techniques for the gaining of release, or ‘isolation-integration’

¹ Muller, Chapter 7, *Yoga Philosophy*, pp. 104, (1899).
En.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hindu_philosophy - 82k –accessed on 28/02/08.

(*kaivalya*). For the research purpose it suffices to say that in our research objective of making a comparative study of the two philosophical traditions, the Thesis seeks to highlight some epistemological and metaphysical presuppositions of the system known as *Sāṅkhya-Yoga* taking note of commonalities as well as some differences within these two schools of thought. Accordingly, the Thesis follows the tradition and regards *Sāṅkhya-Yoga* as roughly a single syncretic school that can also accommodate differences into its fold.

5.3 *Sāṅkhya-Yoga*: The Origin

Sāṅkhya is said to be founded by the philosopher Kapila, a legendary figure who might have lived as early as 7th century bc, but the earliest text that we possess date from the 3rd century, and Patañjali is associated with the *Yoga* school. *Sāṅkhya* deals with *prakṛti* (matter) and *puruṣa* (consciousness), *buddhi* or *mahat* (intelligence), *ahankāra* (I-am-ness), three *guṇas* (elements of stability, activity, and lightness), mind (*manas*), cognitive and active senses (*indriyas*), and the five subtle and gross elements (earth, water, fire, air, and space). In light of its breadth, it contains all of the domains of *Vaiśeṣika*, *Nyāya*, and *Mīmāṃsā*. *Yoga darśana* is one of the most ancient *darśanas*. The word ‘*darśana*’ comes from the root ‘*drishyate anena*’, which means, “that through which we can see.” That particular system through which one can see Reality is called *darśana*. *Darśana* is not the same thing as philosophy. Philosophy is a compound word meaning “love for knowledge.” *Darśana* is not a mere love for knowledge. This is one difference between oriental and occidental philosophy: the ultimate goal of *darśana* is to see Reality. Through its supplementary-*Yoga Darśana*, *Sāṅkhya* explores further in this ‘*darśanic*’ insight. Just as we can see our self in the mirror, so also, through *Yoga-darśana*, the *Yoga-Sūtras*, we can see the Self.

The word *Sāṅkhya* passes for a philosophical system known as *Sāṅkhya Darśana* and the root is derived from *Sāṅkhya* that means knowledge, contemplation, examination, discussion, investigation, discrimination etc. The system of Kapila is called *Sāṅkhya* as it is more or less endowed with all these attributes. It is the philosophy of *Sāṅkhya*, i.e. enumeration or analysis of the universe. Sir Monier

Williams calls it by the name of synthetic enumeration. Sir William Jones calls it the Numeral Philosophy. It has been partly compared with the metaphysics of Pythagoras, partly in its *Yoga* with the system of Zeno. Others compare it with that of the philosophy of Bishop Berkeley. Whatever similarity or dissimilarity these schools bear to the basic tenants of *Sāṅkhya darśana*, it is based on the principle of enumeration of the basic facts of reality so that people will understand them and finds liberation.

As we have already seen the term *Sāṅkhya* is derived from the word *Sāṅkhya* which usually means ‘number’. Accordingly the system of knowledge that is said to be originated with Kapila is called *Sāṅkhya* as enumeration plays an important part in it. If *Sāṅkhya* is derived from *Sāṅkhya* or number, it would naturally mean something pertaining to number and it is very natural that in the *Mahābhāṣya* of Patañjali, *Sāṅkhya* has this special connotation.² . The *Sāṅkhya* philosophy gave birth to mathematics. *Sāṅkhya* Philosophy is the very basis of *Yoga* science. In the ‘*Sulabha-Janaka*’ episode of the Mbh. XII. 320, *Sāṅkhya* is mentioned as one of the essential requisites of a sentence and *Sulabha* defines it as the principle, which establishes by proof the defect and merit of a particular aspect in a sentence. In this manner the word *Sāṅkhya* mostly served its purpose in grammatical speculations but it had very little to do with any philosophical enquiry. Amara in his lexicon states that the term *Sāṅkhya* is used in the sense of discussion and investigation.³ Further light is thrown upon the point if we examine the sense of the term *Sāṅkhya* in which *Caraka* uses it in his medical treatise. In the above-mentioned places *Sāṅkhya* means one who is possessed of *Sāṅkhya* i. e., perfect knowledge. But in *Caraka*, the term *Sāṅkhya* stands for the particular system of philosophy. Kautilya in his *Arthasāstra* mentions both *Sāṅkhya* and *Yoga*, and describes these as ‘*anviksakis*’, i.e., the system which tries to establish defects and merits of something by means of reasoning. Patañjali uses the term *prasamkhyāna* in his *Yoga-Sūtra*⁴ in the sense of supreme knowledge. In the *Yoga-Sūtra-Bhāṣya*⁵ also we find the same term used in the same sense. *Yoga: Sāṅkhya-Yoga* is of course

² *Mahābhāṣya*, 2.2.24 under *Vāttika* 8

³ *Amara*, 1.5.2

⁴ *Yoga-Sūtra*, IV.29

⁵ *Yoga-Sūtra-Bhāṣya*, 1,15

actually two systems, often lumped together because they are almost identical. Much of *Sāṅkhya* literature appears to have been lost, and there seems to be no continuity of tradition from ancient times up to the age of the commentators.

Another explanation of its meaning is that the word *Sāṅkhya* comes from *Samyag akhyate*, which literally means that which explains the whole. Apart from denoting ‘number’ the term *Sāṅkhya* is associated with other shades of meaning. Patañjali uses the term ‘*prasamkhyāna*’ in his *Yoga-Sūtra*⁶ in the sense of supreme knowledge. In the *Yoga-Sūtra-bhāṣya*⁷ also we find the same term used in the same sense. *Sāṅkhya* philosophy defines the whole process of understanding that which is real and that which is not real. Here the word Reality is not used as we use it in the external world. According to *Sāṅkhya* philosophy, the Reality is that which is not subject to change, death, and decay. It is true that it has a material reality, but the blackboard itself is not real because its form and name can change at any time. If an object’s form and name can change, it is not Absolute Reality. According to *Sāṅkhya*, Reality, or Truth, is that which exists in all three times—the past, present, and future. In the material world, a man of flesh and bones is real, but in *Sāṅkhya* philosophy, Reality means that which is everlasting, exists in all times, and is not subject to change, death, and decay. The world appears to exist; it appears to be real, but actually it is not because it exists on the existence of something else.

5.4 The laws of Pratitya-Samutpāda

The first point is that Pratitya-Samutpāda applies to all phenomena whatsoever. As Sangharakshita says,

“...when you really think about the principle of Pratitya-Samutpāda in whatever form it is put—when you meditate on it, when you really follow through its implications, you begin to understand the extraordinary impact it has had on the world. Whatever comes into existence on whatever level, does so in dependence on conditions, and in the absence of those conditions, ceases to exist. This is all it says. But if anything is Buddhism, this is Buddhism. What it is saying is that, from

⁶ *Yoga-Sūtra*, IV.29

⁷ *Yoga-Sūtra-Bhāṣya*, 1,15

the viewpoint of the enlightened mind, the outstanding feature of all phenomena, whether physical or psychological, is that they are conditioned. The unceasing flux of things, both material events and states of mind, is a process of interdependent stages, each of which comes about through the presence of conditions and, in its turn, conditions the stages succeeding it. Rainfall, sunshine, and the nourishing earth are the conditions from which arises the oak tree, whose fallen leaves rot and form the rich humus from which the bluebell grows. A jealous attachment will have consequences which may lead to murder. Nothing phenomenal is spontaneously produced without preceding conditions, or it-self fails to have consequences. And it is the process of becoming aware of this law of conditionality that gradually liberates us from all conditions, leading to the freely functioning, spontaneous creativity of Enlightenment.” (Sangharakshita, ‘*What is the Dharma*’)

This means that the implications of Pratitya-Samutpāda can be confidently applied in any situation, in that all phenomena fall under its sweep and contingent. Sartrean existentialism is another disclosure of this kind of contingency.

5.5 Speculations About an Older Version of ‘Early *Sāṅkhya*’

Kapila, the reputed author of this philosophy, was probably a Brahmin, though nothing is known about him. Kapila is the supposed author of two works- the original *Sāṅkhya-Sūtras* called *Sāṅkhya Pravachan* and a shorter work called *Tatvsmas*. The Chinese source tells us that there were eighteen *Sāṅkhya* schools, the authority for this statement being in the last resort the learned Paramārtha, who lived in the sixth century A.D. and whose testimony cannot be lightly rejected in so far as it concerns the beliefs and traditions of his own day. The *Bhāṣya* on *Yoga-Sūtras* of Patañjali, mentions eight different theories on the supremely important point of the reason for the union between ‘*puruṣa*’ and ‘*prakṛti*’, the fourth being that of the *Sāṅkhya-Kārikā*. (Described as *Śruti*), and Vācaspati Misra adds that all the eight alternatives are taken from treatises on *Sāṅkhya*. Further we know the names of the two most important schools, those of Pancasikha and Varsaganya, which will be discussed hereafter.

The first fruit of the inquiry was embodied in a paper, published in JRAS, pp.855-878.,1930 on the numerical riddle in *Svetāsvatara Upaniṣad*, I, 4 and 5. E. H. Johnston remarked that he set out the evidence for holding that one early and important school of *Sāṅkhya* divided the twenty-four physical⁸ *tattvas* into two groups of eight primary constitutes, *prakṛti*, and sixteen secondary ones, *Vikāra*, and that the *tanmātra* group was a later invention, barely preceding Īśvarakṛṣṇa's work, its place in all early formulations being taken by the group of five great elements, *Mahābhutas*, while the object of the senses appear instead of the gross elements. Through these findings did not go very far in themselves and had been partly indicated by others, they at least showed that the problem of what really constituted early *Sāṅkhya* still awaited solution.

5.6 *Sāṅkhya* Ideas in the *Upaniṣads*: and Other Sources

The *Sāṅkhya* philosophy together with *Yoga*, *Nyāya*, *Vaiśeṣika*, *Mīmāṃsā* and *Vedānta* nominally accepts *Veda* as its guide. *Sāṅkhya* is a system based upon two distinct principles: *prakṛti* and *puruṣa*, and the germ of this dualistic tendency can be traced even in the monistic speculations of the ancient prose *Upaniṣads*. The first references to *Sāṅkhya*-*Yoga* terminology appear in the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad*, roughly 4th century B.C. According to Johnston, this “middle” *Upaniṣad* influences both the *Svetāsvatara Upaniṣad* and the *Bhāgavad Gitā*. A tradition of *Sāṅkhya*-*Yoga* is clearly reflected in these texts. In the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* we find the idea of the food and the eater of the food and further it is the *puruṣa* who is mentioned there as the eater of the food. *Sāṅkhya* also treats *prakṛti* to be the enjoyed (*bhogyā*) and the *puruṣa* to be the enjoyer (*bhoktā*) and this idea of the ‘enjoyer and the enjoyed’ has got a clear resemblance with the idea of the food and the eater of the food as mentioned above.

The *guṇa* theory is another distinct achievement of *Sāṅkhya* and most probably *Sāṅkhya* adopted the idea from the tripartite scheme of the *Ch.Up.*(VI. 4). The said

⁸ E. H. Johnston used the word “physical”, inadequate as it is, throughout his essay to designate *prakṛti* and its twenty-three evolutes, as opposed to “soul”.

Upaniṣad boldly declares: The red colour of the fire is the colour of brilliance, its white colour is the colour of water and its black colour is the colour of the food. The fire loses its heat and brightness, the modification is but a name, and the three colours are real. So also is the case with the *vāyu*, *āditya* and the like. The advocates of *Sāṅkhya* also explain the universe by *prakṛti*, which is said to have the three *guṇas* as its constituents, and all the objects other than the self are only particular formulations of the *guṇas* and hence in reality are not different from them. A verse of the *Sasti Tantra* states that the real form of the *guṇas* does not come within the range of vision, what does come within visual range is altogether insignificant like illusion. Again, it is interesting to observe that the terms *lohita* and *sukla* in Ch. Up. also find their place in the verse etc. of the *Svet. Up.* (IV. 5) where *aja* stands for the unborn *prakṛti* and the three colours most probably refer to the three *guṇas*: redness (*lohita*) taken to be the symbol of *rajas*, whiteness (*sukla*) to be that of *sattva* and blackness (*kr̥ṣṇa*) to be that of *tamas*. The term *guṇa* is explicitly mentioned for the first time in the *Svet. Up.*, and in one place it even mentions the term *triguṇa* (V. 7). In the *Upaniṣad* like *Kaṭha*, *Svetāsvatara*, *Sāṅkhya* is closer to common sense realism.

From the *Mahābhārata* we get that there is no knowledge that is equal to this knowledge, which is described in the system of the *Sāṅkhya*, and that this is the best of all its kinds. The *Bhāgavad Gītā*, not only presents a detailed discussion of early *Sāṅkhya* theories, but also structures its characters and plots to reflect those models. Some sections of the *Gītā* emphasize the indispensability of knowledge, that is derived from a meaningful correlation between the ‘field’ (*khetra*) and ‘knower of the field’ (*khetrajña*), the terms ‘used as synonyms for *prakṛti* and *puruṣa* respectively. The Buddhist poet Asaghosa, in his *Buddhacaritam* (Life of the Buddha) (first to second century), treats *Sāṅkhya* thought as one of the formative teachings studied by the Buddha on his way to enlightenment, suggesting that by Asvaghosa’s time there already existed a developed *Sāṅkhya* tradition considered ancient and influential even by its opponents.

5.7 Origin and Development of *Sāṅkhya* - *Yoga*: Some Scholarly Observations

Richard Garbe⁹, one of the editors and translators of some key *Sāṅkhya* texts and a reputed *Sāṅkhya* scholar, says that *Sāṅkhya* is one of the oldest philosophies of the Indian tradition. To support of this claim, Garbe cites the well-known reference in Kautilya's *Arthasāstra* to the three systems of "philosophy" or "science" (*ānvikṣiki*) current at that time: *Sāṅkhya*, *Yoga*, and *Lokāyata* (materialism)¹⁰. Garbe accepts the dating of the *Arthasāstra* to be around 300 B.C.¹¹ There are several striking similarities between *Sāṅkhya* and Buddhism which seem to argue for the influence of one upon the other. Moreover, these similarities suggest, according to Garbe, for the priority of *Sāṅkhya* to Buddhism.¹² Briefly, these similarities are as follows:

- (a) Organizing notions in "pedantic enumerations" showing a "peculiar scholastic method;"
- (b) "Life is a life of pain;"
- (c) Reaction against the *Vedic* sacrifices;
- (d) Common rejection of self-torture;
- (e) Emphasis on "becoming and change;"
- (f) Similarity of *kaivalya* and *nirvāna*;
- (g) Similarity regarding stages of acquiescence.

In each one of these similarities, says Garbe, the Buddhist doctrine is more radical and probably represents a further elaboration of the original *Sāṅkhya* notion. Garbe next discusses the problem of the historical development of the *Sāṅkhya*. Garbe documents his interpretation mainly from the *Sāṅkhyapravacanaūtra* with special reference to the commentaries of Aniruddha and Vijñānabhikṣu. Relatively little attention is given to the *Sāṅkhya-Kārikā* and its commentaries.

Garbe devotes a whole chapter in *Die Samkhya Philosophie* to comparing *Sāṅkhya* with various forms of classical Western philosophy (e.g., Pythagoreanism,

⁹ Larson, J. Gerald., *Classical Sāṅkhya*, Motilal Banarasidass, Delhi, pp.15-22, (1979).

¹⁰ Garbe, *Die Sāṅkhya Philosophie*, pp.4. The question of the dating of the *Arthasāstra* as well as the meaning of the reference to *ānvikṣiki* has been much disputed. For a recent discussion of these issues, see Paul Hacker, "ānvikṣiki" WZKSO, Band II, pp.54-83, (1958).

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Ibid., pp.v-xiv., 1958.

Platonism, Neo-Platonism, etc.). Of course, Garbe is neither the first nor the last scholar to attempt such comparisons, and in some sense such an attempt is valuable and important. There are elements in the *Sāṅkhya* which become clearer by means of a comparison with certain Western notions. Larson observes: “However, Garbe overlooks the religious dimension of the *Sāṅkhya* and emphasizes only its rationalism. His emphasis on *Sāṅkhya* as atheism, rationalism and a naturalism, which should appeal to every natural scientist, seems to overlook some other dimensions of the *Sāṅkhya darśana*.”¹³

Yet another view regarding the origin of the *Sāṅkhya* comes from the work of the Jesuit scholar, Joseph Dahlmann. His *Die Sāṅkhya Philosophie als Naturelehre und Erlösungslehre*, published in 1902, sets for the argument that the original form of the *Sāṅkhya* is available in the philosophical portions of the *Mahābhārata*. The epic *Sāṅkhya* says Dahlmann, both in its form and expression is identical with the classical *Sāṅkhya* (of the *Kārikā*) with one or two exceptions. According to Dahlmann, the original *Sāṅkhya* was the theistic or absolutistic *Sāṅkhya-Yoga* as found in some passages of the *Mahābhārata*. Only later did an atheistic *Sāṅkhya* appear which asserted the notion of a plurality of souls. It was also at a later time that a separation occurred between *Sāṅkhya* and *Yoga*. Originally the two were one system. This point has great significance for the present work as the Thesis seeks to highlight the two trends in the development of *Sāṅkhya-Yoga* philosophy in which the atheistic trend is more powerful than the theistic part of *Yoga*.

In interpreting the significance of the *Sāṅkhya*, Oltramare focuses his discussion around his view of the nature of the *Sāṅkhya* dualism. He suggests that there are two basic hypotheses in the *Sāṅkhya* conception. First of all, there is the ontological notion of becoming. Cosmologically, physiologically and psychologically, everything is in a state of change or becoming. This is the basic meaning of *prakṛti*, the *guṇas*, the process of emergence, transmigration, etc. This

¹³ Larson, Gerald. James., *Classical Sāṅkhya: An interpretation of Its History and Meaning*, Īśvarakṛṣṇa Book, Ross/Erikson, January, (1979).

continuing process is not an illusion or a product of the imagination; it is quite real. On the other hand, however, the *Sāṅkhya* affirms another principle which is basically teleological, and which is simple, eternal and stable. This second principle is simply the fact of pure being in the deepest selfhood of a creature, the fact for which all becoming takes place, and the fact by which all becoming is intelligible. In other words, the *Sāṅkhya* dualism, according to Oltramare, centres around Becoming (le Devenir) and Being (l'Être), around change and permanence, or around an ontological and a teleological principle.

Finally, Oltramare interprets the atheism of the *Sāṅkhya* as referring to a high God or Omniscient Deity. There is no place for an all-encompassing God in the dualism of Being and Becoming. Oltramare then adds, however, that the *Sāṅkhya* does not deny individual gods. Frequent references are made in the texts, says Oltramare, to various well-known Indian gods but they are all included in the notion of Becoming. A careful discussion of the origin and development of the *Sāṅkhya* is to be found in the work of A. Berriedale Keith. In the history of scholarship concerning of the *Sāṅkhya*, Keith's contribution continues to have influence, even in recent studies. With respect to the origin of the *Sāṅkhya*, says Keith, it is quite unnecessary to look outside the orthodox *Vedic* framework. The *Sāṅkhya* system is most naturally derived out of the speculations in the *Vedas*, *Brahmanas* and *Upaniṣads*.

A truly unique and refreshing interpretation of the origin of the *Sāṅkhya* is to be found in the work of Franklin Edgerton. All of Indian thought, begins Edgerton, is “practical in its motive.” If it seeks truth, it is not for the sake of the truth as an abstract end in itself; it is for the sake of the salvation which that truth is believed to bring with it. In ancient Indian thought, Edgerton continues, several different ways or methods of salvation were developed. He points to *Bhāgavad Gitā* in which some of these methods or ways are summarized. “Here are mentioned salvation by (1) “disciplined activity;” (2) “knowledge;” (3) “asceticism;” (4) “ritual;” (5) “devotion.” Of these various methods of salvation, *Sāṅkhya* is nothing more or less than “salvation by knowing.” In the ancient texts, says Edgerton, there simply is no *Sāṅkhya* system.

Edgerton also points out that the *Sāṅkhya* passages in the ancient texts frequently accept the *Upaniṣadic* doctrine of the Self or Absolute. Thus, the only characteristic of *Sāṅkhya*, which can be found in the ancient texts, is that it was the method of salvation by knowing. Similarly, the *Yoga* in the ancient texts is simply the method of salvation by “doing” or “discipline.” Moreover, *Sāṅkhya* does not mean more than a method of salvation by knowing until the time of the *Sāṅkhya-Kārikā* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa. It was only after the formulation of the system of the *Kārikās*, and precisely as a result thereof that the name *Sāṅkhya* came to be associated exclusively with the doctrines of plurality of souls and no world soul. Only then did the *Sāṅkhya* become associated with a particular system of thought.

One of the most penetrating analyses of the origins and significance of the *Sāṅkhya* is that of the well-known Indian historian of thought, Surendranath Dasgupta. His view of the relationship of *Sāṅkhya* and *Yoga* is quite clearly manifest in his title to Chapter VII: “The Kapila and the Patañjali’s *Sāṅkhya*.” With respect to the origins of the *Sāṅkhya* one can summarize Dasgupta’s view under several basic points:

- 1) The major ideas and terms of the *Sāṅkhya* clearly come from the *Vedic-Upaniṣadic* heritage.
- 2) There were probably many schools of *Sāṅkhya* in the period between the end of the oldest *Upaniṣads* and the composition of the ‘middle’ *Upaniṣads*. Dasgupta points to a reference in Gunaratna’s commentary to *Saddarśanasamuccaya* which mentions at least two ancient *Sāṅkhya* schools: (a) the *Maulikya* (original) and (b) the *Uttara* (later).
- 3) An older school of *Sāṅkhya* can be seen in the *Caraka Saṅhita* and in the doctrines of Pancasikha in *Mahābhārata*. This school accepted only twenty-four principles. It included *puruṣa* within the *avyakta* or *prakṛti*. It had no theory of the *guṇas*, and the ultimate salvation state was a kind of unconscious annihilation.
- 4) The *Sāṅkhya* was probably theistic originally. Dasgupta cites here the content of *Sastitantra*, which is purported to be an old *Sāṅkhya* textbook (but now lost), as described in the *Ahīrbudhnya Saṅhita*. In the description, says Dasgupta, it is obvious that the *Sāṅkhya* is theistic. Dasgupta concludes, then, that the *Sāṅkhya* went through three stages:

- 5) Theistic stage as seen in the *Sastitantra*.
- 6) An atheistic stage as seen in the *Sāṅkhya* school of Caraka and Pancasikha.
- 7) Final atheistic stage as seen in Īśvarakṛṣṇa's *Sāṅkhya-Kārikā*.
Vijñānabhikṣu, the commentator to the late *Sāṅkhyapravacanasūtra*, offers the most satisfactory explanations of key *Sāṅkhya* doctrines. Resorting to Vijñānabhikṣu's discussion can only clear up many difficult points of interpretation. Generally, Dasgupta follows this commentator in his own exposition of the *Sāṅkhya*.

Among Marxist interpreters of Indian thought,¹⁴ the most interesting and sustained treatment of the history and meaning of *Sāṅkhya* philosophy are to be found in the work of Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya. His basic position regarding the interpretation of *Sāṅkhya* was first set forth in his important book, *Lokāyata: A Study in Ancient Indian Materialism* (first edition 1959), and he has more or less reiterated his basic views in his subsequent books, including *Indian Philosophy* (first edition, 1964), and *Indian Atheism: A Marxist Analysis* (first edition, 1969), and most recently, *What Is Living and What Is Dead in Indian Philosophy* (first edition, 1976). Two basic lines of argument are apparent in Chattopadhyaya's treatment of *Sāṅkhya* and can be used for purposes of providing a brief summary of his perspective. First, Chattopadhyaya argues that the form of *Sāṅkhya* found in Īśvarakṛṣṇa's *Sāṅkhya-Kārikā* is neither the oldest form of the doctrine nor a very consistent form of the *Sāṅkhya* position. Īśvarakṛṣṇa's *Sāṅkhya* system is a syncretistic product of an older materialist philosophy derived from *pre-Vedic* or *non-Vedic* sources together with *Vedānta* notions about the *puruṣa* or consciousness taken over from the idealistic *Upaniṣads*. Second, Chattopadhyaya argues that the most important notion in the *Sāṅkhya* is *prakṛti*. The root of the *Sāṅkhya* philosophy is not to be found in the *Vedas*. It must be sought elsewhere, obviously in the *non-Vedic* matriarchal tradition of India. The conception of a matriarchal *prakṛti* which developed in the early agricultural matriarchies of India evolved from the conception of a material earth mother who is supposed to represent the forces that stimulate the generative powers of nature. Magical fertility rites, originally performed by woman to ensure the process of nature, were inevitably associated with such a conception of a material earth mother. These

¹⁴ Including D.D. Kosambi., W. Ruben., N.P. Anikeev. and others

rites, surviving through the ages in popular beliefs and customs, were conserved and crystallized in the *Tantras*, while the more rational speculations centering round the conception of a material earth mother later developed into a distinct metaphysical form, the *Sāṅkhya* system. The notion of *prakṛti* is feminine, and a tradition like the *Sāṅkhya*, which affords such a primary role to the notion of *prakṛti*, probably reflects an ancient agricultural-matriarchal social reality different from the Indo-Aryan pastoral-patriarchal context. Similarly Chattopadhyaya continues, such an agricultural-matriarchal tradition of mother-right is undoubtedly the context from which arise many of India's archaic fertility rites, traditions of ancient magic, forms of proto-materialism and the *Indian Tantra* in all of its varieties. Thirdly, According to Chattopadhyaya's interpretations of the *Sāṅkhya Darśana* and its origin, *Sāṅkhya* probably arose in self-conscious resistance to the Brahmanical idealism of certain *Upaniṣads*, and it was only later that thinkers like Īśvarakṛṣṇa attempted to synthesize this order *Sāṅkhya* materialism with speculations about a detached self or consciousness. The synthesis worked out in classical times, Chattopadhyaya concludes, was a complete failure, but the older *Sāṅkhya* materialism with its theory of *satkārya*, *guṇaparinama* and *tattva-vikāra* is one of ancient Indian's most remarkable contributions to the history of science and the philosophy of materialism.

K.C. Bhattacharya's essays entitled "Studies in *Sāṅkhya* Philosophy." Bhattacharya states that the interpretation of *Sāṅkhya* is not really an historical task but, rather, a constructive philosophical problem. According to Bhattacharya, *Sāṅkhya* philosophy derives from "spiritual reflection" on pain and suffering. *Sāṅkhya* may thus be said to present a religion of reflective spontaneity or spiritual naturalness. Its metaphysics springs from this religion.

Most Indian historians of thought (Radhakrishnan, Chandradhar Sharma, etc.) offer only very general summaries of the doctrines of *Sāṅkhya* followed by a criticism of the system from the point of view of *Advaita Vedānta*. In addition there are some Western studies which emphasize only a particular aspect of *Sāṅkhya* such as Riepe's *The Naturalistic Tradition in Indian Thought* (emphasizing the relationship of *Sāṅkhya* to philosophic naturalism) and Potter's "Presuppositions of Indian Philosophies" (logic and epistemology in *Sāṅkhya* and other systems). Over

against these quite general treatments there are, of course, numerous articles and studies concerning special problems in the *Sāṅkhya* texts and tradition.

Orthodox *Sāṅkhya* begins with Īśvarakṛṣṇa's *Sāṅkhya-Kārikā*, which synthesized centuries of conflicting *Sāṅkhya* speculation. Its seventy verses (although the number varies in different commentaries) concisely present the models, terminology, arguments and systematic configurations that were to be definitive for *Sāṅkhya* from that time on. Virtually every subsequent *Sāṅkhya* text is a commentary on either the *Sāṅkhya-Kārikā* or the *Sāṅkhya-Sūtra* (about fifteenth century). The latter it is considered to be an expanded, reorganized version of the *Sāṅkhya-Kārikā*. Most of the subsequent *Sāṅkhya* literature consists of commentaries and expositions of the *Sāṅkhya-Kārikā* and its ideas, which continued to be refined without minor alterations well into the eighteenth century. No distinct *Sāṅkhya* text prior to Īśvarakṛṣṇa's *Sāṅkhya-Kārikā* is existent. There are three different periods of *Sāṅkhya-Darśana*'s systematic expositions although its first systematic version is Īśvarakṛṣṇa's *Sāṅkhya-Kārikā* in 360-450 CE. The *Sāṅkhya-Kārikā* refers to an earlier exposition, now lost, known as Science of Sixty Topics (*Sastitantra*).

Sāṅkhya models strongly influenced numerous other Indian schools, including *Yoga*, *Vedānta*, *Kashmir Saivism* and *Buddhism*. The many dozens of commentaries written over the centuries reflect the changing concerns and growing sophistication of Indian thought. While some of the commentaries display clever strategies and great erudition, and minor points are continually being re-defined and reinterpreted, the basic parameters set by Īśvarakṛṣṇa are scrupulously followed. The same stock of arguments and examples invariably appear century after century in every commentary (Mainkar 1964; Raja 1963) sometimes with embellishments but there are no truly creative innovations to the system itself. *Sāṅkhya-Kārikā* was translated into Chinese between 557 and 569 CE. The Chinese source tell us that there were eighteen *Sāṅkhya* schools, the authority for this statement being in the last resort the learned Paramārtha, who lived in the sixth century A.D. and whose testimony cannot be lightly rejected in so far as it concerns the beliefs and traditions of his own day. Further we know the names of the two most important schools, those of Pancasikha and Varsaganya. *The Bhāṣya*

on *Yogasūtras* of Patañjali mentions eight different theories on the supremely important point of the reason for the union between *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*, the fourth being that of the *Sāṅkhya-Kārikā* (described as *Srūt*), and Vācaspati Misra adds that all the eight alternatives are taken from treaties on *Sāṅkhya*. Vācaspati Misra's commentary, *Yukti Dipika*, the 'Light of Argumentation' is another authentic and scholarly treatise.

Īśvarakṛṣṇa's *Sāṅkhya-Kārikā* opts for fundamental dualism of '*Saksi puruṣa*' and active and dynamic *prakṛti* although the later trend is toward monistic mysticism. It enumerates and explains the twenty-five components and a subsidiary list of sixty topics, which are then subdivided into further enumerative lists. The earlier commentaries endeavour to deploy the latest developments in Indian epistemology and argumentative discourse to defend the statements of the *Sāṅkhya-Kārikā* from actual and possible objections. The later commentaries make increasing concessions to non-*Sāṅkhya* ideologies, often to the point of subverting or reversing the point of distinctive *Sāṅkhya* teaching while attempting to retain the terminology and basic structure established by Īśvarakṛṣṇa. While orthodox *Sāṅkhya* claimed individuals possessed their own distinct *puruṣa*, later commentators sought to ground this multiplicity of selves in a universal single self. Orthodox *Sāṅkhya* denied the existence of God, or encouraged their readers to reject *Sāṅkhya*'s atheistic claims. *Sāṅkhya* is most famous in Indian philosophy for its atheism, its dualistic model of *puruṣa* (passive, individual conscious) and *prakṛti* (non-conscious, cognitive-sentient body) and its theory that effects pre-exist in their cause. In its classical formulation the *puruṣa-prakṛti* model is analyzed into twenty five components (*tattva*) intended encompass entire metaphysical, cognitive, psychological, ethical and physical worlds in terms of their embodiment as individual constituents and the creative and interpretive projection of those worlds as experience by and for individuals. Both the world and the individual, in other words, are considered a phenomenological refraction and projection of the underlying and constitutive components of the conscious body.

5. 8 Introduction of *Yoga* Philosophy:

In Indian philosophy, *Yoga* is the name of one of the six orthodox philosophical schools. *Yoga* philosophical system is closely allied with the *Sāṅkhya* school. The term *Yoga* generally means “restraint,” “discipline,” and “meditational technique.” In these senses, it constitutes an aspect of almost all Indian religious systems (including Jainism and Buddhism), not a particular system. As a specific religious system within Hinduism, *Yoga* was, for a long time, an adjunct of the older *Sāṅkhya* system. The theoretical part of *Yoga*, i.e. its philosophy, was derived almost entirely from *Sāṅkhya*. Later, *Yoga* was restated in the *Yoga-Sūtras* of Patañjali, and was eventually recognized as a distinct *darśana* (one of the six systems of Hindu religious thought). Like *Sāṅkhya* and the other *darśanas*, classical *Yoga* is a system of liberation (*mokṣa*).

5.8.1 Etymological Meaning of *Yoga*

The *Sanskṛt* term *Yoga* has a wide range of different meanings. It is derived from the *Sanskṛt* root yuk, “to control”, “to yoke”, or “to unite”. Common meanings include “joining” or “uniting”, and related ideas such as “union” and “conjunction”. Another conceptual definition is that of “mode, manner, means” or “expedient, means in general”. The *Sanskṛt* term *Yoga* has a wide range of different meanings. *Yoga* is a group of ancient spiritual practices originating in India. As a general it has been defined as referring to techniques or disciplines of asceticism and meditation, which are thought to lead spiritual experience and profound understanding or insight into the nature of existence. Outside India, *Yoga* has become primarily associated with the practice of meditative postures or *āsanas*.

Some definitions of the *Sanskṛt* word *Yoga* which is now found also in English dictionaries.

a) *Yoga* (with a capital *Y*) means (normally) the philosophy of the *Yoga-Sūtra* and its classical commentaries: each of us is a transcendent Person who mistakenly

identifies with body and mind and whom *Yogic* practices help realize his/her true identity and consciousness.

b) *Yoga* (with a small *y*), from Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary: a system of exercises for attaining bodily or mental control and well-being.

c) *Yoga*, according to YS 1.2: *citta-vṛtti-nirodha*, "suppression of the fluctuations (or happenings) of mental and emotional cognition"

d) *Yoga*, according to the *Gītā*: (a) equanimity, balance; (b) skill in works; (c) self-discipline

e) *Yoga*, in the *Veda*: joining, yoking (a cognate English word).

f) *Yoga* in many places in the "Great Indian Epic": discipline, self-discipline.

g) From Iyengar's YS translation (p. 46): "*Yoga* is . . . the art and science of mental discipline through which the mind becomes cultured and matured."

h) From Iyengar's *Tree of Yoga* (p. 3): "*Yoga* means union. The union of the individual soul with the universal spirit is *yoga*."

i) From Aurobindo's *Synthesis of Yoga* (p. 2): ". . . we mean by this term (*Yoga*) a methodized effort towards self-perfection by the expression of the potentialities latent in the being and a union of the human individual with the universal and transcendent Existence we see partially expressed in man and the cosmos."

5. 8. 2 *Yoga Sūtras* of Patañjali: *Yoga Citta-Vṛtti-Nirodha*

Patañjali was a great sage who systematized and organized the study and teachings of *Yoga*. Patañjali's *Yoga-Sūtra* (YS) is an incredibly difficult text to penetrate. Consisting exclusively of pithy aphorisms (195 to be exact), many of which are no more than a few words in length, the YS lends itself to a wide range of interpretations. Not surprisingly, there is little consensus in either the religious community or in the scholarly community regarding the correct interpretation of the text. *Yoga* is a group of ancient spiritual practices originating in India. As a

general term in Hinduism, it has been defined as referring to technologies or disciplines of asceticism and meditation which are thought to lead spiritual experience and profound understanding or insight into the nature of existence. Outside India, *Yoga* has become primarily associated with the practice of *āsanas* (postures), *Hatha-Yoga*, although it has influenced the entire *dhārmic* religions family and other spiritual practices throughout the world.

This terse definition hinges on the meaning of three Sanskrit terms. I. K. Taimni translates it as “*Yoga* is the inhibition (*nirodha*) of the modifications (*vṛtti*) of the mind (*citta*)”. Swami Vivekananda translates the sutra as “*Yoga* is restraining the mind-stuff (*Citta*) from taking various forms (*Vṛttis*).”Gavin Flood translates the sutra as “*yoga* is the cessation of mental fluctuations”.

Patañjali’s writing also became the basis for a system referred to it as “*Aṣṭāṅga Yoga*” (Eight-Limbed *Yoga*). This eight-limbed concept derived from the 29th *Sūtra* of the 2nd book became a feature of *Raja Yoga*, and is a core characteristic of practically every *Raja-Yoga* variation taught today. The Eight Limbs of *Yoga* practice are:

- (1) *Yama* (The five “abstentions”): violence, lying, theft, (illicit) sex, and possessions
- (2) *Niyama* (The five “observances”): purity, contentment, austerities, study, and surrender to God
- (3) *Āsana*: Literally means ‘seat’, and in Patañjali’s *Sūtras* refers to seated positions used for meditation. Later, with the rise of *Hatha Yoga*, *āsana* came to refer to all the “postures”
- (4) *Prāṇāyāma* (Life Force Control): Control of *prāna*, life force, or vital energy, particularly, the breath
- (5) *Pratyahāra* (Abstraction): Reversal of the sense organs
- (6) *Dhāraṇā* (Concentration): Fixing the attention on a single object
- (7) *Dhyāna* (Meditation): Intense contemplation of the nature of the object of meditation
- (8) *Samādhi* (Liberation): merging consciousness with the object of meditation

Patañjali's *Yoga* is known as *Rāja-Yoga*, which is a system for control of the mind. Patañjali defines the word *Yoga* in his second *Sūtra*, which is the definitional *Sūtra* for his entire work. Patañjali defines *Yoga* as *chitta vṛtti narodha*-*Yoga* is the control of the 'modifications' of the mind.

5.8.3 Yoga in Other Traditions

Yoga and Buddhism

Yoga is intimately connected to the religious beliefs and practices of the *dhārmic* religions. The influence of *Yoga* is also visible in Buddhism, which is distinguished by its austerities, spiritual exercises, and trance states.

Yogacāra Buddhism

Yogacāra (Sanskṛt: "Practice of *Yoga* (Union)"), also spelled *yogāchāra*, is a school of philosophy and psychology that developed in India during the 4th to 5th centuries. *Yogacāra* received the name as it provided *Yoga*, a framework for engaging in the practices that lead to the path of the Bodhisattva. The *Yogacāra* sect teaches *Yoga* in order to reach enlightenment.

Zen (Ch'an) Buddhism

Zen (the name of which derives from the Sanskṛt "dhyān" via the Chinese "ch'an") is a form of *Mahāyāna* Buddhism. The *Mahāyāna* school of Buddhism is noted for its proximity with *Yoga*. In the west, Zen is often set alongside *Yoga*; the two schools of meditation display obvious family resemblances. This phenomenon merits special attention since the Zen Buddhist school of meditation has some of its roots in *Yogic* practices. Certain essential elements of *Yoga* are important both for Buddhism in general and for Zen in particular.

Tibetan Buddhism

Yoga is central to Tibetan Buddhism. In the Nyingma tradition, practitioners progress to increasingly profound levels of *Yoga*, starting with *Mahā-Yoga*, continuing to *Anu-Yoga* and ultimately undertaking the highest practice, *Ati-Yoga*.

In the Sarma traditions, the *Anuttara-Yoga* class is equivalent. Other *tantra-Yoga* practices include a system of 108 bodily postures practiced with breath and heart rhythm. Timing in movement exercises is known as *Trul khol* or union of moon and sun (channel) *prajñā* energies. The body postures of Tibetan ancient *Yogis* are depicted on the walls of the Dalai Lama's summer temple of Lukhang.

5. 8. 4 Yoga and Tantra

Tantrism, is a practice that is supposed to alter the relation of the individual practitioner of *tantrism* to the ordinary social, religious, and logical reality in which he or she lives. Through *tantric* practice an individual perceives reality as *māya*, illusion, and the individual achieves liberation from it. This particular path to salvation among the several offered by Hinduism, links *tantrism* to those *dhārmic* practices such as *Yoga*, meditation, and social renunciation, which are based on temporary or permanent withdrawal from social relationships and modes. During *tantric* practices and studies, the student is instructed further in meditation technique, particularly *chakra* meditation. This is often in a limited form in comparison with the way this kind of meditation is known and used by *tantric* practitioners and *Yogis* elsewhere, but is more elaborate than the initiate's previous meditation. It is considered to be a kind of *Kundalini-Yoga* for the purpose of moving the Goddess into the *chakra* located in the "heart," for meditation and worship.

5. 8. 5 Schools of Yoga

The views of the *Yoga* reveals in *Bhāgavad Gitā* is perhaps due to the way in which it is presented, with various aspects of *Yoga* being treated almost as separate types of *Yoga*. They are *Karma-Yoga*, *Dhyān-Yoga*, *Jñān-Yoga* and *Bhakti-Yoga*.

Karm-Yoga is the path of action. The *Bhāgavad Gitā* discusses it mainly in the third chapter. The problem lie because there are always some puzzles what type of action one should perform, how it should be performed and what are the motivations for doing this work. One's selfish desire (*kāma*) or anger (*crodha*) leads to evil

and make one man blind so that he cannot see the right things and can only act foolishly and it is not possible to maintain a spiritual path by abstaining from active participation in life and another thing is that man's action is that which man shares with the divine. So, persons should do their works without attachment, whatever is correct under the circumstances. When a man acts selflessly and altruistically his works do not bind him and he will find release from the world of action.

Dhyān-Yoga is the path of meditation. In other words, *Dhyāna-Yoga* or the path of meditation can be pursued while man is engaged in a worldly life, provided he also practises *Karma-Yoga* or the path of renunciation of the personal fruits of actions. In this way the lower self of man becomes ruled by his higher self and this personality becomes harmonised and integrated. His meditational efforts will then be crowned with success.

Jñāna-Yoga is the path of knowledge. Whereas *Karma-Yoga* usually involves *bhukti*, enjoying worldly pleasure, *Jñāna-Yoga* promotes knowledge through seclusion, study, and sense abnegation. Activities and the necessities of life are minimised. Since the pursuit of wisdom and realization is not simply an academic exercise, much emphasis is placed on becoming free from the sensual desires that delude the soul. *Jñāna* is sometimes considered the antithesis of karma. *jñāna-yogis* negate the world and usually aim at liberation. There are four basic requirements in the *Jñāna-Yoga* discipline in which the *Yogi* has to train himself. They are *viveka* (discrimination), *vairāgya*(dispassionateness), *Satsampatti* (six attainments) and finally *Mumuksatva* (longing for liberation).In *viveka* one has to develop and cultivate the ability to recognize what is impermanent and temporary in life as he experiences it. In this way he have to scrutinize, analysis and evaluate constantly his experiences, decisions, actions and inclinations. In *Vairāgya* guard his or her mind against everything which may make him or her morally weak. In *Satsampatti*, it contains a programmed of self-education for success on the *Yoga* path covering six points: *Sāma* or the cultivation of tranquility of the mind, *Dāma* or self-control in acting, *Uparati* or eradicating the eagerness to possess, *Titiksā* or patience, *Sraddhā* or confidence, also meaning sincerity and finally *Samādhāna* or

intentness of the mind. *Mumuksatva* is the last requirement is very important. The aspirant must develop a positive longing for liberation.

5. 8. 6 *Bhakti-Yoga*

Bhakti (devotion) appears to be the path most recommended in the *Gītā*. Kṛṣṇa says that at the beginning, *Bhakti-Yoga* appears simple, but as it is perfected and as the practitioner matures, it combines all types of *Yoga*. Within modern Hinduism, *Bhakti-Yoga* remains the predominant path towards spiritual fulfillment. It includes the external and symbolic worship of the *murti*, other practices such as pilgrimage and the sophisticated processes of inner development. It has often been condescendingly presented as suitable to those with emotional rather than intellectual dispositions, but thinkers such as Ramanuja, Madhva, and Vallabha have refuted such claims. Their theologies emphasize the importance of developing *bhakti* based on knowledge that is akin to emotional intelligence. They also stress the importance of grace in achieving such spiritual knowledge, often received via the *guru*, the mediator of God's mercy. Though *bhakti* may involve approaching God for material benefit or liberation these are technically *Karma-Yoga* and *Jñāna-Yoga* respectively. *Bhakti-Yoga* is sometimes considered the synthesis and ultimate goal of *karma* and *jñāna*. The goals of many *bhakti* schools transcend both *bhukti* (enjoyment) and *mukti* (liberation) and aim at pure, selfless service to a personal God.

5. 8.7 Goal of *Yoga*

Within the monist schools of *Advaita Vedānta* and *Saivism*, this perfection takes the form of *Mokṣa*, which is a liberation from all worldly suffering and the cycle of birth and death (*Sarīra*) at which point there is a cessation of thought and an experience of blissful union with the Supreme *Brahman*. For the dualistic *bhakti* schools of *Vaiṣṇavism*, *Saivism*, *Saktism* etc., *bhakti* itself is the ultimate goal of the *Yoga* process, wherein perfection culminates in an eternal relationship with God or one of his associated *avatāras* as manifestations as emerge, etc.

The *Yoga* philosophy thus is based on the idea that if one wants at all to understand his place in nature and to be happy and progressing he must aim at that physical,

psychological and moral development which can enable him to pry into the depths of nature. He/She must observe, think and act, he/she must live, love and progress. His development becomes simultaneous on all the three planes. The law of correspondence, according to this philosophy, rules supreme in nature and the physical corresponds as much to the mental as both in their turn correspond to the moral. Unless one arrives at this stage of corresponding and simultaneous development on the three planes one is not able to understand the meaning of his existence or existence in general, nor even to grasp the idea of happiness or progress. To that person of high aim whose body, mind and soul act in correspondence with the higher realm, all secrets of nature become revealed. Later schools of *Yoga*, the *Hatha-Yoga*, *Rāja-Yoga* etc. gave more importance to the subtle body, dormant life-force and energy called *prāna*, *kundalini sakti* etc. as it used the body positively as aids for salvation and knowledge. As against the monistic principle of the *Puruṣa Sukta*, *Sāṅkhya-Kārikā* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa upholds the doctrine of many *puruṣas*. This way *Sāṅkhya* is realist and is closer to common sense realism.

CHAPTER – 6

Some Key Concepts of *Sāṅkhya - Yoga*

- 6.1** Some Key Concept of *Sāṅkhya-Yoga*
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Chapter 6

Some Key Concepts of *Sāṅkhya* -Yoga

6.1 Some Key Concepts of *Sāṅkhya* -Yoga

This chapter highlights some key concepts of *Sāṅkhya* and *Yoga* like *Puruṣa*, *Prakṛti*, *Guṇas* etc.

6.1.1 Ontological Dualism in *Sāṅkhya*-Yoga

Metaphysically *Sāṅkhya*–Yoga is dualistic: it posits two fundamental categories of reality, *puruṣa* (spirit, self) and *prakṛti* (nature, matter). *Sāṅkhya* philosophy is dualistic. *Sāṅkhya* presents *prakṛti* and *puruṣa* as completely contradictory in nature although interrelated and inter dependent. The *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti* are closely related as well as widely different. The two are co-present co-eternal realities. This relation and difference we can sum up in the following manner:

Table 6.1: Differences between *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti*

<i>Puruṣa</i>	<i>Prakṛti</i>
1) Conscious	1) Non conscious, Inert
2) Subject	2) Object
3) Impartial, above the three <i>guṇas</i>	3) Of three <i>guṇas</i>
4) Many	4) One
5) Inactive	5) Active
6) Beyond space and time	6) In space and time
7) That which experiences	7) That which is experienced
8) Of the nature of knowledge	8) Ignorance
9) Above the universe	9) First cause of the universe
10) Free	10) Attached

Prakṛti and *puruṣa* are entirely independent and absolute but as soon as *puruṣa* comes into the proximity of *prakṛti*, evolution and distortion in the constituent elements of *prakṛti* starts taking place. But the *puruṣa* never becomes tied down or attached to the universe since *puruṣa* is eternally free. Thus although *Sāṅkhya* philosophy has made concerted efforts to establish some kind of relation between *prakṛti* and *puruṣa*, it has been unsuccessful in resolving their dualism. We may find efforts made in the *Yoga Darśana* that would take note of the participatory nature of these two realms although one differs completely from the other. In the *Yoga-Sūtra* of Patañjali one comes across various ways in which *Yoga* has sought to pave way for responsible engagement between the two realms of spirit (*puruṣa*=intrinsic identity as Self, pure consciousness) and matter (*prakṛti*=the source of psychophysical being, which includes mind, body, nature) resulting in a highly developed, transformed and participatory human nature and identity, an integrated and embodied state of liberated selfhood (*jivanmukti*). Overall, one special feature of the *Sāṅkhya-Yoga* kind of dualism is its difference from a dualism of another kind that we come across in the Western philosophy, specially in the philosophy of Rene Desacartes. It is not a dichotomy of body and mind. *Sāṅkhya-Yoga* is close in spirit with Sartrean Existentialism, as it talks about the dualism of two opposite realms, the realm of Being and the realm of Spirit or Nothingness. The realm of consciousnesses is self-luminous and content less as well as egoless. The egos or the separate *aharṅkāras*, that are associated with psycho-physical complex are mere a products of *prakṛti*. The realm of *puruṣa* somehow becomes associated with material principles of *buddhi*, *aharṅkāra* and *manas*, i.e. the first evolutes of *prakṛti*.

6.1.2 Consciousness and Matter: *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti*: *Cit* and *Acit*

The two key themes of *Sāṅkhya* system are the two co-eternal realities viz. 1) *prakṛti* and 2) *puruṣa* of which the *puruṣa* is the self, the principle of pure consciousness. The self is the transcendental subject whose very essence is pure consciousness, freedom, eternity and immortality. It is pure consciousness (*jñānasvarūpa*) in the sense that the changing states and processes of the mind, which we call empirical consciousness, do not belong to the self. The self is the

subject or witness of mental changes as of bodily and physical changes, but is as much distinct from the former as from the later. It is freedom itself in so far as it is above the space-time and the cause-effect order of existence. *Puruṣa* is eternal and immortal, because it is not produced by any cause and cannot be destroyed in any way.¹ Ignorance or *aviveka* is non-discrimination between self and not-self. The *puruṣa* is regarded as the spirit, the subject and the knower. It is eternal and omnipotent. The *Sāṅkhya puruṣa* is free from all the accidents of finite life as it is beyond the temporal realm that is represented by *prakṛti*.

6.2 *Avidyā*, Ignorance and Bondage

In order to explain the mystery of the two opposite realms like *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* coming together and for making real interaction possible, *Sāṅkhya-Yoga* introduces the concept of *avidyā* or *māyā* that can be taken as the substitute for Sartrean concept of ‘bad faith’. Patañjali defines *avidyā* thus:

Tasya hetur-avidyā

Lack of spiritual understanding (*avidyā*) is the cause of the false identification of the seer with the seen. (YS-24) In II.18, it was said that the mingling of *prakṛti* with *puruṣa* can either lead to emancipation or stop our progress by involving us in desires and emotions. This *Sūtra* underlines the fact that *avidyā*, ignorance or lack of awareness, is at the root of the confusion that brings us suffering as well as pleasure. Patañjali introduces the idea that seers or *puruṣas* are wholly distinct from nature. Thus, they are pure and unsullied. Yet, Patañjali notes that they are involved in nature by being the conditions for experiences. The experiences that we have, according to Patañjali, are results of our own past *karma*. This raises an apparent paradox: at once *puruṣas* are supposed to be ‘pure’, and yet they can do undesirable things that lead to undesirable experiences.

Is there no way for reversing this process? In the *Yoga-Sūtra* we come across some kinds of techniques for removing the spell of *avidyā* or ignorance.

¹ *Pravacana-bhāṣya*, 1. pp.146-48.

Declaration and discernment of discrimination (that puts an end to ignorance) can be continuously had by skillful means (*upāya*). Patañjali uses the word ‘*upāya*’ in this *Sūtra*.

6.3 *Vidyā*: the Knowledge that Liberates

The knowledge that is acquired through senses, mind and intellect is insignificant beside that emanating from the vision of the seer. This is the real intuitive knowledge. When knowledge dawns, When the clouds or *avidyā* disappear. When the sun shines, does one need artificial light to see? When the light of the soul blazes, no other light is needed. Ignorance disappears when we, as persons, are understood on our own terms, and not in terms of our entanglement with nature. This is what Patañjali calls ‘isolation’ and liberation.

The following *śloka* explains the nature of liberating knowledge, *Vidyā*, thus :

“*Vidyā* (discriminative knowledge) destroys ignorance, for a fire will burn only as long as fuel lasts. When discernment banishes all doubts, pure understanding begins the process of disownment and detachment which releases us from the shackles of possessing and being possessed. Nature and its qualities cease to affect the fulfilled *Yogi*. From now on they serve him devotedly, without interfering with or influencing his true glory. He understands the sequence of time and its relationship with nature. He is crowned with the wisdom of living in the eternal Now. The eternal Now is Divine and he too is Divine. All his aims of life are fulfilled. He is a *kṛthārthan*, a fulfilled soul, one without equal, living in benevolent freedom and beatitude. He is alone and complete. This is *kaivalya*, the goal, the state of final liberation and freedom from the bondage of *prakṛti*. Patañjali begins the *Yoga-Sūtra* with *atha*, meaning ‘now’, and ends with *iti*, ‘that is all’. Besides this search for the soul, there is nothing.”²

² *Srimad Bhāgavad*, chapter 11.

6.4 *Puruṣa*: The Realm of Subjectivity

It is also very doubtful whether originally the term *puruṣa* denoted soul. The traditional *Vedic* philosophy attaches supreme importance to the doctrine of *puruṣa*. In the *R̥gveda*, *puruṣa* denotes the male principle as opposed to the female principle i.e. *prakṛti*, but in the long evolution of the *Vedic* philosophy, the conception of *puruṣa* had to undergo significant changes.³ Basically the concept of *puruṣa* denotes man, and this concept of *puruṣa*, as a human being with its peculiar bodily structure is not at all unknown in the *Vedic* texts.⁴ Referring to the concept of *puruṣa*, as found in the *Brahmana* literature, Belvalkar and Ranade remark: “*puruṣa* originally denoted the human being with its peculiar bodily structure and not any inner or spiritual entity indwelling therein”.⁵ In this sense the term *puruṣa* is inclusive of both male and female members unlike in some other definition where *puruṣa* represents only male members. There was a shift from this to the idea of *puruṣa* as a soul or spirit. The identification of *puruṣa* with soul was made in later times, and this happened due to the influence of the *Vedānta*.

The term *puruṣa* originally meant ‘person’ as it is used in the *R̥gveda* *puruṣa* has signified the primordial, cosmic person from whom the universe is created (*Puruṣasūkta* 10.90). As *R̥gveda* states, ‘Two birds’ inseparable companions, have found refuge in the same sheltering tree. One incessantly eats from the peepal tree; the other, not eating, just looks on. This image of an inseparable dyad; one part actively engaging its appetites and appropriational desires and the other passively observing the activity of the first part, prefigures the notion of *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*. Ultimately, *puruṣa* came to be identified with the independent and transcendental realm of consciousness that differs from the mind, life or body. The *Sāṅkhya* system finally came to regard *puruṣa* as the ultimate knower who is the foundation of all knowledge. *Puruṣa* is not a substance which possesses the quality of consciousness. Consciousness is its essence. It is itself pure or transcendental consciousness. *Puruṣa* is different from *buddhi* (intellect), a product of *prakṛti*, since the latter is non-conscious. *Puruṣa* is beyond time and space, beyond change

³ *Chāndogya*, 15, 5 ; 10,2; *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, 5, pp.14-15.

⁴ *Svetāsvatara*, 5

⁵ *HIP*,428

and activity. Its nature as unfalling light does not change. *Puruṣa* is not dependent on anything. On the other hand *prakṛti* and its products depend on the light of *puruṣa*, for their manifestation. *Puruṣa* is inactive while *guṇas* are active and *puruṣa* appears to be active in connection with them.

6.4.1 *Buddhi* (intellect) and *Puruṣa*

The purpose of the *puruṣa* is twofold 1) to experience the desirable and undesirable modifications of the *buddhi* derived through the sense organs called ‘*bhoga*’ and 2) finally to realize its true nature called ‘*āpabarga*’. Now the *buddhi* (intellect) of *Sāṅkhya* is unconscious, active and subject to mutation; while the *puruṣa* is conscious, inactive and immutable. Then how does this *bhoga* or experience of desirable and undesirable cognitions of the *buddhi* become possible on the part of *puruṣa* who is quite heterogeneous in nature to it? Here the author of the *Yoga-Bhāṣya* replies that the *puruṣa* is neither entirely similar to the *buddhi* nor entirely different from it. *Buddhi*, unlike the self, is unconscious no doubt; but it is not entirely foreign to the nature of the *puruṣa*. Whenever *sattva* predominates it becomes transparent and it can then easily catch the reflection of the *puruṣa* and can become luminous. Just as the moon is reflected in the transparent water and not in the polluted one, similarly the self-luminous *puruṣa* is reflected in the *buddhi* when *sattva* pre-dominates in it and to in any other gross material object with preponderance of mass-stuff (*tamas*) which is held to be the factor of obstruction.

Sāṅkhya throughout makes confusion between the *puruṣa*, the transcendental subject and the *jiva*, the empirical ego, the product of the reflection of *puruṣa* in *buddhi* or *mahat*. *Sāṅkhya* emphasizes that the *puruṣa* is pure consciousness and that it is the foundation of all knowledge and that it is beyond bondage, liberation and transmigration. *Puruṣa* has really nothing to do with the play of *prakṛti*. It is mere spectator and is not among the *dramatis personae*. It is self-proved and self-shining. It is the transcendental subject, which appears as the phenomenal ego. In the *Sāṅkhya* scheme, consciousness cannot be derived from a material principle called *prakṛti*, nor can we regard consciousness as a quality.

Reality is, according to *Sāṅkhya*, a plurality of selves and the world of objects presented to them. By nature *puruṣa* is entirely passive. It is described as an enjoyer or experient (*bhoktā*) without being a doer or agent (*kartā*). The self is an intelligent principle which does not possess any quality or activity but is a pure consciousness free from the limitations of space, time and causality. It is the pure subject which transcends the whole world of objects including physical things and organic bodies, the mind and the senses, the ego and the intellect. All changes and activities, all thoughts and feelings, all pleasures and pains, all joys and sorrows belong to what we call the mind-body system. The self is quite distinct from the mind-body complex and is. *Puruṣa* is the pure subject which transcends the whole world of objects including physical things and organic bodies, the mind and the senses, the ego and the intellect. All changes and activities, all thoughts and feelings, all pleasures and pains, all joys and sorrows, belong to what we call the mind-body system. The self is quite distinct from the mind-body complex. *Puruṣa* is beyond all the affections and afflictions of the psychical life. Pleasures and pain are mental facts which do not really colour the pure self. It is the mind, and not self, that feels pleasure or pain, and is happy or unhappy. So also, virtue and vice, merit and demerit, in short, all moral properties belong to the ego (*ahaṅkāra*) who is the striver and doer of all acts.⁶ The self is different from the ego or the moral agent who strives for good or bad ends, attains them and enjoys or suffers accordingly. This is the usual interpretation of *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* in *Sāṅkhya* although the Thesis gives more emphasis on these themes as developed in *Yoga Darśana*.

6.4.2 Proofs for the Existence of *Puruṣa*

The *Sāṅkhya* system puts forward several arguments to establish the existence of *puruṣa*.

*Saṅghātparārthatvāt,
Triguṇādiviparyayād- Adhiṣṭhānāt
Puruṣo-sti boktṛbhāvāt
Kaivalyārthampravāṛttesca -ca*

⁶ *Sāṅkhya-Sūtra*. And *Vṛtti*, pp.5.25-26.

Existence of *puruṣa* is argued for (*Kārikā XVII*) on the ground that consciousness and distinctions in the world are for this consciousness, which is itself apart from the world.

The *puruṣa* must exist, because:

- 1) *Sarighāta Parārthatvāt*: We have nothing to worry about when inanimate things lie scattered about here and there without any symmetry or arrangement. But, when we find that they are so arranged that they can serve a useful purpose, we know that an intelligent person must have arranged them for himself or for another. They very symmetry, order and law of the universe afford a proof so that the *puruṣa* exists.
- 2) *Triguṇādiviparyayād*: The person referred to above be surely unlike, or the reverse of, the things arranged by him. The things are non-conscious and mere objects of the senses (as per *Kārikā XI*). He must, therefore, be conscious, not an object of the senses or, in other words, he must be the Seer.
- 3) *Adhiṣṭhānāt*: Inanimate things cannot work or serve a useful purpose unless they are directed into a proper channel by an intelligent being, just as a motor car cannot run without a driver.
- 4) *Bhoktṛbhāvāt*: There is surely some one to enjoy (otherwise the whole creation will be meaningless).
- 5) *Kaivalyārtham Pravāṛtesca*: There is a desire (as said in *Kārikā I*) for absolute release from misery. This cannot be the *buddhi* or of any inanimate substance like *prakṛti*, because, as will be shown hereafter, absolute release cannot be had without parting from the *buddhi* or destroying it altogether. *Buddhi* cannot be said to desire its own destruction. This desire must belong to one who is not the *buddhi*.
- 6) There must be a presiding power, a pure consciousness which co-ordinates all experiences. A conscious self must control all the products of *prakṛti*, which are unconscious, and this is *puruṣa*.
- 7) All knowable objects have three *guṇas*-*sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*. These objects pre-suppose a self who is their seer and who must be devoid of the *guṇas*. It is the *puruṣa* who is the weakness of these *guṇas* and is beyond them.

- 8) *Prakṛti* is non-intelligent, so there must be someone to experience the products of *prakṛti* and this is *puruṣa*.

6.4.3 Plurality of *Puruṣa*

Although the *Sāṅkhya* system admits the plurality of *puruṣa*, and acknowledges the fact that Reality is a plurality of selves and the world of objects presented to them, like the *jives* of the Jainism, the souls of Ramanuja and the Monads of Leibnitz, the *Sāṅkhya puruṣa* are subject to qualitative monism and quantitative pluralism. According to them the *puruṣa* are only numerically different, and essentially alike. *Sāṅkhya* gives the following three arguments for proving the plurality of the *puruṣa*.

- 1) There must be plurality of *puruṣa* because otherwise whatever happens to one consciousness will happen at the same time to every consciousness, which is contrary to the perceived diversity of births, deaths and faculties. (*Kārikā XVIII*). The souls have different sensory and motor organs and undergo separate births and deaths. Had there been only one *puruṣa*, the birth or death of one should have meant the birth or death of all and any particular experience of pleasure, pain or indifference by one, should have been equally shared by all. Hence, the souls must be many.
- 2) If the self were one, bondage of one should have meant bondage of all and liberation of one should have meant liberation of all. The activity of one should have made all persons active and the sleep of one should have lulled into sleep all other persons.
- 3) Though the emancipated souls are all alike and differ only in number as they are all beyond the three *guṇas*, yet the bound souls relatively differ in qualities also, since in some *sattva* predominates, while in other *rajas*, and in still others *tamas*. Hence, their difference.

Some scholars criticize the *Sāṅkhya* view of *puruṣa* voraciously

- 1) According to the critics, the *Sāṅkhya* system actually makes confusion between the *puruṣa*, the transcendental subject and the *jīva*, the empirical ego. *Sāṅkhya* system emphasizes that the *puruṣa* is pure consciousness, the transcendental reality, but this system forgets its own position and reduces the ultimate *puruṣa* to the level of the phenomenal ego.
- 2) Again in *Sāṅkhya* system *puruṣa* is called the enjoyer and *prakṛti* enjoyed but, if *puruṣa* is transcendental subject how can it be an enjoyer? The *puruṣa* is also said to be passive, inactive then it is clear that *puruṣa* cannot enjoy.
- 3) The critics denied plurality of *puruṣa*. According to them as a transcendental subject, there can be no plurality in *puruṣa*. We obviously cannot deny the plurality of the *jīvas*. But, this plurality of *jīvas* does not lead us to the plurality of the *puruṣa*. Again, if all the *puruṣa* are essentially one, as *Sāṅkhya* holds, how can they really be many? Thus the notion of *puruṣa* in the *Sāṅkhya* system is vehemently criticized. But, though severe criticism has been leveled against *Sāṅkhya* view of *puruṣa*; we cannot deny that it played a serious role in Indian philosophy.

The self is not a substance but a subject. It is Alone, the unseen seer, the transcendental Absolute. But *Sāṅkhya* soon forgets its own position and reduces the ultimate *puruṣa* to the level of the phenomenal ego. If *puruṣa* is the transcendental subject, how can it be an enjoyer? If it is passive, indifferent and inactive, how can it enjoy? Again, how can the transcendental reality be split into the many real? How can there be a plurality of the transcendental subjects, the *puruṣa*? Of course, no one denies the plurality of the empirical egos, the *jīvas*. But manyness of the egos, the empirical souls, does not lead us to the manyness of the transcendental selves, the *puruṣa*. In fact, all the arguments advanced by *Sāṅkhya* to prove the plurality of the *puruṣa* turn out to be arguments to prove the plurality of the *jīvas* which none has ever denied.

The commentators like Vāchaspati, Gaudapada and Vijñānabhikṣu have maintained the reality of one *puruṣa* only. If *Sāṅkhya* can reduce all objects to one *prakṛti*, why can it not reduce all the empirical souls to one *puruṣa* by the same logic? And why can *prakṛti* and the empirical *puruṣa* are not reducing to the

Absolute *puruṣa* by the same logic? Again, if all the *puruṣa* are essentially similar, if the essence of all is pure consciousness, how can they be really many? Differences and distinctions constitute individuality. If all the *puruṣa* are essentially the same, there is no meaning in proclaiming their quantitative plurality. Despite many explanations offered in this regard, certain questions remain unanswered.

6.5 Prakṛti

Īśvarakṛṣṇa greets *prakṛti* saying: “We bow to *prakṛti*, the red-white-dark, the unborn mother and nurse and receptacle of all generations.”⁷ In the view of Vyāsa, *prakṛti* is that which both is and is not, which does not have existence in which there is non-existence and which is unmanifest, partless and *pradhāna*. *Prakṛti* is said to be not so much existence as it is energy. We do not know *prakṛti*, as our knowledge is limited to the objective existence of it alone. There is a lot in it which we do not know and perhaps will never know.

6.5.1 Proofs for the Existence of Prakṛti

The *Sāṅkhya* system gives five arguments for the existence of *prakṛti*. This system infers the existence of *prakṛti* from the complex and the manifold products in the universe. The *Sāṅkhya* philosophers argue for the existence of *prakṛti* on the following grounds.

1) All the objects found in this world are limited and interdependent and finite. But the finite can't be the cause of the universe. Logically we have to proceed from the finite to the infinite from the limited to the unlimited, from the many to the one. And it is this infinite, unlimited, eternal and all pervading *prakṛti* that is the source of this universe.

⁷ Books.google.co.in/books? Isbn=8120803655...accessed on 01/03/08.

2) All worldly things capable of producing pleasure, pain and indifference. Hence there must be a common source composed of three *guṇas* from which all worldly things arise.

All effects arise from the activity of a potent cause. And this cause is *prakṛti*. We shall have to accept one cause which is itself uncaused, but it is itself uncaused and the cause of all objects of the world. The unity of the universe points to a single cause. And this cause is *prakṛti*.

6.5.2 Some Criticisms of Sāṅkhya View of *Prakṛti*

Critics have pointed out some defects in the proofs offered for existence of *prakṛti*.

1) If the original state of *prakṛti* is not in harmony, but only a tension of the three *guṇas*, the *guṇas* point to a state beyond them, it is this state which gives harmony to the *guṇa*. *Prakṛti* does not do that. Hence it is not real. Reality is the *puruṣa* alone, the critics say.

2) Again, *prakṛti* is unconscious and unintelligent, how can it then explain the teleology which is immanent in creation? If *prakṛti* is unconscious and blind, evolution must be mechanical and blind and there can be no freedom of the will. And if *prakṛti* and all its evolutes from *mahat* to the *mahābhūtas* tend to serve the purpose of the *prakṛti*, it can be neither unconscious nor independent. Again, if *prakṛti* is blind and non-intelligent, it cannot evolve this world which is full of harmony, order, design and purpose. Stones, bricks and mortar cannot account for the design of a building. Mere clay cannot fashion itself into a pot. How can *prakṛti* explain the original impetus, the first push, and the *élan vital* that disturbs the equilibrium of the *guṇas*? The critics say.

3) Further the argument that *prakṛti* works unconsciously for the emancipation of the *puruṣa* just as unintelligent milk flows for the nourishment of the calf is untenable because milk flows as there is a living cow and there is the motherly love in the cow for the calf. Nor can the modification of *prakṛti* be compared to that of grass, which turns into milk. Grass becomes milk only when a milk cow

eats it, and not when it lies uneaten or is eaten by a bull. The simile of the blind and the lame is also misleading since the blind and the lame are both intelligent and active beings who can devise plans to realize a common purpose, while *prakṛti* is unconscious and *puruṣa* is indifferent and there is no common purpose. Moreover, activity is said to belong to *prakṛti* and enjoyment to *puruṣa*. This overthrows the moral law of *karma* and brings in the charge of vicarious liability. Poor *puruṣa* suffers for no fault of its own, the critic feel. *Prakṛti* performs actions and *puruṣa* has to reap their fruits, good or bad. It is equally unfair to *puruṣa* and she knows how to make delicious dishes, but not to enjoy them.

4) Though *Sāṅkhya* calls *prakṛti* as impersonal, yet its descriptions of *prakṛti* are full of personal notes. *Prakṛti* is called a dancing girl; she is feminine, she is virtuous and generous; she is the benefactress of the *puruṣa*; she serves *puruṣa*'s purpose in a spirit of perfect detachment for no gain to herself; and yet she is blind; she is extremely delicate and shy and cannot stand the eye of the *puruṣa*; she is seven-rainbow-coloured and wants to attract the *puruṣa*. How can such *prakṛti* be absolute and impersonal?

5) *Puruṣa* is untouched by bondage, liberation and transmigration. It is *prakṛti* who binds herself and liberates herself and transmigrates. *Prakṛti* is said to vanish for the *puruṣa* who has 'seen' her, though she continues to exist for others. Does this not make *prakṛti* relative? If she 'vanishes', how can she be absolute and eternal? However, the origin of the anomalous of the multiple *puruṣa* can presumably be traced to the anomalous position of the males in a matriarchal society.

6) The critics allege that although *Sāṅkhya* has described *prakṛti* as independent and absolute but from the account given of it in *Sāṅkhya* philosophy it does not appear to be so. *Puruṣa* is different from it since *puruṣa* does not have these qualities. At the same time, *prakṛti* is said to be dependent on *puruṣa*. Without the influence of *puruṣa*, *prakṛti* cannot evolve the universe. *Prakṛti* creates and evolves only for *puruṣa*. When *puruṣa* comes to know of it, for him *prakṛti* vanishes.

Critics say that it is better to rename *prakṛti* as ignorance or absence of knowledge. It cannot be absolute and independent.

7) *Prakṛti* is the unitary material substance that evolves into the world that we perceive through our senses. The *Sāṅkhya puruṣa* is the passive observer, the ‘witness’ while *prakṛti* includes all the cognitive, moral psychological, emotional, sensorial and physical aspects of reality. It is often mistranslated as ‘matter’ or ‘nature’, in non- *Sāṅkhyan* usage it does mean ‘essential nature’ but that detracts from the heavy *Sāṅkhya* stress on *prakṛti*’s cognitive, mental, psychological and sensorial activities. Moreover, subtle and gross matters are its most derivative by-products, not its core. Only *prakṛti* is an active principle. *Puruṣa* and *prakṛti* are radically different from each other, although both are considered to be eternal, without a beginning and ultimately inseparable. Since *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* are as absolutely separate and independent realities, experience always unfolds them together. At times it is said that like the two sides of the same coin, they are just two aspects of the same reality, although nature wise two are absolutely separate and opposed to one another.

In the present form of the *Sāṅkhya*, as well as in the *Tantras*, the term *prakṛti* acquires a purely metaphysical connotation, but basically it stands for the mother earth, the fruit-bearing soil. The *Sāṅkhya* preaches a law of causation, known as *parināmavāda*, according to which, the effect is a real modification of the cause; the same thing, which is explicit in the effect, is implicit in the cause. The cause of the material world is thus obviously nothing but matter, since *prakṛti* is the primordial matter or substance. In the *Sāṅkhya*, this primordial matter is represented as a Female Principle. The relation between *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* is explained in terms of relation between a man and a woman. *Prakṛti* charms *puruṣa* just as a woman charms a man. The activities of *prakṛti* are also conceived in terms of the emotional activities of a love-stricken damsel *prakṛti* is sometime conceived as a blushing bride and sometimes as a beautiful dancing actress.⁸ “Just as a dancing girl, after showing performances desists from dancing, so does *prakṛti* desist, after exhibiting herself to *puruṣa*?”

⁸ *Sāṅkhya-Sūtra*, 65

6.5.3 *Prakṛti* and Her Constituents

However *Sāṅkhya* has its own justification for identifying *prakṛti* with *pradhāna*, the source of the evolution. It is also known as *avyakta* because prior to the starting of evolution, it remains in an unmanifest state. Just because, it is unmanifest, we can't say *prakṛti* is non-existent. *Prakṛti* is subtle and so it can't be perceived, but it can be inferred from its effects. According to the *Sāṅkhya* system *prakṛti* is uncaused, independent, absolute one and eternal because it is beyond production and destruction. According to the *Sāṅkhya* system these unintelligent, eternal *prakṛti* is the final source of this world of objects.

6.5.3.1 *Guṇas*

Prakṛti is said to be the unity of the three *guṇas* held in equilibrium (*guṇānām sāmīyāvasthā*). The three *guṇas* are *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*. They are the constituents of *prakṛti* and through it, of all worldly objects. Being subtle and imperceptible, the existence of the *guṇas* is inferred from their effects-pleasure, pain and indifference respectively. Although they are called *guṇas*, yet they are not ordinary qualities or attributes like the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika *guṇas*. They themselves possess qualities like lightness, activity, heaviness etc. They are extremely fine and ever changing elements. They make up *prakṛti*, which is nothing apart from them. They are not the qualities which *prakṛti* the substance, possesses; on the other hand they themselves constitute *prakṛti*. They are the factors or the constituents or the elements of *prakṛti*. They are called *guṇas* because they are elements of *prakṛti*. Which alone is called substantive or because they are subservient to the end of the *puruṣa*, or because they are intertwined, like three strands, to make up the rope of *prakṛti* which binds the *puruṣa*.

Sattva literally means real or existent and is responsible for the manifestation of objects in consciousness. It is called goodness and produces pleasure. It is light and bright, buoyant (*laghu*) and illuminating (*prakāśhaka*). Luminosity of light, power of reflection, upward movement, pleasure, happiness, contentment, and bliss are all due to it. Its colour is white. *Rajas*, which literally means foulness, is the principle

of motion. It produces pain. Restless activity, feverish effort and wild stimulation are its results. It is mobile (*chala*) and stimulating (*upastambhaka*). Its colour is red. *Tamas*, which literally means darkness, is the principle of inertia. It produces apathy and indifference. Ignorance, sloth, confusion, bewilderment, passivity and negativity are its results. It is heavy (*guru*) and enveloping (*varanaka*) and as such is opposed to *sattva*. It is also opposed to *rajas* as it arrests activity. Its colour is dark.

These three *guṇas*, which constitute *prakṛti*, are never separated. They conflict and yet co-operate with one another and are always found intermingled. They are compared to the oil, the wick and the flame of a lamp, which, though opposed, yet co-operate to produce the light of a lamp. They are imperceptible and are inferred from their effects. All things are composed of these three *guṇas* and their differences are due to the different combinations of these *guṇas*. The nature of a thing is determined by the preponderance of a particular *guṇa*. Things are called good, bad or indifferent, intelligent, active or slothful, pure, impure or natural, on account of the predominance of *sattva*, *rajas* or *tamas* respectively. When these *guṇas* are held in a state of equilibrium, that state is called *prakṛti*. Evolution of worldly objects does not take place at this state. These *guṇas* are said to be ever changing. They cannot remain static even for a moment. Change is said to be of two kinds-homogeneous or *sarupa-parināma* and heterogeneous or *virupa-parināma*. During the state of dissolution (*pralaya*) of the world, the *guṇas* change homogeneously, i.e., *sattva* changes into *sattva*, *rajas* into *rajas* and *tamas* into *tamas*. This change does not disturb the equilibrium of the *guṇas* and unless the equilibrium is disturbed and one predominates over the other two, evolution cannot take place. Evolution starts when there is heterogeneous change in the *guṇas* and one predominates over the other two and brings about terrific commotion in the bosom of *prakṛti*.

6.6 Kāraṇa & the Theory of Satkāryavāda

In order to understand *Sāṅkhya* concept of evolution we have to look fresh at its theory of causation that is also called the *Satkāryavāda*. *Sāṅkhya-Kārikā* holds that

the effect pre-exists in the cause in a latent or potential state, arguing that since something cannot arise from nothing, the effect must pre-exist. It further claims that all effects rely on a material cause. Things do not arise indiscriminately from just anything: certain types of causes produce certain types of effect for example; cows do not give birth to puppies. Something can only produce what it is capable of being produced; the nature of the cause is in the effect. The same text was elsewhere that all manifest things must have a single ultimate cause to avoid an infinite regress of cause and effects. This ultimate cause is *prakṛti*. The *Sāṅkhya* theory of causation (*satkāryavāda*) is hinted in the Ch. Up. (VI. 2. 1-2.) where the theory of existent coming out from non-existent is overthrown and the doctrine of one absolute real existing in the beginning is maintained.

6.7 The Evolutes

The proximity of *puruṣa* acts as a catalyst in releasing the causal transformation of primordial nature (*mūla prakṛti*) into the whole of the perceptible world. The order in which *prakṛti* evolves is laid down in the following scheme. First, the pure contentless consciousness of the *puruṣa* becomes focused on the *prakṛti* and out of delimitation evolves *mahat* or *buddhi* (intellect). The *buddhi* then evolves the ego (*ahaṅkāra*), which leads to the wrong identification of the true self with the ego. From *ahaṅkāra* evolves the *manas* (mind); from *manas* the five sensory organs and five motor organs; then the five *tanmātrās* or subtle elements (sound, touch, form, taste and smell) and the five *bhūtas* or gross elements (ether, air, fire, water and earth). *Sāṅkhya* thus recognizes the twenty-five principles (*tattvas*) evolving out of *mūlaprakṛti* in this order. The twenty-fifth (and independent) *tattva* is *puruṣa*.

The following are the prime players in the whole show of evolution:

Puruṣa: Of the two companion principles, *puruṣa* is consciousness that is untainted, ever pure. It is self-existent, standing alone from other identities of individuality; conscious being-ness; the principle of spiritual energy.

Mahat or *Buddhi*: This is the purest, finest spark of individuation of *prakṛti* (primordial matter). It is very first of the evolutes of *prakṛti*. It is individuation, but yet, without characteristics. *Buddhi* is the word, which applies to the individual person, while *mahat* refers to the universal aspect of this process.

Ahaṅkāra: This is the process of ego, by which consciousness can start to (incorrectly) take on false identities. Here, the word ego is used not to mean the actual qualities such brother or sister, or loving or cruel, but the capacity itself to take on the countless identities. *Guṇas*: *prakṛti* (primordial “matter”) has three characteristics or attributes of lightness (*sattvas*), activity (*rajas*), and stability (*tamas*). These three combine and re-combine so as to form the various aspects of mind, senses, and the five elements of earth, water, fire, air, and space.

Mind: Mind (*mānas*) is the instrument, which is the driving force behind actions, speech, and the thinking process. It is also the recipient of the sensory input. It is useful to know that, here, mind is being used in this more limited way, rather than the whole of the inner process called *antahkarana*, which includes *manas*, *ahaṅkāra*, *buddhi*, *citta*, along with the senses and the five elements.

Senses/Instruments: The five senses and five motor organs like *karmendriyas* (arms, legs, speech, genital organs, excretory organs) instruments of expression are like ten doors of a building. Five are entrance doors, and five are exit doors. These ten *indriyas* are evolutes of mind.

One way to understand this process of the senses being evolutes of mind is to notice what happens when one falls asleep, into dreamless sleep. One may wonder: ‘what happens to our senses, our ability to perceive through those senses? They seem to go away, yet they return after sleep. Where did they go?’ It is in that sense that we might say the senses are still there, but that they have receded back into the field of mind from which they arose in the first place. This same process of arising and receding happens not only with the senses, but all of the evolutes of *prakṛti*.

Also, if the senses arise from and recede into the field of mind, then it is also easy to see that during times when the senses are operating, they are also infused with

mind, the next subtler level of *prakṛti*. In other words, senses without mind operating through them simply do not work. The idea of senses operating without mind infusing them seems rather silly, in fact. It is that simplicity that is in the whole concept of *prakṛti* manifesting outward, and the process of meditation retracing that process inward.

Elements: A further outpouring of *prakṛti* is when it bursts forth as the equivalent of space, as experienced in the subtle (non-physical) realm. From, and within that emerges air (thinness, lightness, airiness), then fire (energy), then water (flow, fluidity), then earth (solidity, form). When these five elements are in the subtle realm, they are known as *tanmātrās*. When they further come outward, manifesting into the physical world, they are known as *bhūtas*. From these, all of the many objects of the external world are composed.

The Senses and Instruments of action (*indriyas*) emerge out of unmanifest matter, or *prakṛti*. The five Elements also emerge out of *prakṛti*. Thus, one set of evolutes (Senses and Instruments of action) are relating to another set of evolutes (the five Elements in the form of many objects). This is one way of explaining the mechanics of how it can be that all is one can appear to be multiplicity. Following table indicates the reverse process in which the evolutes retreat back to consciousness:

There are 24 physical evolutes of *prakṛti*. The first is *mahat*, from which evolves *aharākāra*. The physical evolutes are mind, five *jñānendriyas* and five *karmendriyas*. The physical evolutes are five *tanmātrās* (Subtle essence) and five *mahābhūtas* (Gross elements).

The following figure is another illustration of the evolutes of *prakṛti*:




Figure 6.1: Evolution Process

6.7.1 Evolution in Darwin: A Comparison with *Sāṅkhya*-Yoga

We may make a comparative study of *Sāṅkhya* theory of evolution with another similar counterpart i.e. Darwin's theory of evolution. In *Sāṅkhya*, and in *Yoga*, *prakṛti* is the first cause. It is not a product of anything else. Though, *prakṛti* is unintelligent it has a purpose. The purpose is to provide enjoyment to *puruṣa* and eventually to liberate it from bondage. That's why *prakṛti* can't be equated with *amaeba*, the most elementary organism, from which biological evolution starts.

The Western thinker and scientist, Charles Darwin, in his book *Origin of Species*, has presented his theory of evolution. This theory of this modern thinker has influenced every sphere of knowledge in the modern world. This problem of the evolution of universe in Indian philosophy was tackled by the *Sāṅkhya* system in the most subtle and philosophical way. It is a distinct system than that of Darwin and though it has not succeeded in giving a proper description of cosmological evolution. Yet it has explained the order of progress from the subtle elements to the gross according to a psychological principle and it is in this that its achievement lies. *Sāṅkhya* system of evolution is very old while Darwin's theory of evolution is the most recent.

Darwinian principle of evolution and *Sāṅkhya* theory of evolution are widely different. Both of these systems have distinctly different methods to explain the process of creation and evolution. The differences between the two may be enumerated in the following manner:

Table 6.2: Difference between Darwin and *Sāṅkhya* Evolution

Darwin's Evolution	<i>Sāṅkhya</i> Evolution
1. It explains biological evolution.	1. It explains cosmological evolution.
2. Evolution begins when matter becomes active.	2. Process of Evolution begins by proximity of Prakṛti to <i>puruṣa</i> .
3. Evolution is mechanical.	3. Evolution is teleological.
4. Motive behind evolution is struggle for survival.	4. Past actions are the inspiration behind evolution.
5. Both mind and soul are believed to originate in matter.	5. Admits the spiritual form of soul as distinct from the mind.
6. Atomistic.	6. Non-atomistic.
7. Scientific	7. Philosophical
8. Supports materialistic monism	8. Dualistic
9. Modern	9. Ancient

Sāṅkhya evolution has a soteriological goal of emancipation of *puruṣa* from the realm of *prakṛti*. In Darwin's evolution is a mechanical process of actualization.

6.8 Summing Up: Some Commonalities in *Sāṅkhya* and *Yoga*

Sāṅkhya and *Yoga* are thought of as kindred schools because they both take the world to be made up of things that fall into one of two categories: *puruṣa* (literally 'person') and *prakṛti* (literally 'nature'). The category of *puruṣa* is the spiritual, subjective side of reality. Both schools agree that the individual *puruṣa* is a center of consciousness. Patañjali's *Yoga-Sūtra* and the most famous form of *Sāṅkhya*, the form elaborated by Īśvarakṛṣṇa agrees that there are many individual *puruṣas*. *Sāṅkhya-Kārikā* 18 explicitly states this, and *Yoga-Sūtra* I.24 implies this, for it recognizes *Īśvara*, or the lord, as a special kind of person (*puruṣavīśa*) distinct from other persons.

While there are many *puruṣa* both *Sāṅkhya* and *Yoga* agree that there is only one vast category called '*prakṛti*'. As we have already discussed *prakṛti* is the world of natural causes. *Prakṛti* in its manifest form contains three types of qualities, according to both *Yoga* and *Sāṅkhya*. These qualities are commonly called 1) '*sattva*', 2) '*rajas*', and 3) '*tamas*', though various texts apply different designations for them. The *Yoga Sūtra* refers to *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* with talk of: a) 'Luminosity' (*prakāśa*), b) 'Action' (*kriyā*), and c) 'Stillness' (*stithi*)⁹ The *Sāṅkhya-Kārikā* paraphrases them as: (a) 'pleasure' (*prīti*) and 'illumination' (*prakāśa*); (b) 'pain' (*apṛīti*) and 'actuation' (*pravṛtti*); and (c) 'indifference' (*viśada*) and 'restraint' (*niyamārtha*)¹⁰.

Both *Yoga* and *Sāṅkhya* agree that the three qualities comprise the totality of things met within the natural world. Inanimate objects, according to this shared theory, have a predominance of the *tamas* quality. Active and moving things have a predominance of *rajas* in their activity apparatus, while *sattva* in its role as

⁹ *Yoga-Sūtra* II. 18.

¹⁰ *Sāṅkhya-Kārikā*, 12.

illuminator is found in great quality in the mind. Both *Yoga* and *Sāṅkhya* also agree that these three qualities contribute to liberation. The *Sāṅkhya-Kārikā* states:

Sattva is buoyant and illuminating; *rajas* is stimulating and active; and *tamas* alone is heavy and darkening; they are like a lamp, functioning for the goal of the *puruṣa* so that it can know itself. (12-13, cf. 21)¹¹

In their function as a lamp, the three elements of Nature bring about discrimination between the essence of *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*, after which liberation occurs. Thus the lamp of Nature is the effort of Nature to liberate *puruṣa*. Similarly, the *Yoga-Sūtra* concludes its description of the three elements with the summary; 'Their purpose (in existing) is to provide edifying experiences for the sensory apparatus and thus facilitate liberation (of the *puruṣa*)' (II.18).

Both schools distinguish the mind, intellect and the other mental faculties from the *puruṣa*, and understand the various mental facilities as part of the world of *prakṛti*. *Sāṅkhya* and *Yoga* thus both display a strong naturalistic tendency, according to which differences in abilities and powers of organic beings are explained in terms of the functioning of Nature, and not *puruṣa* or the spiritual. Thus, for the *Sāṅkhya* of and the *Yoga* of Patañjali, every *puruṣa* stands by a bundle of Nature that evolves and changes over time. The evolution and changes in this bundle of Nature, that a *puruṣa* is associated with, constitute the growth of an embodied being over time, with differing body types and cognitive activities. Upon death, a subtle body comprised of the psychological dispositions and reactions from past experiences continues and gains a gross body again, until liberation is achieved—this is explicitly stated in *Sāṅkhya-Kārikā*. and presupposed by the *Yoga-Sūtra* (II.12).

With the exception of the Lord or *Īśvara*, which only *Yoga* recognizes, *Sāṅkhya* and *Yoga* regard all persons as equals. The equality of persons transcends

¹¹ For a published translation and edition, see *Sāṅkhya-Kārikā*, trans. and ed. S, S, Suryanarayana, Sastri., 2nd rev. Ed, *Madras University Philosophical Series 3* (Madras: University of Madras, (1948).

biological distinctions. So long as a being is conscious, according to these schools, it has a *puruṣa* in it, and they explain the relevant differences in terms of biology and the history of the subtle body. Persons, thus, for both *Sāṅkhya* and *Yoga* are not restricted to the human.

We may sum up some of the discussions that this chapter has dealt with taking recourse to the concept of different “bodies” which are said to comprise the total human person. In terms of the physical, subtle, causal and spiritual bodies the *Sāṅkhya* system can be seen to agree. If we group the first five elements into one, we have the physical or gross body. The mind and the intellect can be seen to comprise the subtle body. Similarly the ego is the causal body being the part that causes us to be and do and want the things we desire. And finally, the self is our spiritual self, that part which is eternal and beyond the perception of the other three.




Figure 6.2: Universal Elemental Substances Grouped by Bodies

The realm of spirit and consciousness is also the domain of free Subjectivity, Knowledge, and sufferingless realm of perfect *Puruṣa* but *Puruṣa* needs co-operation of the lower realms of its manifestation in order to recover its lost authenticity. Since *puruṣa* is afflicted by *māyā* and by ignorance, the spiritual realm is wrongly identified with the other bodies, the gross, subtle and the causal, which in separation are as insensitive as the inanimate *prakṛti*. The liberated man of *Sāṅkhya*-Yoga ultimately re organizes his or her life recovering the lost spiritual essence of one's personality. What exactly is this state of *mokṣa* or salvation? Is there any place for God in it? This is a state of knowledge and emancipation that is to be highlighted in the next chapter.



CHAPTER – 7

God and Salvation in *Sāṅkhya -Yoga*

- 7.1 God and Salvation in *Sāṅkhya –Yoga*
- 7.2 The Conception of God in *Sāṅkhya*
- 7.3 Toward an Integral Personality of the Situated and Existential Man:
Need for God and Salvation for the Practice of *Yoga*
 - 7.3.1 Kinds of *Kleśas*
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- 7.4 Different Interpretations of the Liberated State in *Sāṅkhya* and in *Yoga*
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Chapter 7

God and Salvation in *Sāṅkhya* -Yoga

7.1 God and Salvation in *Sāṅkhya* -Yoga

As we have seen in the previous two chapters the root cause of *Sāṅkhya* suffering is ignorance of *puruṣa*'s true nature, the free and uncorrupted nature of *puruṣa*. So, this chapter will concentrate mainly on how the sufferings are started, about the *Yoga* techniques, the means for cessation of suffering, and the position of God and salvation in in *Sāṅkhya* and in *Yoga*.

It can be rightly said that existential suffering is the root cause for man's religious urge for a God and for liberation from suffering. The first three of the seventy-two *Sāṅkhya-Kārikās* set forth in brief the essential teaching of the entire short work, and therefore of classical *Sāṅkhya*. The first verse of Īśvarakṛṣṇa's *Sāṅkhya-Kārikā* discloses the principal or sole purpose of the system. This is stated to be the relief of humanity from suffering and pain.

Yet in *Sāṅkhya Darśana*, this universal suffering does not lead to a "philosophy of pessimism." The revelation of "pain" as the law of existence can be regarded as the condition laid down with a therapeutic motive. Intrinsically, then, this universal suffering has a positive, stimulating value. It perpetually reminds the sage and the ascetic that but one way remains for him or her to attain to freedom and bliss is withdrawal from the world, detachment from possessions and ambitions, radical isolation. It shows that when the wrong identification of *puruṣa* with *prakṛti* takes place at that time suffering crops into over life as soon as we realize the separation between these two we get liberation. We will also see how in the *Yoga* system of Patañjali, that has offered a wider breath to the overall *Sāṅkhya-Yoga* system, more emphasis is put on keeping a balance between cognition, affection and volitions of the psycho-physical complex (*citta*) that leads to the integration of personality of the emancipated one.

Given that all life is suffering (*dukṭa*) and that *mokṣa* involves freedom from *dukṭa*, then *mokṣa* is worth pursuing whether or not it brings with it an eternal positive happiness. In other words, since elimination of suffering is a basic intrinsic value, then the goal of cessation of suffering ought to be pursued for its own sake. Suffering is caused by our confusion of *puruṣa* with *prakṛti* and emancipation follows from correct understanding of the real nature of *puruṣa* and its difference from *prakṛti*. Our life on earth is a mixture of joys and sorrows. There are indeed many pleasures of life, and also many creatures that have a good share of them. But many more are the pains and sufferings of life and all living beings are more or less subject to them. Even if it were possible for any individual being to shun all other pains and miseries, it is impossible for anyone to evade the clutches of decay and death. Ordinarily, however, we are the victims of three kinds of pains, viz., the *ādhyātmika*, *ādhibhautika* and *ādhidaivika*. As we have already seen, the *Sāṅkhya-Kārikā* begins from the ubiquity of the ‘threefold suffering’: internal (*ādhyātmika*), external or natural (*ādhibhautika*) and cosmic or supernatural (*ādhidaivika*). This doctrine of *Sāṅkhya* is similar to the tenets held by the Buddhists whose main doctrine is that the world is full of miseries.

Thus the *Sāṅkhya* understanding of suffering falls under three categories.

- a) The intrinsic (*ādhyātmika*): suffering is brought about by factors relating to the internal composition of agents.
- b) The extrinsic (*ādhibhautika*): suffering brought about by the external natural environment.
- c) The divine or superhuman (*ādhidaivika*): Suffering brought about by cosmic or divine forces.

Of these, the intrinsic is two-fold, bodily and mental. Bodily pain is caused by the disorder of the several humours, wind, bile and phlegm. Mental pain is due to desire, wrath, avarice, affection, fear, envy, grief, and the non-perception of particular objects. These later are in fact ‘*kleśas*’, a medical term meaning pain. In the Nath tradition, the *kleśas* are given as five in number: The five pain bearing obstructions the root causes of trouble and strife ignorance, ego, revulsion,

attachment and clinging to life.¹ The *kleśas* and other pains above are all of the intrinsic variety on account of their being amenable to internal remedies. This realization of the vulnerability of the human situation leads to the desire to know the root cause of suffering and the means of ending suffering. The *Sāṅkhya* observes an obvious connection between the one and the other. “Because of torment by three kinds of pain (there arises) the desire to know the means of removing it. If because of the obvious (means of removing it) this (desire) seems superfluous; it is not so, for these are neither absolutely complete nor abiding”². Human existence is characterized by suffering, and this cannot be removed by either empirical means or scriptural revelation; the only way to eliminate suffering is by discriminative knowledge. This saving knowledge comprises the clear identification of

- a) The “unmanifest”, *prakṛti*, primordial nature
- b) The “manifest”, the world which arises out of *prakṛti*
- c) The knower, *puruṣa*.

However there is a difference of emphasis between *Sāṅkhya* and *Yoga* in precisely how this goal is to be achieved. *Sāṅkhya* seems to be recommending a progressive sequence of reflective discriminations (*vijñāna*) that spontaneously lead to liberation. *Yoga* supplements this formal, rationalistic methodology with a systematic and rigorous meditative praxis. Essentially the *Sāṅkhya* view of evolution of the world is utilized by *Yoga* in a programme for reversing this process in order that the practitioner can increasingly rediscover the original pure consciousness of the *puruṣa* as distinct from *prakṛti*. This is a radical isolation (*kaivalya*) of the true self from ordinary human experience. In *Sanskṛt* ‘*Sāṅkhya*’ means *enumeration* and it appears to be the ancient analogue of our modern concept of analysis of reasoning, *Sāṅkhya* thus, emphasizes the importance of reasoning in bringing the individual to the point of liberation. In the *Sāṅkhya* system, liberation (*mukti*) is just the absolute and complete cessation of all pain without a possibility of return. It is the ultimate and or the *summum bonum* of our life (*apavarga* or *puruṣārtha*). The complete cessation of pain of these three kinds is the complete end and object of man. (*Trividhasya adhyatmic Adhibhotic,*

¹ *Tantra Magick* : 54

² SK.1. Trans., J Davies., London, (1881).

Adhidaevic, roopsay, dukhsay, atyantnivriti atyant Purushrth.)³ Ignorance is the cause of suffering. So freedom is to be attained through right knowledge of reality.

In this quest for sufferingless state, in this pursuit of immunity from change, fragility and luck we have to give up much of what makes human life worth living. At this state the metaphysics of *Sāṅkhya-Yoga* is invoked, that what we most truly are is rather different from what we originally imagine. *Kaivalya* may not seem a very appropriate picture of a good life for human beings, but according to *Sāṅkhya-Yoga*, the ordinary notion of ourselves as human beings is only a shallow misconception of what we really are. Essentially we are *puruṣa* and liberation is the realization of this. Indeed the *Sāṅkhy-Kārikā* insists that the *puruṣa* is never bound nor released; only *prakṛti* (especially as *buddhi*) transmigrates and is bound and released. “Liberation costs nothing but our errors about what we are”⁴.

7.2 The Conception of God in *Sāṅkhya*

It is observed by some scholars that although the original *Sāṅkhya* was monistic and theistic, the classical *Sāṅkhya*, perhaps under the influence of Materialism, Jainism and Early Buddhism, became atheistic. *Sāṅkhya* belongs to the orthodox (*āstika*) school of Indian philosophy because it believes in the authority of the *Veda*. *Sāṅkhya* does not establish the non-existence of God although it shows that *prakṛti* and *puruṣas*, i.e., consciousness and being, are sufficient to explain this universe and therefore there is no reason for postulating a hypothesis of God. But some commentators have literally tried to repudiate the existence of God, while the later *Sāṅkhya* writers like Vijñānabhikṣu have tried to revive the necessity for admitting God. Those who repudiate the existence of God offer a number of all sorts of arguments in support of its atheistic character. The classical *Sāṅkhya* argues against the existence of God on the following grounds:

³ SS 1.1; SK 1

⁴ Roy, W, Perett., “*Sāṅkhya-Yoga Ethics*” in Purhottama Bilmoria et al edited *Indian Ethics*, New Delhi, pp. 151, (2007).

- 1) If God is affected by selfish motives, He is not free; if He is free, He will not create this world of pain and misery. Either God is unjust and cruel or He is not free and all-powerful.
- 2) If the law of *karma* determines God, God is not free; if not, God is a tyrant.
- 3) Again, God being pure knowledge, this material world cannot spring from God. The effects are implicitly contained in their cause and the material world, which is subject to change, requires an unintelligent and ever-changing cause and not a spiritual and immutable God.
- 4) Again, the eternal existence of the *puruṣa* is inconsistent with God. If they are the parts of God, they must have some divine power. If God creates them, they are subject to destruction. Hence there is no God.
- 5) Since *puruṣas* or souls are eternal in both directions-never having come into being and never ceasing to exist-there is no need of a Creator God; the recognition of the eternity of souls automatically eradicates the need of a creator.
- 6) Again, the only way to liberation is to know the nature of *prakṛti* and the effects of *prakṛti* and their distinctiveness from spirit. Release can be brought about by true knowledge and for this purpose no appeal to God is needed.
- 7) Divine influence is also not necessary for explaining the purely mechanical creation and dissolution of the universe, in as much as the existence of the universe, in as much as the existence of the two principles, *prakṛti* and *puruṣa*, static and dynamic, very well builds up a comprehensive doctrine explaining the being and becoming of the universe.

Besides these the *Sāṅkhya-Sūtra* gives a series of arguments to prove the non-theistic character of this system. The arguments as stated in the first chapter of the *Sāṅkhya-Pravacana-Bhāṣya (Sūtrāni)* are as follows:

- a) As *Īśvara* can be neither free nor bound, nor be anything of a different character, there is no proof of His existence.
- b) On account of this above mentioned ‘no proof’ of *Īśvara*.

- c) If free from desire and all attachments, God can't be the creator, and if bound, God must be as ignorant as we are, so, even if there is a God, this God cannot exist as the Creator God.
- d) The sacred texts, which speak of *Īśvara*, are either glorifications of the free souls or homages paid to one made perfect by the practice of *Yoga*.
- e) God must be either bound or liberated. If God is bound He is tainted with merit and demerit and can't be accepted as God, and if God were a free soul He would have no desire to create this manifold world. Hence God cannot be admitted as the agent in the process of creation because of His unattached nature.
- f) That the world as a system of effects must have a cause is no doubt true. But God or *Brahman* cannot be the cause of the world. God is said to be the eternal and immutable self: and what is unchanging cannot be the active cause of anything. So it follows that the ultimate cause of the world is the eternal but ever-changing (*parināmi*) *prakṛti* or matter.
- g) It may be said that *prakṛti* being non-intelligent must be controlled and directed by some intelligent agent to produce the world. The individual selves are limited in knowledge and, therefore, cannot control the subtle material cause of the world. So there must be an infinitely wise being, i.e. God, who directs and guides *prakṛti*. But this is untenable. God, as conceived by the theists, does not act or exert Himself in any way; but to control and guide *prakṛti* is to act or do something. Supposing God is the controller of *prakṛti*, we may ask: What induced God to control *prakṛti* and thereby create the world? It cannot be any end of His own, for a perfect being cannot have any unfulfilled desire and unattained ends. Nor can it be good of His creatures. No prudent man bothers himself about the welfare of other beings without his own gain. As a matter of fact, the world is so full of sin and suffering that it can hardly be said to be the work of God who had the good of His creatures in view when He created.
- h) The belief in God is inconsistent with the distinctive reality and immortality or individual selves (*jīva*). If the latter were included within God as His parts, they ought to have some of the divine powers which, however, are not the case. On the other hand, if God creates them, they must be subject to destruction.

The conclusion drawn from all this is that God does not exist and that *prakṛti* is the sufficient reason for they're being a world of objects. *Prakṛti* creates the world unconsciously for the good of the individual selves (*puruṣa*) in the same way in which the milk of the cow flows unconsciously through her udder for the nourishment of the calf. Despite all these arguments that have sought to disprove God on logical and rational grounds, atheism in *Sāṅkhya* is still a debatable point. Therefore, it always makes sense to ask this question: “Does the system admit of the existence of God, or is it atheistic?” If we go by the nature of the rational spirit of *Sāṅkhya* system, in its classical form may *Sāṅkhya* may be regarded as holding a non-theistic and dualistic position. Even then there are differences in this front. Regarding the nature of the arguments offered by the *Sāṅkhya* school, some scholars are of the opinion that the *Sāṅkhya* is not atheistic in the sense that it attempts to establish that there is no God. It simply makes no attempt to prove the existence of *Īśvara* or God, on the grounds that not only are such proof not available, but that within the system there is no necessity for positing such a Supreme Being.

The attribute of the *Sāṅkhya* towards theism has been the subject of controversy among its commentators and interpreters. While some of them clearly repudiated the belief in God, others take great pains to make out that the *Sāṅkhya* is no less theistic than the Nyāya. Vijñānabhikṣu, the well-known commentator on the *Sāṅkhya Pravacana Sūtra*, attempts to explain away the *Sāṅkhya* attitude to God saying, “He, the supreme, i.e., the generic universal, collective *puruṣa*, possesses the power of knowing all and doing all, being like the lodestone, the mover to activity by means of mere proximity. It seems that although the old gods of the *Vedic* hymns manage to live under the patronage of the rationalistic *Sāṅkhya*, they are thought to be of no effect since the dual principles of *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* are entrusted with the processes of evolution, dissolution etc for which God, even if there was any, was pushed to the background just as one of the causal factors in the total scenario. *Sāṅkhya* admits also to the existence of an emergent *Īśvara* previously absorbed in *prakṛti*, who, at the time of creation, arranges the successive developments of *prakṛti*. This God, whom the *Sāṅkhya* admits, is not pure subject, but is an effect of *prakṛti* and has in him the potentiality of object. Vijñānabhikṣu

was hard put to account for the harmony between the needs of *puruṣa* and the actions of *prakṛti* and so he compromised by accepting a personal God to whom could be attributed the function of guiding the development of *prakṛti*. Vijñānabhikṣu sought to make concessions to *Sāṅkhya* by treating *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* as the *sakti* or energy of God, pointing out that between power and possessor of power there is no difference, and by treating the *puruṣas* as pure witnesses like *Īśvara* into whom they enter when liberated. We can sum up the diverse positions taken by the commentators in this regard in the following manner:

The noted scholar Vāchaspati Mishra justifies *Sāṅkhya*'s atheistic position on the following grounds:

1. The assumption of God is ontologically irrelevant.
2. It is logically unsound assumption.

A few centuries after Vāchaspati Mishra, Madhava, in his famous *Sarvadarśansanīgraha*, justifies atheistic position of classical *Sāṅkhya*. *Sāṅkhya* retains its *āstika* or conservative position because of its loyalty to the *Vedic* tradition. *Sāṅkhya* advocates that *prakṛti* and *puruṣas* are sufficient to explain this universe and therefore there is no reason for postulating a God-hypothesis. Although some early commentators have accepted *Sāṅkhya* skepticism in this regard, some later commentators like Vijñānabhikṣu have identified *Sāṅkhya* position as theistic.

7.3 Toward an Integral Personality of the Situated and Existential Man: Need for God and Salvation for the Practice of Yoga

'Yoga' is often derived from the verbal root 'yuj', which means *TO YOKE*. In most contexts of Indian thought, *Yoga* has been associated with elaborate mental and physical disciplines, geared to achieving some liberated state. Thus, the title of the philosophical school *Yoga* informs us that it is concerned with such activities. Like *Sāṅkhya*, *Yoga* acknowledges existential suffering as one of the givens and as one basic fact of life. It further clarifies its stand on what suffering means and what are these and why one does undergo suffering.

7.3.1 Kinds of *Kleśas*

The *Yoga* believes that *avidyā* or ignorance breeds false knowledge which in its turn breeds *kleśas* or sufferings. *Kleśas* are of five kinds:

- (1) Ignorance (*Avidyā*)- The seeing of self as eternal and pure as non-eternal, impure and painful not-self is *avidyā*.
- (2) Egoism (*Asmitā*)- False conception of identity between *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* and the admitting of no distinction between them is *asmitā*.
- (3) Attachment (*Rāga*) – Acute thirsting for worldly pleasure is *rāga*.
- (4) Aversion (*Dveṣa*)- Feeling of jealousy with anger for others is *dveṣa*.
- (5) Fear of Death (*Abhinivesha*)- Clinging to life and instinctive fear of death is *abhinivesha*.

All these *kleśas* cause wrong identification with the mental modifications and cause bondage. And liberation, therefore, means the end of this wrong identification and the resulting cessation of mental modifications through the practice of *Yoga*.

7.3.2 From Existential Suffering to God: Theism in *Yoga*

God concept is essential for the philosophy of *Yoga*. The *Yoga* system became a part and parcel of *Sāṅkhya* at a later stage. Patañjali has written in his *Yoga-Sūtra*, and God is a particular person who is devoid five *kleśas* of *avidyā*, *asmitā*, *rāga*, *dveṣa* and *abhinivesha*. The *jīva* has to bear the fruits of his *karmas* and accordingly, he or she enjoys and suffers in the world. God is free from all this. God is different even from the *kevali* i. e. the liberated man. The *kevali* is liberated from the bondage, but God was neither in bondage nor ever will be. Hence God is different from *Kevali*. Unlike classical *Sāṅkhya*, *Yoga* is theistic in that it admits the existence of God (*Īśvara*). But *Īśvara* is not an additional ontological principle of the system; rather God here is just a special kind of *puruṣa*, one who has never become wrong identified with *prakṛti* and hence is particularly effective as a model for that aspiring for release. God is eternally free and is above and beyond the law

of *karma*. God is absolute perfection and is knowledge incarnate. God is the Teacher of the *Ṛṣis* and the Teacher of the *Veda*. The only purpose of God is to show compassion towards the living beings. Thus it becomes evident that the practical man of *Yoga* could reconcile the theistic and religious needs and aspirations for refinement and growth and development of one's personality in a harmonious manner. The interest of earlier *Yoga* philosophers including the founder Patañjali in God seems to be for serving practical purpose rather than satisfying mere intellectual quest. For them, God is only one of the objects on which *Yogis* can concentrate their minds. The only purpose of God is to do good to the aspirants of *Yoga*. Patañjali says that *Īśvara Pranidhāna* helps in the attainment of *Samādhi*. However, *Yoga*, the school complementary to *Sāṅkhya*, remains closer in spirit with *Sāṅkhya* when some of its adherents proclaim that devotion to a personal God serves a practical aid to liberation, and that theism is not an outstanding part of its teaching. *Yoga* abstains from bringing into unity the three ideas- God, soul, and matter.

According to Vijñānabhikṣu, “the *Yoga* in order to avoid the difficulties of meeting the imputations of a partial or a cruel God has accepted *prakṛti* in all its winding and unwinding.” *Īśvara* is only one of the many objects on which *Yogis* can concentrate their mind. The only purpose of *Īśvara* is to do good to his devotees. The meditation on God or *pranava* helps in the attainment of *Samādhi*. These positions of some commentators of *Yoga* echo the basic concerns of *Sāṅkhya* darśana and it makes God's position redundant. The foregoing discussion makes it clear that God of *Sāṅkhya* and also of some phases of *Yoga* is not the creator, preserver or destroyer of this world. God does not reward or punish the souls. Innumerable *puruṣas* and *prakṛtis*, all eternal and absolutes, are there to limit God and God alone can not bestow liberation unless there is full co operation from the embodied and situated man of he world. God can only remove the obstacles in the upward progress of the devotees who are the authors of their own spiritual destiny. Besides, God has nothing to do with the bondage and the liberation of the *puruṣas*, it is a mechanical process that ignorance binds and the knowledge of the discrimination between *prakṛti* and *puruṣa* liberates. The end of human life is not the union with god, but only the separation of *puruṣas* from *prakṛti*.

Although commentators like Vijñānabhikṣu did not consider God as necessary in solving the problems of the world, later *Yoga* philosophers have shown much theoretical interest in God. Later *Yogins* have tried to prove God's existence as a necessary philosophical speculation. Interestingly *Yoga* has made efforts to safeguard its theistic concerns rationally and logically besides safeguarding God on pragmatic and therapeutic grounds alone. While *Sāṅkhya* logically seeks to refute God, the *Yoga* philosophers have advanced the following arguments to prove God:

1. The existence of God is proved by the scriptures. The scriptures including *Vedas* and *Upaniṣads* etc. have described God as the ultimate existence and the *summum-bonum* of life.
2. Existence must have a lowest and highest limit. Just as with regard to the quantity there is the smallest and biggest, similarly. Knowledge and power etc. must also have their highest limits, i.e., there should be persons possessing the greatest knowledge and maximum power. Thus the ultimate *puruṣa* is *Īśvara*. Had there been another person equal to him, in knowledge and power, the system of the world should be destroyed by their conflict. Hence God is unique.
3. The union and disunion of *prakṛti* and *puruṣa* lead to creation and destruction respectively, but because they are very much different in nature, the union and disunion is not possible spontaneously. Hence there must be an efficient cause, responsible for the union. The efficient cause is God. Without the direction from God, the *prakṛti* cannot evolve a world which is favourable for the self-evolution of the living beings. God is the efficient cause in their proximity. Hence God exists, as without God no evolution is possible.

Devotion to God is the surest way of obtaining concentration and there by liberation. Patañjali regards *Īśvara Pranidhāna* as a means to attain *Samādhi* only, but later *Yoga* philosophers consider it to be the best means because God is not merely an object of concentration but also the great Lord who removes impediments from the path of *Yoga* and thus makes it easy.

A true devotee of God and one, who always depends on God, remains meditating on Him and sees God pervading the whole universe. Such a devotee gets the purity of the heart and the light of the intellect and other Excellencies from the God. The sacred sound of 'Pranava' is a synonym for God as the scriptures also define God as *Sabda Brahman*. "His symbol is the syllable *AUM*. This sound is divine: it stands in praise of divine fulfillment. *Aum* is the universal sound (*sabda Brahman*). Philosophically, it is regarded as the seed of all words. No word can be uttered without the symbolic sound of these three letters, ā, u and m. The sound begins with the letter ā, causing the mouth to open. So the beginning is ā. To speak, it is necessary to roll the tongue and move the lips. This is symbolized by the letter u. The ending of the sound is the closing of the lips, symbolized by the letter m. *AUM* represents communion with God, the Soul and with the Universe."⁵ Liberation or *kaivalya* occurs once an individual is drenched with moral goodness, in an event called 'dharmameghasmadhi' (*Yoga-Sūtra* IV. 29).

The repetition and meditation of its meaning helps in the concentration. By meditating on God with one pointed mind the intellect is purified and all the impediments are destroyed. The aspirant realizes himself/herself through *Īśvara pranidhāna*. Interestingly liberated *puruṣa* attains God-like state but there is a difference. In *Sāṅkhya-Yoga* there is a difference between liberated man and God as *Īśvara*. The liberated persons like Kapila etc., were first in the bondage and then liberated. God, on the other hand, was never in bondage. Hence God is different from the *mukta puruṣa* also, because such a *puruṣa*, in spite of being liberated has the possibility of getting into bondage in future. God is called *Īśvara* because of his powers of knowledge, desire and activity. There is no one equal or better to God in virtues. God possesses all these virtues since eternally. Patañjali has not considered God as different from the twenty-five elements of *Sāṅkhya*. The only purpose of God is to have compassion towards the living beings.

⁵ Yehudi, Menuhin, *Light on the Yoga-Sūtra of Patañjali: Patañjala Yoga Pradīpakā*.

7.3.3 Techniques of *Yoga-Sūtra*

The descriptions given below is a summary of some of the *Yogic* techniques that are offered to any aspirant who wants to proceed in the struggle for spiritual dimension of life, whose sole goal is emancipation of *puruṣa* (consciousness/ self) from the clutches of ignorance and inauthenticity. The following are step-by-step meditation procedures the exact nature of which differ text wise.

a) **Meditation on objects composed of the five elements:** Meditation often starts with awareness of gross objects of one kind or another. It might be done with the eyes open, or with the eyes closed. It might be some religious or spiritual object, a picture, a geometric form, or a point of concentration, such as a candle flame or light visualized in the inner mind field. The object of attention might be scanning ones own physical body, or awareness of the mechanics of breathe regulation.

In each of these and other cases, we are dealing with the gross world of objects, which are each related to the world of earth, water, fire, air, and space. One might use a single object of meditation, or a variety of objects. The objects might be constructed of the physical five elements (*bhūtas*) or their subtle counterparts (*tanmātrās*). They might be experienced as solid or heavy, like in the waking state, or as thin or vaporous, like in the dreaming state. One might focus on many such constructed gross and subtle objects for many years. However, we might move to subtler meditation, where the object of meditation becomes the five elements themselves, and the sensing instruments themselves.

b) **Meditation on the five elements themselves:** Gradually, as the mediator progresses in attention training, there comes the ability to focus on and explore each of the five elements themselves, one at a time. At this stage one learns to see more subtly how all objects are constructed, which helps to temporarily set aside all such objects during meditation. One can literally meditate on the elements of earth, or water, or fire, or air, or space. Because one can see that all of the grosser

objects as being only constructs (made of the five elements), non-attachment comes more easily and naturally⁶.

c) **Meditation on senses or means of cognition (*jñānendriyas*):** As meditation progresses still further, the aspirant can come to explore the senses themselves, as objects of meditation. One can now examine the instruments with which we experience all of those objects (described above). If we can imagine for a moment the way a telescope works, we may observe the following:

- a) There is some object out there, such as a mountain in the distance.
- b) There is a person in here (“me” or “I”), who is experiencing that distant mountain.
- c) The telescope is a third part of this process, and is the instrument by which the perception occurs.

In this metaphor, we might focus our attention not only on the mountains in the distance (the objects), but we might also focus attention on the telescope itself, the instrument with which we have previously been using to look at the mountains. Similarly our five cognitive senses (smelling, tasting, seeing, touching, and hearing) are instruments by which the indweller (however you conceptualize or name that) experiences the external world. As meditation progresses, we turn our attention inward, in such a way that we are examining those instruments themselves. Those senses appear to be physical instruments, such as a physical eyeball. However, we also, for example, see in our dreams, so we come to understand that the sense of sight (as well as the other senses) is internal or mental processes.

e) **Meditation on instruments of action (*karmendriyas*):** The instruments of action (*karmendriyas*) are also doorways to the external world. These instruments (elimination, procreation, motion, grasping, and speaking) are the means by which the indweller expresses outward into the world. These instruments of action

⁶ *Yoga-Sūtras* 1.12-1.16 on *Vairagya*, *Sūtras* 2.10-2.11 on subtle meditation, and *Sūtras* 3.45-3.46 on the five elements.

(*karmendriyas*) are the exporters, so to speak, while the cognitive senses (*jñānendriyas*) are the importers. Both are in service of the indweller. Together, they form a complete communication system between the inner and the outer.

At meditation time, we not only turn the cognitive senses inward, we also withdraw these instruments of action as well. This is why, at the grossest level of meditation practice, we both close our eyes and we sit still; one has to do with the exporter, and the other with the importer. This is a process of turning inward of the *jñānendriyas* and the *karmendriyas*. As with the senses (noted above), the instruments of actions themselves also become objects, so to speak, of exploration in meditation. We learn to witness the tendencies of expression themselves. We become aware of the inclinations toward moving and speaking, for example, becoming literally aware of the cessation of these processes, as we come inward towards stillness. It is as if the senses and instruments of action are beginning to come inward in such a way that they are receding back into the mind and *prakṛti* from which they originally emerged. This process of withdrawal of the ten *indriyas* is described in the *Yoga-Sūtras*, as part of *pratyahāra*, which is rung 5 of the 8 rungs of *Yoga* (*Yoga-Sūtras* 2.54-2.55).




Figure7.1: Self-Realization (Downloaded from http://swamiji.com/yoga_sutra_25455.htm on 28/09/05)

f) Meditation on mind itself: As we see in this chart the senses and means of cognition (*indriyas*) as well as the five elements (*tanmātrās* and *bhūtas*) emerge from the field of mind (*manas*) at the very subtle level of mind. Gradually, one has the ability to use mind itself as the object of meditation. This is extremely subtle, beyond our normal idea of what it means to witness the flow of thoughts in the mind and usually the novice has to take help of a spiritual guide in this regard. Here, again, we are literally aware of the instrument of mind itself. In the *Eight Rungs of Yoga (Yoga-Sūtra 2.29)*, rung five is *Pratyāhāra*, the withdrawal of the senses when one truly turns one's attention inward bracketing one's attention not only from the typical objects of attention, but also from the senses themselves. One then encounters deeper ability to concentrate on the mind itself. Like meditation on the elements and the senses themselves (as objects), awareness of mind (*manas*) itself has a bewildering quality to it, as we come back into our day-to-day

awareness and try to understand or explain this. By being aware of this, it is easier to hold the subtlety of such experience.

g) **Meditation on *I am-ness (ego or ahaṅkāra)***: Most of the time we mistakenly think that “who I am” is my mind and personality. However, as we gradually come to witness the subtle elements, the senses, and the mind itself, we come to see that there is a still subtler aspect, which simply declares, “I am!” When it stands alone in this way, it is independent of the other manifestations. To be aware of this “I-am-ness” (*ahaṅkāra*) is a further stage along the journey to realization of pure Consciousness (*puruṣa*). This *ahaṅkāra* (literally “I-maker”) becomes the coloring agent for attachments and aversions, which define our personalities and false identities. In meditation on this subtle level, those have subsided along with the senses. Once again, that the process is similar to dealing with gross objects of meditation, as well as the elements and senses. Something emerged from something, and now we are simply becoming aware of that substratum, letting go of the more surface manifestations.

h) **Meditation with *Buddhi* standing alone**: Still subtler is *buddhi*, which is the individuated intelligence itself. It doesn't yet declare itself to be this or that identity, but is the very intelligence, which supports the ego (*ahaṅkāra*), the senses and instruments of actions (*indriyas*), and the constructs of the inner objects and physical body (*tanmātrās* and *bhūtas*). One of the final resting places of the individuated person is to know oneself as *buddhi*, this most fine vehicle of consciousness (*puruṣa*). It is still constructed of *prakṛti*, leaving that final discrimination or uncovering yet to be done. To know oneself at this level of *buddhi* is sometimes called the level of bliss or *ānanda*, as all of the other levels and false identities have temporarily come to rest or been transcended.

i) ***Puruṣa* resting in itself**: Finally *puruṣa*, pure consciousness, rests in itself, alone, separate from all evolutes of *prakṛti*. The seeker on the path of Self-realization seeks even a minute or a moment of this highest glimpse of Realization, after which he or she continues to purify the remaining *sanskāras* and *karmas*.

Although the specific practices are the subject of the *Yoga-Sūtras*, this spiritual journey is sought to be mapped systematically, and the effort bears fruit, as it appears to flow much more smoothly for one who achieves a general understanding of the entire process from the real of *prakṛti* to that of the *puruṣa* or the realm of selfhood and subjectivity. This understanding, along with oral counsel, and the most important part of all, which is practice, gradually brings one to direct experience, which is the goal, the salvation and the emancipation of enlightened *puruṣa* in *Sāṅkhya* and of the enlightened and embodied person of the *Yoga* who is an integral personality combining in him or her the actualizations of all the hidden potentialities of cognition, affection and volition. Here we have to highlight the moral and the social aspect of the *Yogi*. Before that we must sum up *Sāṅkhya* concept of bondage and liberation.

7.3.4 *Yoga*: Transformation of Ignorance into Knowledge (Seven states of Wisdom)

After explaining the functions of nature and of the seer, Patañjali speaks of the seven states of understanding or wisdom (*prajñā*) that emerge from the release of nature's contact with the seer, first let us identify the seven corresponding states of ignorance, or *avidyā*.

The seven states of wisdom are:

1. Knowing that which has to be known
2. Discarding that which is to be discarded
3. Attaining that which has to be attained
4. Doing that which has to be done
5. Winning the goal that is to be won
6. Freeing the intelligence from the pull of the three *guṇas* of nature
7. Achieving emancipation of the soul so that it shines in its own light

They may be further simplified as:

1. Understanding the body within and without
2. Understanding energy and its uses

3. Understanding mind
4. Consistency of will
5. Awareness of experience
6. Awareness of pure quintessence, sentiment and beauty
7. Understanding that the individual soul, *jivātman*, is a particular of the Universal spirit, *Paramātman*

The *Yoga Vasista* correlates this *Sūtra* (II.27) with the seven stages of individual development:

1. Study and cultivation of the company of wise men
2. Capacity to solve problems
3. Development of non-attachment
4. Dissolution of inherent faults
5. Working towards the bliss in which a half-sleeping and half-wakeful state is experienced
6. Experience of a deep sleep state
7. Attaining a state in which purity, tranquility and compassion flow out towards others.

The seven frontiers of awareness also correlate with the five sheaths or *kośas* of the body. Consciousness is the sixth, and the inner self, the seventh. Patañjali describes the seven states of awareness as:

1. Emerging consciousness (*vyutthāna citta*)
2. Refraining consciousness (*nirodha citta*)
3. Tranquil consciousness (*santa/praśānta citta*)
4. One-pointed attention (*ekāgratā citta*)
5. Sprouted consciousness (*nirmāṇa citta*)
6. Rent consciousness (*chidra citta*)
7. Pure consciousness (*divya citta*)

It is also possible to consider the ethical, physical, physiological neurological, emotional, intellectual and spiritual domains as the seven states of awareness. When one rests on the vision of the soul, divinity is felt in this empirical state.

7.4 Different Interpretations of the Liberated state in *Sāṅkhya* and in *Yoga*:

7.4.1 Critical Estimate of the *Sāṅkhya* Position

For *Sāṅkhya*, bondage and liberation are not real for *purusa*, it is only the ego (*ahankāra*), the product *prakṛti*, which is bound, and also liberated. *Puruṣa* remains in complete isolation and remains untouched by bondage and liberation. Critics of *Sāṅkhya* have been quick to point out that *puruṣa* is defined in *Sāṅkhya-kārikā* as inherently liberated and indifferent to pain and pleasure, thus it should be in no need of liberation. *Sāṅkhya*'s response to this criticism again hinges on *buddhi*, but with an additional notion known as the 'predispositions' (*bhāva*). The predispositions that blind and liberate are classified into three types and into eight types: the three are innate, natural and acquired; the eight are dharma (meritorious action), which leads to rebirth in a higher life, *adharma* (demerit), which leads to lower births, knowledge, which leads to liberation, ignorance leading to bondage, detachment leading to dissociation from the activities of *prakṛti*, attachment producing the cycle of birth and death, power conducive to controlling circumstances and importance leading to loss of control. Innateness, acquisition, detachment leading to dissociation from activities of *prakṛti* and power conducive to controlling forces are considered *sattvic*, their opposites are considered *tamāsic*.

Although *Sāṅkhya puruṣa*, prior to liberation, watches *prakṛti*'s transformations and suffers the pain of old age and death, after liberation, there is change in perspectives. At this stage, while 'standing like a spectator,' *puruṣa* views *prakṛti* who, having fulfilled her purpose, stops, turning her back on the seven forms', that is all the predispositions except knowledge. Although *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* are still conjoined, no new relation is generated and no new predispositions are created. By the attainment of correct knowledge the seven predisposition cease to cause further embodiment and yet, 'like a potter's wheel that continue to spin even after the

potter has stopped applying force’, embodiment continues for a while. Having fulfilled its purpose, *prakṛti* ceases functioning, sometimes understood to mean that the qualities return to an equilibrium from which no further transformations emerge. Attaining separation from the body, *puruṣa* attains everlasting ‘salvation’ or ‘freedom’ (*kaivalya*). Īśvarakṛṣṇa frankly puts it thus: “*Puruṣa*, therefore, is really neither bound nor is it liberated nor does it transmigrate; bondage, liberation and transmigration belong to *prakṛti* in its manifold forms. There is nothing finer and subtler than *prakṛti*; she is shy that she never reappears before that *puruṣa* which has once ‘seen’ her in her true colours. Just as a dancing girl retires from the stage after entertaining the audience, similarly *prakṛti* also retires after exhibiting herself to the *puruṣa*”⁷.

The *Yoga-Sūtra* is quite clear that it is the *puruṣa* that is liberated from its pedagogical association with *prakṛti*, which Patañjali calls ‘*samyoga*’ (II.17). In contrast, the *Sāṅkhya-Kārikā* admits that in the *Sāṅkhya* view, it is not the *puruṣa* that is liberated but Nature itself that goes through the charade of being bound and liberated (that is, it is the subtle body or the psychological dispositions of the mind that are liberated, not the person) for the benefit of the *puruṣa*.

Sāṅkhya accepts both *jivanmukti* and *videhamukti*. For the *jivanmukta* person, the final and the absolute emancipation, the complete disembodied isolation automatically comes after death. This is known as *videhamukti*. The ideal of *kaivalya*, the isolation of *puruṣa* from *prakṛti* and all its transformations, is the eschatological goal (*videhamukti*). Within this life another can be reached: the state of *jivanmukti* wherein the *puruṣa* continues to be associated with the *buddhi*, but it is a purified *buddhi* such that on attaining separation from the body *kaivalya* is both certain and final. Although *kaivalya* is an escape from the world of suffering, no positive bliss is associated with it. The self not only has no pleasure and pain in that condition it is also without knowledge since it lacks the means thereof (the *buddhi*). However the liberated self does not become insentient, sentience is the very substance of the self. In this state, all kinds of bodies, subtle and gross attain

⁷ Dr. Mishra., *Indian Philosophy*, published by V.K. Chopra, pp.206, (2006).

complete liberation or *kaivalya*. According to Vijñānabhikṣu, *videhamukti* is the only kind of liberation because so long as the body detains and restrains the soul, the liberation is not entirely free from physical and mental distortions. The *Vedānta* regards *mokṣa* as a state of happiness but *Sāṅkhya* regards liberation above pleasure and pain, beyond all qualities. Find salvation as reaching a transcendental level of consciousness.

Critics also find fault with *Sāṅkhyan* conception of liberation as a negative cessation of the three kinds of pain and not as a state of positive bliss. *Sāṅkhya* feels that bliss is a product of *Sattva guṇa* and cannot remain in liberation which is the state beyond the *guṇas*. But *Sāṅkhya* forgets that the bliss in liberation is not empirical happiness produced by *sattva*. This bliss is also transcendental in character. It is beyond both pain and pleasure. What is related to pain is empirical pleasure and not transcendental bliss. It appears as if the liberated *puruṣas*, the *kevala* in *Sāṅkhya* are the eternally isolated units who would represent ‘a vast array of sad personalities’. If liberation is an annihilation (*nasmi, naham*) of human personality and not its perfections the ideal of the liberation is most uninspiring, the critics feel they would rather look for a kind of eternal existence that is positively blissful and ever dynamic. Vijñānabhikṣu, however, thinks that the latter is the real kind of liberation, since the self cannot be competently free from the influence of bodily and mental changes so long as it is embodied.⁸ But all *Sāṅkhyas* agree that liberation is only the complete destruction of the threefold misery (*dukṣa-traya-bhigāta*). It is not a state of joy as conceived in the *Vedānta*. Where there is no pain, there can neither be any pleasure; because the two are relative and inseparable.

7.4.2 The Moral and the Intersubjective Dimension of Worldly Beings: Salvation as Actualisation of all Potentialities

The most important differences between the two schools of *Sāṅkhya-Yoga* are their respective views on the nature of *puruṣa*. Both schools agree that the *puruṣa*'s nature is that of a consciousness and luminous being. However, the *Yoga* tradition

⁸ Cf. *Pravacana-bhasya*, 3. 76-84, 5.116.

regards *puruṣas* as actors as well. This difference is brought out the following lines from the *Sāṅkhya-Kārikā*: ‘It is clear that no one is ever bound; no one is ever liberated, nor does anyone transmigrate; it is Nature (*prakṛti*) assuming many forms that is bound, is liberated, and transmigrates. This is a rather remarkable line, for in its account, we as persons are merely passive spectators in our lives: bondage and liberation are things that happen to our natural constitution and not to us. Whatever reasoning that may happen to eventually facilitate our liberation occurs in our natural constitution, and is wholly extraneous to us. We might call such a view the ‘non-agency view’, but the ancient ascetic philosophers of India had their own label for such a view. They, particularly the Jain philosophers, called it ‘*akriyavāda*’ or ‘non-action view’, because it conceives of selves as passive. This is the aspect of the *Sāṅkhya* philosophy that the Jains, in particular, found most objectionable⁹. Can *Yoga* also be classified as an *akriyavāda*?

The evidence suggests that the *Yoga darśana* (literally ‘view’ or ‘perspective’) espouses the contrary view—the view that selves are active; or rather, the *Yoga darśana* is a species of the *kriyavāda* or agency view. *Kriyavāda* is negatively borne out in *Yoga* by the conspicuous absence of bold statements, of the kind found in *Sāṅkhya* literature, which attribute non-agency to the self. Positively, Patañjali affirms the *kriyavāda in Yoga*’s view that the *puruṣa* is the ‘master of the character of the mind’ (*citta-vrttaya-s tat-prabhoh*) (*Yoga-Sūtra* IV. 18); That is, the *puruṣa* is the one ultimately in charge. Patañjali echoes this empowered view of the *puruṣa* elsewhere in the *Yoga-Sūtra* as well (see II.23). In keeping with this theme, at the outset of the *Yoga-Sūtra*, Patañjali tells us that the objective of *Yoga* is to control the moral character of thought (I.2), which results in a person abiding in its essence. (I.3). Accomplishing the control of the mental culminates in liberation. *Yoga* requires constant practice and effort (I.12-13). Thus, success comes to those who are intense (*samveganam*) (I.21). Such a programme expresses optimism about a person’s ability to gain control of the nature that constitutes their body and mind. Such comments would make little sense if persons were completely not responsible for their fate.

⁹ cf. *Sūtrakṛtanga* I.i.1.13.

Repeatedly, Patañjali emphasizes that persons are in control (that they are ‘master of the character of the mind’ *Yoga-Sūtra* IV.18), that the will is what accounts for the troubled, bound state of the individual (*Yoga-Sūtra* IV. 9-10), and that this state provides persons with the opportunity to be the cause of their own liberation (i.e. their own spiritual master) (*Yoga-Sūtra* II.23): “Yet, popular and scholarly accounts of the *Yoga-Sūtra*, blurred with the value theory of *Sāṅkhya* and *Advaita Vedānta*, marginalize both the ethical and empowering aspect of *Yoga* theory.”¹⁰

Thus we find that what is common to both *Sāṅkhya* and *Advaita Vedānta*, the conception of a passive, non-agential conception of the true self, is a counter position to the practical nature of Patañjali’s *Yoga-Sūtra*. According to both *Sāṅkhya* and *Advaita Vedānta*, ultimately real persons (which are many in the case of *Sāṅkhya* and unitary in the case of *Advaita Vedānta*) are merely pure consciousness or passive spectators that never do anything but merely view the phantasm of the world. In both systems, ethics, and *dharma*, does not lead directly to liberation, but at best too more favourable circumstances, such as birth in heavenly regions. However, for *Advaita Vedānta*, as espoused by the famous Śaṅkara, morality can be a distraction from liberation, particularly in the case of a serious aspirant¹¹.

This contrasts sharply with Patañjali’s view that *dharma*, or Ethics, is essential to the achievements of liberation for all a view that goes hand in hand with the practical outlook of Patañjali. While *Sāṅkhya* and *Advaita Vedānta* regard liberation to be a function of an intellectual insight into the nature of the self and not a yogic process of personal practice and purification,¹² Patañjali regards liberation to be a direct result of the effort that persons put into the practice of *Yoga*, geared as it is to moral perfection. This is closely connected to another contrast between *Yoga* on the one hand, and *Sāṅkhya* and *Advaita Vedānta* on the other. For *Yoga*, bondage (transmigration across lives) is a real problem for the person.

¹⁰ http://www.gwipl.org/documents/FORE_religions_environment.pdf accessed on 11/09/2008.

¹¹ See Śaṅkara’s *Bhāgavad Gītā Bhāṣya* 4:21; and *Sāṅkhya-Kārikā* 44

¹² *Sāṅkhya- Kārikā* 23-46; Śaṅkara’s *Brahma Sūtra- Bhāṣya* I.i.4),

Wu-wei: What is said above regarding *Sāṅkhya-Yoga puruṣa* might also be made more explicit with a reference to the Taoist sage's reference of Wu-wei and how the Taoist sage wins and rules an empire in Tao Te Ching.

Wu-wei (traditional Chinese: 無為; simplified Chinese: 无为; is an important tenet of Taoism also known as Daoism, that involves knowing when to act and when not to act. Another perspective to this is that “Wu-wei” means natural action as planets revolve around the sun, they “do” this revolving, but without “doing” it; or as trees grow, they “do”, but without “doing.” Thus knowing when (and how) to act is not knowledge in the sense that one would think “now” is the right time to do “this”, but rather just doing it, doing the natural thing. Similar to the *Yogi* who acts in detachment even after liberation the Taoist sage remains active out of compassion for mankind.

The basic concern of *Yoga darśana* for safeguarding the *dhārmic* and the moral dimension of life is a reflection of one of the general concerns of Indian philosophers in general to re focus, time and again, the hidden meaning of some of the ethical concepts by their text type theoretical function and their effort to show that ‘*dharma*’, in all its variegated uses in Indian philosophy, is the correlate of ‘ethical’ or ‘moral’. In step with this practical and ethical emphasis is his correlative affirmation that persons (*puruṣas*) are not only transcendent beings of consciousness and knowledge, but also volitional beings. Indeed, Patañjali characterizes *puruṣas* as having the characteristic of *cetanā*. (*Yoga-Sūtra* I.29), which in Sanskr̥t not only denotes consciousness and knowledge, but also the will. For while Patañjali's whole project is geared to moral improvement of the liberated person, it culminates in *dharmameghasāmadhi*, the rain cloud of morally liberating state of absorption, that, Patañjali observes, should be able to wash away all stains and evils. *Sāṅkhya* and *AdvaitaVedānta*, while possessing philosophical views on *dharma*, have little use for *dharma* in their account of what is ultimately important. In light of this clearly moral emphasis of Patañjali's philosophy, it becomes evident that the aspect of his thought devoted to practice, external moral

observances and internal purification of the psyche are not simply pragmatic means to some abstract spiritual end, but directly a function of his concern for the ethical.

Parallel to this moral and inter subjective dimension of *Yogins* and liberated *puruṣas*, contrary to some other interpretations in this line takes theism in *Yoga* as a serious effort on their part to safeguard the inter personal dimension of *Yogic* liberated *puruṣa* even after liberation. For Patañjali, essential to the practice of *Yoga* is surrendering to *Īśvara*, or the Lord. *Īśvara* is a term that traditionally in the context of *Hindu* and Indian thought (including *Yoga*) has always denoted a personal, theistic God, and is understood as such by other philosophers in the Indian tradition. Buddhist readings of the *Yoga-Sūtra* sweep this signification under the rug and recast *Īśvara* in terms of the realized soul. This error is not far removed from the *Advaita Vedānta* distortion of conflicting *Īśvara* with the universal consciousness that is the basis of all reality. The *Sāṅkhya-Kārikā* at one point appears to affirm the lordship of the *puruṣa*, but this is a chimera. In *Sāṅkhya-Kārikā* 17, *Īśvarakṛṣṇa* argues that one of the reasons that *puruṣas* must be thought to exist is because something must be the *adhishānat* this term can sometimes be translated as ‘governing’ or ‘lording over’, but it also refers to something that stands by and observes. Shortly afterwards, *Īśvarakṛṣṇa* tells us that *puruṣa* is really characterized by percipience (*drastrtvam*) and non-agency (*akartrbhāva*). Lordship and governance is alien to the *Sāṅkhya* conception of *puruṣa*. In contrast, the *Yoga-Sūtra* at no point affirms the non-agency of the *puruṣa*. As we have seen, it affirms the opposite. The *Sāṅkhya-Kārikā* must take this bold stance because of its position on the passivity of the *puruṣa*: if *puruṣas* cannot act, but are pure witnesses, then they cannot change. If they cannot change, they can no more be bound as they can be liberated. Liberation in the *Sāṅkhya* account (much like the *Advaita Vedānta* account) is an event experienced by an evolving bundle of Nature, which comes to the realization that it does not exist as a person (*Sāṅkhya-Kārikā*). This perspective is alien to the practical and proactive philosophy of Patañjali’s *Yoga-Sūtra* that regards entanglement or bondage (*samyoga*) and liberation (*kaivalya*) to be distinct events that occur to a person.

Another related and extremely significant difference between *Sāṅkhya* and *Yoga* is their respective views on the relationship between morality and liberation. As mentioned earlier, morality is intrinsic to the *Yoga* account of the path to liberation, and to the final event of liberation itself. Liberation or *kaivalya* occurs once an individual is drenched with moral goodness, in an event called ‘*dharmameghasmadhi*’ (*Yoga-Sūtra* IV. 29). The picture that we receive from the *Yoga-Sūtra* is thus that in constraining our natural constitution to be moral, we allow the body and mind to reflect the *puruṣa*’s true nature and for the *puruṣa* to have self-knowledge. Hence, morality is essential to live authentically as a person, in Patañjali’s account. *Sāṅkhya*, in contrast, regards morality as a mere device to gain favourable births. Ethics, for the *SK*, is thus a means of karmic betterment and nothing more. This too is a form of bondage for *Sāṅkhya*. Liberation is only a result of knowledge that reveals the nature of the *puruṣa* as a passive spectator that is distinct from natural causes (*SK* 44-45, 63-64). For *Yoga* one’s efforts make what one becomes. A bird cannot fly with one wing. In the same way, we need the two wings of practice and renunciation to soar up the zenith of Soul realization.

Such liberation also keeps room for a relational and an engaged personality that attains *kaivalya* and liberation while still in association with others existing in a situated world. Such a liberated man also attains a religious dimension of life for which whatever one does there is commitment as well as detachment, there is renunciation while in enjoyment and there is spirualisation even of the mundane and the embodied realm. The liberated man in *Yoga* is compassionate and caring, enlightened and moral, a true believer in God whose life is an offering to God.

The picture that we receive from the *Yoga-Sūtra* is thus that in constraining our natural constitution to be moral, we allow the body and mind to reflect the *puruṣa*’s true nature and for the *puruṣa* to have self-knowledge. Thus we find that the participatory nature of the *Yogi* keeps room for a creative interaction between the self and the other, the mundane and the divine, the cognitive, affective and the volitional aspects of one’s personality in such a manner that there should not be any antagonism between the one and he other. The *Yogic* liberated man in this *Yoga* system is one who emerges as an integral personality. To quote from

Patañjali's *Yoga-Sūtra* the liberated man is one who is a culmination of all the following:

*“Maitri-karuna-muditopeksanam sukha-duhkha-
Punyapunya-visayanam bhavanatas-citta-prasadanam*

Mentality brightens, and gets to be of a serene disposition and good humour, when one takes on an attitude of friendliness towards the pleasant, of compassion for those who suffer, of joy for the meritorious, and of equanimity towards the unmeritorious.”¹³



¹³ Ranganathan, Shyam, *Patañjali's Yoga Sūtra*, Penguin Books, pp.108, (2008).

CHAPTER – 8

Reflections and Comparison

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Chapter 8

Reflections and Comparison

8.1 Reflections and Comparison

Chapter 8, “Reflections and Comparison”, is an attempt at comparing some basic themes of the Existentialist Philosophy of Jean Paul Sartre expounded above and some of the key themes of *Sāṅkhya-Yoga Darśana* in order to demonstrate that they both suggest methodological approaches toward attainment of a higher state of Consciousness, that both aim at cessation of suffering and attainment of release and Freedom as against, bondage, materialism and existential suffering. That existential suffering is the central focus of both these systems is an accepted fact. One of the principal texts of the *Sāṅkhya* School, the *Sāṅkhya-Kārikā* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa, puts supreme emphasis on existential suffering as one of its key themes. The concerns of this text are made clear in the opening stanzas¹(*Kārikā* I). It means that suffering is inherent in the human condition, and knowledge alone alleviates suffering. Interestingly, Jean Paul Sartre takes recourse to philosophical activity as the means to encountering the knowledge of man’s ‘salvation’ from the torments associated with attachment to corporeal existence and the indeterminateness of his condition.

Sāṅkhya-Yoga’s key themes are *puruṣa*, *prakṛti*, *māyā*, *avidyā*, *mokṣa* etc. Similarly Sartrean basic themes center round consciousness, freedom, *facticity*, and quest for God, existential dread and nothingness etc. This spring from existential concerns and has their existential roots. There are many such common themes that have drawn attention of both the existentialists and Indian and Buddhist philosophers in general and Sartrean Existentialism and *Sāṅkhya Darśana* in particular, despite being the fact that the way *Sāṅkhya-Kārikā* offers answers to such issues are different from those encountered in the Western thought. Despite some basic similarities in their existential concerns for understanding man’s predicament in a situated condition, differences in cultural and social aspirations and intentions have prevented these systems from being identical. Keeping this in mind, this chapter is

¹ Phukan, Radhanath. , *The Sāṅkhya-Kārikā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa*, published by Firma, K. L. Mukhopadhyay., Calcutta, pp. 69, (1960).

an exploration of the basic concepts of existentialism with those of *Sāṅkhya-Yoga* that apparently seem to be addressing similar existential and ontological concerns.

8.2 General Comparison of *Sāṅkhya* Existentialism and Philosophy of Sartre

In order to make an estimate of the general comparison of these two philosophical systems, the first part of the chapter begins with some scholarly observations in this regard. Gerald Larson's article "Classical *Sāṅkhya* and the phenomenological ontology of Jean Paul Sartre"² shows similarities between the ontologies of Sartrean Existentialism and *Sāṅkhya-Yoga Darśana*. Larson, for example, highlights the point that similar to the dichotomous relation shared by *Sāṅkhyān puruṣa* and *prakṛti*, "being-for-itself" (*etre-pour-sui*) in the Sartrean scheme is the being of consciousness conceived as a lack of being, a relation to being or a desire for being. "Being-in-itself" (*etre-en-sui*) is the being of the phenomenon conceived as the non-conscious being which always overflows the knowledge we have of it. As pointed out by Ashok Malhotra, Larson's discussion brings to focus the following intimate connections between the two: "first, both regard philosophy as a description of the human condition; second, both look at reality as manifesting itself in terms of the undifferentiated being and consciousness, the latter as the negation of the former third, man is regarded by both as a unique kind of being, i.e., "being-for-itself" or *puruṣa*, who makes possible all relations, meanings, and values; fourth, both view the world in terms of its instrumentality and man's involvement in it as suffering; and, last, both tend towards complete theism."³

Despite these similarities, Larson observes the following striking differences between the two systems: first, both regard man's existence in the world as a sea of suffering, but their solutions to the problem are different. Sartre believes that man cannot be salvaged, whereas *Sāṅkhya* asserts firmly that *puruṣa* can attain its absolute freedom or *kaivalya* and can live without a body; second, the emphasis on

² Larson, Gerald., "Classical *Sāṅkhya* and the phenomenological ontology of Jean Paul Sartre", Book Review, *Philosophy East and West*, XIX, no. I, pp. 45-58., Jan,(1969).; Larson, Gerald, *Classical Sāṅkhya and the phenomenological ontology of Jean Paul Sartre*, Motilal Banarasidass, (1969).

³ Malhotra, A. Kumar., on the article "Classical *Sāṅkhya-Yoga* Versus Sartre's Philosophy" in journal of *Asian thought and society*, pp.68-82,(1977).

the disembodied *puruṣa* living in an isolated state is contrary to Sartre's belief in the absolute termination of the "being-for-itself" with the death of the body; and last, Sartre's philosophy is more sophisticated in its orientation and more comprehensive in its concerns than the *Sāṅkhya*'s. Larson further observes that "notwithstanding the similarities, there are four basic ontological differences which determine their specific solutions: first, unlike *Sāṅkhya puruṣa* and *prakṛti*, Sartre's "being-for-itself" and "being-in-itself" are not two separate realities. They are two distinct aspects of the same being; second, unlike *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*, the "for-itself" is completely dependent on the "in-itself" for its existence. On the other hand, the "in-itself" does not require the "for-itself" for its existence but only for its meaning; third, contrary to the *Sāṅkhya* view, the "for-itself" is active and productive whereas the "in-itself" defies the attributes of activity or passivity; and last, contrary to the *Sāṅkhya* view, the "for-itself" characterizes desire, i.e., desire constitutes its basic ontological structure. Thus, without desire the "for-itself" cannot exist."⁴

Although Larson here primarily highlights *Sāṅkhyan* position in this regard, the present Thesis highlights points of similarity and differences of *Sāṅkhya-Yoga* in general with special emphasis on the *Yoga-Sūtra* of Patañjali and the *Nausea* of Jean Paul Sartre. That would lead to some different observations regarding the status of *kaivalya*, disembodied liberation or *videhamukti* etc. that will be more highlighted in the "Conclusion" chapter. For the time being the chapter continues taking note of some general points similarities and differences between the two philosophical traditions. However, certain conclusions can be drawn from Larson's discussion regarding *Sāṅkhya* and Sartre's similarity.

8.2.1 Realism as Against Idealism

The question of everyday life that concerned the young Sartre reinforced in him the desire for a philosophical approach which accorded a place to reality as well as idea. This is what he would discover completely unexpectedly in Husserlian

⁴ Malhotra, A. Kumar., on the article "Classical *Sāṅkhya-Yoga* Versus Sartre's Philosophy" in journal of *Asian thought and society*, pp.68-82,(1977).

Phenomenology: “The messenger from heaven for me was Raymond Aron. Upon his return from Berlin,⁵ he spoke to me in a bar about the phenomenologists. ‘Those hearty individuals,’ he concluded smiling, ‘find a way of philosophizing about everything. They would pass the night Phenemenologically describing the essence of a lamppost.’ “I was overjoyed: nothing seemed more important to me than raising streetlights to the dignity of a philosophical object. A year later I was reading Husserl in Berlin. Everything had changed for all time.”⁶

In this regard, he would remark in *La Transcendance de l'Ego*: “ For centuries.. one had not experienced a movement in philosophy that realistic. They (the phenomenologists) plunged human beings back into the world. They gave them back the full measure of their anguish and their sufferings, their revolts also”⁷ Sartre shows how the *cogito* as transcendence itself requires the analysis of that towards which it is transcending, in what regard it differs and in relation to what it constitutes itself as Itself. This head on confrontation by the consciousness thus leads to the foundation of the ontology of intentionality in “being-in-itself.”

The realism, which excited Sartre, consists more concretely in the fact that “consciousness and the world are given in a single blow: inherently external to consciousness, the world is, inherently relative to it.”(BN). *Facticity* is the universal human condition. It is the “for-itself’s necessary connection with the “in-itself.” By virtue of *facticity* we can say that the “for-itself” exists. For Sartre, *facticity* is not an essence of humanity since it’s meaning depends on the “for-itself” for its interpretation. *Sāṅkhya Darśana* admits the reality of *prakṛti* as against its illusory nature as advocated in Saṅkraracharya’s school of *Advaita Vedānta*. Although one can find meaningful interplay between *Sāṅkhya* and *Vedānta*, Patañjali advocates realism both of suffering and of salvation, of *puruṣa* and of *prakṛti*. Since this point will be further highlighted in the Conclusion chapter of the thesis, this motivation to make a meaningful dialogue between *Yoga-Sūtra* of Patañjali with Sartrean Existentialism is further illustrated in the special

⁵ Aron had spent a year at the Institute francais in Berlin. It was after him that Sartre was granted the fellowship.

⁶ *Ibidem*. P.5. This great turning point in Sartre’s life was also described by Simone De Beauvoir; S. de Beauvoir. *La force de l’ age*, Paris: Gallimard, pp.156, (1960).

⁷ Sartre, J.P., *La trascedance de l’ Ego*, Paris: Vrin, pp.86, (1972).

comparison that is made between the two particular texts, the *Yoga-Sūtra* of Patañjali and the *Nausea* of Sartre in the later part of this Thesis.

8.2.2 The Dichotomy of *Pour-sui -En-sui, Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti*

Sartre sought to establish the Ontological difference between the two realms of “being-the in-itself” and the “for-itself”; the one is opposed to the other. According to Sartre, it is in *anguish* that man gets the consciousness of his freedom, being of freedom as consciousness of being. The famous formula that Sartre used to define the “in-itself” as opposed to the “for-itself” is conceived in these terms: “Being (*l’être*) is. Being (*l’être*) is in-itself. Being (*l’être*) is what it is.”⁸ Since “active” and “passive” are human concepts designating ways of being human, aiming for a given goal, being “in-itself” cannot be defined either as passive or active, it is indeterminate; any determination to “in-itself” comes through “for-itself.” Wrong identification of “for- itself” with “in-itself” leads to bad faith that accounts for the fall, the humanization of the realm of the spirit. This is how responsible and authentic man takes easy comfort in surrendering one’s responsibility and by behaving as if man is a helpless victim of circumstances and is, essentially, an “in-itself” and unfree.

The existentialist critique of essentialist accounts of humanity goes hand in hand with its critique of determinism. If there is no fixed human nature, then humanity must be wholly free. This means that human beings must be wholly accountable for their behavior, and it is only in cowardice that they turn to “deterministic excuses,” seeking to hide from the “complete arbitrariness” of their existence. Although Sartre denies that it is possible to find a universal essence in each human being that would be our shared human essence, Sartre still affirms “there does exist a universal human condition.” Sartre does not deny that there are certain a priori boundaries which define the human situation in general. Although historical situations vary, there is no variance in the obligation to exist in the world, to work in the world, to live among others, and to be mortal. These limits are “neither subjective nor objective, or, rather, they have an objective and a subjective side.”

⁸ Sartre, J. P., *The Main Works of Existentialism, L’Etre et le neant*. pp. 29, (1943).

In that they are ubiquitously discernible, they are objective. In that they are lived and because human beings freely determine their existence with respect to them, they are subjective. In *Being and Nothingness*, Sartre describes the basis of the psychobiological condition of “man” and his unavoidable connection with the world and with the past under the category of “facticity.”

8. 2. 3 Existential Suffering

Interestingly the *Yoga-Sūtra* of Patañjali gives centrality to suffering and salvation and it can be said that the major thrust of the philosophy of *Sāṅkhya-Yoga* is centered round these basic themes. The key theme for both Sartre and Patañjali is existential suffering as their distinctive methodologies are intended to eliminate suffering through enlightenment. Patañjali holds that suffering is a consequence of the lack of salvational knowledge. This knowledge consists in comprehending *puruṣa* as distinct from *prakṛti*. *Sāṅkhya-Yoga* Philosophy has its therapeutic approach to life and its existential issues. The sorrows of human life and its self-contradictions have been constant themes since ancient times. But many people do not face this fact deeply. When this fact of the sorrow of life is faced, the problem of religion arises for us.⁹ (Indeed, the problem of philosophy also arises from this point.)

Through a deep confrontation with the sorrows and self-contradictions of life we can reach the “standpoint of total freedom and self-authenticity.” The confrontation with the sorrows and self-contradictions of life is a standard characteristic of existentialist philosophy. In an essay titled “The Humanism of Existentialism”, Sartre endeavours to defend Existentialism against certain popularly held criticisms. It is generally known, he says, that the basic charge against Existentialism is its apparent emphasis on the tragic side of life. He wonders, however, if those who accuse Existentialism of being too gloomy are reacting not so much to its apparent pessimism as to its optimism. He inquires if what really scares such reactionaries is not the sense in which existentialism “leaves to man a

⁹ Nishida, Kitaro., “Religious Consciousness and the Logic of the *Prajñāparamitā Sūtra*,” Section II of *The Logic of Place and a Religious World-view* (1945), trans. David A. Dilworth, *Monumenta Nipponica*, 25, nos. 1-2, pp. 210-216, (1965).

possibility of choice?”¹⁰ Existential choice is self-conscious choice which we actively determine. We can, of course, remain passive. In which case we have still chosen passivity. Both *Sāṅkhya* and Sartre agree that our customary approach to the world is superficial and biased. It is colored by language, logic, cultural values, and personal prejudices. Both believe that habitual knowledge must be transcended in order that reality is grasped. Both Sartre and *Sāṅkhya* have the same desire for restoring the concreteness and facticity for the people.

There is gradual shift in Sartre’s philosophy from its earlier individualistic orientation to situating the problems within a socio-historical context. Sartre’s formidable project consisted in resuscitating the individual, “*l’être-en-situation*,” at the very heart of her concrete existence in history. Concrete human beings are human beings within their socio-historical, familial setting etc. Human beings become human beings in existence in relation to concrete existential situations through action, through praxis. The war taught him the ‘the force of circumstance’, anti freedom and more importantly, the need to commit oneself. Commitment within situations is just as much a factor for freedom as a factor of alienation, because our freedom encounters that of other people that transforms us into objects. That alienation is unavoidable in a way is stressed but what remains fundamental is that of commitment with full responsibility before humanity.

The re-direction of Sartre’s interest from Husserl to Marx does not signify the abandonment of the Phenomenological field but it leads to the union of phenomenology and dialectics. “*Critique de la raison Dialectique* was the opus magnum of this project in which Phenomenology as Anthropology acquires the status of foundation of the social sciences and humanities.”¹¹ But achieving access to concrete human beings needed rethinking of two traditions from Marx’s perspective. But here too Sartrean quest for freedom and authenticity of “for-itself” could not reconcile with the project of treating human beings and the collective whole as mere objects. Using his progressive-regressive method Sartre sought to make an interplay between describe human beings as universal singulars by detecting two constitutive elements there the project toward a goal determined by a

¹⁰ Sartre, J. P., *Essays in Existentialism*, New York: Citadel Press, pp.33,(1974).

¹¹ Sartre, J.P., *Critique de la raison dialectique*, London: New Left Books, Vol. I, pp. 104. (1976).

choice and the existence of individuals within a socio-political and cultural context.

In the words of Dan Zahavi, “Praxis is then aimed at as a form of individual becoming in time (diachronic analysis) then as being “in a situation”, as inert praxis, like an objectified social activity (synchronic analysis). Human beings are conceived, therefore, within the general social structures (universality), as well as within their unique individuality and destiny (singularity).”¹² By replacing the notion of the “in-itself” with that of the practico-inert, and the “for-itself” with individual praxis, Sartre seeks to explain praxis as the transition from abstract praxis to historical humanity. Thus in dictatorial regimes, as well as in non-dictatorial regimes, the fundamental problem is quite the same. It is that of the insuperable alienation by the absorption of human beings within the collective whole or from being serialized (*dans la sérialité*).¹³ In order to live together people aspire to union, but that leads either to unification and depersonalization, or to assimilation within otherness, and even when human beings resist through individual action, revolutionary commitment or by joining a political party they are totalized and transformed by others at a distance.¹⁴ Hence the tragic side of life and the inevitable failure of all human history.

Ian Whicher makes scholarly observations regarding the theory-praxis dimension in the philosophy of *Yoga*. Due to *Yoga*'s traditional praxis-orientation it becomes all too easy to reduce *Yoga* to a ‘means only’ approach to well being and spiritual enlightenment. In the light of its popularity in the Western world today in which technique and practice have been emphasized often to the exclusion of philosophical/theoretical understanding and a proper pedagogical context, there is a great danger in simply reifying practice whereby practice becomes something the ego does for the sake of its own security. Seen here, practice often then conceived as a superior activity in relation to all other activities becomes all important in that through the activity called ‘practice’ the ego hopes and strives to become ‘enlightened’. Practice thus becomes rooted in a future-oriented perspective largely

¹² Zahavi, Dan., *Subjectivity and selfhood*, MIT, Cambridge, London, England, (2006).

¹³ Sartre, J.P., *Critique de la raison dialectique*, Vol. I, Paris: Gallimard, pp. 104,(1985).

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 443.

motivated out of a fear of not becoming enlightened; it degenerated into a form of selfishly appropriated activity where ‘means’ becomes end-in-themselves.

To be sure, the concern of *Yoga* is to (re) discover *puruṣa*, to be restored to true identity thus overcoming dissatisfaction, fear and misidentification by uprooting and eradicating the cause of ignorance (*avidyā*). Yet, as Wilhelm Halbfass puts it, true identity ‘cannot be really lost, forgotten or newly acquired’, for liberation “is not to be produced or accomplished in a literal sense, but only in a figurative sense”¹⁵. Sufficient means for birthing the natural light of the mind are, however, both desirable and necessary in order to prepare the *Yogin* for the necessary identity shift from egoity to *puruṣa*. By acknowledging that ‘aloneness’ cannot be an acquired state resulting from or caused by *Yogic* method and techniques, and that *puruṣa* cannot be known,¹⁶ acquired or discarded/lost¹⁷, *Yoga* in effect transcends its own result-orientation as well as the categories of means and ends.

In this journey from egoity to *puruṣa*, from ego centered man of the world who is also a practitioner, an *Yogi*, an adept in *karma* (action), *jñāna* (knowledge) or *bhakti* (devotion), toward the realm of *puruṣa*, of *cit* and consciousness, freedom and authenticity, the *Yogi* attains a complete balance between enlightenment (theory) and action (practice). The *Yogi*’s center of agency changes, it is now no longer the narrow domain of *buddhi* centric egoism, the realm of *prakṛti* is gradually transcended when work becomes play and it no longer binds the liberated one. Self also stands for the subject, as contrasted with the object, of experience. It is that out of which the primeval thought of ‘I’ arises, and into which it dissolves. The *Yogi* is thus both a practitioner and a *kevali*, a loner in the crowd who acts from a dimension of *prajñā*, enlightenment and the realm of *puruṣa*.

Here we find that, *Sāṅkhya puruṣa* is isolated and disengaged in Classical *Sāṅkhya*, a being-with others in *Sāṅkhya-Yoga* while aspiring for communal salvation and aspiring for a state of ever-dependence (on God or on a larger project). *Sāṅkhya-Yoga* lays special emphasis on individuality of each separate and independent

¹⁵ Halbfass, *Tradition and Reflection: Explorations in Indian Thought*, Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, pp. 251,252, (1991).

¹⁶ YB III. 35

¹⁷ YB II.15

puruṣa. *Yoga* paves way for integration of concrete personality with its emphasis on *Yogic* union of subject centric *puruṣa* and the greater self or God. This is a shift from abstract *puruṣa* of early *Sāṅkhya* and his ideal of attaining abstractness (*Yoga chitta-vṛtti nirodha*), toward concrete and integral personhood of *Bhakti-Yoga* (*Yoga* as union with God) of *Sāṅkhya-Darśhna*.

References to the ontological conceptions in the *Yoga-Sūtra* are few but the little in formations given allows the following reconstruction. On the one side there are numberless transcendent and eternal Selves (*puruṣa*), on the other side there is the transcendent core of nature (*prakṛti-pradhāna*) the matrix out of which the whole manifest cosmos is created. Both ultimate principles are forever distinct and do not co incident, as the *Upaniṣadic* seers and particularly Saṅkara announced. But what is interesting is that in this cosmic evolution there is a co relation between Consciousness and Being on account of which it is possible to experience two different levels of reality. The view that the *puruṣa* is the ‘master of the character of the mind’ (*citta-vṛttaya-s tat-prabhoh*)¹⁸, is a gradual shift toward an empowered and active *puruṣa*, that is, the *puruṣa* is the one ultimately in charge. Patañjali echoes this empowered view of the *puruṣa* elsewhere in the *Yoga-Sūtra* as well. In keeping with this theme, at the outset of the *Yoga-Sūtra*, Patañjali tells us that the objective of *Yoga* is to control the moral character of thought, which results in a person abiding in its essence.

Suffering is caused in both by Bad Faith, misidentification of *puruṣa* that is our real nature with *prakṛti*. In a sense *Yogic mukti* is separation of *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*. The active and responsible man of Sartre is in search of his or her authenticity in all realms, socio-political, moral and in spiritual realm as well. This makes more sense to open dialogue with the *Yogi* and the authentic person since unlike in classical *Sāṅkhya*, Patañjali affirms the *kriyāvāda* (agency view) in *Yoga*.

In line with the distinction between natural characteristics and personhood, the *Yoga-Sūtra* does not restrict the category of persons to that of humans. Persons, in Patañjali’s view, are perceivers. Hence, any being with this capacity is a person. Thus, persons are not found in human bodies, but bodies of the other animals,

¹⁸ *Yoga-Sūtra* IV. 18.

insects, fish and the like. This is an important feature of Patañjali's system, which has both moral and epistemic implications. The moral implication is that we must treat all living beings as full persons and not as means to our desires. The epistemic implication is that we must regard all beings that are knower as persons, and not confuse their outward bodies with their status as persons. The epistemic implication is emphasized in *Yoga-Sūtra*.¹⁹ With the exception of the Lord or *Īśvara*, which only *Yoga* recognizes, *Sāṅkhya* and *Yoga* regard us all as equals. The equality of persons transcends biological distinctions. So long as a being is conscious, according to these schools, it has a *puruṣa* in it, and they explain the relevant differences in terms of biology and the history of the subtle body. Persons, thus, for both *Sāṅkhya* and *Yoga* are not restricted to the human.

8.2.4 Theism, Atheism, and the Quest for Salvation

While Marx dubbed religion 'opium of the masses', Sartre championed the cause of the individual over and above anything divine. But unlike Marx, Sartre's Existentialism echoes to a large extent the thought of Buddhism in that he accepts the reality of suffering and denies man the comfort of escaping from the responsibility of suffering by claiming faith in God. In his thought-provoking essay "Existentialism is Humanism", Sartre explains: "Existentialism declares that even if God existed that would make no difference... Not that we believe that God does exist, but we think that the real problem is not that of His existence; what man needs is to find himself again and to understand that nothing can save him from himself, not even a valid proof of the existence of God."²⁰ Although Sartre adopts an atheistic standpoint, one can say that the religious exigency is of paramount importance to his view of the human condition. For Sartre, the basic human drive is not the Freudian libido or the Adlerian will to power; it is a certain sort of religious urge.

'Is *Sāṅkhya* religious?' We have seen that *Sāṅkhya* is atheistic and much similar to Sartre although *Sāṅkhya* too shows religiosity in its concern for salvation. If we

¹⁹ *Yoga-Sūtra*, II.6

²⁰ Lecture given in 1946, *Existentialism from Dostoyevsky to Sartre*, ed. Walter Kaufman, Meridian Publishing Company, 1989; First Published: World Publishing Company in (1956).

accept this fact that, “Religion is the problem of the self,”²¹ Sartre, would doubtless eschew such an assertion lest it imply a “religious” interpretation of the self. The problem of the self, for Sartre, is tragically religious in character. Both Sartrean existentialism and *Sāṅkhya-Yoga* emphasis on dualism of a kind but Sartre often compares the two realms in reference to a God in absence. *Sāṅkhya* needs no God but *Yoga* needs God although the emphasis is more on duality of spirit and being. In Sartrean scheme both God and being must be nihilated by man’s project of freedom. When Sartre says, “Everything happens as if the world, man, and man-in-the-world succeeded in realizing only a missing God,”²² he might more aptly say that man’s freedom demands a missing God. From this point of view, Sartre’s system is not dualistic, it contains three ontological categories: “being-for-itself” (human consciousness), “being-in-itself,” and God. Or, otherwise stated, nothingness, being and God. Of course, God does not exist. Nevertheless, God is a necessary dialectical foundation of the system.

One can point out that since *Sāṅkhya* interprets *puruṣa* as a separate reality that does not require *prakṛti* for its existence and which, by its intrinsic nature, is without desire, it can live without a body. Thus, *Sāṅkhya*’s belief that salvation consists in complete freedom or disassociation from *prakṛti* is quite consistent with the ontological presuppositions of the system. On the other hand, Sartre’s rejection of the *Sāṅkhya* type of salvation is a deduction from his own ontological commitments. For Sartre, the “for-itself” or consciousness, living without the “in-itself,” is an abstraction, i.e., an impossibility. Absolute salvation in Sartre’s system is a fusion of the “for-itself” with the “in-itself.” This fusion is unattainable because each excludes the other. Therefore, the desire for absolute salvation is unrealizable and futile. Sartre had characterized man as a “useless passion”²³ who could not forsake the desire to be God i.e. the desire for the freedom of the “for-itself” to coincide with the facticity of the “in-itself”. He now suggests that it is possible to make sheer freedom the object of one’s aspiration. This project is paradoxical in that the “for-itself” is always ineluctably free. But to be in bad faith

²¹ ccbs.ntu.edu.tw/FULLTEXT/JR-PHIL/brian1.htm - 49k accessed on 01/05/07.

²² Anna-Teresa, tymieniecka., *Life: Creative Mimesis of Emotion; from Sorrow to Elation*, Kluwer Academic Publishers, pp.46, (2000).

²³ Sartre, J.P., *Being and Nothingness*, trans. Hazel, E. Barnes, introduction by Mary, Warnock, New York: Washington Square Press, pp.615, (1969).

is to be in flight from one's freedom. Sartre writes: "For in the eyes of the other I am my "in-itself," were I able to look at myself through the eyes of the other while miraculously retaining my own standpoint, I would thereby attain a coincident of my "for-itself" and "in-itself."²⁴

In spite of the apparent opposing solutions, both seem to be genuinely concerned with man's salvation. *Sāṅkhya-Yoga* believes that man's aim in life is to achieve *kaivalya*. Sartre, on the other hand, too, is deeply concerned with man's salvation from the nauseating existence. The works of Sartre, both literary and philosophical, are oriented towards the same goal. However, for *Sāṅkhya*, *kaivalya* represents an absolute termination of all suffering, whereas Sartre denies this permanent salvation. But Sartre does recommend various conditions for the temporary relief from *Nausea*. These conditions are specified in *Nausea*, *The Flies*, *Dirty Hands*, and *Being and Nothingness*. Sartre's suggestions for a salvaged life include the awareness of freedom, the respect for the freedom of others, the total commitment to a particular cause, and the acceptance of responsibility by the performer. When an act satisfied all the above conditions, it can be regarded as meaningful, and a person who lives a life performing acts of this type lives a meaningful life. Sartre believes that life can be salvaged, not completely, but to some extent through the performance of meaningful acts.

Although one line of thinking is common among scholars who would emphasize the isolation and passivity of the liberated *Sāṅkhyan Puruṣa* in contrast to the Sartrean concerned and involved man in the world, who is equally concerned for socio-political limitations of our human existence, the Thesis in general and this chapter particularly puts more emphasis on the Sartrean concept of a free liberated and creative individual and the creative and moral and spiritual dynamism of the *Yogin* who is as much a being in the world and a being with others. In this regard the Thesis highlights the following interpretation of suffering and salvation in the *Yoga Darśana* especially in the *Yoga-Sūtra* of Patañjali. To quote Ian Whicher: "In asserting absolute separation of *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*, scholars and non scholars alike have tended to disregard the possibility for fresh hermeneutical options, and

²⁴ Cutrofello, Andrew., *Continental Philosophy: A Contemporary introduction*, pp. 303, (1992).

this radical, dualistic metaphysical closure of sorts surrounding the nature and meaning of Patañjali's *Yoga* has proved detrimental to a fuller understanding of the *Yoga Darśana* by continuing a tradition based on an isolationistic, one sided reading (or perhaps misreading) of the *Yoga-Sūtra* and Vyāsa's commentary."²⁵ Accordingly, the absolute separation of *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* can only be interpreted as a disembodied state implying death to the physical body. To dislodge the sage from bodily existence is to undermine the integrity of the pedagogical context that lends so much credibility or 'weight' to the *Yoga* system which Ian Whicher comments: "Rather I am suggesting that it need not be assumed that, in *Yoga*, liberation coincides with physical death. That would only allow for a soteriological end state of; disembodied liberation. (*videhamukti*). What is involved in *Yoga* is the death of the atomistic, egoist identity, the dissolution of the *kārmic* of *saṁsāra* that generates notions one being a subject trapped in the *puruṣa* constitution of a particular body-mind."²⁶

Is the *Yogi* passive and a non-doer after the attainment of liberation? Ian Whicher observes: "To be sure, the concern of *Yoga* is to (re) discover *puruṣa*, to be restored to true identity thus overcoming dissatisfaction, fear and misidentification by uprooting and eradicating the disease of ignorance (*avidyā*). A permanent identity soft, from the perspective of the human personality to *puruṣa*, takes place."²⁷ Patañjali declares: 'From that (*dharmameghā Samādhi*) there is the cessation of afflicted action.' "*tatah klesakarmanivrittih*", Whicher comments: "The mind and actions are freed from misidentification of acts, the liberated seer is liberated from all patterns of actions motivated by the Ego. By transcending the normative conventions and obligations of *kārmic* behavior, the *Yogin* acts morally not as an extrinsic response and out of obedience to an external moral code of conduct, but as an intrinsic response and as a matter of natural, purified inclination."²⁸

²⁵ Book Review., Ian Whicher., *The Integrity of the Yoga Darśana: A Reconsideration of Classical Yoga*, Albany, N.Y, SUNY Press, (1998).

²⁶ Ian, Whicher., "Ethics of Liberation in Patanjali's Yoga" in Purushottama, Bilmoria et al edited *Indian Ethics*, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, pp.162., (2008).

²⁷ YS IV.30.

²⁸ Ian, Whicher., "Ethics of Liberation in Patanjali's Yoga" in Purushottama, Bilmoria et al edited *Indian Ethics*, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, pp.162, (2008).

Is the *Yogin* disengaged? What kind of *kaivalya* (aloneness) is talked about? To quote Whicher, “‘Aloneness,’ I suggest, is not to isolation of the seer (*draṣṭṛ*, *puruṣa*) separate from the seeable (*dṛśya*, *prakṛti*), as unfortunately far too often maintained as the goal of *Yoga*, but refers to the ‘aloneness’ of the ‘power’ of ‘seeing (YS II.20, 25) in its innate purity and clarity without any epistemological distortion and moral defilement.”²⁹ “*Kaivalya* implies a power of seeing ‘in which the dualisms rooted in our egocentric patterns of attachment, aversion, fear, and so forth have been transformed into unselfish ways of being with others.”³⁰ *Yoga* presupposes an integration of knowledge and activity. There can be no cessation between theory and praxis. Praxis is deemed essential, yet without examination and reflection there would be no meaningful striving for liberation. Although God is impossible, the religious ideal is basic to being human; hence human beings have abundant religious experiences. We can say, then, that *Sāṅkhya* and Sartre would concur that we experience a religious exigency, but differ in their respective interpretations. *Sāṅkhya puruṣa*, in its *kaivalya* becomes God like.

There are many ways to begin the practice of *Yoga*. First and foremost, Patañjali outlines the method of surrender of oneself to God (*Īśvara*). This involves detachment from the world and attachment to God, and is possible only for those few who are born as adepts. Patañjali defines God as the Supreme Being, totally free from afflictions and the fruits of action. ‘In Him abides the matchless seed of all knowledge. He is first and Foremost amongst all masters and teachers, unconditioned by time, place and circumstances’, the *Sūtra* states.

8.2.5 Re-visiting General Observations of Similarities and Differences

1. Complete eradication of existential suffering is a possibility in early Sartre and in *Sāṅkhya* whereas *Sāṅkhya* asserts that *puruṣa* can attain its absolute freedom only without the corporeal body, partial freedom while still in body, *Yoga* adopts a more practical attitude by advocating *jivanmukti*, *kaivalya* of the situational and the embodied man. Liberation also highlights inter subjective dimension of *puruṣa*, there is scheme for liberation for each one of the *puruṣa*,

²⁹ Ibid., pp.167.

³⁰ Ibid.

liberation of many *puruṣas* because liberation of the one fails to liberate all. The emphasis on the disembodied *puruṣa* living in an isolated state is contrary to Sartre's belief in the absolute termination of the "being-for-itself" with the death of the body.

2. Sartre acknowledges facticity and freedom as essential co-relates. *Puruṣa* and *prakṛti* are separate although they work interdependently. In place of complete separation between these two realms Sartre has accepted a modified position; necessity is made contingent upon contingency. And contingency is subjected to the necessity of each singular person's being condemned to be free. In later Sartre the essentiality is accidental. The *Yogi* makes his/her spiritual journey from egolessness toward the realm of universal subjectivity, from egoity of *buddhi* to egolessness of *puruṣa*.
3. There is similarity between cosmic consciousness or "mahat" and Ego or *aharṅkāra* in *Sāṅkhya*-Yoga. *Aharṅkāra* is grounded in *mahat* or cosmic consciousness. In Sartre ego or reflective consciousness is preceded by pre-reflective consciousness or egoless consciousness. The following chart may be taken as representation of the gist of some basic points of similarities and differences.

Table 8.1: Similarities between Sartre and *Sāṅkhya*

Sartre	<i>Sāṅkhya</i>
Being-in-itself	<i>Prakṛti</i>
Being-for-itself	<i>Puruṣa</i>
Two types of dualism. a) Being-in-itself (Body/thing) b) being-for-itself (conscious)	Two types of dualism. a) <i>Puruṣa</i> (consciousness/spirit and b) <i>Prakṛti</i> (not-conscious/body/material nature)
Bad faith	<i>Māyā</i>
Good faith/ knowledge	<i>Vidyā</i>
Authenticity and freedom	Independent, isolated
Suffering, dread, anxiety	<i>Dukḥa, kleśas</i>
Notion of Freedom and Consciousness as Nothingness	"Emptiness" or "nothingness" appears to be appropriate terms, for the condition of

	salvation in classical <i>Sāṅkhya</i> is the condition of the <i>Puruṣa</i> “in-itself.” By <i>kaivalya</i> means isolation, the state of being different. <i>Kaivalya</i> is-“ <i>Tad eva nanyad asti</i> ” (only this, there is no other) .It is consciousness emptied of all contents or a kind of translucent emptiness or nothingness. It is rather, the pure, translucent witness, which is at once the source of man’s freedom and suffering.
Existential suffering is the central focus	Existential suffering
Man is the focal point, centrality of the individual.	Man is the focal point of <i>Sāṅkhya</i> – <i>Yoga</i> .
Liberation from the NAUSEA is the cherished goal although what is meant by liberation is how one interprets it in terms of its other, the Nausea, in Sartrean Existentialism.	Liberations remain the cherished goal although its interpretations differ to some extent in <i>Sāṅkhya</i> and in <i>Yoga</i> .

Table 8.2: Differences between Sartre and *Sāṅkhya*

Sartre	<i>Sāṅkhya</i>
Active <i>pour-sui</i> (being-for-itself)	Inactive <i>Puruṣa</i> in <i>Sāṅkhya</i> , creative activity in from spiritual dimension in <i>Yoga</i> .
Embodied man, Being-in-the-world	In <i>Sāṅkhya</i> position of disembodied existence but in <i>Yoga</i> man is being in the world and being with others.
Political concern	Cosmological
Atheism, aesthetic quest for salvation	<i>Sāṅkhya</i> -atheism <i>Yoga</i> -theism, quest for <i>mukṣa</i> in both

8.3 Special Comparison on Sartre and Patañjali's *Yoga-Sūtra*

The second part of this chapter is an attempt at a special comparison of Patañjali's *Yoga-Sūtra* and Sartre's method of 'Epoché' in *Nausea*. From the preceding discussion, it is evident that both Sartre's and Patañjali's methods can be significantly related. Though the methods are not identical, diverse aspects are analogous. The similarity of the two methods can be demonstrated in terms of goals, stepwise procedures, and accomplishments. The following is an attempt at special comparison of these two philosophical texts provided by some scholars in general and here, for the purpose of the present chapter Ashok Malhotra's guidelines in this direction is sought to be incorporated in an effort at making a special comparison between the two texts as mentioned.

8.3.1 The Phenomenological Reduction

It is interesting to note that although Husserl and Sartre employ the same method, Phenomenological Reduction, to enquire into the nature of consciousness, the outcome of their enquiries turns out to be different. Thus it is worth asking whether their methods, in spite of bearing the same name, are really the same. Let us try to answer this question. In *Logical Investigations*, Husserl was mainly concerned with intuiting the essence which could be arrived at only through phenomenological description of the given³¹ As yet, the Phenomenological Reduction had not assumed any importance. Only when Husserl realized that phenomenological description couldn't give us the absolutely evident so long as we remain confined to the naturalistic standpoint, did he introduce the Phenomenological Reduction or *epoché*. By the Phenomenological Reduction Husserl understands the bracketing of all presuppositions, including our belief in the existence of the world. Husserl writes:

“Everything transcendent that is involved must be bracketed, or be assigned the index of indifference, of epistemological nullity, an index which indicates: the existence of all these transcendences, whether I believe in them or not, is not here

³¹ Bhadra, M.K., *A Critical Study of Sartre's Ontology of Consciousness*, The University of Burdwan, pp.11, (1978).

my concern; this is not the place to make judgments about them, they are entirely irrelevant.”³²

After bracketing, what remains over is “the pure experience as act with its own proper essence.”³³ And the act is found to be related to the Transcendental Ego.

Sartre does not accept Husserl’s phenomenological Reduction in the sense it is understood by Husserl. Though Sartre would not object to bracketing the presuppositions, he thinks that the existence of phenomena cannot be bracketed, for it is the most immediately given. Existence, for Sartre, is coextensive with phenomena and hence is regarded as the “self-evident irreducible.”³⁴ As such, the suspension of the existence of the world is not possible. Merleau-Ponty also points out that a complete bracketing is impossible, for experience is achieved through a bodily perspective and that cannot be bracketed out.³⁵ Following the lead of Husserl, Sartre proceeds to unveil existence in its immediate character. Pure existence, which is presupposed in our intellectual practical world, is never given to us through intellectual categories. Our concepts act as stumbling blocks since they come between existence and us. Existence can be grasped only through a personal intuitive experience. Sartre finds that Husserl’s method is extremely logical and abstract and, thus, incapable of giving rise to a primordial intuition of pure subjectivity. Faced with this challenge, Sartre is forced to draw upon his literary talent which can easily depict existence in its immediacy. Thus, Sartre has to write a novel in a diary form in which the main character confronts existence through his personal experience.

Sartre constructs his method by avoiding the errors of both Husserl and Descartes, Sartre says so. Husserl’s phenomenological method, which aimed at the experience of reality, was a modified version of Descartes’ universal doubt. For Husserl, universal doubt means a deliberate suspension of all judgment about the nature of

³² Coopers, E. David. and Mohanty, Jitendranath., *Epistemology: The Classic Readings*, pp. 231., *The Idea of Phenomenology*, pp. 31.

³³ Lensing, S. George., *Wallace Stevens and the Season*, pp. 82., *Idea*, s. 80, pp. 233.

³⁴ Sartre, J. P., BN, pp. 722, (1969).

³⁵ Edie, J., “Phenomenology as a Rigorous Science”, *International Philo-sophical Quarterly*, pp.28, March (1951).

the world. Both Descartes and Husserl considered universal doubt and epoché respectively only on intellectual levels, but they never made their methods a “way of life.” Sartre believes that universal doubt is to be carried on in all ramifications, e.g., fear, distrust, uncertainty, a deliberate suspension of judgment, etc. Sartre also believed that the doubt should become a “way of life” for the investigator, i.e., it should pervade his faculties of seeing, hearing, tasting, smelling, touching, and understanding. The success of the investigation depends upon treating doubt as the mode through which the initiate relates to the world. This strict discipline, if inculcated, can give rise to the immediate experience of existence.

What follows from these statements is that Sartre’s method is Phenomenological because it rests on intuitions and descriptions of essences. It is not the same as Husserl’s Phenomenological Reduction in that it does not bracket the existence of the world. In spite of this, Sartre calls his method. Phenomenological reduction because it is a ‘Partial Reduction’³⁶ in the sense that presuppositions are suspended. Sartre’s method can be well described as “a phenomenological description of human existence in its situation-in-the-world.”³⁷

8.3.2 The *NAUSEA* : A Study

Nausea, Sartre’s first novel, is specifically concerned with the disclosure of primordial existence. The existence of Antoine Roquentin gravitates toward the café Mably with its glittering atmosphere of bohemian libertinage. In 1945, in a conversation with the French philosopher Roger Troisfontaines, Sartre frankly admitted that he was passing most of his days, “from morning till night,” in the café. Accused by Troisfontaines, of mistaking the atmosphere of the café for that of normal human living, Sartre replied: “Your interpretation is all wrong; in the café I am more absorbed (engage) than at home. In my room I feel the desire to

³⁶ Giorgi, A., “Sartre’s Systematic Psychology”, P.A. Schilpp (ed.), *The Philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre*, pp. 195.

³⁷ Williams, F. and Kirkpatrick, R., “Translator’s Introduction” to *The Transcendence of the Ego*, pp. 25.

stretch out on my bed. In the café, I work. It is there that I have composed all my books.” Asked what in particular attracted him to the café, the author added, “ It is this atmosphere of indifference: the others are there without bothering about me, and I do not care about them... The burden of a family would be intolerable for me.”³⁸ Sartre’s universe, Troisfontaines, concludes his comments on this conversation, “is a world seen from the point of view of the café.”³⁹

Quite interestingly, one of the basic prerequisites for an would be Yogi is this need for becoming an wanderer monk, one who takes *sannyasa* or renunciation from one’s pet identities and one’s loyalty to name, fame and family affiliation. One becomes a ‘homeless’, an wanderer whose real home is now ‘the world and the universe at large’ and all mankind becomes one’s family, *vasudha eva kutumbaka*. In philosophic idealism human consciousness is the epistemological center of the world of being and of the being of the world. Everything that is, is nothing but an artifact of the human mind. Sartre, in *La Nausée*, makes this philosophic idealism the object of his attack. Like most modern Existentialist thinkers he starts out from an anti-Cartesian position but, unlike the others, he relapses in his later works into the idealism of Descartes.

In *La Nausée*, the center of the world is not man or human consciousness, but the massive extra mental universe as it is symbolized in the seemingly most insignificant objects of everyday life. To ridicule Philosophic Idealism, Sartre introduces the figure of the “Autodidact,” the omnivorous reader, the peddler of dead ideas: “ The reading matter of the ‘autodidact’ gets more and more on my nerves,” writes Antoine Roquentin; “suddenly I remember the names of the authors he has recently perused: Lambert, Langlois, Larbaletrier, Lastex, Lavergue. This is like an illumination. Now I understand his method: he is reading in the alphabetical order.”⁴⁰ The encyclopedic brain of the “Autodidact,” is filled with shadows and specters, not with realities, and the home and origin of these shadows is the void of nothingness or, what amounts to the same thing, the Platonic “ream of

³⁸ Roger, Troisfontaines, *Le Choix de Jean-Paul Sartre*, Paris: Aubier, pp. 52 f,(1945).

³⁹ In the Café –knowledge of other objects.

Roger, Troisfontaines, *Le Choix de Jean-Paul Sartre*, Paris: Aubier, pp. 52,(1945).

⁴⁰ Sartre, J.P., *La Nausee*, pp. 48., (1938).

ideas.” What strikes and overwhelms Antoine Roquentin is the brutal reality of existing things, in contrast to the phantomlike reality of ideas. The experience, which makes him aware of the naked “being-there” of existents, is *La Nausee*, the “great disgusts.”⁴¹ And what makes this experience so terrifying is the fact that dead objects actually have the power of limiting the freedom of a human being to deal with them at will. As this world of “dead” objects confronts man with silent and stubborn hostility, there arises in the human consciousness a horrible, oppressive fear of the obscene nakedness of the “being-there” of things.

Roquentin, the hero of the novel, appears to follow Sartre’s method step by step to obtain enlightenment. The novel opens with a description of the *nausea* which Roquentin experiences while throwing a stone into the sea. This *nausea* develops as he confronts other objects, situations, and human beings. Roquentin wants to relieve himself of his *nausea* by knowing its causes. Each encounter brings Roquentin closer to the experience of raw existence. Roquentin realizes that his relationship to the objective world is being altered with each confrontation. Ordinarily, people control, regulate, appropriate, manipulate, and use objects as instruments serving specific functions. This usual human relationship of control appears to be gradually disintegrating in Roquentin’s encounters with objects. The objects want to be what they are in themselves. To facilitate this revelation, Sartre uses the literary devices of simile, metaphor, humor, irony and other literary devices through which Sartre accomplishes his goal in the novel. Roquentin adopts these devices as a “way of life.” He senses, feels, sees, understands, and experiences the world through them. Through the use of simile and metaphor, Sartre tries to unveil the masks of language and logic. Ordinarily, we are trained to look at the world in terms of humans, animals, and objects. Sartre attempts to show that there are no absolute and clear-cut distinctions between the three modes of existence. This he accomplishes through the use of simile and metaphor. To quote Malhotra : “Metaphor is defined by Webster’s dictionary as “a figure of speech in which a word or phrase literally denoting one kind of object or idea is used in place of another to suggest a likeness or analogy between them. Since simile describes a

⁴¹ Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm, *The Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for Everyone and nobody*, Graham Parkes, pp.300, (2005).

likeness between two unlike objects or ideas, it can be incorporated under the general heading of metaphor.”⁴² Malhotra finds that *Nausea* is filled with a great variety of metaphors with which Sartre describes each mode of existence in terms and categories of another mode of existence. “The metaphors used in the novel can be classified into three groups based on the priority of humans or objects or animals. In the description of human beings or human features, if the terms are drawn from the animal mode, the object mode, or the human mode, the statement is termed a metaphor of the human mode. Similarly, if the objects or animals are described in terms of the other two modes of existence, the statements are designated as metaphors of the object mode and the animal mode, respectively. It has been convenient to use H, O, and A for human, object, and animal modes. By combining the above letters, one can form nine sub modes of metaphors: HO, HA, HH, OH, OA, OO, AH, AO, and AA. Of these nine sub modes, Sartre uses the first five in *Nausea*. Nowhere in the novel, can one find a description of objects in terms of objects, or of animals in terms of either human beings or objects as animals.”⁴³

One does, however, find descriptions of human beings and human features in terms of animals or objects or other human features. Furthermore, there are various instances in which Sartre describes objects, houses, and things in terms of human or animal characteristics. Following are the examples of the different sub modes of metaphors which Sartre uses in the novel: (a) OA (objects described in animal terms), for example, “They (objects) touch me, it is unbearable. I am afraid of being in contact with them as though they were living beasts.” “This enormous belly turned upward, bleeding, inflated bloated with all its dead paws, this belly floating in this car, in this gray sky, is not a seat. It could just as well be a dead donkey tossed about in the water, floating with the current, belly in the air in a great grey river, a river of floods; and I could be sitting on the donkey’s belly, my feet dangling in the clear water.” (b) OH (objects described in human terms) “Then the garden smiled at me. I leaned against the gate and watched for a long time. The smile of the trees, of the laurel, meant something.” (c) HA (human beings described in animal terms) “With them there is also a young man with a face like a dog.” (d) HO (human beings described in object terms) “Her nose was planted on her face

like a knife in an apple.” (e) HH (an aspect of human being described in terms of a different aspect of human being).⁴² “. . . it was a hand, the small white hand which slid along the table a little while ago. Now it was resting on its back, relaxed, soft and sensual, it had the indolent unity of a woman sunning herself after bathing.”⁴³ These and other similar examples fill the pages of the novel. Roquentin looks at the world through these five sub modes of metaphor. This way of experiencing the world helps him realize the fluidity of concepts, i.e., one group of concepts concerning one type of existence can flow into the concepts concerning another mode of existence. Furthermore, as the experience deepens, Roquentin is able to transcend these concepts, i.e., language and its logic, towards the immediate experience of existence. The revealed existence is experienced as superfluous, absurd, contingent and viscous.

Although metaphor aims at disclosing existence in general, it is specifically concerned with showing that objects are more like animals and humans. On the other hand, the use of humor and irony reveals the identity of man to objects. Humor deals with man’s body as well as his actions. The aim of humor is to identify body with objects or flesh and actions with mechanical movements, both devoid of any sense. “When Roquentin scrutinizes his body, he experiences it as filled with warm milk; his cheeks appear as ‘insipid flesh blossoming and palpitating;’ eyes seem ‘glossy, soft, blind, red rimmed ... like fish scales,’ and his face appears as follows: ‘A silky white down covers the great slopes of the cheeks, two hairs protrude from the nostrils; it is a geological embossed map.’ Roquentin’s second use of humor is evident when he describes the activities of the people of Bouville. “The Bouvillois regard Sunday to be their common possession. Sunday after Sunday, they act the same way, do the same types of things, and perform the same types of rituals and antics. Morning is spent at the church; afternoon is used for a visit to a cemetery or to one’s parents; and evening is utilized for listening to

⁴² Sartre, J.P., *Nausea*, Penguin books, (1965).

⁴³ users.telenet.be/sterf/texts/phil/Sartre-Nausea.pdf – accessed on 02/03/08.

the radio and thinking about Monday. These activities are repeated Sunday after Sunday in a manner of a machine doing the same sort of work, day after day.”⁴⁴

Malhotra comments: “Roquentin views his own body and the actions of himself and others by means of humor, which reveals to him the gratuitousness of both. His revelation that the natural world and man’s body and actions are superfluous, absurd, contingent, and viscous is complemented by another revelation which concerns man’s motives, intentions, ideas, and values. This latter revelation is achieved through the technique of irony that aims at disclosing contradictions in the motives, intentions, and ideas of another, thus defeating him with his own arguments. Roquentin makes everyone, including himself, the target of his irony. The leaders of Bouville, whose time, effort, and indulgence have made the city an important seaport, provide a convenient outlet for Roquentin’s irony. This elite regarded itself as having been created by God for the unique purpose of building Bouville. Its members believed that they had a divine right to exist. While observing their portraits, Roquentin proclaims, “none of those painted had died a bachelor, none of them had died childless or in testate, none without the last rites. Their soul at peace that day as on other days, with God and the world, these men had slipped quietly into death, to claim their share of eternal life to which they had a right. For they had a right to everything: to life, to work, to wealth, to command, to respect, and, finally, to immortality. They convinced themselves that their lives were essential and justified. Roquentin’s irony reaches its peak when he exclaims, “Farewell, beautiful lilies, elegant in your painted little sanctuaries, good bye, lovely lilies, our pride and reason for existing, good bye you bastards!”⁴⁵ Through the use of irony, Roquentin shows that no one, including the Bouville elite, is essential and justified. Like all others, they are gratuitous.

By experiencing the world through metaphor, humor, and irony, Roquentin is able to obliterate the meanings which people have privately and publicly assigned to the world. When existence is revealed in its primordial nature, Roquentin gives the following description of his enlightenment: “So I was in the park just now. The

⁴⁴ Malhotra, K. Ashok, *The Philosophy Of Sartre Versus Sāṅkhya Yoga*, Oneonta Philosophy Studies, USA, (1995).

⁴⁵ Doerksen, Nan., “In a free state and Nausea”, published in journal of *Postcolonial writing*, vol. 20, issue 1, pp.105- 113, (1981).

roots of the chestnut tree were sunk in the ground just under my bench. I couldn't remember it was a root any more. The words had vanished and with them the significance of things, their methods of use, and the feeble points of reference which men have traced on their surface.... And then all of a sudden, there it was, clear as day: existence had suddenly unveiled itself. It had lost the harmless look of an abstract category: it was the very paste of things; this root was kneaded into existence. Or rather the root, the park gates, the bench, the sparse grass all that had vanished: the diversity of things, their individuality, was only an appearance, a veneer. This veneer had melted, leaving soft, monstrous masses, all in disorder naked, in a frightful, obscene nakedness.”⁴⁶

At the time of this illumination, all man made distinctions have disappeared, and Roquentin confronts existence in its primordial state. The revealed world is experienced as an undifferentiated and unformed mass that defies all perceptual and intellectual descriptions. Roquentin experiences the meaning of existence but finds it extremely difficult to interpret the experience through ordinary intellectual concepts. He therefore chooses to describe this meaning through certain experiential categories. Existence is grasped as superfluous, absurd, contingent and viscous. It is superfluous in two senses: first, it is unwanted, gratuitous, and overflowing; second, its presence does not serve any function or purpose. Roquentin realizes that being, in general, and man, in particular, are superfluous in the above two senses. Existence is not only superfluous but also absurd. Roquentin finds that there is no reason for it to be or not to be. It is, deprived of inner or outer source of meaning and direction. Moreover, this absurdity is experienced in another way. Something is not absurd if it can be explained or if reasons can be given for its being. Roquentin exclaims, “The world of explanations and reasons is not the world of existence. A circle is not absurd; it is clearly explained by the rotation of a straight segment around one of its extremities. But neither does a circle exist. This root, on the other hand, existed in such a way that I could not explain it. Knotty, inert, nameless, it fascinated me, filled my eyes, brought me

⁴⁶ Sartre, J.P., *Nausea*, pp. 170-171, (1938).

back unceasingly to its own existence ... This root . . . was ... below all explanation.”⁴⁷ Thus, existence is absurd because it defies all explanation.

Existence, being superfluous and absurd, is also experienced as contingent. Roquentin describes this as follows: “The essential thing is contingency. I mean one cannot define existence as necessity. To exist is simply to be there; those who exist let themselves be encountered, but you can never deduce anything from them. I believe there are people who have understood this. Only they tried to overcome this contingency by inventing a necessary, causal being. But no necessary being can explain existence: contingency is not a delusion, a probability which can be dissipated; it is the absolute, consequently, the perfect free gift.”⁴⁸ In addition to being superfluous, absurd, and contingent, existence is experienced as viscous and slimy. During his enlightenment, Roquentin experiences existence in the following manner: “It was there, in the garden, toppled down into the trees, all soft, sticky, soiling everything, all thick, a jelly ... filling everything with its gelatinous slither ... I shouted ‘filth! What rotten filth!’ and shook myself to get rid of this sticky filth, but held fast and there was so much, tons and tons of existence, endless . . .”⁴⁹

At this point, we may consider the philosophical significance of Roquentin’s enlightenment. This significance can be revealed by answering two questions: what meaning, if any, does Roquentin assign to his own illumination, and how does Sartre utilize Roquentin’s discoveries towards developing his existential philosophy? The answer to the first question can be found in Roquentin’s statement during his enlightenment. Roquentin finds that his various confrontations with objects constituted the different stages which led to his illumination. Each brought him closer to the experience of existence, the secret meaning of which he seems the one chosen to discover. At the time of enlightenment, Roquentin grasps the world of existence in terms of its superfluity, absurdity, contingency, and consciousness. He also realizes that his own being is completely deprived of

⁴⁷ Hubert L. Dreyfus, Mark A. Wrathall, *A Companion to Phenomenology and Existentialism*, Published Online: 26 Nov, (2007).

[doi.wiley.com/10.1002/9780470996508.ch19](https://doi.org/10.1002/9780470996508.ch19) accessed on 22/03/08

⁴⁸ books.google.com/books?isbn=0195155084 accessed on 27/03/08.

⁴⁹ Mc Bride, L. William., Purdue university, *Sartre and Existentialism*, Garland Publishing, New York, pp.377, (1997).

meaning and significance. Like the world, he is unjustified. His past illusions about finding meaning in life are shattered by his enlightenment. He can now clearly see that there is no reason to live or not to live.

Along with the negative experience, Roquentin makes a positive discovery. He realizes that his freedom or a special type of consciousness which sets him apart from the material world. This freedom is revealed first, as constituting man's being; second, as a task of assigning meanings to things; and finally, as an activity to liberate oneself from the meaning structure of others. Grasping his being in terms of freedom generates hope in Roquentin. He thinks that he may attempt to salvage his life by involving himself in a creative enterprise. Thus, he plans to create a work of art, i.e., a fictional novel. Not only does Roquentin's illumination give his life a direction and a sense of commitment, but it also provides Sartre with the basic ingredients of his ontology. The disclosures of the dual character of reality in terms of the undifferentiated being and the conscious being of man, the meaninglessness of life, and man's desire to salvage his existence, are some of the revelations in *Nausea* which are given a systematic description and critical interpretation in *Being and Nothingness*. On the one hand, *Being and Nothingness* can be regarded as developing a pre suppositionless system of philosophy that is based upon certain self evident premises given to Roquentin in his personal intuition. On the other hand, it appears that *Being and Nothingness* is a philosophical commentary or a logical explanation and justification of the discoveries made by Roquentin. Thus, *Being and Nothingness* describes the meaning of Roquentin's realizations in philosophical language.

Following Malhotra's guidelines a summary of the study can be written down:

1. Philosophy is anthropocentric: Man or the human condition is its genuine concern.
2. Man is a unique creature: Man is the "being-for-itself" in contrast to everything else which is designated by the "being-in-itself."

3. Man has no God given essence: Man first exists and then creates his essence. Therefore, in man, existence comes before essence.

4. Man is absolutely free and absolutely responsible.

5. Anguish is the outcome of man's absolute freedom and absolute responsibility.

6. Man's existence is contingent and unjustified: Man's ideal is to salvage his life by attempting to fuse the "being-for-itself" with the "being-in-itself." This ideal is contradictory and, hence, unattainable.

This summarizes the discussion of Sartre's method in *Nausea*, as well as the philosophical significance assigned to Roquentin's revelations in *Being and Nothingness*.

8.3.3 Patañjail's Method in *Yoga-Sūtras*

In order to achieve the realm of *puruṣa*, of consciousness and freedom, *Sāṅkhya* uses, the *neti-neti* and the *tat-tvam-asi* techniques. The first one, the *neti-neti* technique, is characteristic of the orthodox *Vedic* tradition and has been applied for the first time by Yajnavalkya in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad*. It is to be found in the very basis of a cosmic ontology of *Vedānta*. Completely negating the empirical determinations of Brahman one comes to explicating Him as eternal purity (i.e., totally independent of matter), spirit, and freedom, *Vedānta* lays the foundation of non dual and thereby the sole reality of Consciousness (*Brahman*) and unreality of material world. *Sāṅkhya* modifies this in order to safeguard dualistic and realistic philosophical position that ultimately leads to liberation of many *puruṣa* and reality of *māyā* or *prakṛti*. Using this methodology *Yoga* aims at eliminating suffering and mundaneness by helping the aspirant obtain the discriminative knowledge of the two realities of *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*. The second *Sūtra* of chapter one indicates the hindrances to be removed in order to acquire the desired knowledge. The various modifications of the mind are the obstacles which hide from the individual the true nature of reality. The goal of *Yoga* is to inhibit, restrain, control, and end these modifications completely.

In line of the above-mentioned perspective, Patañjali suggests a special method consisting of eight steps, which, by fully terminating these modifications, make possible the immediate grasp of reality through the primordial intuition. These modifications that constitute our mental life consist of, first, the entire Information obtained through the contact of the sense organs with the physical world, the classification of the information through the concepts, and the retention and the modification of the Information through memory and Imagination; second, our emotional reaction to this information; and, last, the sense of possession through which the information is made one's own. Each person has a tendency to falsely identify his or her real self with these contents. This false identity hides from the person the authentic nature or reality. After one inhibits these modifications of the mind, his consciousness can be emptied of all its superficial contents and can be experienced in its purity. This is accomplished through the eight-step method of *Yoga*.

Patañjali's method can be understood in two stages. The first five steps are known as *yama*, *niyama*, *āsana*, *prāṇāyāma*, *pratyāhāra*, which constitute the preparatory stage, are called the *bahiraṅgas* or the external steps. The second stage of the method, are termed the *antaraṅgas* or the internal steps. The *bahiraṅgas* are called the external steps because they are directed towards inhibiting, controlling, and finally eliminating all disturbances arising from external sources. Our desires, emotions, passions, and sentiments are disturbances caused by objects or people. *Yama* and *niyama* consist in developing certain mental and physical habits through which distractions are restrained and eliminated. The physical body causes other mental modifications. One's body is intimately connected with one's mind, and any change in the bodily mechanism is bound to cause a corresponding modification in the mind. The aim of *Āsana* and *prāṇāyāma* is to regulate one's body and its functions so that no undesirable or uncontrolled mental disturbance originates from them. After the disturbances caused by the emotions and desires are restrained, and the body is brought under complete control, the mind is still constantly receiving information through the five sense organs. *Pratyāhāra* is the last of the *bahiraṅgas* which aims at the absolute elimination of these sense impressions. This is accomplished through the withdrawal of the mind from the sense organs.

The *bahiraṅgas* cleanse the mind of all disturbances caused by external factors and prepare it for the second and more difficult stage of the method. Since the mind is completely withdrawn from the influences of the outer world, it is in an excellent position to reflect upon its own contents. Now, the contents which the mind confronts are of two kinds: first, the information retained and modified by memory and imagination, and, second, and the awareness that the information belongs to oneself. The *antaraṅgas* aim at controlling and eliminating both the above mental contents altogether. Once the aspirant empties his consciousness of all superficial modifications, whether caused by external or internal factors, he will be able to grasp the true nature of both *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*. Thus, in the second stage, when all interruptions and disturbances are brought nearly to a halt, the aspirant is ready to take the final step, *samādhi*. Thus, *samādhi* marks the end of all modifications of the mind and reveals to the aspirant the authentic nature of reality.

In *Yoga* terminology, this enlightenment is called *kaivalya*. When this realization occurs, the aspirant grasps the two independent realities of *puruṣa* or man's essential self and *prakṛti* or "non-self." This discriminative knowledge is subjective, i.e., the aspirant knows now that he is not the body or *prakṛti* and that *prakṛti* is not he. Thus, *puruṣa* recognizes its distance, isolation, and transcendence from and its evolutes. The aspirant realizes that he is *puruṣa* who uses his body and mental faculties as instruments but is not identical with them. The aspirant not only experiences separation from *prakṛti* but is also enlightened about his real nature. This nature is experienced in terms of complete freedom and pure consciousness. These are the revelations of the aspirant.

At this point, it should be noted that Patañjali does not provide us with any elaborate description of the nature and relationship between the two disclosed realities. His *Yoga*, being a religion practical method that aims exclusively at enlightenment, is unconcerned with the philosophical description of the revealed states of consciousness. Hauer asserts in his *Dev-Yoga* that *Sāṅkhya* originated from *Yoga* to provide the latter with a philosophical description and justification for its revelations. *Yoga* offers a method to disclose reality, whereas *Sāṅkhya* complements

it by providing an ontology which justifies it. *Sāṅkhya* accepts the *Yogic* method and its revelations and presents a complete philosophical analysis of the nature and the relationship of the two disclosed realities of *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*. Thus, *Sāṅkhya* describes the meaning or significance of the aspirant's realizations in philosophical language. Following are the main ideas of *Sāṅkhya* ontology.

8.3.4 General Observations:

1. Philosophical inquiry begins with the fact of human suffering and aims at terminating it. Thus, Philosophy is concerned with the description of man's existence here and now.
2. Man's existence is to be understood in terms of the interaction of the two realities of *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*.
3. Man is a special being in the universe. Man is *puruṣa* or pure consciousness in contrast to everything else which is *prakṛti*.
4. Man's essential self is freedom,
5. Man's suffering is due to his lack of the correct knowledge of his real self.
6. Man's ultimate aim is to obtain salvation by acquiring correct knowledge about the nature of *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*. This knowledge is to be attained through the practice of *Yoga*.

This, in short, summarizes Patañjali's method, as well as the philosophical significance assigned to its revelations by the *Sāṅkhya-kārikā* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa.

Malhotra comments: "From this step by step analysis of these two methodologies we are in a position to make some general observations: The method of *Yoga* purposes to unveil this knowledge to the aspirant. On the other hand, Sartre uses the term "nausea" to characterize metaphysical suffering. Sartre's hero wants to be enlightened about the condition of his nausea in order that he may escape from it. Unlike Patañjali's aspirant, Roquentin's nausea is not caused by the ignorance of

salvation knowledge, but results from the nature of reality itself. Sartre's method aims at helping Roquentin obtain the absolute experience of existence and thus enlighten him about the condition of his suffering. Once Roquentin's illumination occurs, he reflects upon various means to save his unsalvaged existence. Therefore, by enlightening the aspirants, both methods intend to eliminate suffering.”

Like Husserl, Patañjali and Sartre agree that our customary approach to the world is superficial and biased. It is colored by language, logic, cultural values, and personal prejudices. The shallow veil of meanings which surrounds conventional knowledge hides reality from us. Patañjali and Sartre believe that habitual knowledge must be transcended in order that reality is grasped. Their methods systematically obliterate these artificial meanings. Similar to Husserl's phenomenological method, the aims of Patañjali and Sartre's methods are to disclose reality through a personal intuitive experience.

8.3.5 Comments on Stepwise Procedures:

The methods used by Patañjali and Sartre are extremely rigorous. Each involves step-by-step procedures. Patañjali's method consists of five external steps that control and eliminate modifications from without and three internal steps that restrain and obliterate existing memory impressions, images, and ideas. As Malhotra has pointed out, the *bahiraṅgas* aim at elimination all external influences, and therefore may be regarded as the equivalent of the *epoche* stage of Husserl's method. Like the *epoche*, the *bahiraṅgas* constitute the preparatory stage. In this stage, the aspirant deliberately practices self-control in order to refine the naivety with which he views the world, other people, and himself. Paralleling the *epoche*, the *bahiraṅgas* give rise to a transformation from an unphilosophical to a philosophical attitude. Thus, impartial contemplation of the contents of the mind is made possible. Only when the aspirant is firmly established in the *bahiraṅgas* is he permitted to practice the three internal steps of concentration. The latter constitute the *antaraṅga* stage of the method. This is similar to the Reduction aspect of Husserl's method. As reduction purposes to reveal pure subjectivity by analyzing the contents and activities of consciousness, so the *antaraṅgas* unveil *puruṣa* by

concentrating on the contents of the mind. Thus, both methods attempt to reveal transcendental subjectivity through primordial intuition.

According to critics, Husserl's method is more abstract and theoretical although Sartrean interpretation differs from such observations. Sartre is concerned with rectifying these shortcomings. He offers the literary devices of a simile, metaphor, humor and irony which constitute the four concrete steps of his method. Roquentin, the hero of Sartre's novel, "lives" these devices. Through them, he relates to the world and to others. By experiencing the world through these devices, the superficial structure of meanings crumbles and the world of existence reveals itself in its naturalness. Thus, Roquentin realizes the experience of naked existence and of pure subjectivity.

The preceding discussion makes clear that both Patañjali and Sartre, unlike Husserl, present strict step-by-step procedures to unveil ultimate reality. These methods must become "ways of life" to those who undertake to follow them. Patañjali expects the aspirant to apply himself to the method for a long period of time; to avoid any interruption which may be detrimental to his practice; and to show absolute devotion and complete involvement in the method. When these conditions are fulfilled, the aspirant is bound to realize his goal. On the other hand, Sartre's aspirant, Roquentin, is without obligations and has severed all social and personal ties. At each stage leading to his enlightenment, Roquentin is thoroughly engrossed in living these literary devices. Like the *Yogi*, he is totally involved in his own salvation. Therefore, he clearly satisfies the conditions which Patañjali sets forth for the mastery of the *Yoga* method. Thus, both Patañjali and Sartre give us specific procedures for the performance of actual phenomenological reductions. Patañjali describes how the initiate should perform the reductions step by step, whereas the hero of Sartre's *Nausea* actually performs the *apoche*.

The two methods, of Sartre and *Sāṅkhya*-*Yoga*, are compared because, according to Malhotra, the two methods can be compared. To quote Malhotra: "The two methods can also be compared in terms of their respective accomplishments. We can include under accomplishments the nature of enlightenment, as well as the philosophical significance assigned to this enlightenment. By adhering strictly to

their methods, both Roquentin and the *Yogi* achieve illumination. There are some obvious similarities in the actual confrontation of reality. Like the *Yogi*, Roquentin experiences the meaning of reality but finds it impossible to describe the experience through the sense intellect concepts. During the enlightenment, both are plunged into it, both are delivered by it, both recognize its absolute nature, but neither can characterize it”.⁵⁰

Another similarity between the two methods pertains to the disclosed contents of reality. Roquentin grasps reality in terms of the undifferentiated substantiality of existence and the non-substantial consciousness, and the *Yogi*, as well, comprehends the two distinct and separate realities of substantial *prakṛti* and pure consciousness or *puruṣa*. Thus, both Roquentin and the *Yogi* achieve discriminative knowledge.

The revelations of Roquentin and the *Yogi* are also similar with respect to the disclosed self. Patañjali does not give explicit descriptions about the nature of *puruṣa* or the conscious self. However, the last five *Sūtras* of the *Kaivalya Pāda* do offer some clues to its nature. The revealed self is experienced as essentially free and fully conscious. It is a freedom from all *kleśas* and *karmas*. The *Yogi* transcends the deterministic influence of his former physical and psychic conditions so that his self is experienced as a total and absolute freedom. Roquentin, too, experiences his self as a total freedom. He grasps it as freedom from all external and internal hindrances; freedom to create meanings and values; and freedom as constituting man’s essence. Both Roquentin and the *Yogi* realize that this self is a pure consciousness devoid of all substantiality.

“Notwithstanding the similarities, the revelations of the two differ in one important aspect. This difference consists in the personal meaning which each assigns to his own illumination. In some ways, Roquentin’s reactions to the disclosed reality are contrary to those of the *Yogi*. His illumination is not pure bliss but a “nauseous

⁵⁰ Malhotra, Kumar. Ashok., *The Philosophy Of Sartre Versus Sāṅkhya Yoga*, Oneonta Philosophy Studies, USA, (1995).

ecstasy” or “atrocious joy” The abundance of reality does not fulfill him, but suffocates him. He is not sure whether he is relieved or satisfied by this enlightenment but finds himself crushed by it. Existence is not revealed as perfection but, rather, as imperfection or weakness. The illumination results in alienation rather than integration. Roquentin finds himself alone, solitary, and abandoned. The world of existence and his own being appear to be superfluous, absurd, and contingent. Instead of adding meaning to his life, Roquentin’s enlightenment deprives it of all significance. Faced with his meaningless existence, he broods over various means of salvation”.

Unlike Roquentin, the *Yogi* believes that the realization of *puruṣa*, as distinct from *prakṛti*, results in a totally fulfilled life. He also recognizes that the experience of ‘Pure Subjectivity’ is the ultimate and the only goal of all human existence. That is, nothing is higher or better than this end, for once this enlightenment is achieved, the *Yogi*’s pursuit is terminated; he attains salvation or *kaivalya*.

The enlightenments of Roquentin and the *Yogi* have different personal meanings, although the Ontologies based upon these enlightenments are similar in some striking respects. Sartre accepts the truths revealed in *Nausea*, and from them he develops his ontology in *Being and Nothingness*, whereas *Sāṅkhya* adopts the revelations of *Yoga* and builds its own ontological system from them.

The concluding chapter of this Thesis aims at re-visiting the prime objectives of the thesis in order to re-assess some of the findings here. Is there any scope for meaningful dialogue between these two traditions? This is what the next chapter in tends to look for.



Chapter 9

CONCLUSION

9.1 Summing Up: A Brief Over View of the Chapters in Light of the Research Questions

In this concluding chapter the Thesis re-visits the research objective and the research questions in light of what we have discussed at some length about some of the key themes of the Thesis. The opening chapter raised some issues and now it is time for re-visiting some such issues in order to understand the Thesis position in this regard. In its attempt at understanding Subjectivity, Selfhood etc. in two different philosophical traditions, the Thesis is rather an exploration of the first person subjective awareness of what it is to be conscious at all. The following is an exploration in this direction.

9.1.1 Some of the Key Research Questions of the Thesis are

Research Question: *a) Is this journey toward a deeper dimension of human subjectivity significant? Is this a quest for the self in terms of Consciousness? Is it a study of brain, mind, and Self-etc.? When we speak of self awareness, do we then necessarily also speak of a Self?*

9.1.2 The Self as Experiential Dimension

In this Phenomenological exploration of both *Sāṅkhya-Yoga* and Sartre, I have dealt mostly on the experiential dimension of knowledge that adds Phenomenological character to both these systems of thought. In Patañjali *Yoga*, for example, the *Yogin* is not a theoretician but a practitioner who takes his or her own experience (*pratyaksa* or perception) as the highest criterion. Besides, as shown in Chapters 3 and 5, “the key themes in Sartre and *Sāṅkhya-Yoga*,” both these philosophical traditions have dealt at length on the questions of human Subjectivity and its deeper nature in these philosophical traditions. We have seen that one of the prime objectives of the Philosophy of Consciousness, as expounded in both *Sāṅkhya* and Sartre, is to show the irreducible dimension of deeper

Subjectivity that can not be the subject matter of empirical sciences like introspective Psychology although it keeps room for Phenomenological exploration of this irreducible dimension of Subjectivity. The Introductory chapter of the Thesis has thus justified the adoption of Phenomenological Methodology in Sartrean Existentialism and in *Sāṅkhy-Yoga* Darśana, specially highlighting the similarity that one comes across between techniques laid down by Patañjali's method and the Phenomenological *Epoché*, as adopted by Edmund Husserl and later modified by his predecessors like Heidegger and Sartre.

Phenomenological exploration toward subjectivity aims at unveiling the deeper and hidden structures of meaning. This Transcendental dimension of Subjectivity is common in both these philosophical schools. In Phenomenology, the Self is claimed to possess experiential reality, is taken to be closely linked to the first person perspective, and this first person Phenomenological perspective seeks to accommodate phenomenal qualities that are intentional in nature. Dan Zahavi writes: "We are as we can not ask what it feels like to be a piece of soap or a radiator, we can ask what it is like to be a cat, a wolf, or another human being, because we take them to be conscious and to have experiences. Experiences are not something that one simply has, like coins in the pocket. On the contrary, experiences have a subjective "feel" to them. That is a certain (Phenomenal) quality of what it is like or what it "feels" like to have them."¹

The conclusion, which we can draw from the foregoing comparisons, is that for both Sartre and *Sāṅkhya*, the realms of Consciousness, Self or Subjectivity, the realm of *Cit* or *Puruṣa*, stands for the Subject, as contrasted with the object, and it is an emphasis on personal realm of experience. Sartre's method for explaining his position on the "Self" is the Phenomenological one, utilized before him by Husserl and Heidegger. Phenomenology may be defined as the descriptive analysis of subjective processes. It differs from Psychology in that while Psychology sets up causal or genetic laws to explain *Subjective processes*, Phenomenology merely describes. As already discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, Sartre points out the

¹ Dan, Zahavi., *Subjectivity and Selfhood*, MIT, Cambridge, Massachusetts , pp. 116, (2005).

intentionality of Consciousness (a process earlier described by Husserl and Brentano), as the mark or characteristics of this personal realm of Subjectivity and Consciousness. Consciousness is always consciousness of something. As it was discussed in previous chapters, for Sartre, there exist non-conscious beings independent and external to Consciousness. Sartre as the “in-itself” refers to this realm of non-conscious beings while Consciousness is referred to as the “for-itself.” For Sartre the “Self” is an illusion, a mistaken notion created by the nihilating activity of the “for-itself,” often in an attempt to escape the Nothingness which each of us carries around within us. In Sartre, “for-itself” is not “in itself,” it is Nothingness as such. One peels away the layers of oneself; all that is revealed at the core of oneself is Nothingness. It is also discussed in the said chapters that one essential characteristic of Sartrean Consciousness and Subjectivity is its non-egological character. For Sartre, as long as we are absorbed in experience and we live in through, no ego appears. There is no unifying Ego to synthesize the stream of consciousness.

However this does not make Sartre abandon first person and personal approach to Subjectivity. Zahavi comments “Although no ego exists on the pre reflective level, Consciousness remains personal because consciousness is, at bottom, characterized by a fundamental self-givenness or self referentiality that Sartre called *ipseity*. Thus, the ego appears to consciousness as a transcendent in-itself, as an existent in the human world, not as *of* the nature of consciousness. Yet we need not conclude that the for-itself is a pure and simple ‘impersonal’ contemplation. The ego is far from being the personalizing pole of a consciousness which, without it, would remain in the impersonal stage; on the contrary, it is consciousness in its fundamental *ipseity* which, under certain conditions, allows the appearance of the ego as the transcendent phenomenon of that *ipseity*.”²

Philosophical phenomenology as developed by Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and others not only addresses crucial issues often absent from current debates over consciousness but also provides a conceptual framework for

² Dan, Zahavi., *Subjectivity and Selfhood*, MIT, Cambridge, Massachusetts , pp. 115, (2005).

understanding subjectivity. Zahavi fills the need given the recent upsurge in theoretical and empirical interest in subjectivity for an account of the subjective or phenomenal dimension of consciousness that is accessible to researchers and students from a variety of disciplines. His aim is to use phenomenological analyses to clarify issues of central importance to philosophy of mind, cognitive science, developmental psychology, and psychiatry. By engaging in a dialogue with other philosophical and empirical positions, says Zahavi, phenomenology can demonstrate its vitality and contemporary relevance.

Sartre's crucial move was, consequently, to distinguish between Ego and Self. From the context, it is obvious that Sartre had nothing like narrative identity in mind when he spoke of *ipseity*. He was referring to something much more basic, something characterizing consciousness as such. 'It is something that distinguishes my very mode of existence, and although I can fail to articulate it, it is something I can fail to be'. As he also wrote, "pre-reflective consciousness is self-consciousness. It is this same notion of self which must be studied, for it defines the very being of consciousness."³

The Chapters 6 and 7, "Some Key Concepts of *Sāṅkhyā–Yoga*," and "God and Salvation in *Sāṅkhyā–Yoga*," have focused more about this irreducible dimension of Transcendental Subjectivity in *Sāṅkhyā–Yoga*. The *Yogi* looks for the highest realization of the Transcendent Reality, or, in the words of Kant the "thing-in-itself," behind and beyond the world of appearance but unlike Kant, the *Yogi*'s experience of the numinous is a returning home to the origin, the nostalgia for the original consciousness as opposed to the primary empirical state of the mind. *Yoga Sūtra*, on its own, is a highly original contribution towards a Phenomenology of meditative Consciousness. The purpose of meditation is to eliminate the gross fluctuations by way of focusing the ideational contents of consciousness held by the power of concentration. To quote G. Feuerstein and J. Miller "To fully understand the nature of *Samādhi*, one must resort to personal experience."⁴

³ Dan, Zahavi, *Subjectivity and Selfhood*, MIT, Cambridge, Massachusetts , pp. 116, (2005).

⁴ G. Feuerstein. and J. Miller, A., *Reappraisal of Yoga* , Rider & Company, London, pp.35, (1971).

The *Yogi* thus has direct experience of what Rudolf Otto describes as the experience of the Holy. Otto sees religion as a *Sui generis* category, which stands above all natural processes and whose essence is irreducible and unavailable. He writes “if there is any single domain of human experience that presents us with something unmistakably specific and unique, peculiar to itself, assuredly it is that of religious life.” The numinous cannot be known through ratiocination; awareness of it comes only through the feelings it evokes. In Oriental art there may be no more evocative portrayal of what Rudolf Otto calls the *mysterium tremendum*.

Yoga can only be known by *Yoga*, says Vyāsa. The *ecstatic* experience evades definition. Hence circumscriptions must suffice. It is through eliminating the layers that one meditates into the deeper mystery of Selfhood. In principle, the Self is Nothingness; it is *neti neti*, not this, not this. This is Transcendental Consciousness, the *Cit* that lies under the veil of universal *māya*. In Vyāsa’s *Bhāṣya* on the *Yoga Sūtra*, *Yoga* is the state of *ecstasies*. This is a realm that is not accessible to the empirical sciences like nor to Psychology nor to Philosophy or Religion. It is an act in which ordinary subject object relation is Transcended and Pure Consciousness, in Patañjali’s words ‘Power behind mind’, ‘*Cit Sakti*’ rests in itself. *Cit Sakti* stands for Transcendent Self. *Yoga* is not just psychotherapy because it does not stop at mere integration, the actualization of the psyche; it aims at complete transformation of man. It aims at man’s emancipation from all restrictions peculiar to human.

It is this ‘Transcendental Realm of Consciousness’ out of which the primeval thought of ‘I’ arises, and into which it dissolves. Self has a shape or form as ‘I’, and is infused with the illuminative, or *sāttvic*, quality of nature (*prakṛti*). Let us know how the two, the realm of Ego and *buddhi* and the realm of *puruṣa* and Consciousness are symbolically presented in some temple rituals in Hinduism. In the temples, we see a base idol, an idol of stone that is permanently fixed. This represents the soul (*ātman*). There is also a bronze idol, which is considered to be the icon of the base idol, and is taken out of the temple in procession as its representatives, the individual self. The bronze idol represents the self or the

individual entity, while the base idol represents the universality of the Soul, in *Sāṅkhya–Yoga* terminology, the *puruṣa*. It is often described *via negation*.

The *Siva Saṅhita* prescribes *Contemplation of the Void* as a practice sure to bring Self-realization. The description goes like this: “Let him (the *Yogi*) contemplate on his own reflection in the sky as beyond the cosmic Ego: in the manner previously described. Through that let him think on the Great Void unceasingly. The Great Void, whose beginning is void, whose middle is void, whose end is void, has brilliancy of tens of millions of suns, and the coolness of tens of millions of moons. By contemplating continually on this, one obtains success. Let him practice with energy daily this *dhyāna*, within a year he shall obtain all success undoubtedly. He whose mind is absorbed in that place even for a second, is certainly a *Yogi*, and a good devotee, and is revered in all worlds. All his stores of sins are at once verily destroyed. By seeing it one never returns to the path of this mortal universe; let the *Yogi*; therefore, practice this with great care by the path of *Svadhishthāna*. I cannot describe the grandeur of this contemplation. He, who practices, knows.”⁵

9.1.3 Blotting Out of the Ego

“A similar technique requires the meditator to feel his closed eyes and his head to be filled with foaming water. Next he must meditate on his body from the throat to the stomach, filling it with imaginary water. Then he mentally fills all of his body, including the arms and legs, with cool water, the colour of glass. After he has filled all of himself with pure water, he should imagine that the room too is filled with it. When this has been clearly experienced, he must gradually drain away the water, reversing the previous process. That is to say, he drains the water from the room slowly and steadily until none remains between ceiling and floor; then from his arms, legs and stomach; next from his chest and throat; finally from his head and eyes. In this way the false Ego vanishes.”⁶

⁵ hu.wikibooks.org/wiki/Szerkesztő:Dubaduba/Siva_szamhita2 on 08/05/07.

⁶ www.sivanandadlshq.org/download/practical.htm - 358k accessed on 08/05/07.

Research Question: *b) Is Sāṅkhya atheistic in nature? What is theism in Yoga darśana? How do Sartre and Sāṅkhya reconcile atheism and man's urge for salvation? How is it related to the existentially personal question, "who am I"?*

Chapters 4 & 7 of the Thesis, "The Aesthetics of Salvation in Sartre's Existentialism" and "God and Salvation in *Sāṅkhya-Yoga*", Sartre, have dealt much on this experiential dimension of numinous. Interestingly this experienced dimension of the numinous keeps room for religiosity and salvation quest of a kind that is discussed at length in Chapters 4 and 7. The experiential dimension of sheer profaneness in the *Nausea* and other works of Sartre keeps room for a sudden revelation of a sort, a kind of religious conversion may takes place although it is not tied to a God of religion. As shown in previous chapters Sartrean Atheism keeps room for religious conversion when, like the *Yogic* techniques, the *Nausea* reveals the sacredness of the profane, when some moments become religiously distinctive, when one is converted into another and a deeper mode of life suddenly. It is surely a revelation of the sacredness of the profane. Meaningfulness of sheer obscenity and 'isness,' has made Sartre a mystic. Sartre records in his diary "This moment was extraordinary. I was there, motionless and icy, plunged in a horrible ecstasy. But something fresh had just appeared in the very heart of this ecstasy; I understood the *Nausea*, I possessed it. To tell the truth, I did not formulate the discoveries to myself. But I think that it would be easy for me to put them in words now. The essential thing is contingency. I mean that one cannot define existence as necessity. To exist is simply to be there; those who exist let themselves be encountered."⁷ We have also discussed at length about the position of God in *Sāṅkhya-Yoga* and we have seen that *Yoga* advocates Theism and both *Sāṅkhya-Yoga* keeps room for salvation.

Research question: *c) What is the mystery of Consciousness? Is Consciousness essentially free, spontaneous and essentially disembodied or it can be concretized with more emphasis in man's social and material world? Is there a dichotomy between theory and praxis? What is subjectivity and inter-subjectivity in Sartrean*

⁷ Sartre, J.P., *Nausea*, Penguin books, New Directions: New York, pp. 131, (1938).

existentialism and Sāṅkhya-Yoga Darśana? Is man essentially free, or a helpless victim of situation? Can one reconcile between the two?

9.1.4 Facticity and Transcendence: Subjectivity and Inter-Subjectivity

In both *Sāṅkhya-Yoga* and Sartre, man is projected as situational who is often tormented by suffering, affliction, bad faith and *avidyā*, and all these experiences are almost depicted in similar manner in both Husserlian Phenomenology and Sartrean Existentialism. Despite the language of the ontological Phenomenology of *Being and Nothingness*, the Nothingness that is the “for-itself” has “being” just in the sense that it is subject to essential modifications. It appears that the “purity” of the “for-itself” (the purity of its not-being what it is) is a misleading abstraction. That it is the destiny of beings in the world that facticity is an inseparable part of the spirit, the essential vulnerability of the *factual* man.

How this shocking revelation closer to Husserl? We need only recall the opening pages of *Being and Nothingness*, where Sartre painstakingly dissects Husserl’s idealism and its identification of Transcendent objects with syntheses performed by the Transcendental Ego in order to replace it by his own Phenomenological Ontology. In fact, Sartre could not have known that Husserl himself, in a series of reflections recurring over many years, entertained just the sort of possibility we detect in *Nausea*. Sartre would have been unaware of them for the simple reason that they do not appear in Husserl’s published writings and are only now available to us as the editing of Husserl’s manuscripts nears completion.

Husserl, too, appears to have been aware of the radical contingency of the world of Transcendent objects. In 1907 Husserl wrote:

“Must consciousness be so rationalized that a world is constituted in it? Might it not be the case that everything that emerges in consciousness as elements, self-intuitions, judgments, etc., that...might make up a manifold of consciousness that

would not permit rigorous rationalization...and therefore no nature or science of nature?"⁸

Although there is talk of facticity and contingency in both Husserl and Sartre, there are some differences between them that cannot be subsided. Sartre attacked Husserl's notion of a Transcendental Ego. The break with Husserl, in turn, facilitated Sartre's transition from phenomenology to the existentialist doctrines of his masterwork, *Being and Nothingness*, which was completed a few years later while the author was a prisoner of war. When Sartrean Existentialism says that man is anguish what this means is this: the man who involved himself and who realizes that he is not only the person he chooses to be, but also a lawmaker who is, at the same time, choosing all mankind as well as himself, cannot escape the feeling of his total and deep responsibility. Sartre describes abandonment or forlornness as nothing else but the acceptance of the fact that man is alone in a frightening cosmos, left without a God, and that he must draw all consequences of the absence of God right to the end. Freedom then is limited by facticity. In *Being and Nothingness*, Sartre considered one's place, body, past, position, and fundamental relationship to the Other as among the facticities of freedom. Early Sartre considered the Other as a danger to one's freedom. The look of the Other objectifies one, and endangers his subjectivity.

It would appear that Husserl's own version of transcendental idealism does not preclude the affirmation of an important contingency in our experience of the world of transcendent objects. The worldly man is a being in the world who is in constant conflict with himself or herself, the world, other beings and with all sorts of *factual* limitations. Man is a dualistic being, a 'rope stretched between animal and God', as Nietzsche says. *Sāṅkhya–Yoga* is at loss to explain this *factic* nature of human subject, at one end man is *Cit*, the realm of pure Subjectivity and authenticity and on the other end, man is a helpless victim of situation. The otherness of *prakṛti* is unavoidable and an embodied man has to clear one's way through struggles and efforts, through a series of bad faiths and *māya* till one

⁸ Husserl, E., Quoted in Roy Elveton, "Sartre, Intentionality & Praxis" *International Web Journal*, Published on line : 2007/01.
http://www.sens-public.org/article.php3?id_article=361) accessed on 15/01/08.

regains discriminatory knowledge. “The mind, indeed, is the cause of man’s bondage and liberation. Attached to objects it is said to [lead] to bondage, [when] free of objects, to liberation.”⁹ In the *Sāṅkhya–Yoga*, it is still not explained how at first the free and independent *Puruṣa* fell into the trap of *avidyā* and *māya* while the *factis* and the embodied *jīva* suffers and enjoys the fruits of *prakṛti*, the Witness Self is an Onlooker. However the one is in inseparable relation with the other and the dialogue continues as long as man remains a being in the world and being with others. Beyond that what lies is one’s pious hope and aspiration, but is it humanly desirable? Is that dream of attaining God like perfection and Absolute Freedom feasible? Interestingly, while there is more recognition of human dimension of situated and relational nature of “for-itself” in late Sartre, *Yoga*’s liberated *puruṣa* is more for *jivanmukti* than *videhamukti*, more for being with others and serving others than seeking isolation and dissociation

In Sartrean Existentialism, the “look” reveals to me the givenness of another Consciousness within the world. “Yet Sartre’s dialectic of the self and other cannot rest with this givenness. “Just as the other’s freedom constitutes not only a threat but a successful elimination of my own, so, in turn, I must be able to imprison the other in my ‘look.’”¹⁰ It appears that Husserl viewed the process of alienation more positively than Sartre that it leads to a maturation and enrichment of subjectivity. Through an other subject I can learn to apprehend myself as a person among persons that is I can learn to adopt a *personalistic* attitude on myself. I can also learn to conceive of myself as a causally determined object among objects, in other words, to adopt a *naturalistic* attitude on myself. Zahavi comments: “Husserl frequently distinguishes between two types of alienating self apprehensions.”¹¹

Sartre spoke of Existential alienation occasioned by one’s encounter with other. “The gaze of the other thrusts me into worldly Space and time. I am no longer given to myself as the temporal and spatial center of the world. I am no longer

⁹ Stanzas 1-2.cf. *Visnu-Purana* V1.7-28.

¹⁰ www.sens-public.org/spip.php?article361 - accessed on 30/01/08.

¹¹ Dan, Zahavi, *Subjectivity and Selfhood*, MIT, Cambridge, Massachusetts , pp. 225, (2005).

simply “here”, but next to the door, or on the couch; I am no longer simply “now”, but too late for the appointment (Sartre 1943, 309,313,317,481,582).”¹² Sartre himself took intersubjectivity, first and foremost, a question of conflict and confrontation. “I am ashamed of myself as I appear to the other.”¹³ For both Sartre and Husserl there are types of self-apprehension that do not have their origin in the self but depend on *radical alterity*. It is remarkable that Sartre’s Phenomenal approach to consciousness gradually focuses on the personal than the impersonal and third person approach to consciousness. Sartre now puts more emphasis on self-awareness than non-reflective consciousness. Although early Sartre spoke of a reflective or non-reflective self-awareness, he later increasingly opted for the term “pre reflective self awareness.”¹⁴

But man is basically inter-subjective. Even in Sartrean Phenomenological Existentialism, where the look of the other is predominant, there is an interplay between one’s own subjectivity and inter-subjectivity as already discussed in the Chapters, the inter-subjective and situational nature of man and his/her humble aspiration for freedom in the human situation, is more evident in later Sartre and in Patañjali *Yoga* than in early Sartre and Classical *Sāṅkhya*. This social dimension of the authentic man is brought out more clearly in Patañjali’s *Yoga-Sūtra* when the social dimension of a liberated man is given much positive value. In this journey toward authenticity the first step toward it is to harmonize one’s social relationships. The ideal man becomes a representative of all man who would become a *Yogi* in turn; he or she lays down rules for all humans as such. This is done on the basis of recognition of the fellow man as being essentially the same reality as oneself. This is extended to all living beings. The whole field of social conduct is covered by various precepts of *Yama*, *Niyama*, Moral and Social Restraints etc. *Yoga* is a gradual process of harmonization.

¹² Ibid., pp.95. www.sens-public.org/spip.php?article361 - accessed on 30/01/08.

¹³ Dan, Zahavi, *Subjectivity and Selfhood*, MIT, Cambridge, Massachusetts, pp. 225, (2005).

¹⁴ Dan, Zahavi, *Subjectivity and Selfhood*, MIT, Cambridge, Massachusetts, pp. 225, (2005).

Research Questions: *d) What is the meaning of philosophical humanism? What is Sartre to his critics? e) Is it necessary to compare between Western and Indian conception of Consciousness and vice versa, Sāṅkhyan and Sartrean conceptions of the conscious realm of subjectivity?*

The Thesis, a Comparative study of two philosophical traditions, looks forward to global dimension of Philosophy that could pave way for meaningful dialogue between two diverse traditions like *Sāṅkhya-Yoga* and Sartre, for example. What is Comparative Philosophy and how it is relevant now, for the purpose of this Thesis, is already discussed in the Introductory Chapter. This mode of intercultural comparison is a reflection of cultural inspiration of Philosophy, both in the West and in the East. Western philosophy was very much related to the long cultural heritage from ancient Greek, through Rome, to Mediaeval and modern Europe; whereas in other cultures, for example, in Chinese, Indian and other Oriental culture, we find also other traditions of Philosophy. Martin Heidegger has well articulated this when he says “Western Philosophy was in fact a choice made by the Western culture from the times of Parmenides and Plato.”¹⁵

One basic pre-requisite for Comparative Philosophy is its openness for dialogue as reflected in the Philosophy of Socrates and Plato. Socrates philosophized via dialogues in which views held by others were constantly scrutinized and compared with his own; Confucius began his work by refining wisdom previous to his time and in this transformation lays an implicit comparison.¹⁶ All these observations have justified research motive for bringing two diverse Philosophical traditions closer for meaningful dialogue between philosophical wonders and the praxis of life. Aristotle says, Philosophy begins with a sense of wonder.¹⁷ For Wittgenstein, this wonder has always something to do with the existence of the world, which, for him, “is the totality of facts.” As for Heidegger, his wonder is expressed as “Why is there something rather than nothing?”¹⁸

¹⁵ www.religion-online.org/showchapter.asp?title=3040&c=2588-17k-

¹⁶ Quoted in What is Comparative Philosophy for? KWAN Sui-chi Homepages of Hong Kong Society of Humanistic Philosophy <http://www.arts.cuhk.edu.hk/~hkshp> accessed on 22/02/08.

¹⁷ Aristotle., *Metaphysics.*, London: Heinemann, pp.23., (1933-35).

¹⁸ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, London: SCM Press, (1962).

Expressed in different terms, this wonder is always directed at the *perennial riddle of life*. Suffering has an existential dimension in the sense that life, from womb to tomb, is deeply entwined in and intricately bound up with it. It is so ubiquitous and pervasive that there is simply no way we can escape from it. For the great thinkers ever lived in human history, Philosophy is that very tool devised by mankind to help us think through the perennial riddle of life. Jaques Maritain observes: “We should be grateful to Kierkegaard and his successors for having, in their fight against Hegel, taught a new, to those who profess to be thinkers, the great lesson of anguish; and in particular for having reminded the disciples of St. Thomas of the great lesson. The moral danger run by those whose doctrine mounts towards the heights of unity and peace is that they may think they have reached their goal when they have only started on their path, and that they may forget that for man and his thought, peace is always a victory over discord, and unity the reward of wrenching suffered and conquered.”¹⁹ It is precisely because suffering just hangs there, without any clear-cut prospect of solution, that we need to have philosophical insights drawn from every source available to help shed light on it.

The Thesis explores possibilities of combining a sense of wonder of the existentialist philosopher with the practical necessity for being open to others in intelligible communication between philosophers of Existentialism and the *praxis* centric action oriented philosophers of other cultures that would enrich our vision philosophy and its human dimension. If we accept the fact that Philosophy was, and still is, culturally bound, as Paul Griffiths has it, Philosophy has to be denaturalized in order for it to be universal and intelligible.²⁰ The next thing is to tap resources from every cultural and philosophical system available in human history in order to guide through the wonder of life without ceasing to think. We can attain this “upgraded” meaning of multiculturalism only through conducting dialogues between different cultural worlds. The wisdom of the East, in Taoism or Buddhism is also reflected in the philosophy of *Sāṅkhya* -*Yoga* when there is harmonious interaction of *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti* at a time when the two creatively

¹⁹ Jaques, Maritain., *Existence And The Existent*, Vintage Books, New York, pp. 144,(1966).

²⁰ Griffiths, Paul. “Denaturalizing Discourse: Abhidharmikas, Propositionalists, and the Comparative Philosophy of Religion.” Frank, Reynolds. and David, Tracy, eds. , *Myth and Philosophy*, Albany: State University of New York Press, (1990).

intermingle in an act of play, when differences are sought to be creatively harmonized in the integral personality of the *Yogi*. If we look at Chinese Philosophy, the *Book of Changes* said, “The rhythmic interaction between Ying and Yang constitutes what we call the Way (Tao).” Also Lao Tzu in the *Tao Teh King* said something similar to this: “All things carries Ying and embraces Yang, and through their blending interaction they achieve harmony.”²¹

Like any other Comparative Philosophy, this Thesis too encountered difficulties in translating thoughts of one culture in language of the other. Certain terms like *Mukṣa*, *Kleśa*, *Māya*, *Avidyā*, *Dukḥa* etc. in *Sāṅkhya* Philosophy could not be simply replaced with its Sartrean counterparts like suffering, anxiety, nausea, bad faith etc. although it keeps room for conveying similar sense expressed differently using different terminology. Wittgenstein suggested different language games corresponding to different life forms; appropriation of another language would give us access to the life form implied in that specific language. By appropriating different languages of different cultural traditions, we could enter into different worlds and thereby enrich the construction of our own world. In this pluralistic world, the search for self-identity, for respect of difference and for mutual enrichment become more and more urgent. Except in the domain of artistic creation, where there will be no space for compromise and consensus, and there we can accept Jean Francois Lyotard’s suggestion of a radical respect for difference in language games in view of originality and creativity. But in the public sphere, in any case, we always need more communications and more effort for consensus. Because, in the public sphere, life could not go without communication, and policy making could not be made without consensus.

Besides, there is fresh impetus for identifying this research topic, i.e. “Sartre and *Sāṅkhya*: A comparative Study.” Atleast three features of this Comparative study seem particularly relevant to current discussions among philosophers both Anglo-American and Continental. The first is Sartrean concept of the human agent as not a self but a “presence to self.” This cracking opening of the Cartesian “thinking

²¹ Mou, Zhong-San., *Fourteen Lectures on Chinese Philosophy*, Taipei: Xue Sheng, (1983).

thing” supports a wide variety of alternative theories of the self while retaining the features of freedom and responsibility that, one can argue, have been central tenets of Western Philosophy and law since the Greeks. *Sāṅkhya-Yoga* too takes a position that drastically differs from the extreme idealism of *Vedānta*. *Sāṅkhya Yoga* defines *Puruṣa* in non-empirical terms, it refer to a realm that Transcends ‘human’, and defies anthropocentric definitions of man. Interestingly in the *Yoga-Sūtra*, the liberated *puruṣas*, attaining complete self control, become “egoless” who transcend human limitation but retain the inter personal and caring and nurturing traits of *Yogi* till the end and remains *mukta* (liberated) while in life but becomes a representative of all ideal men. The *Yogi* is one universal man.

Emphasis on an Ethics of responsibility in contrast to one of rules, principles or values in recent years that led to a wide-spread interest in the work of Levinas as a necessary complement to so-called “postmodern” Ethics keeps room for fresh look at the ethical position of Sartrean Existentialism and of Patañjali’s *Yoga-Sūtra*. While Sartrean “authenticity” is equally relevant in this regard, as Charles Taylor and others have pointed out. The Thesis seeks to highlight moral and interpersonal dimension of *Yoga* that needs, special focus. While renewing an interest in Hellenistic Ethics as well as in various forms of “spirituality,” one can find in Sartrean Existentialism and in *Sāṅkhya-Yoga*, the moral dimension of *Yoga* is well evident. *Yoga* is an way of life and a mode of reflective man. that are in fruitful conversation with contemporary Ethics, Aesthetics and Politics without devolving into Moralism, Aestheticism or Fanaticism? Finally, the recent revival of the understanding of Philosophy as a “way of life” as distinct from an academic discipline focused on epistemology or more recently on the Philosophy of language, forms of “*care of the self*”.

In *Sāṅkhya-Yoga*, and also in Sartre there is an effort at understanding transitional phases of human existence that has kept provision for understanding life and existence as a phase of journey of the animal man toward moral and spiritual dimension. Both Sartrean Atheistic Existentialism and *Sāṅkhya-Yoga Darśana*, have ultimately emerged neither as philosophers of Being or of Becoming, but as philosophers of Action, either of *Praxis* and the transforming action of the world,

or of ‘moral or spiritual creation’ when action no longer binds one to the realm of dull, monotonous ‘karmas’ and their mundaneness, when praxis itself becomes liberating and action becomes fun and play! The *Sāṅkhyan* isolated man, the *kevali*, and her spiritual space, is re-canalized in purposive and meaningful action in *Yoga*. It is now a crusade against all sorts of imbalance and disharmony that alone leads to suffering, conflict and erosion of values.

9.2 Conclusion:

The ‘other’ is experienced in his or her ‘otherness’ and it remains so. That way Comparative Philosophy of *Sāṅkhya–Yoga* and Sartre can enrich our vision and widen our philosophical horizon. Indeed, as the *Nausea* suggests, “I can surrender myself to the “other” in a sort of total abandon and still not lose myself in the other. For what I am is just this transcending toward the other.”²² However, *Being and Nothingness* adds a critically new element to this dialectical structure. “The otherness of the other should reveal to me a new dimension of the in-itselfness of the “in-itself” (for example, its “intersubjective” nature).” “Sartre and *Sāṅkhya–Yoga*: A Comparative Study”, has made an attempt at exploring this meaningful dimension of Comparative Philosophy that can open new avenues for meaningful dialogue of ‘one’ and ‘the other’ at the same time, ensuring that the “otherness of the other” is not subsumed under the one homogeneous global perspective. The Thesis concludes with J. N. Mohanty’s observations about philosophical search for transcendental goal of mundaneity and toward a common goal of “world loyalty” that itself restores sacredness of the profane. This Comparative study of two different philosophical traditions is aimed at contributing its little share in this direction. The Thesis concludes with Mohanty’s observations in “Self and its Other”: “Philosophy, as a search for the transcendental ground of mundaneity, began to make sense. I also attempted to recover the sense of religiosity that was important for me. Religiosity now meant to me a sensitivity to the irreducible sacredness of things; the sacredness of life; sacredness of humanity; and the sacredness of nature; the moral responsibility to preserve life, nature and

²² www.sens-public.org/spip.php?article accessed on 01/02/08.

humankind, to let humans flourish and develop to their best ability-in brief, using Whitehead's expression,"²³

The Thesis is an exploration in this direction of making two philosophical traditions open to one another in meaningful dialogue.

9.3 Scope for further Studies:

1) There is scope to combine some of the perspectives from contemporary theoretical physics, cosmology and biological science with some perspectives of classical Indian Philosophy, especially Philosophy of *Sāṅkhya-Yoga*. The Relativity and the Quantum theories lend support to the conclusions of the *Sāṅkhya* philosophy. Again it was Lord Rutherford who proved the fundamental principle of the *Sāṅkhya* Philosophy that there is nothing real in this world except Energy in the form of electricity.

2) Sartrean concept of the human agent as not a self but a "presence to self" is a cracking opening of the Cartesian "thinking thing". This supports a wide variety of alternative theories of the self while retaining the features of freedom and responsibility that, one can argue, have been central tenets of Western Philosophy and law since the Greeks.

3) Emphasis on an ethics of responsibility in contrast to one of rules, principles or values in recent years has led to a wide-spread interest in the work of Levinas as a necessary complement to so-called "postmodern" ethics. But Sartrean "authenticity" is equally relevant in this regard, as Charles Taylor and others have pointed out.

²³ Mohanty, J.N., *Between Two World, East and West: An Autobiography*, Oxford, pp.120, (2002).

APPENDIX




Fig : COSMOGONY CHART

Glossary

<i>Abhāva</i>	Non-existence, non-occurrence, absence of feeling
<i>Abhyāsa</i>	Practice, repetition
<i>Adhyāsa</i>	Superimposition
<i>Adhyātma</i>	Supreme Soul (manifested as an individual soul)
<i>Adṛṣṭa</i>	Unperceived, invisible, fate destiny
<i>Advaitā</i>	Monism expounded by Srī Saṅkarācārya
<i>Āgama</i>	Spiritual doctrines testimony
<i>Ahaṅkāra</i>	Ego, pride, the making of self, sense of self
<i>Ahiṁsā</i>	Non-violence, non-injury, harmlessness
<i>Ākāra</i>	Form
<i>Ākāsa</i>	Ether, space, one of the five elements of nature
<i>Aparigraha</i>	Freedom from avarice, without greed, non-acceptance of gifts
<i>Apavarga</i>	Emancipation, freedom, beatitude, liberation
<i>Āsana</i>	A seat, posture, position; third of the eight aspects of <i>astāṅga</i>
<i>Yoga</i>	Being still, seated, firm (one of the ‘eight limbs’ of yoga).
<i>Asat</i>	Non-being
<i>Asmitā</i>	Pride, egoism, ‘I’ consciousness
<i>Astāṅga yoga</i>	The eight limbs of yoga, which are <i>yama</i> , <i>niyama</i> , <i>āsana</i> , <i>prāṇāyāmā</i> , <i>pratyāhāra</i> , <i>dhāraṇā</i> , <i>dhyāna</i> and <i>samādhi</i> .
<i>Asteya</i>	Non-stealing, non-misappropriation
<i>Ātmā, ātman</i>	The individual, individual spirit
<i>Ātma darśana</i>	Reflection of the soul
<i>Ātmajñāna</i>	Knowledge of the self
<i>Ātmajyoti</i>	Light of the soul
<i>Āum</i>	Sacred syllable, Sabda Brahman
<i>Avidyā</i>	Want of spiritual knowledge, lack of wisdom, ignorance
<i>Bhāgavad Gītā</i>	A classical text of yoga, a dialogue between Lord Kṛṣṇa and Arjuna, Containing the celestial sayings of Lord Kṛṣṇa
<i>Bhakti</i>	Devotion
<i>Bhakti mārga</i>	Path of devotion
<i>Bhakti yoga</i>	Yoga of devotion
<i>Bhāṣya</i>	Commentary
<i>Bhoga</i>	Enjoyment, pleasure, experience of sensual joys
<i>Brahma Sutra</i>	Treatise on the knowledge of the Self
<i>Brahmajñāna</i>	The realization of the Supreme, the highest knowledge
<i>Brahman</i>	The Universal Spirit, Universal Soul
<i>Brāhmaṇa</i>	Priest class, one who has realized the Self, one of the four <i>varṇas</i>
<i>Bṛhaspati</i>	Preceptor of Indra, Lord of heavens
<i>Buddha</i>	The founder of Buddhism
<i>Buddhi</i>	Intelligence
<i>Cakra</i>	Energy centers situated inside the spinal column
<i>Cetanā</i>	Consciousness, intelligence, volition (characteristics of the <i>puruṣa</i>)

<i>Chakra</i>	Center of psychic energy; literally ‘wheel’
<i>Cit</i>	Thought, emotion, intellect, feeling, disposition, vision, to perceive, to notice, to know, to understand, to desire
<i>Citta</i>	Consciousness, a composite word for mind, intellect and ego (pride or the sense of self)
<i>Citta jñāna</i>	Knowledge of the consciousness
<i>Citta vṛtti</i>	Movement in the consciousness
<i>Darśana</i>	Seeing, looking, seeing the mind, perception, sight, vision, Perspective, school of Indian Philosophy
<i>Dhāraṇā</i>	Concentration, attention, focusing, sixth of the eight aspects of <i>astāṅga yoga</i> , fixing attention (one of the ‘eight limbs’ of yoga)
<i>Dharma</i>	First of the four aims of life, science of duty, religious duty, virtue
<i>Dharma pariṇāma</i>	Transformation towards that which is to be held fast or kept, virtue, justice
<i>Dharmameghasamādhi</i>	Rain Cloud of Morality Liberating State
<i>Ddhārmic</i>	Pertaining to <i>dharma</i>
<i>Dhyāna</i>	Meditation, reflection, observation, contemplation, seventh of the eight aspects of <i>astāṅga yoga</i>
<i>Dṛṣṭa</i>	Visible, perceptible
<i>Duḥkha</i>	Sorrow, pain, grief, distress
<i>Ekāgra</i>	Intent upon one object, one-pointed attention, concentration, fixity. Also <i>eka</i> = one without a second; <i>agra</i> = prominent, root, base, excellent, summit, i.e. indivisible soul
<i>Guna</i>	Qualities of nature: <i>sattva</i> , <i>rajas</i> and <i>tamas</i> , natural quality
<i>Guru</i>	(gu=darkness; ru=light) a preceptor who removes ignorance and gives knowledge, Yoga master, Guru to receive spiritual instructions
<i>Hatha Yoga</i>	A particular path of yoga that leads towards Self- Realisation through vigorous and rigorous discipline
<i>Haṭhayogī</i>	One who practices <i>haṭhayoga</i> , a master of <i>haṭhayoga</i>
<i>Indriya</i>	Senses of perception, organs of action, mind
<i>Īsvara</i>	The Lord (God) .
<i>Īsvara pranidhāna</i>	(<i>pra</i> = fullness; <i>ni</i> = under; <i>dhāna</i> = placement) Surrender of oneself to God
<i>Jāgrata</i>	Conscious, careful, wakefulness
<i>Jīvātmā</i>	The living or individual soul enshrined in the human body, the vital principle, that principle of life which renders the body capable of motion and sensation
<i>Jñāna</i>	Knowing, knowledge, cognizance, wisdom
<i>Jñāna yoga</i>	Yoga of knowledge, Union by knowledge
<i>Jñānamārga</i>	Path of knowledge
<i>Jñānendriya</i>	Senses of perception
<i>Jñātā</i>	Known, perceived, understood
<i>Kaivalya</i>	Absolute state of aloneness, eternal emancipation, Isolation
<i>Kaivalya pāda</i>	Fourth part of the <i>Yoga Sūtras</i> on perfect emancipation

<i>Kāla</i>	Time, period of time
<i>Kāma</i>	Wish, desire, love, lust, the third of the four aims of life
<i>Kapila</i>	Name of a sage, the founder of Sāṅkhya philosophy
<i>Karma mārga</i>	Path of action
<i>Karma phala</i>	Fruit of action
<i>Karmayoga</i>	Yoga of action
<i>Karmendriya</i>	Organs of action
<i>Kleśas</i>	Pain
<i>Kriyā yoga</i>	Yoga of action
<i>Kroda</i>	Anger
<i>Kṛṣṇa</i>	The eight incarnation of Lord Viṣṇu, who recited <i>Bhagavad</i>
<i>Kuṇḍalini</i>	Divine cosmic energy
<i>Mahat</i>	Great, mighty, the great principle, cosmic intelligence, universal Consciousness
<i>Mārga</i>	Path
<i>Mithyā jñāna</i>	(<i>mithyā</i> = false, sham, illusory; <i>jñāna</i> = knowledge) false knowledge
<i>Moha</i>	Delusion, frenzy, infatuation, error, the state of being enamoured
<i>Mokṣa</i>	Liberation, deliverance, release, the fourth religious stage or order
<i>Mūla prakṛti</i>	Root of nature
<i>Mūlādhāra cakra</i>	Energy centre situated at the root of the spine
<i>Mundakopaniṣad</i>	One of the important <i>Upanisads</i>
<i>Muni</i>	Sage
<i>Nirodha</i>	Restraint, check, obstruction
<i>Nirodha citta</i>	Restraining consciousness
<i>Nirodha parināma</i>	Transformation towards restraint
<i>Nivṛtti</i>	Resigning, abstinence, cessation
<i>Nivṛtti mārgo</i>	Path of abstention from worldly concerns and engagements
<i>Niyama</i>	Five individual ethical observances, second of the eight aspects of <i>astanga yoga</i> , purity, contentment, self-discipline, Self-study, and surrender to God (one of the 'eight limbs' of yoga)
<i>Om (Aum)</i>	Sacred syllable; symbol of Atman and Brahman; the basis of all sound
<i>Parama</i>	Highest, most excellent, best
<i>Paramātman</i>	Supreme Soul, Universal Self
<i>Patañjali</i>	(<i>pata</i> = falling; <i>añjali</i> =prayer) the author of the <i>Yoga Sūtras</i>
<i>Patañjali</i>	'The father of Yoga'; author of the <i>Yoga Sūtras</i>
<i>Phala</i>	Fruit, result
<i>Pradhāna</i>	Primary matter, first cause, first principle
<i>prajña</i>	Awareness
<i>Prajña jyoti</i>	Light of wisdom
<i>Prākāśa</i>	Evident, luminosity, brilliance, splendour
<i>Prakṛti</i>	Nature
<i>Prakṛti jñāna</i>	Knowledge of nature

<i>Prāna</i>	Life force, vital energy incoming breath
<i>Prāṇa jñāna</i>	Knowledge of vital energy
<i>Prāṇa vṛtti</i>	Regulation of breath or energy
<i>Prāṇāyāma</i>	(<i>prāna</i> =vital energy; <i>āyama</i> =expansion, extension). Expansion of the vital energy or life force through restraint of the breath. Fourth of the eight aspects of <i>astāṅga yoga</i> , control of breath.
<i>Praṇidhāna</i>	Laying on, directing upon, profound religious meditation, surrender
<i>Pravṛtti</i>	Evolution, going forwards
<i>Pravṛtti mārga</i>	Path of evolution
<i>Purusa</i>	person, the inner self
<i>Rāga</i>	Desire, attachment, pleasure
<i>Rajas</i>	One of the three qualities of nature, vibrancy, active, energy, passion; one of the three <i>gunas</i>
<i>Rājasic</i>	Belonging to the quality of <i>rajas</i>
<i>Rsi</i>	A patriarchal sage, a saint, seer
<i>Sādhana pāda śakti</i>	First part of the <i>Yoga Sūtras</i> , on total absorption Power, capacity, faculty
<i>Samādhi</i>	Putting together, profound meditation, eighth and final aspect of <i>astāṅga yoga</i>
<i>Samādhi pāda</i>	First part of the <i>Yoga Sūtras</i> on total absorption
<i>Samādhi parināma</i>	Transformation towards tranquility
<i>Sāṃkhya</i>	One of the divisions of philosophy enumerating the principles of nature and soul
<i>Sāṅkhyā</i>	Minuteness, precision
<i>Saṅskāra phala</i>	Effect of subliminal impressions
<i>Samprajanya</i>	Awareness
<i>saṃprayoga</i>	Communion
<i>saṅskāra</i>	Subliminal impressions
<i>Śaṅkarācārya</i>	8 th -century teacher who expounded the philosophy of monism (<i>advaita</i>)
<i>Satya</i>	Truthfulness
<i>Siddhis</i>	Supra-natural powers
<i>Smṛti</i>	Memory, recollection
<i>Śrīmad Bhāgavatam</i>	One of the sacred <i>purānas</i>
<i>Sunya</i>	The void
<i>Svarūpa</i>	One's own state, of true form
<i>Tamas</i>	Inertia, darkness
<i>Tāmasic</i>	One of the three <i>guṇas</i> of nature: inertia
<i>Tapas</i>	Austerity, penance, spiritual practice, devoted discipline,
<i>Tyāga</i>	Abandonment, renunciation
<i>Upalabdhi</i>	To find, perceive, recognize
<i>Upaniṣad</i>	(<i>upa</i> =near; <i>ni</i> =down; <i>sat</i> =to sit) literally sitting down near the Guru to receive spiritual instructions
<i>Vācaspati Miśra</i>	A great scholar of the sixth century who wrote a glossary on
<i>Vairāgi</i>	A renunciate

<i>Vairāgya</i>	Renunciation, detachment, dispassion
<i>Vairāgya mārga</i>	Path of renunciation or detachment
<i>Veda</i>	Sacred scriptures of the Hindu religion
<i>Vijñāna</i>	Discerning knowledge
<i>Vijñāna jñāna</i>	Stability in intelligence
<i>Vijñāna Bhikṣu</i>	(1525-1580 A.D.) the great scholar, author of <i>Yoga Vārttika</i> , commentary on <i>Yoga Sūtras</i>
<i>Vikalpa</i>	Imagination, fancy
<i>Vikṣipta</i>	Agitated, scattered
<i>Viparayaya</i>	Perverse, contrary, unreal cognition
<i>Viṣṇu</i>	The second deity of the Hindu triad or Trimurthi, the sustainer or the protector of the Universe Sorrows less effulgent light
<i>Vrtti</i>	Waves, movements, changes, functions, operations, conditions of action or conduct in consciousness
<i>Vyasa</i>	A sage, author of <i>Vyāsa Bhāṣyā</i> , the oldest commentary on <i>Vyāsa's</i> commentary on the <i>Yoga Sūtras</i>
<i>Yama</i>	The first of the eight limbs of <i>astāṅga yoga</i> ; five ethical disciplines of Yoga: non-violence, truthfulness, non-misappropriation, celibacy and non-greediness
<i>Yoga</i>	Yoking, uniting, joining, contacting, union, association, connection, deep meditation, concentration, contemplation on the supreme union of body, mind and soul, union with God
<i>Yoga cudāmani</i>	One of the Yoga Umahisads
<i>Yoga darśana</i>	(<i>yoga</i> = union, <i>darśana</i> = mirror, insight) like a mirror, yoga reflects one's soul through one's thoughts and actions
<i>Yoga sūtras</i>	Yoga aphorisms of Patañjali
<i>Yogaśāstra</i>	Science of yoga
<i>Yoga-svarūpa</i>	Natural constitution of yoga, natural states of yoga
<i>Yogī</i>	Adept of yoga
<i>Yogin</i>	Male Yogi (alternative term)
<i>Yogini</i>	Female Yogi (alternative term)

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LIST OF PUBLICATIONS

Following Papers were published

1) **National seminar** on “*Pedagogy and Epistemology: Perspectives in Indian philosophy of Education*” Organized by NEHU with ICPR, Tura Campus, 11th to 13th March, 2003

Paper Title : A dialogue between Modernity and Vedic Education

2) **International Conference** on “*The Ramayana: Its impact on Life and Culture*” organized by Department. Of Culture, Govt. of Assam, held at Srimanta Sankardev Kalakshetra Society, 6th and 7th December 2003.

Paper Title : The Allegorical Significance of the Ramayana

3) The **International Congress** of “*Social Philosophy*” organized by Gauhati University with ICSP from December 9-11, 2004.

Paper Title : Crisis of Values from the angle of Sartre and Simone De Beauvoir

4) **National Seminar** on “*Intellectual Property Rights*” organized by St. Anthony’s College, Shillong, Sponsored by Ministry of Human Resource Development, Govt. of India, 6th-8th October, 2004.

Paper Title: Copyright and the Indian Scenario

5) **PHILOSOPHY PATHWAYS** (Electronic journal published from U.K.), Issue number 121
11th October 2006.

Paper Title : The Teleological Argument for the Existence of God

6) **PHILOSOPHY PATHWAYS** (Electronic journal published from U.K.) Issue number 119
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Paper Title : The Problem of Evil

7) Accepted the paper and called for presentation on **The International Conference** on “*Environmental science and Technology (EST)*”, Environmental Conference Program, American Academy of Sciences, Houston, USA, held on July 28-31, 2008. but not attended due to budget constraints.

Paper Title : Environmental Ethics

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