

**An Exploration of Subjectivity in the Phenomenology of Edmund Husserl:  
From Epistemic Subject to Ethical Person**

**A Thesis submitted in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirement for the Degree of Doctor of  
Philosophy**

*Submitted By*

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*Dedicated to*

*My Parents*

*Jiten Das*

*&*

*Late. Hira Das*



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**Declaration**

I do hereby declare that the thesis entitled “**An Exploration of Subjectivity in the Phenomenology of Edmund Husserl: From Epistemic Subject to Ethical Person**”, is a research work carried out by me in the Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, Indian Institute of Technology Guwahati, under the supervision of Prof. Archana Barua, for the award of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

No part of this thesis has been submitted to any University or Research Institute for the award of any degree or diploma.

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### Certificate

This is to certify that Minakshi Das has prepared the thesis entitled “**An Exploration of Subjectivity in the Phenomenology of Edmund Husserl: From Epistemic Subject to Ethical Person**”, under my supervision for the award of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. The thesis is the result of her own investigations during the period she worked here as a research scholar in the strict conformity with the rules laid down for the purpose.

The present thesis or any part thereof has not been submitted to any other University or Research Institute for award of any degree or diploma.

All assistance received by the researcher has been duly acknowledged.

Prof. Archana Barua

Supervisor

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## Abstract

The present study makes an attempt to explore Husserlian probe for subjectivity from various perspectives. Unlike the pre-phenomenological philosophers Husserl tries to give a very different exploration of subjectivity by discovering the objectivity of the objects and its necessary connection with the meaningful realm of the subjectivity. Husserl's significance lies in the fact that he always keeps room for the value aspect in all of his explanations by concentrating on consciousness. According to Husserl, in the process of attaining knowledge the contribution of both consciousness and objectivity are equally important. In Husserlian phenomenology knowledge is a collection of feeling, thinking and willing by taking into consideration the subjective as well as the objective aspect. It is a process where objectivity is constituted but in constituting the objectivity the self constitutes itself by keeping scope for the subjectivity to re-construct itself in its future orientation. In order to purify consciousness his search for subjectivity then took a transcendental turn which he explained with the help of his methods for phenomenology. This transcendental subjectivity which is not like the windowless monad finally gets connected with other subjects and constitutes the transcendental intersubjectivity. Here the others are also self-like subjects and equal members of the society sharing a common bond living in a primordial world which he referred as the life-world. Husserlian phenomenology, particularly the later phase of its development, centered round the devastating experience of the first world-war and therefore, he grounded his phenomenology on the life-world which is a shared, public and intersubjective world. For him, the theorizing nature of modern objective sciences alienates the humans from the life-world. Husserl has identified this as one of the root causes of the crisis occurred in the Europe. On this background the study will also discuss how modern technological advancements might create a detachment from the life-world. Thus, the study finally aims at exploring the significance of the life-world that keeps room for accommodating ethical, spiritual and cultural dimension of meaning by emphasizing upon the ethical renewal of humanity. In this connection an attempt is also made to find out how Freudian psychoanalysis could also be accommodated within the sphere of phenomenological philosophy of Edmund Husserl.

## Chapter-I

### Introduction

#### *Know thyself*

#### Attributed to the Oracle at Delphi

Delphic oracle's claim that Socrates was the wisest person, motivated Socrates to understand his own ignorance and ultimately to be able to give an account of his life. Since then, the philosophical tradition has wrestled with the nature of the self and the problem of personhood stems from the philosophy of the self. Therefore, now it is necessary to ponder deeply on the philosophical question on subjectivity, and how the subjectivity question implies a degree of self awareness about who I am.

#### 1.1. Background of the Problem;

“Who am I?” is a question that seeks our attention at some point, perhaps at many and various points, in our lives (Hall, 2004). In ancient philosophy it also took a turn toward self quest as soul quest, a search for a spark of divinity and of permanence amidst contingencies. This familiar problem of philosophy extends from metaphysical issues to epistemology and ethics. It can be stated that the concept of subjectivity is much older than philosophy itself. In Philosophy subjectivity is generally referred to the observations of a *subject*, who is a perceiver, a doer, a knower, who has reason and reflection and who is conscious about its surroundings. Different philosophers have interpreted the concept of subjectivity in their own way. This search continued through Greek philosophy and the looking for meaning and substance were framed in historically specific ways. Thus, while the Greek philosophers have mostly identified the concept of subjectivity with the soul of human being, Rene Descartes has given the most influential concept of subjectivity by developing his concept of *cogito* which totally rejected the outer world as well as the body of a human being. Thus, the pre-Socratic philosophers from Homer, Pythagoras to Heraclitus emphasized upon the superiority of the soul over the body. Later on Socrates, Plato and Aristotle also went on to explore the priority of the soul over the body.

In this regard it is necessary to mention here that Plato has forwarded his theory that the soul is the ultimate real thing exists independently of the body, which is the representation of the mind and intellect. But, at the same time he also mentioned that the identity of the self is the root of all the passions, pleasures and worldly pains. In Plato's philosophy the Form is regarded as ultimately real thing. By Form Plato meant something universal, which is never changing and which is permanent. Forwarding his own opinion that human being actually has two countenances which are body as matter and soul as form, Aristotle believes that one can understand that relation between body and soul as more than just interrelation and interdependence of two different separate substances. Thus, it has been seen that in the whole tradition of early and pre-modern philosophy the soul has been interpreted as the prosecutor of the human existence or subjectivity. Gradually there emerges a modernist trend in philosophy and also in other fields like literature and cultural studies that shifts the ground from the so called soul-talk to a quest for subjectivity.

Descartes, the Father of Modern philosophy, argues that human being is constituted by soul and body and man is an odd combination of 'a thinking substance that has intelligence', but unlike its body counterpart, the thinker subject does not occupy any space. This idea consequently compels Descartes to accept that beings other than humans, who are the only conscious animals, are but machines. Descartes began contemplating deeply on the issue of selfhood as subjectivity by developing his Method of Doubt according to which one can doubt anything and everything except his/her own existence (Watson, 2002). Like Descartes, Hamlet recognizes that "man" is defined by his ability to look "before and after" with "capability" and "godlike reason."

In this modernist quest for subjectivity, one is confronted with the tension between choice and illusion, between old formula and new responsibilities, and ultimately the self/subjectivity appears to mean so many things together. Legal theorist and social historian Lawrence M. Friedman defines this trend as follows:

In the later trend from soul to subjectivity quest...as the result of a gradual move from a "vertical" (hierarchical, inflexible) to a more "horizontal" (negotiable, agency-driven) mode of defining our relationships to each other,

one in which we are laden with the responsibility for “making something” of ourselves (As cited in Hall, 2004, p. 1).

In this regard it is necessary to mention here that subjectivity and identity are often used synonymously but there is a slight difference between the two. Identity is a set of traits, beliefs, allegiances that gives one a consistent personality and mode of social being while subjectivity implies a degree of thought and self consciousness about identity.

Hall (2004) argues that

In this way, subjectivity is the intersection of two lines of philosophical inquiry: epistemology (the study of how do we know what we know) and ontology (the study of the nature of being or existence). In other words, inquiries into subjectivity might ask, how does our understanding of knowledge relate to, impact, and/or constrain our understanding of our existence? Indeed one question that follows is: Is our social and individual existence determined by the ways that we collectively organize knowledge? (p. 4).

These are now no more only religious and philosophical questions but are of interest to literary and cultural criticism because; identity became thoroughly politicized in the 19th and 20th century. Therefore, the textuality of the self implies that in exploring subjectivity we are exploring the ‘self’ as a text, a topic for critical analysis. Thus Regenia Gagnier argues:

First, the subject is a subject to itself, an “I,” however difficult or even impossible it may be for others to understand this “I” from its own viewpoint, within its own experience. Simultaneously, the subject is a subject to, and of, others; in fact, it is often an “Other” to others, which also affects its sense of its own subjectivity....Third, the subject is also a subject of knowledge, most familiarly perhaps of the discourse of social institutions that circumscribe its terms of being. Fourth, the subject is a body that is separate (except in case of pregnant women) from other human bodies; and the body, and therefore the subject, is closely dependent upon its physical environment (Gagnier, 1991, p. 8).

Here, we can also add a few philosophers of the analytical school particularly belonging to the stream of the philosophy of mind, and also from the stream of Applied Ethics, who have made valuable contributions in this quest for subjectivity, selfhood and the human-person. These philosophers have followed argument proceedings by appealing to certain criteria as essential to selfhood and personhood; i.e. self-consciousness in Michal Tooley, linguistic capacity and a sense of sense in Paola Cavalieri, Peter Singer and also among others.

With more emphasis on the moral notion of the person than its metaphysical counterpart, philosophers like Daniel Clement Dennett accord normative status to the concept of person. Person is an entity to which rights and responsibilities could be attached. He stated that mind can sustain without its body. He narrated a story where the brain of a person has been removed from his/her body and placed in a vat of nutrients. Then, the remaining parts of the brain have been connected with the body via radio waves. After that the body stops functioning and dies. But the brain does not stop functioning. After a few days Dennett repeated his experiment again with a new body. Initially he faced problems in adjustment but later on he managed with that new body. According to him, it is a very simple operation that can be compared with the operation of sex change and plastic surgery (Gallagher & Zahavi, 2008).

Since the third-person perspective on personhood and subjectivity, focuses on the concept of personhood and not the experience that constitutes the concept, this method of investigation brings to mind Natorp's objection that science "kills subjectivity in order to dissect it, and believes that the life of the soul is on display in the result of the dissection" (As cited in Hahn, 2012, p. 15). Again, Hall (2004) said that

While Descartes may find in thinking the very means by which he defines human being, Shakespeare reveals the limitations and drawbacks of adopting a detached, meta-conscious perspective on selfhood....Like Descartes, Hamlet recognizes that "man" is defined by his ability to look "before and after" with "capability" and "godlike reason" (p. 22).

As the "I" centric trend continues, after Descartes many philosophers have interpreted the concept of subjectivity in their own way but it is generally said that the modern concept of identity or self has got its originality in the philosophy of John Locke who identified memory as the single criterion of personal identity. The trend that continues from the time of Leibniz

to Hume is that man's thought process can not only be directed by reason, it is also guided by nature. Kant (1724-1804) in this regard responded to Hume's critic of subjectivity by defending the ability of reason and thereby affirms the concept of a rational agent by giving a formal centre, a source of apriori meaning giving dimension which reveals the formal, the rational and the judgmental nature of subjectivity.

Franz Brentano added another dimension to the mystery of subjectivity and consciousness with his submission that "all mental phenomena are intentional". Husserl takes upon himself the task of showing a contrast between these two approaches to the question of selfhood, subjectivity and personhood, highlighting the fact that the first personal experience of subjectivity must be the starting point of this investigation (McIntyre & Smith, 1989).

While many scholars in the Humanities and Social sciences have taken natural science as a paradigm of their methodology in order to render their intellectual enterprises more "scientific," Husserl believed that science is unable to explain the "mind" and understanding of mind in the form of activity of nervous system. While "Intentionality" is the main part of consciousness, the ego is the core of all experiences and also the source and the limit of all knowledge. For Husserl, consciousness possesses an unchanging structure which he regarded as "meaning". He believed that mind connects meanings with objects. The works of Edmund Husserl thus had a great influence in the philosophy of mind and other scientific areas such as linguistics, cognitive psychology and sociology. Husserl further rejected "Noumena" or "things in themselves" held by Kant, and supposed that the reality in itself, in order for us to know about it, must appear as subject dependent phenomena only and that experience can never be independent reality. As Donald Davidson insists,

if the mind has "categories and concepts," it must distort "the real" when it comes to "grapple" with it. Hence the mind must distort its objects and therefore never has access to undistorted objects, i.e., to things as they are apart from the distorting caused by the grappling with or toward things "in themselves" (Williard, 2002, P. 72).

As Husserl was up against the Midas touch tradition of "contributions" and "distortions", it is no wonder that Edmund Husserl, the Father of Phenomenology, had a much negligible presence in the contemporary philosophizing traditions that proposed an alternate submission in order to "return to things themselves", the phenomena, that is not something that is left

behind as the mysterious noumena solely because subjectivity and objectivity, self and others, mind, soul, spirit and the world, are just directly revealed to one another in a spontaneous relation of reciprocity intrinsically bound together in a noematic co relation of meaning.<sup>1</sup> Husserl's basic view on consciousness of an object is one according to which the act of consciousness is a natural sign, that is, the act of consciousness (and by extension the linguistic act) is of or about something else simply in virtue of the sort of thing it is. The intentionality or meaning ('ofness' or 'aboutness') of the act is grounded in the other aspects of the act, as for Husserl;

What 'meaning' is, is a matter as immediately given to us as is the nature of color and sound. It cannot be further defined; it is an ultimate in description: whenever we perform or understand an act of expression, it means something to us, we have an actual consciousness of its sense (Husserl, 1970, p. 400).

But, whatever he said in this passage, of course is not the last word in the phenomenology of meanings, it is only the beginning. But such a phenomenology must be carried through to completion if the objectivity of knowledge is to be understood, and this task is made very difficult by the fact that, normally, "One thinks in meanings and not about meanings." "The act-analysis of meaning investigates 'what is contained in our meanings'." (ibid, p. 400-401).

## **1.2. Issues of the Study Undertaken**

The basic and the direct concern of the study is to understand Husserlian interpretation of the concept of subjectivity and its interconnectedness with others. While his early philosophical concerns led him to explore subjectivity from logical perspective by developing his concept of pure logic, his transcendental turn toward philosophy of subjectivity is a later phase that sought to restore the meaningful dimension of the life in the world. These developments eventually disclosed the meaningfulness of the life in the life-world against the crisis led by the objective natural sciences. On the basis of the life-world the study further makes an attempt to show how the modern technological developments alienated the human dimension of life in a dehumanized mechanical world which finally robs one's first person dimension of

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<sup>1</sup> "Significance of Husserl's Logical Investigations" From The Society for the Study of Husserl's Philosophy at the APA meetings in Albuquerque, April 7, 2000. Co-Symposiasts: Dagfinn Føllesdal and Barry Smith. Retrieved from: <http://www.dwillard.org/articles/printable.asp?artid=60>

subjectivity and its natural light of reason and consciousness. Significantly, toward the end Husserl tries to give some ethical hint with the hope of a better society and to heal the people from a crisis situation led by the Nazi atrocity in the Europe. To explore this ethical dimension in order to heal the people of Europe the study also refers to a significant figure Sigmund Freud (1856-1939) of the same period who also had the same intention of healing the traumatic people in the post war situation. Hence, the study finally tries to understand this connection between both the thinkers in a positive manner.

### **1.3. Review of Literature:**

Husserlian study of subjectivity has been discussed in the available literature from a very wider perspective. The study tried to consult all the possible literatures on the basis of which an attempt is made to formulate the objectives of the study. Depending on the demand of the study a brief review of the consulted literature is outlined in the following section and classified into four sections.

- a) Husserlian exploration of subjectivity in its early and later period.
- b) The Ethical dimension of the life of the subjectivity.
- c) On Freud and Husserl
- d) Review of the study on related themes.

#### **a) Husserlian Exploration of Subjectivity in its Early and Later Period:**

According to Centrone (2010) the history of the Philosophy of Mathematics rarely mentioned about Husserl's Philosophy of Arithmetic within its scope. Husserl completely went out of the picture from that golden period between 1879-1939 because of Frege's criticism against him. By discussing about Dogfinn Føllesdal's accusation according to which, Frege made Husserl to change his position from psychologism to anti-psychologism Centrone discusses about the contributions made by the Husserlian scholars like Mohanty, Moran etc. Finally, Centrone took the position that Husserl had a great enthusiasm for Logic and Mathematics which is very much independent from psychologism from its beginning. Centrone then went on to discuss 'pure logic' by specially mentioning about Bolzano and finally concluded by emphasising the fact that Logic is a practical discipline which should be grounded on 'pure

logic'. By 'pure logic' Husserl mainly tried to safeguard the objectivity of logic but at the same time he also brought the concept of intentionality in order to keep the touch of the subjectivity in Logic.

In this regard Sinha (1969) maintains that with Husserlian phenomenology we got a new description regarding subjectivity, which gives a lot of emphasis on the "relatedness or reference to the subject principle- a sense under which the element of subject dependence may be considered" (ibid, p. 52). Thus, Husserl regarded the point that reference of the subject does not mean the complete dependence on the subject or the knower but rather it means that the object can exist in the context of the observer, who perceives it. Therefore, it can be stated that "To be dependent –whether completely or partially- upon a subject would necessarily mean to be related to, or have essential reference to, the subject" (ibid). But, this aspect of Husserl has been criticised by the philosophers as a return toward the Cartesian Cogito. But, unlike the Cartesian dimension Husserl brought the concept of essential relatedness to the world and maintains that in order to attain the level of epistemic dimension of subjectivity, the subject or the knower should essentially be related with the world and objects in and through which it can constitute the meaningfulness of the objective world.

In this regard Moran (2005) maintains that for Husserl there exists a world which has a very close connection with every possible act of consciousness. Thus, he criticized Descartes' concept of the 'I' or *cogito* and tried to establish a new concept of philosophy. By applying the methods for phenomenology finally Husserl established the concept of transcendental ego or the pure ego which is the most original and key concept of phenomenology. He regarded the pure ego as pure life of a human being, the ego which is non empirical and is inseparable from the world and the others. But, most importantly this transcendental ego is essentially embodied and connected with others.

Here, by following McIntyre (2012) it can be stated that the transcendental subject is not the 'I-subjectivity' but rather it is the 'we- subjectivity'. According to Husserl, to constitute the experience of oneself one needs others. For him if 'I' am an isolated solitary 'I', then 'I' would not be able to experience my own personhood, because, my personhood always depends on some other factors. I would not be able to define my position without some relations, some properties and without some sort of roles. According to Husserl, the objects

of the external world are not only for me but also for the others. He also explores Husserl's concept of empathy, which refers to the experience of the others as subjects. According to Husserl, there are other bodies existing around me, the other "I's". Husserl regarded them as same subjects as "I's". As for him, we live in a shared world; we live with others, which is not limited with one subject. The natural objects existing in this world have some links with the self and the others. So, according to Husserl, objects are not constituted for the self perception only but for others as well.

Zahavi (2003a) in his book gives a total picture of Husserlian phenomenology from its early to later development. He maintains that if we want to have a true concept of reality then we must have to have consciousness related acts. To understand the external objects we would have to focus on subjective part, because objects are the objects of a conscious subject only. Zahavi thus said that "Subjectivity is a condition of possibility for reality. Without subjectivity there can be no reality" (ibid p. 53). This is the subjectivity which cannot be grasped without the objects, without the others. According to Husserl, I as a subject experience the other but that does not mean that the other is the intentional object for me. The relation between 'I' and the 'other' is the relation between subject and subject but not the relation between subject and object. This is the intersubjectivity which constitutes the life-world by constituting itself. In this regard he also talks about historicity and temporality of this subjectivity rooted in a tradition which could be understood as the layers of one's selfhood.

In this regard (Moran, 2012) explores what led Husserl to develop his later philosophy of life-world in his phenomenology. Moran shows how Husserl tried to overcome Galilean mathematization of nature with his phenomenological methods and transcendental philosophy which finally unveils the meaningful dimension of the life-world.

#### **b) The Ethical dimension of the life of the subject:**

By following Borràs (2010) it could be said that Husserl talks about the need for a complete renewal or re-birth of the ideal of science and most importantly of philosophy which will recuperate the autonomy, the notion of presuppositionlessness, or the attitude of self-reflection. In his book Borràs uncovered almost all aspects of Husserlian phenomenology

from its early to later phenomenology including phenomenological methods, intersubjectivity life-world, crisis, ethical renewal and the ethical life of human person.

Smith (2007) in his book explores Husserlian role in both continental and analytical tradition in the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Thus, he encompasses Husserlian philosophy as an integrated system of logic, ontology, epistemology and ethics particularly. He basically gives focus upon Husserlian ideas about ethics addressing the phenomenological and ontological foundations of values. By referring the concept of intersubjectivity Smith says that it is the main ethical tenet in Husserl which answers all ethical questions in Husserlian phenomenology.

**c) On Freud and Husserl:**

Owen (2006) in his book says that though within the phenomenological tradition there could be found Heidegger criticizing Freud in his psychotherapy but Husserl and Freud did not share any personal intervention among themselves. But all three of them were busy exploring what mind relates to and what it does not. Thus, Owen in his book gives a theoretical exploration of Freud and Husserl and how both of them understood consciousness. In this regard he concentrates upon the intersubjective relation between the self and the other endorsed by Husserl and says that Freudian interest in meaning, intersubjectivity and empathy brought him closer to Husserlian phenomenology.

Bernet (2003) in his work says that Freud himself contributed very little toward a fruitful debate on psychoanalysis and philosophy. According to Freud philosophy has always underestimated the content of unconsciousness and has always reduced unconscious to conscious. In this regard Bernet talks about other philosophers like Scheler, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Ricoeur, M. Henry, Derrida, Binswanger, Boss, Lacan, who tried to find out a connection between Philosophy and psychoanalysis. But, subsequently each of them criticised Freudian unconscious and got influenced by Heideggerian psychotherapy.

**d) Review of the Study on Related Themes:**

Natanson (1973) in his book explores Husserlian phenomenology by outlining certain central themes like phenomenological methods, intentional consciousness; life-world etc. He regarded Husserl as philosophy's primal grandfather. According to him, Husserl brought philosophy back to the centre of the world with the help of his phenomenology. According to him, Husserl with his theme of life-world seeks to reconstruct the everydayness in his

phenomenology. Thus, the human person finds himself/herself within a world where s/he lives together with other person. Thus, Natanson in his book tried to bridge the gap between solitude of radical reflection and the community of human action.

Hahn (2012) in his doctoral dissertation tried to explore the concept of personhood in Husserl. While talking about the transcendental person he writes that a person lives in a community with others by sharing a bond and a common telos among themselves. After outlining the structures of personhood, his dissertation argues how there exists a teleological motif to uplift the ideal of a person and his or her community. And he regarded this as teleology of reason which reveals the philosophical task of living a justified life. He ended his thesis by describing a person as that who always captures the teleological striving of reason and regarded that Husserl's concept of personhood also includes that sphere within it.

Bachrycz (2010) in his doctoral dissertation explores the epistemological foundation of transcendental phenomenology by tracing Husserl and the problem of knowledge. In his dissertation he provided an account of Edmund Husserl's epistemology and its place within his phenomenology up through the publication of Ideas I in 1913.

#### **1.4. Statement of the Problem:**

It is evident from the source of literature that there are various studies done on Husserlian concept of Subjectivity. There exists extensive literature on early as well as later phenomenology of Husserl which include his concepts like pure logic, transcendental phenomenology, embodiment, intersubjectivity, life-world and particularly his ethical developments. But the existing literature does not present any study on the relationship between the life-world and the modern technological world and how technology is taking away the life from the life-world. Moreover, although there are available literature on the relationship between Husserl and Freud but that is limited only within the theoretical horizon. The present study tries to show the practical relation that exists between both the thinkers from the perspective of the life of human being, shattered during the time of crisis. Thus, the study makes an attempt to explore Husserlian subjectivity by making a thorough analysis of all the mentioned layers in one single effort.

### **1.5. Objectives of the Study:**

In order to pursue the queries systematically the study will proceed by following certain objectives on the basis of which the chapters are designed. The objectives which are to be addressed in the study are as follows:

- a) In what manner Husserl provides an alternate concept of subjectivity that differs from the pre-phenomenological exploration of selfhood, personhood and subjectivity.
- b) To explore how Husserl has taken the problem of subjectivity in different phases of his philosophical development, in its early phase and also in the later phase.
- c) To explore in what manner Husserlian position of transcendental subjectivity differs from traditional Idealism even though Husserl claims that everyday object must necessarily be understood in correlation to constituting subjectivity.
- d) To examine in what manner Husserlian description of subjectivity keeps room for objectivity, intersubjectivity and life-world that also safeguards spiritual and moral aspirations of our subjectivity.
- e) In what manner Husserlian phenomenology could address the issue of alienation that emerged out of technologisation? To examine how Husserlian exploration for restoring meaning in a crisis bound world may find some resemblance with another kind of crisis in philosophy as well. In other words is there any possible dialogue between Freud and Husserl in some manner?

### **1.6. Methodology:**

As this is a phenomenological study of layers of selfhood so it needs to proceed applying the phenomenological methodology comprising of bracketing or epoché and other related tools. Besides, the study needs serious reading and discussion of primary and secondary sources on related area. Primary sources would include the books or articles written by the philosophers whose works have been assessed in the present study. The secondary sources comprise of any other study material that throw light on the primary sources.

## **1.7. Layout of the Chapters:**

### **Chapter-I: Introduction:**

The introducing chapter of the study tries to trace the history of the issue of subjectivity in its pre-phenomenological exploration. By giving the philosophical background the study proceeds to explore how the self talk has become a topic of critical analysis and how identity has become a topic of political enquiry in the present situation. Further the chapter also discusses the analytic philosophical counterparts to explore the issue of subjectivity or selfhood. Thus, by discussing the third-person perspectives on the issue of subjectivity the study continues to show that the 'I' centric trend in philosophy started from Descartes onwards. Thus, finally the chapter introduces Edmund Husserl and his philosophy of consciousness which concentrates mainly upon the phenomenology of meaning.

### **Chapter-II: Logical Quest for subjectivity: Subject-Object Co-Relation in Early Husserl.**

The first part of the chapter concentrates upon Husserl's deviation from psychologism and naturalism. Then the chapter proceeds to explore Husserlian debt to his teacher Brentano and his influence upon Husserl. It was Brentano's psychological teachings because of which Husserl has been supposed to get influenced by him. As a result of that Frege criticised Husserl as a psychologistic logician. In this regard an attempt is made in the chapter to safeguard Husserlian position from Frege's accusation by following the studies made by Husserlian scholars like Mohanty and Moran. Finally, the reference is made of Bernard Bolzano who was the main reason of the deviation of Husserl from Brentano's teaching. Thus, the chapter goes on to explore Husserlian concept of the pure logic which is an attempt of Husserl to unite the subject pole with the object pole by concentrating upon the meaning aspect of an act of knowing.

### **Chapter-III: Transcendental Turn to the Ego and Subjectivity: Phenomenological Reductions to the Intentionality of Consciousness and its Noematic Co-Relates.**

Concentrating on the Husserlian methods for phenomenology the chapter first explores the phenomenological or the transcendental reduction and then the eidetic reduction. After applying the methods Husserl finally reached to that level of consciousness which is pure and devoid of natural attitude. According to Husserl, this is the domain of transcendental subjectivity which he regarded as consciousness as such or the absolute universal

consciousness. Thus, in the next part of the chapter it has been discussed how Husserlian transcendental philosophy is different from the other transcendental philosophical thoughts like that of Kant, Natorp etc.

#### **Chapter IV: Phenomenological Quest for the Inter-subjective Dimensions of Transcendental Subjectivity.**

The consciousness which Husserl referred to as the universal sphere of meaning giving dimension is essentially embodied according to him. This transcendental subjectivity is essentially embodied in nature and connected with others by forming an intersubjective world which Husserl referred to as the life-world. Thus, Husserlian transcendental subjectivity is essentially embodied by making things and entities part of this world. Husserl explained this constituting feature of the body with the concept of *lived body*, which is not an object of the natural sciences like the physical body but essentially based on lived experiences which is neither a sensorial nor perceptual but, coming from within or from one's own self. As per Husserl, this lived-body has double-sensation therefore; it possesses the subject-subject status, which very importantly qualifies the existence of the other subject as an embodied subject of this world. But, most importantly the self could experience the other only through the first-person experience. If other has been perceived from third person perspective then the other would become an object. Therefore, phenomenology always emphasizes on the first-personal givenness provided by 'empathy' which offers direct, intuitive experience of the other. But, at the same time it is not possible to have the accessibility of the otherness of the other. Thus, in Husserlian phenomenology the others' experiences are constituted in an intersubjective world where both the self and the other live together. This can be regarded as the transcendental intersubjectivity in Husserlian phenomenology.

#### **Chapter-V: Genetic Phenomenology and the Hidden depth of the Person: Phenomenology as Ethical Life in Husserl**

By bracketing the factual history and objective time the chapter proceeds to explore the historicity and temporality form a wider horizon which constitutes meaningfulness of life by constituting family, tribe, culture, society etc. In this regard Husserl mentioned about the European community and its legacy which had been destroyed by the self sufficient tendency of the natural sciences. Thus, an attempt is made in the chapter to find out the distressful situation created by the modern technological developments in the present situation. Husserl in this regard asks for the ethical upliftment of the individual through phenomenology. The

chapter further incorporates an attempt to understand the relationship between Husserl and Freud who tried to work for the betterment of human community in the period of insurgency.

**Chapter-VI: Conclusion:**

This chapter includes the summaries of the major findings of the previous chapters and also tries to make a critical estimate of the issue undertaken.



## Chapter- II

### Logical Quest for Subjectivity: Subject-Object Co-Relation in Early Husserl:

#### 2.1. Introduction:

Edmund Gustav Albrecht Husserl (April 8, 1859- April 26, 1938), the founder of phenomenology and one of the most original thinkers of 20th century philosophical thought, was born in what is now called the Czech Republic, on 8<sup>th</sup> April, 1859. His family was Jewish, yet secular. Like Kafka, Husserl was more “German” than Jewish but until World War II Husserl could not be able to ignore his Jewish heritage. He writes, in a letter to Albrecht dated August 2, 1917:

Duty demands that I bring to completion and publication my labors of so many years, especially since they provide the scientific foundation for reconciliation between the naturalistic world views that dominated the epoch just expired and the teleological world view....But the teleological world view is the definitively truer one (Husserl, 1989, p. 19). Husserl takes upon himself the task of showing a contrast between these two approaches to the question of selfhood, subjectivity and personhood, highlighting the fact that the first personal experience of subjectivity must be the starting point of this investigation.

Thus, the chapter makes an attempt to understand Husserlian interpretation of ‘pure logic’ and the various phases of Husserl’s early philosophy including his relation with Frege and his relation with his own teacher Franz Brentano. The study further shows a Husserlian shift from the psychological and empirical approach to Logic centering round his earlier interest in Mill, Sidgwick and others toward an ideal realm of ‘pure logic’ as demonstrated in the works of Bolzano, Lotze and others.

#### 2.2. Early Phase of Husserlian Phenomenology of Selfhood:

Recognizing the need for a concrete description of subjectivity that can still remain within the transcendental dimension of subjectivity, Husserl offers a transcendental-phenomenological account of personhood. This differs greatly not only from the usual

anglophone discussions of the term subjectivity, but also from what is usually characterized as analytical philosophy in general. Before exploring Husserlian approach to subjectivity and intersubjectivity, it is necessary to briefly outline what is involved in the general analytic discussion of subjectivity. Husserl's project differs in several important ways from the general analytic approach, and it will be helpful to make these contrasts explicit in order to have a better understanding of what questions Husserl's notion of the subjectivity is intended to address as well as what questions will remain foreign to Husserl.

Centering on the topic of personal identity, the analytic tradition proceeds by addressing certain key questions in order to ascertain what criterion allows us to re-identify a person as the same person? While the Lockean tradition relies heavily on psychological continuity as the deciding criterion for personal identity, some others, such as Bernard Williams, have appealed to a criterion of physical continuity rather than psychological continuity. P. F. Strawson combines both these approaches in his attempt at defining a person in terms of the distinguishing features approached to personhood. On the whole, within the analytical tradition, the theme of subjectivity focused on the concept of subjectivity only, and not on how we experience human person or what kind of subjectivity mean to us in our everyday living experience which constitutes all such meaning. This can be regarded as the conceptual way of investigating subjectivity. Husserl while on the one way rejects this kind of exploration of subjectivity, on the other he goes against psychologism advocated by Mill, Sidgwick, Brentano and others. Therefore, in order to get a clear glimpse of the issue now it is necessary to discuss Husserl's rejection of both psychologism and naturalism in this regard.

### **2.2.1. Psychologism, Naturalism and Beyond:**

Psychologism is regarded as the theory according to which psychology is considered as the basic foundation for all other disciplines like Logic, theory of knowledge, Aesthetics, Ethics etc. with more focus on the issue of Logic and theory of knowledge that have drawn the attention of the German philosophers of late nineteenth century. Therefore, psychologism, as Husserl mentioned can be regarded mainly as *logical psychologism*. Husserl insists that the first personal experience of subjectivity must be the starting point of investigation, and all phenomenological problems must begin from the experience of the *ego*. In this regard Debabrata Sinha comments that subjectivism generally referred to the fact

according to which truth of something strictly depends on someone's mental state or position (Sinha, 1969). Therefore, subjectivism generally can be referred as psychologism, because here the truth is mind dependent. Therefore, subjectivity regarded the mind making facts as true facts, which is very personal in nature. While logicians like J.S. Mill, C. Sigwart, W. Hamilton, B. Erdmann, T. Lipps, tried to give a psychological foundation to the objective truths thereby opting for psychological and empirical foundation of logical meaning, phenomenological concern for subjectivity, though apt to be misunderstood as a preference for psychology oriented theory of knowledge, is a critique of psychologism on the one hand and of naturalism and scientism on the other (Moran, 2001). Accordingly in order to give priority to the personalistic attitude over the naturalistic one phenomenological and Husserlian exploration of subjectivity and selfhood will take a position that differs from both psychologism and naturalism. This important trend of exploring meaning can be found in Husserl's *Logical Investigations* and in *Prolegomena* published in 1900 and 1901 simultaneously. Now, the chapter would explore this trend subsequently.

### **2.2.2. Rejection of a Metaphysically Constructed Speculative Self in Preference for Intuition and Description of the Epistemic Subject:**

Husserl in his *Logical Investigations* mainly tries to establish a sufficient ground for Epistemology, Logic and Science. His main intention was not to search for the reality of the external world as one comes across in the traditional philosophies of realism or idealism but rather he wanted to find how knowledge is possible. In his quest for Logic as a tool for knowledge, Husserl further wanted to combine both the objective and the subjective poles. Generally, Logic is concerned with the objectivity and the objective meanings by studying the objective facts. So, Husserl tried to ground Logic on phenomenology in order to add an experienced and verifiable dimension to it. Thus, he tried to correlate the objective dimension of meaning with the subjective part as its counterpart and in that process he uses Logic as a tool. This leads to Husserl's fascination for 'pure logic' and its philosophical aspects than otherwise. This is his shift from the psychological and empirical approach to Logic and from his earlier interest in Mill, Sidgwick toward an ideal realm of 'pure logic' as demonstrated in the works of Bolzano, Lotze and some others. However, prior to understand Husserl's relation with Bernard Bolzano and with the concept of 'pure logic' it is necessary to begin with two other phases of Husserl's early philosophy, his relation with Frege and his relation

with his own teacher Franz Brentano whom he always addresses respectfully as ‘my teacher’. So, in order to have a better grip of the development, we must re-visit Husserl’s relationship with Frege and Brentano in order to understand the Logic-Psychology boundary from a Husserlian perspective.

### **2.3. Husserl and Frege: Similarities and Differences:**

It is believed in some circles that it was Frege who was critical of the early psychological phases of Husserl and that Frege made Husserl change his path from Psychology to Logic. It is worthwhile to enter into this debate in order to understand Husserl’s position in an adequate manner.

It was Gottlob Frege (1848-1925) who had criticised Husserl’s position in his “Philosophy of Arithmetic” very harshly. Frege criticised Husserl by saying that “I was able to gauge the devastation caused by the influx of psychology into logic” (Frege, 1972, p. 337). According to Dogfinn Føllesdal, it was Frege’s review of Husserl’s “Philosophy of Arithmetic” which made Husserl re-think about psychologism, which he thought as the foundation of Logic. According to him, though the criticism was too abrasive and unpleasant for Husserl, it however helped Husserl to understand the dangers of psychologism. Husserl himself mentioned about that criticism in front of Gibson, the translator of Husserl’s Idea I, that “it hit the nail on the head” (Føllesdal, 1982, cited in p. 55). Føllesdal made the point clear that the publications of Husserl during the period of 1891-93 do not reveal any kind of indication regarding his change of shift. In the year 1894, Husserl writes a paper titled “Psychologische Studien zur Elementaren Logik”, but according to Føllesdal, in that paper Husserl clearly indicates the role of Psychology as the foundation of Logic (Mohanty, 1982, p. 12). After Frege’s review in 1894, Husserl delivered a lecture in Halle, in 1896 which he regarded in the forwarding of the second edition of the *Prolegomena* as the root of his change. Therefore, according to Føllesdal, it was Frege’s review only which made Husserl to modify his shift from Psychology to ‘pure logic’.

Prior to entering into this controversy, we have to begin with a brief description of the problem as such. Psychologism ignores the difference between the temporal act of knowledge and the ideal object of knowledge and it reduces the later to the previous. As like, subjective idealism reduces intentional object to mental content. Husserl in this regard differentiates between the mode of givenness of our acts and the mode of givenness of

our objects. When we perceive an object we have to distinguish between that which appears and the very appearance of the object. The object now appears in its totality but always from a certain limited perspective. No single description can capture the object in its totality. But, the object thereby is not akin to an “unknown unknowable Kantian noumena”. Object for Husserl does not have a hidden backside. All these make it clear that Husserl’s phenomenology differs from psychologism of any kind.

J. N. Mohanty made a very clear and distinctive statement in this regard that helped clearing these confusions on Husserl-Frege relationship. Frege’s main accusation against Husserl was that Husserl has not maintained any distinction between the object and the presentation of the object and also between the presentation and the meaning of the object and thereby Husserl fall into the trap of a psychologistic logician (Moran, 2000). But, Mohanty maintains that Husserl has already made the distinction among the meaning, object and the presentation of the object in his review of Schroder’s *Vorlesungen Uber die Algebra der Logik* in 1891 and maintains that the meaning of a thing always remains the same while the presentation of that same object may vary (Mohanty, 1982; Dreyfus, 1972). So, according to Mohanty, (1982)

Presentations may vary, but the meaning or *Sinn* may remain the same. Further, there may be no object that is designated, and yet a name may have meaning. Even when there are objects that are designated, the multiplicity of objects does not imply multiplicity of meanings. He, therefore, has a clear distinction between *Vorstellung*, *Gegenstand*, and *Bedeutung* or *Sinn*. It is true that these remarks do not contain the thesis of the ideal objectivity of meanings, but they certainly do not confuse meaning with *Vorstellung* and therefore testify to an awareness of the objectivity of meanings as contrasted with the subjectivity of the *Vorstellungen* (p. 3).

Moreover, Frege in his letter on 24<sup>th</sup> May, 1891 to Husserl writes that “he had not yet in the *Grundlagen* drawn the distinction between meaning and reference” (Mohanty, 1982, p. 3). So, it is not possible that Husserl has got the idea from Frege’s review. In this regard Mohanty significantly explained that both Husserl and Frege have arrived at their viewpoints regarding the distinction among the meaning, sense and reference independently, but not with the help of one another. This is evident from Husserl’s reply to Frege: “I also notice, that in

spite of essential points of divergence, our points of view have many things in common. Many observations which forced themselves on me, I find had been expressed by you many years earlier” (Quoted in *ibid*, p. 4).

Later, while Husserl sent the copies of his *Philosophy of Arithmetic*, his review of Schröder’s paper and *Inhaltslogik*, Frege found that there are similarities between himself and Husserl. While on the one way Frege maintains that proper names must have to possess an object on the other hand he again maintains that in the case of common names, the possibility of object reference may not be there. But, that possibility will not make the concept to be a scientifically useless concept. Thus, Mohanty writes, “This refers to Frege’s well-known and controversial thesis that concepts constitute the reference, not the *Sinn*, of common names” (*ibid*, p. 6). In contrast there could be found a total opposite view in Husserl’s understanding. Husserl in this regard maintains that, “*Sinn* (or, in Husserl’s language, the *Bedeutung*) of a common name is the concept expressed by it and its reference is constituted by the object or objects falling under the concept” (Mohanty, 1982, p. 6).

This can be regarded as the most crucial point of divergence between Husserl and Frege. In case of Frege there remains a dividing line between sense and the concept. Frege gives utmost importance to sense and relates concept with the object. (The symbolization of something will be the sense in Frege’s case, which is nowhere related to an object though it may have but not particularly) Frege remarks “a sense must be “in” an act in a way more like bones and muscles are in the hand: not in it as what it grasps, but as that by virtue of which it grasps what it does” (McIntyre, 1987, p. 532). But, on the other hand according to Husserl, sense (Husserl uses the word Meaning in the same sense) of a common name is the concept of the same which always refers to an object under the same concept.

Moreover, while Frege reviewed Husserl’s *Philosophy of Arithmetic* he charged Husserl of committing the mistake of considering Arithmetic as the branch of Psychology. But, Husserl in his *Philosophy of Arithmetic* has never mentioned Arithmetic as the branch of Psychology.

As Mohanty writes,

In *Philosophie der Arithmetik*, arithmetic is not regarded as a branch of psychology, or arithmetical laws as laws of actual human thought processes; rather, the senses of the fundamental concepts of arithmetic are sought to be clarified by tracing them back to their origin in intuitive presentations, certain acts of abstraction and combination, and reflection on those acts. (Mohanty, 1982, p. 21)

Thus, while Husserl talked about *intuition* he has been misunderstood as a psychological philosopher. So, Mohanty finally concludes by saying that “Husserl’s overcoming of psychologism and acceptance of a theory of objective, pure logic was fundamentally independent of Frege’s 1894 review of the ‘*Philosophie der Arithmetik*’” (ibid, p. 10). Moreover, Mohanty maintains that Frege could not be able to understand “The Philosophy of Arithmetic” and thereby could not make an effective criticism. If we try to find out then it would be clear that Husserl has never acknowledged Frege in any of his works apart from the two references that he made in his *Logical Investigations*, where once he used Frege’s reference as a footnote and in the other he refers “Frege’s preface to the *Grundgesetze*” (ibid p. 14).

Again, Moran regarded Frege’s criticism as unfair and maintains that Husserl in his dissertation, (published in 1887, which has been reprinted in 1891 in his *Philosophy of Arithmetic*) claims that there is a very clear distinction between a psychological phenomena and the meaning of that phenomena (Moran, 2005). Moreover, Husserl in his review of Ernst Schroder’s work *Algebra of Logic* in 1891 criticised him for merging the meaning with its presentation. Again, Husserl talks about the same distinction in his *On the Logic of Signs* published in 1890. Here also Husserl made a distinction between the meaning of a sign and the indication of the same (ibid).

So, it can be stated that Husserl himself started to find some critical evaluation of psychologism, in his writings much before Frege criticised it in that line. Finally, it can be summerized that Husserl’s overcoming of psychologism is totally independent of Frege’s review. Thus, Mohanty writes that Husserl’s refutation of psychologism in the *Prolegomena*

is different from what Frege criticised in his review of *Philosophy of Arithmetic*. According to Moran, the problem with the *Philosophy of Arithmetic* is that Husserl's expression in *Philosophy of Arithmetic* was not that proper and clear, his uses of language also was not that much clear; because of which many influential thinkers like Frege could not be able to grasp Husserl's position and thereby criticised him.

Husserl's distinction between the ideal and the real is in many ways similar to Gottlob Frege's distinction. But, the very important difference between the phenomenological and the Fregean criticism of psychologism is that Husserl believed it to be necessary to follow up on this criticism by way of an analysis of intentionality, and this interest in subjectivity is not shared by Frege (As cited in Zahavi, 2003, p. 11)

Now, it is necessary to mention here that Husserl was not busy to develop any technical system in Logic. Like Frege and Boole he was not concerned only with the objective aspect of Logic but at the same time he also wanted to focus on the subjective aspect by putting human dimension in it. The most important distinction between Frege and Husserl is that Husserl brought intentionality of consciousness in Logic. The concept of intentionality which he mainly emphasized means that consciousness is always object directed (Zahavi, 2003). Husserl as a philosopher of Logic thus establishes his concept of 'pure logic' the *theory of theories*, which is not mathematized, but, only a philosophical theory, a theory of ideal meaning. The scope of Logic cannot be confined with the task of reasoning alone. Therefore, Husserl says that the scope of Logic is much broader than the practicality and normativity (Smith, 2007). Husserl, unlike Frege, enters into the experiential dimension of subjectivity which keeps room for phenomenological exploration of experience and intuition within the wider horizon of transcendental subjectivity. This aspect of Husserlian subjectivity and his differences from Fregean standpoint highlights difference between analytic and phenomenological approaches to the realm of logical agency and subjectivity and the epistemic and the intuitive subject in phenomenology.

Many philosophers have tried to give the credit to Frege for Husserl's deviation from the psychologism of Brentano. This also needs little clarification on Husserl's debt to

Brentano who first inspired Husserl to study Philosophy and to explore related areas of knowledge.

#### **2.4. Brentano and Husserl:**

Brentano was born on 16th January, 1838 in Marienberg. Brentano was a hardcore follower of Aristotle. He was a professor at Wurzburg in 1872. Brentano, as mentioned earlier, was a dedicated student of Aristotle and his notion of psychologism has been derived from the Aristotelian philosophy which he named as intentionality (Rollinger, 2004). Therefore, there could be seen the reflection of Aristotelian psychology in Brentano's psychology, but with a new light. Brentano modified the Aristotelian psychology by removing the traditional supposition according to which, Psychology is regarded as the "science of the soul" (As cited in Antonelli, 2002, p.13). According to Brentano, the metaphysical reality cannot be imposed upon Psychology, which is empirical in nature. For him, Psychology is the "science of mental phenomena" (Antonelli, 2002, p.13). Brentano wanted to elevate Psychology to scientific psychology. According to Brentano, only scientific psychology would be able to address the metaphysical questions like, mind-body relationship, questions of immortality etc. Thus, Brentano discovered a new kind of knowledge which he named as 'Descriptive Psychology' which can be regarded as the 'a priori science of the fundamental laws of our mental lives" (Glendinning, 2007, p. 35). Though Brentano believes on soul but he kept that principle aside to elevate Psychology to scientific psychology (Brentano, 2015). Therefore, Brentano could be regarded as one of the creators of modern psychology who has liberated Psychology from Philosophy. As a result, in 1874, Brentano has published the book called "Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint". It is worth mentioning that Brentano was a follower of modern empiricism and that can be known from his consideration that

The title I gave to my book characterizes its subject-matter and its method. My standpoint in psychology is empirical: Experience also is my teacher. But I share with others the conviction that a certain ideal intuition ("ideale Anschauung") can well be combined with such a standpoint. (As cited in Spiegelberg, 1960, p. 35)

Thus, it can be said that Brentano's main aim was to establish the point that knowledge must essentially be based on direct experience. But, along with his indisputable concept of the empirical source of knowledge, in his writing there could also be found the use of the term "ideale Anschauung" (ideal intuition). Thus, it can be stated that though there are not any explicit writing about Brentano's acceptance of the non-empirical knowledge but still his use of the term ideal intuition made many points clear. Thus, we can see a new openness in Brentano's thinking, openness toward a new kind of knowledge, which is not allowed in the traditional philosophical teachings. Brentano treated this kind of non-empirical knowledge as a special kind of knowledge, which is also given by experience but in a primary sense (Spiegelberg, 1960). Brentano later on developed this Empirical Psychology as Descriptive Psychology which is known as the *Philosophy of Mind* at present time (Jacquette, 2004).

*Descriptive psychology* as emphasized by Brentano is totally based on inner perception and is a kind of a priori knowledge. Brentano made a clear distinction between *descriptive psychology* and *genetic psychology*. According to Brentano, *descriptive psychology* is a kind of a priori knowledge which discusses or studies "the elements of psychic life and the laws that govern it" (Albertazzi, Libardi & Poli, 1996, p. 44). For him, "the task of descriptive psychology was to determine the elements of human consciousness and their connections. By *human consciousness* Brentano meant the set of psychic phenomena given in inner perception" (ibid). On the other hand, according to Brentano, *genetic psychology* is that which now-a-days is called "empirical psychology" or the "cognitive science". It is a kind of a posteriori knowledge which involves the experimental works like the empirical sciences. *Genetic psychology* explores the causal connections because of which the mental phenomenon occurs (Sajama & Kamppinen, 2014). *Genetic psychology* according to Brentano, "is concerned with the laws according to which these phenomena come into being and pass away" (As cited in Bell, 1990, p.6); and its findings, like those of physiology, will comprise inductively based generalizations which are, contingent, a posteriori, and merely probabilistic" (Bell, 1990, p. 6). *Genetic psychology* basically uses the methods of natural sciences and believes in experimental processes like the nature of the sense-organs, nervous systems etc. Therefore, Brentano rejected the concept of *genetic psychology* and accepted *descriptive psychology* as according to him, Philosophy is basically resides in descriptions but not in causal connections. According to Brentano,

“Philosophy is the description of what is given in direct ‘self-evidence’ (Evidenz)” (Moran, 2000, p. 8). As per Brentano, *descriptive psychology* as a science of a priori knowledge descriptively identifies “the domain of the mental in terms of intentionality” (ibid). As a result, we can only grasp them but we cannot observe or introspect them.

Thus, here could be seen a difference in Brentanean thought from the early introspective philosophical trend. Like Descartes, Brentano maintains the fallibility of outer perception and emphasizes the concept of inner perception. Though he followed Cartesian line of “inner perception” or “inner sense” which is self-evident in nature, at the same time he completely denied the concept of introspection. The most important point in this regard is that Brentano in his *Psychology* mainly tries to find out a difference between psychological phenomena and non-psychological or physical phenomena. According to Brentano, physical phenomena are erroneous and therefore, he only talks about the mental phenomena. Brentano maintains that

Physical phenomena are only “symbols” of real entities or processes that are not directly accessible (atoms, molecule, electromagnetic waves, etc.); by acting causally on the perceiver, they produce in him a presentation which provides only an approximate indication of them (Antonelli, 2002, p. 14).

On the other hand, Brentano gives utmost importance to the mental phenomenon. According to him, mental phenomenon is basically conscious by their nature. For him, “there must exist within the mental act itself a moment that makes possible our consciousness of it” (ibid). Brentano named that ‘moment’ as ‘inner perception’. Thus, Brentano maintains that psychological (mental) phenomena are the only real phenomena which can be known in inner perception and which are referred to objects. Brentano puts, “[Mental phenomena] are perceived [Wahrgenommen] only in inner consciousness, while in the case of the physical only outer perception is possible” (As cited in Morrison, 1970 p. 30). According to Brentano, mental acts must always be conscious and it must have a possible object within itself. Therefore, we can mention here the declaration made by Brentano that “there can be no mental act which is not either a presentation or based on a presentation” (Moran, 2000, p. 8-9). This leads to the situation that “the intentional object of consciousness is for Brentano always a presented object, an ‘immanent objectivity’, or an object as it shows itself to

consciousness” (Glendinning, 2007, p. 38). Brentano refers this kind of object as *intentional inexistence* but, by *inexistence* Brentano means the co-existence of the object in consciousness but not the non-existence of the same.

To explain this point of *intentional inexistence*, Brentano gives an example of desiring to hear a tone, where the object of the act of desire can be the hearing itself, where without having the physical object one can wish for something like (object) act of hearing, which in turn may have its object like tone. Thus, Brentano tried to convince that each and every thought has its referred object like desiring-desired, love-loved, hate-hated etc (Morrison, 1970). While the outer perception involves bodily sense-organs, inner perception does not need anything and therefore, inner perception can be proved as true and evident while the outer perception can be mistaken as sense-organs may sometimes give us wrong informations. Brentano believes that mental phenomena are private because they can be perceived only by inner perception and which is available only to a particular person at a particular point of time. But, on the other hand, physical phenomena can be seen and are accessible to all the individuals (Morrison, 1970). In this regard one important point should be mentioned here is that internal perception essentially differs from internal observation or introspection. While introspection directs full attention toward a phenomenon to gain a firm grasp of it, inner perception does not observe and does not take one's own mental activity as its object (Bunnin & Yu, 2004).

the intentional relation, Brentano affirms comprises a pair of correlates, of which “only one is real, while the other is not real....As a person who has been is not something real, neither is the person, who is thought. The thought of person, thus, has no real cause, and neither can he perform any action but, while the act of consciousness (the thinking of the person) takes places, the thought of person is its necessary correlate (Antonelli, 2002, p. 20)

So, from this assertion the essential point can be affirmed is that consciousness only refers to the mental side but not the objective side. Because of this, many have accused Brentano as a hardcore subjectivist. Among the others it was Husserl, the student of Brentano himself who had criticized him from various perspectives. Thus, it is necessary to find out the relationship between Brentano and Husserl and how and why Husserl has criticized him.

#### 2.4.1. Brentano's Influence on Husserl:

According to Rollinger, Husserl was a hardcore Brentanist till the time of 1894. Therefore, there can be found the flavour of psychologism in all his writings during that period of time (Rollinger, 2004). At that time Husserl was regourously following Brentano and he had the habit of reading the notes which he collected from Brentano's lectures (ibid). Husserl himself writes that "However highly I value this ingenious work, and however strongly it (and also the other writings of Brentano) influenced me in younger years" (Husserl, 1980, 10§ p. 50). Huseerl attended Brentano as a teacher at the University of Vienna from 1884 to 1886 (Huemer, 2004). Husserl met Brentano at Vienna in order to study philosophy in 1884. Initially Husserl attended Brentano's lectures only out of curiosity but Brentano's lectures influenced Husserl to an extent that he abandoned mathematics and accepted philosophy as his own subject (Boer, 1978). After attending Brentano, Husserl went to Halle, where he attended Stumpf, a regorous student of Brentano. In Halle, Husserl first writes his inaugaural dissertation to qualify in lectureship under Stumpf. He attended Stumpf's lectures on psychology in Halle. Thus after working as a lecturer, Husserl again visited Brentano once in 1887. That can be regarded as the final meeting of Husserl and Brenatno before Husserl's deviation from Brentano's teachings (Boer, 1978). Husserl writes,

The good fortune of attending Brentano's lectures was mine for only two years... At that time I had just finished my university studies and was still a beginner in philosophy, which was the minor subject for my doctorate in mathematics (Husserl 1919, p. 342).

Again, Husserl writes "At a time when my philosophical interests were increasing and I was uncertain whether to make my career in mathematics or to dedicate myself totally to philosophy, Brentano's lectures settled the matter" (Husserl 1919, p. 342). Moreover, Husserl says, "Brentano's lectures gave me for the first time the conviction that encouraged me to choose philosophy as my life's work, the conviction that philosophy too was a serious discipline which also could be and must be dealt with in the spirit of the strictest science" (Husserl 1919, p. 343). "Brentano was entirely devoted to the austere ideal of a strict philosophic science, an ideal he saw in the exact natural sciences" (Husserl 1919, p. 344-45). Brentano's acceptance that "Philosophy can and must be scientific" (Rollinger, 2004, p. 256) impressed Husserl a lot.

Brentano was equally impressed by Husserl and therefore he praised Husserl in his letter to Stumpf (Huemer, 2004). Then after 1886 on Brentano's advice Husserl went to Halle in order to teach philosophy and psychology under Carl Stumpf. He spent 15 years in Halle from the year 1887 to 1901 (Moran, 2000). Husserl completed his Habilitation thesis *Über den Begriff der Zahl (Concerning the Concept of Number)* in 1887, which he dedicated to his teacher professor F. Brentano (Rollinger, 1999; Huemer, 2004). After becoming the lecturer in the department of Philosophy in Halle, Husserl has delivered the first inaugural lecture i.e. *The Aims and Tasks of Metaphysics*. In Halle he has published his first book *The Philosophy of Arithmetic: Psychological and Logical Investigations, Book I* in 1891, which he dedicated to his teacher Brentano "in heartfelt gratitude" (cited in Moran, 2000. p. 99). But, gradually Husserl started to deviate from Brentano's teachings as Husserl was dissatisfied with Brentano's viewpoints and as a result he criticized Brentano. So, it is the time to discuss Husserl's criticism against Brentano.

#### **2.4.2. Husserl's Critical Estimate of Brentano's Initial Inclination for Psychologism:**

Husserl basically was so much dissatisfied with Brentano's account of intentional object and also for grounding Logic on Psychology. Husserl did not like Brentano's division between inner perception as evident and outer perception as erroneous or non-evident. By criticizing the exactness of the inner perception Husserl maintains that when we feel pain in the body we can particularly locate that part which causes the pain (Glendinning, 2007). For example, if someone feels pain in hand but not in the head then that person is capable of indicating his/her pain. So, in this case the total perception (both inner and outer) must essentially present and equally important.

Moreover, by criticising Brentano's concept of outer perception as erroneous Husserl explains that when a person perceives a white building s/he directly perceives the building. Here the perception of that person directed toward the building but not what his/her perception presents to that person. Thus, the person would not be able to make any judgement about the building as the building is already there but only about the fact how the building appears to that person as white or red, square or rectangular etc. These all can be regarded as the properties of the building which are physical in nature.

Husserl maintains that

It is physical (and not mental) in the sense that it is neither an act nor is it intentional. But since I am not judging about the house as it really is, but only about how it looks to me, I cannot be mistaken, i.e., the perception is evident (Morrison, 1970, p. 36).

Thus, Husserl tried to overcome Brentano's distinction between the two separate realms of the mental and the physical and finally he exchanged the term mental phenomena with "intentional lived-experiences (intentionale Erlebnisse)" (As cited in *ibid*, p. 39). Moreover, Husserl maintains that we perceive something as something not because of our consciousness or sensation of the object as consciousness cannot constitute the object. The object may look different from different perspectives.

Husserl again criticizes Brentano for the position that mental phenomena are acts. Mental phenomena as referred by Brentano have the attribute of intentional inexistence along with the three other characteristics of presentation, judgment and feeling (*ibid*). But, Husserl says that all mental phenomena do not possess the quality of intentionality. As some of the feelings like "A pain (say) can be located in the body, and in this loose sense "refers" to an object (say my tooth), but such a "referring" is not at all act-like in character." (Morrison, 1970, p. 39) Thus, Husserl again gives another example of being pleased. "To be pleased is to be pleased *about* something." (*ibid*) Thus, Husserl concludes that all mental phenomena are not intentional and therefore all mental phenomena are not acts. (*ibid*)

Moreover, Husserl was very much dissatisfied with Brentano's concept of *intentional inexistence* according to which intentional object is already contained in the act. As per Husserl, Brentano's theory can be regarded as the repetition of the theory like representational theory forwarded by the empiricists like Locke, Berkeley and others. It is worth mentioning that during the period of 1894-96, Husserl writes an article entitled "Intentional Objects", an unpublished review of Kasimiri Twardowski's book. In that review Husserl made a clear distinction between the presentation of the object and the meaning of the same object, (Moran, 2000 & Rollinger, 2004) "between the real or the psychological content and the ideal or the logical content, or meaning of the act, and also between the whole

notion of content and the intentional object of the act” (Moran, 2000, p. 73). This can be regarded as a complete deviation of Husserl from Brentano as Husserl here is seen of completely denied the concept of intentional inexistence (Rollinger, 2004). Husserl says;

A perceived physical object (or "phenomenon") is not "in" consciousness or a "part" of it - it is always transcendent. The immanent contents which belong to the constituents of an intentional lived-experience are not themselves intended by the latter, i.e., they are not the object of the act. I do not see color sensations or color experiences but colored things. The thing is thus not a "bundle of impressions" or an "idea." We should avoid all talk of immanent objects. Only the acts and contents of consciousness are immanent (Morrison, 1970, p. 40).

According to Brentano, both appearance and phenomena stand for the same but Husserl made the point clear by criticizing Brentano that when somebody perceives something that appears in front of the person as something lived but not as the appearance. Husserl differs by saying that appearance cannot be regarded as something real. Things of the world would exist even if they are not perceived by someone. But, appearance always exists in perception only and hence, they cannot be regarded as independent as they do not appear without the perceiver (Morrison, 1970). This distinction between the appearance of a thing and the thing that appears can be compared with Husserl's concept of momentary 'I' and the 'I' which transcends all the empirical boundaries (ibid).

In this regard Brentano made a very serious assertion that, “descriptive psychology will provide the necessary grounding for genetic or causal psychology and for other sciences, including logic, aesthetics, political economy, sociology and so on”(As cited in Moran, 2000, p. 39). Brentano stated that

Epistemology is concerned with the cognitive nature of perceiving, believing, judging and knowing. All of these phenomena, however, are psychical phenomena, and it is therefore obvious that it must be up to psychology to investigate and explore their structure. This also holds true for our scientific and logical reasoning, and ultimately logic must therefore be regarded as a part of

psychology and the laws of logic as psycho-logical regularities, whose nature and validity must be empirically investigated (Zahavi, 2003, p. 8).

Brentano, who was a follower of Aristotle, tried to reform the traditional logic and therefore he stated that only Psychology could help us to solve the logical issues or problems. This assertion leads Brentano toward committing the mistake of *psychologism*. By criticizing Brentanean position Husserl maintains that the truths of logic are not psychological but ideal. “The Pythagorean Theorem stand as an independent valid truth whether anyone actually thinks it or not” (Moran, 2001, cited in p. Xxxi). Truths of logic are beyond empirical, they are not subjective but a priori, which cannot be reduced to Psychology. According to him, Logic is not concerned with any temporal and spatial conditions. Moreover, psychologism also leads to subjectivism, which was really very hard to accept for Husserl. Husserl wanted to ground Logic and Mathematics on epistemology by applying the methods of phenomenological insight. Therefore, Husserl abandoned psychologism led by Brentano and started to explore ‘pure logic’ and in doing that among the others he basically got influenced by the works of Bernard Bolzano (1781- 1848). As a result he published the “Prolegomena to a Pure Logic,” which is totally about the theory of ideal objects i.e. Logic and eventually he developed his theory of ‘Intentionality’, which is different from Brentano’s notion of intentionality. Interestingly enough though Husserl deviated himself from Brentano, still it was Brentano who for the first attempted to find out the intentional character of the psychical act. Although from Brentano’s teaching it is not possible to establish the independence of an object but still in Brentano there could be seen a slight deviation from his predecessors while he talks about intentionality in his philosophical exploration. “His greatest contribution was in seeing the formal structure of consciousness as consciousness of and the inadequacy of the traditional conception of consciousness and the mind as "thinking substance" (Cartesian rationalism) and/or a "bundle of ideas" (empiricism)” (Morrison, 1970, p. 45). In this regard Husserl writes in his Crisis;

This is the place to recall the extraordinary debt we owe to Brentano for the fact that he began his attempt to reform psychology with an investigation of the peculiar characteristics of the psychic (on contrast to the physical) and showed intentionality to be one of these characteristics; the science of ‘psychic

phenomena,' then, has to do everywhere with conscious experiences (Bewusstseinslebniss). (Husserl, 1970, §68, p. 233-234)

Despite the fact that one can trace the ideas of phenomenology back to Brentano's thought but, it was Husserl's belief that Brentano failed to grasp the real nature of intentionality the way it should be articulated. Now, it is important to investigate Husserlian exploration of 'pure logic' and his debt to Bolzano in details.

## **2.5. Husserlian Departure from Traditional Logic to Pure Logic:**

Husserl was not satisfied with the theories developed by various logicians like J.S. Mill, C. Sidgwart, W. Hamilton, B. Erdmann, T. Lipps and as a result he wrote various critical reviews, which has got published in 1894, 1897, 1903 and 1904 simultaneously. Husserl has recognized the concept of Logic comprehended as calculus by logicians like George Boole, Ernst Schroder, William Stanley Jevons, Gottlob Frege and all. But, according to Husserl, though the logicians tried to refine Logic by introducing the method of calculus, the scope of that refinement was very limited. The reason behind this is that that will distil only the technical aspect of the whole branch but not the genuine philosophical counterpart of the same. Husserl in his *Prolegomena* criticizes the concept of Logic as psychologistic and claims that Logic should be founded on "objective, formal, a priori and theoretical discipline" (Hartimo, 2012, p. 121). By Logic Husserl means the 'pure logic' which depends on objective relations and which is devoid of any other methodological rule and regulation. According to him, Logic should be pure, independent, demonstrative and formal science but not a method (Hartimo, 2012). In this regard it should be mentioned here that Ernst Schröder was one of the significant figures for Husserl's devotion to the logical tradition. Hartimo writes, Husserl was a family friend of Robert Grassmann, "who published a book called *Formenlehre* (1872), which presents a system close to that of Boole's" (ibid, p. 130). Husserl during his time in Halle in 1895 & 1896 received two letters from Grassmann where he regarded Aristotle as the most intelligent logician and criticizes Schröder's work. Thus, Husserl came to know about Schröder's work and wrote his review of on Schröder's work *Vorlesungen über die Algebra der Logik* (Lectures on the algebra of logic). So, here it can be said that Husserl in his early phase of life has got influenced by both Grassmann and Schröder. However, Husserl in his book *Prolegomena to Pure Logic* starts his discussion by criticizing the 19<sup>th</sup> century formations of Logic, which contains Psychology and also the

practical or normative aspect of Logic. “Psychologism sees logical laws as empirical generalizations of how people happen to reason, while normative views see logical laws as prescriptive of how people ought to reason.” (Smith, 2003/2, p. 143)

As per Husserl, Logic cannot be a normative or a practical discipline. If Logic would be a normative discipline then the primary concern of Logic would be how one ought to reason. Normativity would restrict Logic within some strict rules and regulations (Husserl, 2007). Thus, in the *Prolegomena* Husserl’s main intention was to demarcate Logic from other sciences and to establish Logic as an independent science. He therefore, tried to establish ‘pure logic’ as an “a priori, theoretical discipline that is formal and demonstrative in nature” (Tieszen, 2004, p. 221).

## **2.6. From Kant to Bolzano: Husserlian Quest for Pure Logic:**

In the 10th chapter of the *Prolegomena* Husserl started his discussion of ‘pure logic’ by mentioning about Kant, Herbert, Lotze, Bolzano and Leibniz (Husserl, 2001, p. 135). It was Kant who tried to establish the a priori objectivity of Logic and like Kant, Herbert and Lotze also tried to find out the objectivity of Logic. (Smith, 2007) In this regard by referring Kant Husserl says that, Kant takes the help of understanding and reason in order to demarcate the pure and applied Logic (Husserl, 2001, p. 135). Kant placed understanding and reason in a higher level and he did not leave any room for other exceptions. Moreover, he maintains that understanding and reason pre-suppose ‘pure logic’ (ibid). Husserl maintains that “Pure logic, which in truth is alone science, ought, according to Kant, to be ‘brief and dry’, ‘as is required by the scholastic exposition of a theory of the elements of the understanding” (As Cited in ibid). Husserl maintains that, “according to Kant we rather take the terms ‘understanding’ and ‘reason’ as merely indicating a direction to the ‘form of thinker’ and its ideal laws, which logic, as opposed to an empirical psychology of knowledge, must follow” (ibid). Thus, Kant attempted to forward the objectivity of Logic, which is a priori and reason based. Therefore, Husserl maintains that “We agree with Kant in his main drift, though we do not find that he clearly espied the essence of his intended discipline, nor set it forth in accordance with its adequate content” (Husserl, 2001, p. 136). Thus, Husserl could not find a proper answer from Kant and therefore, accepted the positions forwarded by Leibniz and finally by Bolzano (Smith, 2007).

Husserl in his *Prolegomena* primarily referred to the works of mathematical logicians like Leibniz and Bolzano. The reason behind this reference is that they tried to bring a mathematical strictness within the discipline of Logic which at the same time determines the objectivity of Logic (Bachelard, 1968). Husserl in his *Prolegomena* gives utmost preference to Gottfried Wilhelm Von Leibniz (1646-1716) regarding the concept of Logic. Leibniz with the help of the concept of broader *mathesis universalis* tried to combine various sciences despite of being quantitative or qualitative. For Husserl Leibniz “was the first thinker to begin to see what logic as a science ought to be” (Smith, 2013, p. 90). It is very important to note that it was Leibniz who talked about *mathesis universalis*, which means *universal mathematics* (ibid). Husserl has got inspired by this concept of *mathesis universalis* and implemented that into his concept of ‘pure logic’. Husserl, in his *Prolegomena* admires Leibniz because of his insight of “the possibility of combining the formalized scholastic logic with other formal disciplines devoted to the forms that governed, for example, quantity or spatial relations or magnitude.” (Drummond, 2007, p. 17) Moreover, it can be said that, “Leibniz had brilliant insights about the universal mathematics of quality. By his *Ars Combinatoria* we can consider him, Husserl says, as the “spiritual father of the *Mannigfaltigkeitslehre* (theory of multiplicity)”.” (As cited in Bachelard, 1968, p. 88). Thus, Husserl acknowledged the influence of Leibniz and writes that, “The intuitions of Leibniz, which speed forth so far beyond their time, seem sharply defined and highly admirable to a modern acquainted with ‘formal’ mathematics and mathematical logic” (Husserl, 2001, p. 140).

In this regard Smith (2013) maintains that as per Husserl, Leibniz just showed a simple glance of the concept of Logic as *mathesis universalis*. But, it is Bernard Bolzano who first propounded the concept of *mathesis universalis* in his *Theory of Science* (*Wissenschaftslehre*). It is worth mentioning that Husserl in his writings very specifically talks about Bolzano and has never mentioned about any other writer as precisely as Bolzano. But the most important point is that Bolzano was not the first person to use the term *Wissenschaftslehre*. It was Johann Gottlieb Fichte who also used the same term before Bolzano. But, in *Wissenschaftslehre* Husserl found Fichte to follow the Kantian type of subjectivism in a more radical way (Smith, 2003/2). Therefore, it can be stated that though Husserl read the writings of Fichte and Kant but in his *Logical Investigations* he referred mainly Bolzano. Husserl follows Bolzano’s “*Wissenschaftslehre*” i.e. “theory of Science” published in 1837 and he declared that “logic as science...must be built upon Bolzano’s work,

and must learn from him its need for mathematical acuteness in distinctions, for mathematical exactness in theories” (Husserl, 2001, p. 143). Thus, it is necessary to explore the philosophical counterparts developed by Bolzano which influenced Husserl a lot in his phenomenological exploration.

## **2.7. Husserl and Bolzano in Developing the Concept of Pure Logic:**

Bernard Bolzano, (1781-1848) born in Prague and can be regarded as one of the lone forbearer of analytical philosophy and phenomenology. The *Wissenschaftslehre* (Theory of Science) published in 1837 makes him the greatest logician of that period. Though he did not discuss anything about ‘pure logic’ as a theory as such but in his *Wissenschaftslehre* (Theory of Science) he has forwarded his thought, which is very pure and scientific in nature. He died in Prague in the same year in which Frege was born; who is philosophically closer to Bolzano than any other thinker of the nineteenth or twentieth century (Künne, 1998). But, Bolzano did not get the due attention in those days and finally after a long period of neglect he recouped philosophical attention in the twentieth century when Edmund Husserl read his book and adopted his ontological strictness of propositions. The most important discovery of Bolzano was his concept of truth-in-themselves (*Wahrheiten an sich*) which he regarded as independent and exists prior to language or man (Hillel, 2006). Truth-in-themselves refers the kind of truth irrespective of whether anybody thinks or utters that or not. Truth-in-themselves as mentioned by Bolzano is a subset of proposition-in-themselves. Bolzano thought that this concept of proposition-in-themselves should be introduced in Logic as well. Sentences-in-itself, representations-in-itself, and truths-in-itself can be regarded as the appropriate subject matter of logic (ibid). By referring all those concepts Bolzano tries to indicate objective content of sentences and representations, which does not depend on any other condition like human thinking. They will exist whether somebody thinks them or not (ibid). Bolzano thus establishes the fact that objects have their own existence regardless of their dependency on any subjective agent. By objects of representation Bolzano includes both existent and non-existent objects. Thus, objects in his Logic have got utmost importance as he tries to explain most of the essential relations of Logic in terms of object. Moreover, he accepts the fact that sentence without object reference cannot be considered as sentence but it is not necessary whether that object is an existent object or not (Chernoskutov, 2013).

Interestingly enough though Brentano claims that he introduced Bolzano to Husserl but it was Karl Weierstrass the mathematics professor, from whom Husserl heard about Bolzano. Moreover, he came to know about Bolzano; from a Brentano scholar namely Benno Kerry's writing i.e. *Ueber Anschauung und ihre Psychische Verarbeitung* which was published in between 1885-1891. Husserl in this regard maintains that he misunderstood Bolzano in his first reading of *Wissenschaftslehre*. Husserl writes, "I mistook, however, his original thoughts on presentations, propositions, truths 'in themselves' as metaphysical absurdities" (As cited in Huemer, 2004, p. 205). But at the same time it was Herman Lotze who helped Husserl to understand Bolzano's position. Therefore, Husserl always used to acknowledge Bolzano and Lotze as two influential figures in his life. It was Herman Lotze who made him understand Bolzano's concept through his interpretation of Plato's concept of independent validity of ideas. Husserl started to study Bolzano's concept of proposition and representation while Lotze gave his interpretation on Plato's theory of Ideas. For him, the *Form* or the *Idea* is the ultimate real thing. By *Form* Plato means something universal, which is never changing and which is permanent. Thus, he said that the concept *horseness* would always remain the same even if all the horses would cease to exist from this universe. Similarly, while black can be transformed to white the blackness of the black will always remain the same (Moran & Cohen, 2012). These ideas do not exist anywhere. He never tries to ascribe physicality to these Ideas. Plato only ascribes validity to them. Husserl first thought those Ideas as metaphysical, exist somewhere in heaven but Lotze made the point clear to him.

Lotze attempts a clarification of the meaning of the Platonic 'world of Ideas' by arguing that they are the predicates of things in this world considered as general concepts bound together in a whole in such a way as to 'constitute an unchangeable system of thought' and which determine the limits of all possible experiences. Plato recognizes that in the Heraclitean world of change, black things become white, etc., but blackness does not change, even if a thing has only a momentary participation in it (Moran, 2005, p. 88).

Thus, Husserl finally recognizes that Bolzano's concept of truths-in-themselves can mainly be regarded as something ideal, the co-relation of different statements like theorems, which is objectively valid whether the object exists or not (ibid). The basic form of a proposition according to Bolzano is A is B where A is a subject and B is an abstract name which has the

concept of predicate. Thus, for Bolzano A is B will be expressed as A has B. “This is red” will be “this has redness”. Thus, Bolzano affirms subjectivity and the predicate form to non-existent thing. e.g. “There are no unicorns” will become “the concept of unicorn has objectlessness” (Simons, 1999). According to Bolzano, proposition-in-itself is independent of language and thought which do not have existence like thought proposition and written proposition. Here, the property of unicorn is objectlessness; black is blackness, which can also be regarded as logical object. So, in Bolzano’s thinking logical object do not refer any special kind of object (Rusnock, 2000). Husserl has adopted this concept of proposition-in-itself and considered the aspect of ideality as devised by Bolzano. In his “Theory of Science” Bolzano developed a kind of logical theory and knowledge, which deals with ideal meaning. Ideal meaning is that which provides the objectivity of Logic.

In this regard Centrone (2010) writes that “In Husserl’s eyes, Bolzano’s great merit lies in his characterizing pure logic as a discipline that is concerned “with the most general conditions of *truth* itself” and deals with the relations among the *contents* of our thoughts” (p. xiv). According to Tragesser (1984), Bolzano’s *Theory of Science* is that work which “inspired Husserl’s characterization of philosophy as the science of science, a science not reducible to any other, such as psychology” (p. 6).

Logic, according to Bolzano, is a formal science, but it is due to the fact that it considers the *forms of ‘propositions-in-itself’*, not the *forms-of-thought*. Thereby logic may not be viewed as objectless knowledge and qualifying it as formal will not serve as verdict in unproductiveness (Chernoskutov, 2013, p. 14).

Thus, Husserl understood the fact that proposition-in-themselves basically refers the sense of a statement. The sense of a statement will always be the same even if it is uttered by various persons. Therefore, he maintains that “proposition-in-themselves were simply what scientists called a theorem about the sum of three angles in a triangle which no one would think of considering the product of anyone’s subjective experience of judging” (As Cited in Hill, 2002, p. 83). Bolzano very seriously demarcates the subjectivistic content of a proposition from the meaning or essence or the objective truthfulness of that proposition (Moran, 2005).

By referring Moran's citation of *Wissenschaftslehre* we can have a clear idea of Bolzano's work.

'idea' in this sense is a general name for any phenomenon in our mind ... Thus, what I see if someone holds a rose before me is an idea, namely the idea of a red colour.... In this sense, every idea requires a living being as a subject in which it occurs. For this reason I call them subjective or mental ideas. Hence subjective ideas are something real. They have real existence at the time when they are present in a subject, just as they have certain effect. The same does not hold for the objective idea or idea in itself that is associated with every subjective idea. By objective idea I mean the certain something which constitutes the immediate matter (*Stoff*) of a subjective idea, and which is not found in the realm of the real. An objective idea does not require a subject but subsists (*bestehen*), not indeed as something existing, but as a certain something even though no thinking being may have it; also it is not multiplied when it is thought by one, two, three, or more beings, unlike the corresponding subjective idea, which is present many times. Hence the name 'objective' (As cited in Moran, 2005, p. 87).

Husserl has adopted this teaching of Bolzano and recognizes the fact that the ideality or the objects of Logic can never be reduced to psychologism. As a result Husserl in his *Logical Investigations* concentrates mainly on the concept of ideality or meaning. Bolzano's influence on Husserl can be known from Husserlian acceptance of the fact that logical truths are the ideal truths but not the real (Moran, 2005). In this regard Sebestik says that it was Bolzano from whom Husserl has got the inspiration to take the new turn. Thus, he maintains that "Husserl himself recognized his debt to Bolzano in the famous appendix of p. 60 of the *Logical Investigations*" (Sebestik, 2003, p. 61).

But, the point should be noted here is that though Husserl took various ideas from Bolzano, but still Bolzano cannot be regarded as a phenomenological philosopher. Bolzano, basically was a realist and according to Husserl "Bolzano had no idea of what phenomenology actually was" (As cited in Benoist, 2002, p. 99). Husserl himself regarded the fact and said that "But the great Logic of Bolzano has so little pertinence here that he had

not even the slightest inkling of phenomenology –of phenomenology in the sense that my writings represent” (Husserl, 1980, §10, p. 49).

## 2.8. Husserlian Quest for Epistemic Subject:

As it is a well established fact that Frege’s main intention in Logic was to emancipate Logic from linguistic involvements and to simplify logical propositions to mere symbols. Though both Frege and Husserl tried to overcome psychologism but Husserl never tried to reduce the linguistic participation in Logic to symbolic one. Rather Husserl in his first *Logical Investigation* tried to develop a very intricate relation between language and Logic. Husserl was not influenced by the newly developed formal system of Logic of that time but he was in favour of the subject-predicate structure of judgment-in-itself. Husserl’s intention was to establish the philosophy of Logic but not something calculative kind of system (Moran, 2005). “Logic is not one science alongside others; in fact, it studies the formal a priori belonging to all the sciences as such” (ibid, p. 95). Husserl’s main aim was “then, is an 'epistemologically "clarified" pure logic'. This 'clarification' in turn requires *phenomenology*, and a vigilance to avoid reimporting speculative ('mythical') conceptions back into epistemology” (As cited in ibid). Husserl like Bolzano regarded the *ideality* of truth whether somebody asserts that as true or not. In this regard Husserl by criticizing Neo-Kantian philosopher Sidgward maintains that truth always remains the truth without any exception. Thus, Husserl mentioned about the ideal content of *meaning*. He says that “there are countless objective meanings which may never find human expression” (As cited in ibid, p. 97). Phenomenology as Husserl’s discipline tries to bring *clarity and distinctness* to those meanings by bringing their origin back to intuition, as Husserl writes, “the intuitions that underlie them: 'Logical concepts, as valid thought-unities, must have their origin in intuition” (ibid).

Intuitions (*Anschauungen*) according to Husserl, is that kind of experience which is concrete or tangible and where the intended things are given directly. Intuition is grounded on ‘evidence’ (*Evidenz*) which fulfils the intuition. Thus, it can be stated that knowing a thing means trace that thing back in order to verify the experiences which are evident. Here again comes two points, meant and given and in this process both comes into a total correspondence. This is an immediate correspondence but not causal. Husserl says that knowledge does not necessarily mean something sensuous product but it is a kind of seeing

and given along with *evidence* and *insight*. But, very interestingly Frege criticized Husserl regarding the concept of *evidence*. Frege regarded the concept of *evidence* as psychological which is basically wrong in Husserlian sense. Moreover, Husserl rejects the view according to which, *evidence* is the property of Mathematics or Logic. Husserl in his *Logical Investigations* considers *evidence* as an ongoing process of “everyday 'production' or 'achievement' (*Leistung*) in all cognitions where the object is given in a satisfactory form, with 'intuitive fullness'(*anschauliche Fülle*), or as Husserl prefers to say, where the object gives itself” (ibid, p. 98). Thus, Husserl explains anything logical must have to fall under the two important classes of meaning and object which are correlated.

Thus, meaning can be regarded as the main concept in Husserl's phenomenology which constitutes the 'pure logic'. But, by meaning Husserl never tries to mean the content of something but, that part of experience which is a temporal or timeless and ideal. His intention was to go beyond to establish logic of truth where truth can be addressed as truth as such but not simply by its meaning content. As a result he emphasized the concept of 'pure logic' which deals with the formal ontology, the objectiveness of object. Logic in its highest form, for Husserl, is the a priori study of all possible forms of theory, and includes a pure science of propositions, understood as the meaning of senses or judgments or linguistic statements or sentences. Thus, Husserl tried to interpret everything scientifically and gives the example of Mathematics. Thus, Husserl along with Mathematics also talks about various other state-of-affairs like cultural entity and says that there is only *one* Hamlet though we can find out various replicas of the same.

The most important point should be mentioned here is that though Husserl in his *Logical Investigations* especially in the *Third Investigation* talks about an a priori science of the forms of objects later described as *formal ontology* but at the same time he also gives emphasis on the other side of the knowledge. Husserl emphasizes that aspect as the subjective aspect of knowing. Thus, Husserl introduced the concept of subjectivity in Logic which he regarded as the “transcendental logic” in the later phase of his development. For Husserl

logic remains a science in *naiveté* if it does not tackle this subjective dimension, which above all, as he came to realize, is the problem of exploring the modes of experiencing (or evidencing, understood as the direct givenness

of the object) in which objectivities are revealed (As cited in Moran, 2005, p. 106) Husserl named this dimension of givenness of objectivity to subjectivity as *phenomenolog* (ibid).

According to Husserl, the task of a philosopher is not to obstruct in the work of a proper technician. A proper inventive technician who is “the constructor, as it were, who, looking merely to formal interconnections, builds up his theory like a technical work of art” (As cited in Mohanty, 1982, p. 5). But, a philosopher should not behave like a technician; a philosopher always should try to investigate the “insight in regard to the sense and essence of his achievements as regards method and manner”(ibid).

Husserl analogously like Frege was developing a correlation among the form of expression; meaning and object existed outside of this world. The main intention of Husserl’s early phenomenology was to explore the *meaning* of an intentional act. Phenomenology always seeks to explore the meaning aspect of both the act of thinking and also the object of knowledge. Meaning always refers to an object, whether that is an object of a natural world or individual state of affair (Zahavi, 2003).

Today, we think of logic as a calculus of written symbols, as we speak of propositional calculus and the predicate calculus. Husserl’s conception of pure logic includes much more than the manipulation of symbols in forms of inference. In the Investigations that follow the Prolegomena, Husserl stresses the formal structure of acts of thought and speech, ideal meanings, and even states of affairs in nature — moving beyond what we today call logic, metalogic and philosophy of logic into philosophy of language in relation to mind and wider structures of the world. Nonetheless, Husserl gives full credence to the written symbol in this theory of science, or logic (Smith, 2003/2, p. 144).

In this regard Findlay writes;

Husserl seeks to move beyond what Kant intended as “pure” or “formal” logic to the ideal of the “science of science, which...would be most pregnantly called theory of science [*Wissenschafts-lehre*]”. The essence of science, Husserl says, involves the “systematic unity” of “theories”, and the resulting theory of theories is “a *Wissenschaftslehre*, a logic” (As cited in *ibid*).

Husserl maintains that in order to have the knowledge of the ideal logical attitude or the knowledge of the physical objects we have to move back toward subjectivity, because it is the subject which possesses the ability of knowing the object and the other principles. Therefore, though our attention is to analyze the objective part but we are bound to put our concentration on the acts of consciousness. As this is the only way to obtain the knowledge of the relation between the ideal object and the conscious act of knowing. Thus, Husserl again set back himself to consciousness, though this time his move cannot be regarded as psychological, because, in his attempt he is not trying to reduce the object to the act of consciousness. His attempt is only to have the knowledge of the object in relation to the a priori act of consciousness (Zahavi, 2003). Therefore, in his *Investigations* he abandoned the *descriptive psychology* and adopted the concept of Phenomenology. Consciousness provides an epistemological criterion and there is a co-relation between the intentional object and the intentional act and by examining the manner in which objects fulfill or disappoint particular expectations. Husserl tried to explain how objective judgments are possible without lapsing into psychologism. To be sure, this psychology that described experiences as they seemed or felt to the experiencing person without the transcendent must first be de-psychologised before it is bracketed, and this Husserl intends to do with the help of phenomenological methodology i.e. the noema-noesis co-relation and the final culmination of the Logical Person.

Interestingly enough, this leads to the possibility of phenomenological approach to subjectivity and personhood, subjective pole of consciousness and the person, to that extent, none but a phenomena that needs to be bracketed at a later stage. This shows how far Husserl differs from the Cartesian dimension of subjectivity and mentality that resides within the immanent realm of consciousness. As Debabrata Sinha writes, “phenomenology, in its descriptive phase, as already noted, reveals no evidence for the necessary dependence of

phenomena upon the empirical subject has to be taken into consideration in this context” (Sinha, 1969, p. 57).

This thus keeps room for ideality in experience and since the ideal realm of meaning can be investigated only in the realm of consciousness, only in relation to a conscious subject for whom something appears as meaningful, Husserlian quest for logical person now makes shift from ideal objects toward subjective pole of experience and to the acts of consciousness and to the intentional subject of consciousness with objects as its noematic co-relates. The object as meant and intended and is always an object in relation to someone and the one essentially leads to the other. This is how Husserlian quest for epistemic subject differs from Cartesian isolated cogito since unlike in Descartes here the ego or the subject pole is also to be bracketed at a later phase which will keep room for a new way of exploring subjectivity, inter-subjectivity and life-world.

## **2.9. A Brief Summary of the Chapter:**

For Husserl, the man of reason is not just a formal calculator or a machine subject which is just a rule follower formal device. Rather, a rational agent is a human subject for whom something is objectively valid or invalid and for whom certain truths appear as self-evident as these are also elucidated in the intuitive and experiential dimension of meaning. For Husserl, things experienced and meant are one and the same. This fringe of realism at the heart of idealism differentiates Husserlian subject not only from a Cartesian *cogito*, it makes him a critic of the so called idealist position that disrobes autonomy of objects that are ‘things in themselves’ independent of the one who is aware of these in an intentional act exploring experienced dimension of meaning in an essential subject-object co-relationship.

Thus, we have seen how Husserlian probe into the logical person in his early philosophy has kept room for both the experienced and the logical dimension of meaning in order to keep room for the necessary co-relation between the subject pole and the object pole of experience. The basic principle of Husserl’s idealism is such that every existing thing demands the co-existence of an experiencing subject. As such, they are clearly different than the merely ideal possibilities of Logic or Mathematics. Phenomenology thus safeguards a world to live by meaning bestower subjects as this realm of meaning is directly and

intuitively experienced in a true encounter of the knower and the known that also keeps room for strangeness and mystery at the heart of familiarity. This turn to meaning bestower aspect of Transcendental Subjectivity will be explored further in the subsequent chapter in particular.



## Chapter-III

### Transcendental Turn to the Ego and Subjectivity: Phenomenological Reduction to the Intentionality of Consciousness and its Noematic Co-Relates:

#### 3.1 Introduction:

After the publication of the first volume of *Logical Investigations*, Husserl thought *that* ‘pure logic’ could be capable of addressing various important questions of philosophy and would give a new direction to philosophical studies (Kockelmans, 1994). But, finally he was not satisfied with the results and involved himself in a continuous process of discovering right path in order to explicate his new ideas. By the end of 1906, Husserl finally realized that he found the right approach of doing Philosophy which would be capable of giving Philosophy a proper foundation by following a new process, which he regarded as the Transcendental Phenomenological<sup>2</sup> approach. Thus, *transcendental phenomenology* helped Husserl to go beyond his earlier notions developed in his *Logical Investigations*. After *Logical Investigations* Husserl made the conviction that the structures of consciousness can be studied only when there exists a co-relation between the act of consciousness and the object intended.

...After LU, Husserl emphasizes more and more that consciousness must be approached in its ‘purity’, in pure ‘immanence’, as a self-enclosed domain with everything contingent and all assumptions drawn from the actual, ‘transcendent’ world removed: ‘consciousness considered in its “-purity” must be held to be a self-contained complex of being (Seinszusammenhang), a complex of absolute being into which nothing can penetrate and out of which nothing can slip’ (As cited in Moran, 2005, p. 132).

This move back toward consciousness led Husserl to transcendental phenomenology. Although this turn toward transcendental philosophy was not a psychological or Cartesian

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<sup>2</sup> In 1906, after five years of the publication of the first volume of *Logical Investigations* the Board of Education of the University of Göttingen decided to promote his position to full professor, but at the same time the university itself rejected this proposal. As a result Husserl got worried about his philosophical career and developed the Transcendental Phenomenology.

kind of ego-centric move, critics could not be able to grasp Husserl's main intention and thereby criticized him. Thus, Husserlian turn to the subjectivity which differs from other egocentric explanation of subjectivity needs further clarifications of the Phenomenological Reductions and the Methods of Bracketing so that one could be able to grasp the exploration of noema-noesis co-relation of Transcendental Subjectivity and its positioning in the Life-world.

Thus, gradually there could be seen a development and the application of phenomenological methodology in his phenomenology. Although Husserl began the process of phenomenological exploration even prior to the publication of his *Logical Investigations* and the *Philosophy of Arithmetic*, his writings on phenomenology got its final shape only in his major work *Ideen I (Ideas I)* published in 1913. Initially Husserl was unaware of the wideness of the field of Phenomenology till the time of the *Logical Investigations* and understood Phenomenology only in relation to the problems of Logic and Epistemology. But, gradually Husserl started to comprehend the enormity of the field which in general covers all the conscious experiences and which can be regarded as the science of all possibilities (Moran, 2000, p. 109).

...He realised that phenomenology could contribute not just to the region of conscious experiences, but to all material regions of being, every field of 'material essences' from geometry to morality. Phenomenology would illuminate the necessary laws governing such essences as are possessed by colour, sound, extension, time, as well as the more formal essences of identity, unity, plurality, difference, whole and part, individual and species, and so on (As cited in Moran, 2000, p. 124).

Thus, there has been a continuous shift in the philosophical development of Husserl that is also reflected in the gradual process of introducing a series of methodologies known as Phenomenological Methodology. The chapter begins with a fresh look at the nuanced way in which Edmund Husserl re-visits his quest for phenomenological exploration primarily focusing on its deeper dimension of meaning as per its turn toward the *transcendental subjectivity* and *selfhood*. This chapter thus addresses the question: "What is Phenomenology?" and "why there is a transcendental turn in Phenomenology?" Husserl

believes that the first step toward any attempt at understanding the theoretical problem which one confronts must have its grounding in the phenomena themselves. Phenomenology thus evolves as a method of approaching phenomena in their pure state. Phenomena, for Husserl, is anything, imagined or objectively existing, ideal or real, that presents itself in any way to individual consciousness. Husserl's aim is to develop a method that will not falsify these phenomena, but will allow them to reveal. Before exploring the methods of phenomenology, it is necessary to find out what phenomenology is, according to Edmund Husserl.

### **3.2. Phenomenology: A Brief Description:**

Phenomenology is basically a study of human experiences. It studies how things appear through and in human experiences. While on the one hand it tries to restore the Platonic sense of philosophizing on the other it embarks upon the issues of modern thought (Sokolowski, 2000). In other words it goes beyond from the issues of ancient and modern times by concentrating upon reactivating the philosophical life in the present circumstances (ibid). The term 'phenomenology' was first introduced by Johann Heinrich Lambert (1728 - 1777) in the 18th Century. Afterwards, it was used by Immanuel Kant, Johann Gottlieb Fichte, and especially G. W. F. Hegel in his "Phenomenology of Spirit" of 1807.<sup>3</sup> Although Hegel employed the term in his "Phenomenology of Spirit" previously, it could not impel phenomenology into a separate philosophical school. It was Edmund Husserl who adopted the term phenomenology and developed phenomenology as a style or method of doing philosophy. Phenomenology, as Husserl's discipline, investigates the phenomena experienced consciously from first-person perspective. As a method of study phenomenology goes against the rationalist bias and emphasises upon the contemplative deliberation that discloses the individual's "lived experience" (Husserl, 1970). Therefore, phenomenology is intended certain methods that strive to reduce an object of perception to its essence, a process that attempts to generate pure data of consciousness with its focus on how objectivity is constituted as a meaningful activity in its interaction with the realm that is experienced as meaningful.

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<sup>3</sup> [http://www.philosophybasics.com/branch\\_phenomenology.html](http://www.philosophybasics.com/branch_phenomenology.html), accessed on 18/05/2016

As per Maurice Natanson,

The radicality of the phenomenological method is both continuous and discontinuous with philosophy's general effort to subject experience to fundamental, critical scrutiny: to take nothing for granted and to show the warranty for what we claim to know (Natanson, 1973, p. 63).

Husserl in his phenomenology made an attempt to describe the phenomena without any presupposition and in order to follow that he avoided all sorts of causal explanations and theories (Spiegelberg, 1965) According to Safranski (1998)

....['Husserl and his followers'] great ambition was to disregard anything that had until then been thought or said about consciousness or the world [while] on the lookout for a new way of letting the things [they investigated] approach them, without covering them up with what they already knew (p. 72).

The main focus of Husserlian phenomenology does not concentrate on causal explanations but on clarifications, the clarification of examining the givenness of the phenomena in the first-person experience (Spiegelberg, 1965). As Luft (2011), rightly points out,

....Phenomenology is certainly a "rigorous science of the subjective" in analyzing the different attitudes the subject takes toward the world. Phenomenology's main insight is that the world is in a certain way given, and phenomenology's task is to analyze and categorize these modes of givenness (p. 136).

Phenomenology studies consciousness from the first-person perspective and this is a shift from the preoccupied third-person perspective of natural sciences which is causal in nature. It is a reaction of the predominant third-person perspective of natural sciences. While natural sciences look for perfection and establish everything on the basis of some already existing factual truths from a third-person perspective phenomenology on the other hand seeks for eidetic values from a first-person perspective (Luft, 2011). Phenomenology as an eidetic science deals with *consciousness as such*, but not with any particular type of consciousness.

The results of phenomenology are always *eidetic*, but not law based as they are true at all the time and for all the subjects (ibid). For example, a neurologist could give all the possible mechanical reporting of the pain of another person from a third-person perspective which is different from undergoing the experience of having the same pain by himself/herself. So, it could be said that neurology also cannot explain the mystery of first-person perspective like “what it is to be in pain”. In this regard it could be mentioned that Husserl always insists phenomenology to be a *rigorous science* and therefore, he seeks to explore everything from a first-person perspective which he regarded as accurate and certain.

Thus, there could be seen a notable change in the course of phenomenological development led by Husserl. Husserl in the early phase in his *Prolegomena* mainly tries to refute psychologism and seeks to elevate Logic to the realm of an ideal science by emphasizing its meaning dimension. In its pre-transcendental phase there was a systematic analysis of the concept of subjectivity in terms of its noematic interaction with the meaningful realm of Logic and reasoning. At the same time the second volume of the *Logical Investigations* can be regarded as the systematic analysis of acts of meaning in its effort at understanding the true nature of the phenomena that can only be exhibited “the relationship between the subjectivity of knowing and the objectivity of the content known” (Moran, 2000, p. 109). Husserl believes that the first step toward any attempt to understand the theoretical problems which one confronts must have its grounding in the phenomena themselves. Phenomenology thus evolves as a method of approaching phenomena in their pure state. Phenomena, for Husserl, is anything, imagined or objectively existing, ideal or real, that presents itself in any way to individual consciousness. Husserl’s aim is to develop a method that will not falsify these phenomena, but will allow them to reveal. This led us toward the methods for phenomenology developed by Edmund Husserl.

### **3.3. Husserlian Methods for Phenomenology:**

Husserl’s continuous search for the proper phenomenological methods begins with his effort at refuting psychologism in order to identify the epistemic nature of meaning and truth. Husserl introduces the methods for phenomenology in his *Logical Investigations* which was only a starting point but not the final systematic way of doing phenomenology. Husserl aimed at identifying a method for philosophizing which would be able to ground

those laws and entities which are non-empirical in nature. One can say that his methods for phenomenology have attained their final shape and fulfillment in his *Ideas I* that aims at practicing consciousness in its purity. As Dr. Sreekumar Nellickappilly **writes** it is the realm of pure consciousness that throws light on the ideal and non-factual essences that phenomenology seeks to explore within this consciousness only. So, to reach that level of purity in meaning, Husserl advances the methods for phenomenology.<sup>4</sup> Thus, Husserlian phenomenological methods will finally uncover the true nature of consciousness.

Husserlian methods for phenomenology will finally lead toward the significant assessment of the transcendental turn in phenomenology as per the appropriate phenomenological method suitable for it. Husserl's scheme for the phenomenological methodology is in fact a combination of two distinctive methodological approaches named as the Transcendental or Phenomenological Reduction and Eidetic Reduction which together serve the purpose of identifying the essence of the phenomena within the realm of Transcendental Subjectivity. Transcendental subjectivity in Husserl is thus identified with the meaning giving realm of consciousness that goes beyond the usual understanding of subjectivity and selfhood that one came across in Cartesian *cogito* or in the transcendental philosophy of Immanuel Kant. Like the 'cogito-ergo-sum' in Descartes the phenomenological residue of reduction in Husserl leads to the region of absolute, apodictic certainty of pure consciousness. The background for Husserl's investigation into a set of distinctive methodology needs a little clarification that can be easily understood if we compare it with Cartesian aim at 'cogito' centric certainty in Philosophy. Unlike in Descartes for Husserl the question is not "what things are", "are they real or illusory?" In Husserl epoché leads one into reflective mood of talking about experience and knowledge, not of things. This can be clarified through an elaboration of Husserlian methods for phenomenology. In order to understand the transcendental turn in Husserlian phenomenology that remains transcendental with a difference, it is necessary to begin with the methods laid down by Edmund Husserl in a systematic manner.

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<sup>4</sup> (Nellickappilly, n.d.). *Edmund Husserl's Phenomenology: The Principle of Intentionality and the Methods of Reduction*. Retrieved from <http://nptel.ac.in/courses/109106051/Module%205/Chapter%2032.pdf>

### 3.3.1. The Transcendental or Phenomenological Reduction:

Husserl discusses about this reduction in five lectures published later under the title of “Die Idee der Phänomenologie” (Husserl, 1980a, p. 2). As an introduction to Husserl's "Dingkolleg," these lectures were delivered between April 26 and May 2 of 1907 later published as “Ding und Raum: Vorlesungen” (Husserl, 1980a, p. 2) in 1907. The main intention of this reduction is to purify the ego and to remove all sorts of assertions and presuppositions regarding the phenomena of the natural world (Mickey, 2008). Husserl in this *reduction* mainly tries to bracket the *natural attitude*. Husserl in his development of the phenomenological methods started his discussions with the concept of the *naturalistic attitude* which he said must be removed first in order to grasp the true nature of consciousness (Moran, 2005). The *transcendental or phenomenological reduction* can be defined as that point which removes the sense of ‘I’ from one’s belief.

...As long as an ‘I’ functions in inquiry, the lived experiences whose synthesis is an identity affect the inquiry, mostly in the form of idealizations and typifications. The active presence of an ‘I’ means that consciousness is still has common-sense elements. Though reduced, it remains significantly mundane (Rogers, 1983, p. 73).

Thus, subsequently by putting the natural attitude out of play the first ‘reduction’ of phenomenological methods is effected and this is called the *transcendental or phenomenological reduction*. In this regard Husserl writes,

...Thus the being of the pure ego and his cogitations, as a being that is prior in itself, is antecedent to the natural being of the world the world of which I always speak, the one of which I can speak. Natural being is a realm whose existential status [Seinsgeltung] is secondary; it continually presupposes the realm of transcendental being. The fundamental phenomenological method of transcendental epoché, because it leads back to this realm, is called transcendental-phenomenological reduction (Husserl, 1982, p. 21).

The important point here is that in transcendental reduction like a sophist neither *the world is negated* nor the existence of the world *is doubted* like a skeptic. Husserl writes: “By phenomenological epoché I reduce my natural human Ego and psychic life -- the realms of my psychological self-experience – to my transcendental phenomenological Ego, the realm of transcendental phenomenological self-experience” (ibid, p.26). So, to understand this *reduction* which is the first method of his phenomenology it is necessary to understand the concept of *natural attitude* first.

### 3.3.1.1. The Natural and the Phenomenological Attitude:

According to Husserl, the true nature of phenomena can only be grasped while the *natural attitude* could be removed or bracketed. In *natural attitude* the world is taken for granted and each and every occurrences of this world is understood as existing and causally connected to each other not only in the day-to-day life but also in the process of scientific theorization (Smith, & McIntyre, 1982). Husserl writes in his *Cartesian Meditations*:

...the non-intuitive processes of meaning objects, the judgments, valuing, and deciding, the processes of setting ends and willing means, and all the rest, in particular the position-takings necessarily involved in them all when I am in the natural and non-reflective attitude since precisely these position-takings always presuppose the world, i.e., involve believing in its existence (As cited in Smith, & McIntyre, 1982, p. 20).

In *natural attitude* the reality is taken only from one aspect i.e. how they exist and as humans we think them as real. This is also the approach of the empirical sciences (Brauner, 2005). Giorgi, (2007) writes, “It is taken to be something present to one’s consciousness—a phenomenon, not a reality. It is a reduction from existence to presence” (p. 64). According to Husserl, this presupposition can be regarded as the ‘general thesis’ of the *natural attitude*. As Husserl himself puts, in *natural attitude* the assertion takes place “*from the natural standpoint*” (Husserl, 1969, p. 101-110) where the human self is “set in relation to a world,...a *world of values, a world of goods, a practical world* (Husserl, 1969, p. 103).

Again, Moran (2005) writes;

...Husserl felt that the nature of consciousness could only be grasped properly if persistent naturalistic distortions could be removed... Thus he wanted to 'put out of action', or 'put out of play' the 'natural attitude' (die natürliche Einstellung), bracket it, with the aim of purifying consciousness of all intrusion from 'objective actualities' - including 'the actuality of all material nature' and of psychic experiences (p. 26).

Thus, there could be seen the development of Husserlian phenomenology toward the concepts of *Bracketing* or *Epoché* and *reduction* which need little clarification in this regard.

### 3.3.1.2. Bracketing or Epoché:

Husserl developed the methods for his phenomenology four years after the discovery of *epoché* and *reduction*. *Epoché* or in German, *Einklammerung* is that which removes all kinds of presuppositions and *reduction* is that which uncovers the ego and transforms the world into mere phenomena. It is *reduction* because; it leads us back toward the experience of the things themselves. According to Zahavi,

...The epoché is the term for our abrupt suspension of a naïve metaphysical attitude, and it can consequently be likened to a philosophical gate of entry (Cited in Zahavi, 2003 p. 46) in contrast, the reduction is the term for our thematization of the correlation between subjectivity and world (ibid).

The intention of both is to lead toward the transcendental level and to remove the naturalistic distortions. In this regard it could be mentioned that the concept of *bracketing* reflects more the mathematical training that Husserl has undergone in his psychological associations. Therefore, it can be regarded as an outcome of Husserl's mathematical training. He believes that in order to reach to the level of *pure ego* the natural and usual presuppositions must be suspended. Therefore, Husserl tries to bracket the *natural attitude* in order to turn the attention from empirical objects of the natural world to the phenomena as it is.

According to Smith & McIntyre (1982),

...Husserl believes, it is self-evident to the experiencing subject that he undergoes experiences, experiences that at least purport to be of or about external objects, and that he himself exists as the subject, or ego, having these experiences. Setting aside his ordinary concern with the natural world, the subject can explicitly direct his attention to these experiences, and to himself as their subject, in what Husserl calls acts of “reflection” (p. 95).

Husserl says,

...The epoché can also be said to be the radical and universal method by which I apprehend myself purely: as Ego, and with my own pure conscious life, in and by which the entire Objective world exists for me and is precisely as it is for me. Anything belonging to the world, any spatiotemporal being, exists for me that is to say, is accepted by me in that I experience it, perceive it, remember it, think of it somehow, judge about it, value it, desire it, or the like (Husserl, 1982, p. 21).

Thus a shift is made from one's *natural attitude* to *phenomenological attitude* which is different from both the Sceptical and Cartesian attitude that doubts the real existence of things. Husserl is not concerned about the fact whether things, matters, facts etc. exist or not but the sole concern is upon the left over part received after the parenthesis. The point to be noted here is that though Husserl's *reduction* suspends *natural attitude* this bracketing activity cannot be compared with Descartes' *method of doubt*. While Descartes' *method of doubt* gives emphasis upon the absolute *ego* by suspending the world at the same time epoché or reduction provides a very different picture (Husserl, 1982). Unlike Descartes, Husserl's epoché never tries to negate or nullify the existing world; rather it tries to concentrate on the unbracketed part by putting the presuppositions out of play for a short while (ibid). Thus, it can be stated that Husserlian epoché or reduction can never be compared with Cartesian *method of doubt* at any ground. Moreover, Husserl regarded this bracketing as a kind of

freedom where one can act freely without any prior involvement though later he regarded this aspect of freedom as problematic (Luft, 2004)

Husserl says;

...this “phenomenological epoché” and “parenthesizing” of the Objective world therefore does not leave us confronting nothing. On the contrary we gain possession of something by it; and what we (or, to speak more precisely, what I, the one who is meditating) acquire by it is my pure living, with all the pure subjective processes making this up, and everything meant in them, purely as meant in them: the universe of “phenomena” in the (particular and also the wider) phenomenological sense (Husserl, 1982, p. 20-21).

Now, after the performance of the first reduction we are left out with the ego with the pure experiences as the constituting factor of all experiences. But, Husserl did not stop here and unlike in Kant we find in him a further continuation of his search for a transcendental realm of meaning that will not completely dichotomise the realms of phenomena and noumena as unbridgeable and separate. Husserl now believes that both the universal essence of facts and the *facticity* of life can somehow co-inside together, that, “ this region of the Transcendental Ego is as a result of the phenomenological epoché not yet the region of universal essences, it is still a region of individual being, that is of individual experiences” (Brauner, 2005, p. 8). Husserl in his *Cartesian Meditations* regarded the “Transcendental ego” as the concrete ego attained after the performance of the *Transcendental Reduction* (O’dwyer, 1983). But, Husserl very quickly realized that the intention will not be fulfilled if the present reduction would not be complemented with Eidetic Reduction. Husserl was continuously looking for an improvement in his methodologies and therefore, he soon realized the fact that only Phenomenological Reduction cannot lead us toward the knowledge of pure consciousness. According to Husserl, the ego as the source of pure transcendental universality could only be grasped after the performance of Eidetic Reduction. Husserl thus developed another method for phenomenology which he regarded as Eidetic Reduction.

### 3.3.2. Eidetic Reduction:

In eidetic reduction the individual object of question is bracketed in order to reach the essences. According to Husserl, an essence is that which is shared by many objects. Husserl was not at all concerned with the individual essence of each and every object (Føllesdal, 2006). So, according to Husserl, “When we turn from observing a concrete physical object to studying one of these general features, we perform what he called the eidetic reduction” (Nellickappilly, n.b. p. 106). Here the focus is not on the empirical object but on the essences which the object possesses. The science of essence does not deal with the actual existence but it is concerned only with mere possibilities. While eidetic science do not have any factual science about them, in contrary, factual science depends on eidetic science. In eidetic reduction it is not possible to conceive any particular as such but can be arrived at a general idea. The similar kind of notion can be found in Plato’s theory of *Ideas* or *Forms* following which many writers have looked up Husserl as the *Modern Plato* (Hopkins, 2010). Hopkins in his writing tries to explain Husserl’s position as the modern Plato by saying that while Husserl talks about *eidōs* or essences Plato talks about the Ideas or Forms. So, like Hopkins many others tried to compare this aspect of Husserl with the world of *Ideas* or *Forms* of Plato, which is universal. But, in Husserlian phenomenology the essences, unlike Platonic *Ideas*, are worldly yet transcendental. But, Plato goes far beyond from this world and placed his *Ideas* in some other world.

On the other hand Husserl’s move can be regarded as a move from the particular to universal where universal can be seen in the individual. But this *seeing* is different from normal seeing as Husserl regarded it as *intuitive seeing* (Kyung, 2007). In this regard one most important concept has to be mentioned here is that in order to grasp the essences more clearly one can focus on the concept of ‘imaginative free variation’, which helps to open up certain new aspects of experience in a very clear way. Descartes also discusses about ‘imaginative free variation’ in his *Meditation Two* while he gives his famous example of ‘wax’. As according to Descartes, the wax may not be the same after it got heated but still the essence of the wax will remain the same. As per Descartes the wax is judged as wax grasped by the mind but not by the senses. Husserl also talks about this essence but in a far distinct way. Here the imaginative variation can be connected with the notion of reduction. Thus, Moran points out “Imaginative free variation plays a helpful role in allowing

the *eidōs* or essence of the phenomenon to manifest itself as the structure of its essential possibilities” (Moran, 2000, p. 155). Thus, it can be stated that the eidetic reduction can be achieved by eidetic variation (Drummond, 2007). Finally, after the performance of Phenomenological reduction with the help of eidetic reduction the intentional co-relation of the consciousness and the world can be understood (ibid). This intentional co-relation which Husserl identified as *noema-noesis co-relation* defines what phenomenology is. In Husserlian phenomenology there could be found various stages of developments of this co-relation between *noema* and *noesis*. In order to get a clearer picture before exploring the transcendental subjectivity, now it is necessary to investigate this co-relation first.

#### **3.4. The Noema-Noesis Correlation:**

Husserl first came to introduce this unique co-relation between the *noesis* and the *noema* in his *Logical Investigations* in which he identifies the *noesis* with the real content and *noema* with the ideal content of an act (Smith, 1984). In the first edition of his *Logical Investigations* the *real* content was accepted as the subjective part of an act, which is guided by a descriptive analysis from the empirical or natural point of view. But in his *Ideas I* and also in the second volume of his *Logical Investigations* he talks about the *noesis* or the *real* content only with reference to the *pure phenomenological* or the *transcendental attitude* and rejects consciousness to be an occurrence of the empirical world (Smith, 1984). With the publication of *Ideas I* the concept of intentionality has got a complex character. The role of the *noesis* as Husserl ascribed to it is to *give the sense* or *sinn* to an act of consciousness. He regarded the act of consciousness (e.g. the act of perceiving) as the *noesis* and the intentional object (e.g. the perceived) as the *noema* (Russell, 2006). Therefore a co-relation can be found between the structure of an act which also can be said as the *noetic* analysis and the structure of an object which can be regarded as the *noematic* analysis (ibid). Both the *noema* and *noesis* are essentially correlated and the same object can be given in consciousness in various experiences. While on the one hand the object and sense may be the same but can be given in a variety of acts similarly, the object might be given in the same kind of act with various senses (ibid). According to Husserl, the object can be distinguished from the act and also from its *noematic* sense. Thus the object is called the *noematic core* and the *meaning characteristic* of the same is called the *full noema* (ibid). Therefore, now it is possible to distinguish between the object i.e. the *noematic core* and how it appears in an act i.e. the *full*

*noema* e.g. in the act of perceiving. This is the distinction Frege was talking about as in his philosophy where the *full noema* is referred as *sense* and the *noematic core* is referred as the *reference* (ibid). But, after the performance of *epoché* the concept of sense and reference is changed and Husserl has removed the concept of literal reference but only talked about “the act of referring and the *intended* reference of the act” (Moran, 2000 p. 156). Husserl tried to accommodate both Fregean sense and reference within *noema*. Thus, Moran writes; “Husserl is not simply restating the Fregean conception in his own terms, but essentially re-thinking the relation between the act of giving meaning and the meaning and object intended” (ibid).

Husserl continues this structure of *noema* and *noesis* in his *Ideas* although he has now widened the concept from the earlier one. By *noesis* now Husserl talks about that content of the act which is regarded as meaning giving or meaning constituting. Husserl identifies this part of *noesis* as that part which provides the directedness to the act toward a specific object. On the other hand, the *noema* can be referred as the meaning in its purity. Thus, Husserl in his *Ideas* mainly talks about the *noema* which he referred as *meaning* to which an act refers in order to have the intentional character (Husserl, 1982). Some scholars try to compare Husserl’s notion of *noema* as the generalization of Frege’s notion of *sense*. Follesdal interprets the concept of *noema* as the mediating factor between the act and the object which always exists in all conscious acts. Thus, Follesdal tries to compare Husserl’s notion of *noema* with Frege’s notion of *sense*. But according to Husserl, “the *noema* is the *object as it is intended* in the act; it is the object, not a *Sinn* or 'sense', although it can be turned into a sense or can support a sense.... (As cited in Moran, 2005, p. 137). Each *noema* has its “content”, that is to say, its “sense”, and is related through it to its object’.” (As cited in ibid). While Frege transformed the object totally to sense, which is limited to one particular notion only, Husserl’s intention was not to transform the object only to mere sense. In his *Ideas* Husserl gives a holistic approach to the *noema* which is not only an actuality but, after the performance of the bracketing, it remains as one of its possibilities as such. So, we can see here how Frege through his notion of sense centric meaning, proceeds toward a geometrical world of abstraction, whereas Husserl aims at re-storing the pre-scientific sphere of the life-world as a meaningful domain. Thus, there could be found certain methodological developments in Husserlian phenomenology after the performance of the methods of phenomenology.

Thus, the co-relation between the noema-noesis has been changed which will keep room for a wider horizon in terms of a wider vision known as *categorial intuition*. But, as Husserl puts, the *noema* cannot be grasped in the normal seeing but can only be grasped by a special kind of act of reflection that Husserl calls transcendental reflection. The noema as according to Husserl is not the object towards which the act is directed but is the route through which the object can be grasped; it connects the occurring thought to the object which is intended (Moran, 2000). This is the point which can be regarded as the *transcendental subjectivity* or a universal horizon of consciousness, where ego alongwith its intentions is bracketed. Thus, there could be found the development of Husserlian notion of “transcendental subjectivity” which needs further clarification.

### **3.5. Husserl on Transcendental Subjectivity:**

Before exploring Husserlian concept of transcendental subjectivity it is necessary to discuss the most frequently asked question that what is the difference between transcendental ego and transcendental subjectivity or are they the same? From the analysis given by Husserl it could be stated that transcendental ego constitutes itself as transcendental consciousness or concrete monad reflectively after the performance of transcendental or phenomenological reduction (Husserl, 1982). This ‘ego’ could be known only as absolute apodictic evidence but not as pure transcendental universality. In this regard O’dwyer (1983) maintains that “transcendental ego is the concrete ego which we attain after the transcendental reduction, while the transcendental subjectivity is the eidos ego, that is, the universal pure possibility of any possible de facto ego” (p. 112).

By the end of 1906 Husserl finally realized that he got the right approach of doing philosophy which could be capable of giving philosophy a proper foundation by following a new process. Husserl has regarded this new approach as the Transcendental Phenomenological approach. Transcendental subjectivity according to Husserl is the absolute universal consciousness, which is not only a sphere of consciousness but a ground of understanding human subjects unlike the scientific description of man as psycho-physical entity (O’dwyer, 1983). It is “the universal ontological source of all possible beings” (ibid, 112). This newness or the turn toward transcendental philosophy is also evident in the way Husserl now focused on the meaning constituting activity of the transcendental subject. In

this regard this is important to note that in the transcendental realm the meaning may not be constituted by a particular conscious agent as phenomenology, in reality, does not believe in a particular human way of experiencing, rather it regards human experience as one of the possible manners in which one could experience the world. The reductions will put all the related links of mundane human life in brackets. Thus, by applying the methods for phenomenology one could enter into a domain of meaning which is not *constituted by* a psychic agent of this world but *by* consciousness as such which as human being *one* can access. The same will be the case with the objective world as well; now, the world will also become the *world as phenomenon*. As according to Husserl, the valid transcendental philosophy always enquires about the *phenomenon of the world*. This is not only the source of absolute apodictic evidence or the “transcendental ego” but also the source of all universal possibilities. By exploring about transcendental subjectivity O’Dwyer (1983) writes, “The character of the ego as pure transcendental universality will only be grasped through an eidetic reduction, in which I descend from what Husserl calls my de facto transcendental ego, with its accomplished typology, to eidos-ego” (p. 112). Thus, the transcendental subjectivity which is the realm of universal consciousness involves a particular kind of intuition in order to grasp true nature of the essences. Husserl thus develops the notion of Categorical Intuition by widening the scope of intuition, which is non-sensuous and is given immediately. Therefore, it is necessary to analyse the notion of Categorical Intuition in detail in order to understand the Husserlian quest for transcendental subjectivity which leads Husserl’s phenomenology to a different position, the position where Kant could not reach. However, many critics took it to be a turn toward Kantian idealism and subjectivity, Husserlian phenomenology will give us a different direction than the others which will be discussed gradually.

### **3.6. Categorical Intuition:**

Categorical intuition in Husserl’s phenomenology can be referred as a case of actual seeing, which is not empirical but conceptual and which does not imply the literal meaning of seeing but can be considered as a metaphorical seeing. Categorical intuition is the extensive nature of Husserl’s notion of intuition which implies seeing in a universal sense (Smith & Smith, 1994). To understand the concept of *categorical intuition* there can be referred an example of seeing a house. In moving around a house there could have a series of

simple acts of perception. When the house is seen the windows, doors, walls etc. could equally be seen although the main intention here is to see the house. To speak clearly even if we look at the door of the house, the key object of our perception is not the door but the house only. Although we see a house by seeing the various individual parts of it still it is the complete intentional sense of the house where all the individual parts of the house belong.

In the above example of seeing the house there could be found three different steps in perceiving the house. These three steps can also be regarded as the steps of the process of categorial intuition. At first we intend the whole house at one glance in an implicit way, in the second step we intend the parts of the house explicitly which were already there in the house in implicit manner. Here the intention is different but we are not targeting any new object but the house only. Husserl regarded this act as “subdividing act” (cited in Lohmar, 2005, p. 116). Thus, in the second step the parts of the house are intended in an explicit way while in the first case also we have apprehended the same parts but in an implicit way. If in the first step the house has been perceived in the second case the colour of the house and thus goes on. Thus, we can see though the perception of the whole and the parts are different but the sense content is the same. Here, Husserl finds a continuous “synthesis of coincidence” in the transition from the implicit intention of the whole to the explicit intentions of the parts. In this process of “synthesis of coincidence” we come to know that the object of intention is the same and the object i.e. the house has a colour in general and the colour is green. Now, in the third step of the process of categorial intuition a relation can be established between the object of the whole and one of its dependent parts. (Between the house and ‘the house is green’). Thus to refer Lohmar (2005) again “In this founded act the elements which are synthetically connected in a categorial relation take on a new character: they are synthetically formed by the categorial act” (p. 117).

In this regard Sokolowski (1982) writes that according to Husserl, when we say the word house it corresponds the house being there like the same way when we say the word green it means that there is something which corresponds the word green. Now, the question is when we say the “house is green” then is there anything which corresponds the word “is”? Sokolowski (1982) says one can answer this question by following John Locke, who admits that words like ‘is’, ‘and’ etc. express certain ideas which are in the mind but not in the things known by the mind. The mental activities of predicating and combining the ideas are expressed by the words like ‘is’, ‘and’ etc. According to Locke, whatever we

receive in our inward perception are named by such words on the other hand words like 'house', 'green' etc. represent the experience of outward perception (ibid). Interestingly enough Sokolowski here maintains that according to Husserl, if we accept the words like 'is', 'and' etc. as the representation of inward perception then that will be a category mistake. According to Husserl, they are neither the experience of inward perception nor introspection but something which represents the external experience. When somebody says "the house is green" it is an expression based on external affair and hence it is directed toward the house which is green.

Sokolowski (1982) writes,

We are thing-directed when we say, "The house is green," and we find the house *being* green. The "is" responds to something in the house, even though that something will not show up, like the color or shape, as one of the standard features of the house. The being of the house is not a predicate of the house, but it is also not a predicate of the psychological activity that goes on when we see and judge that the house is green (p. 127-128).

By summing up the point Husserl maintains that *being* is something which cannot be grasped in sense perception whether outward or inward. (Husserl, 1970)

Thus, after rejecting the above possibilities Husserl finally tries to give name to the expressions like "is", "and" etc. Husserl uses the term "categorical" in order to mean those expressions which entail simple names and more. Categorical expressions always use syntax in order to convey anything and therefore all linguistically articulated expressions; which use syntax can be regarded as categorical. Again by *intuition* Husserl means the actual present of the object in front of us instead of just thinking or talking about it in its absence. Thus, daydreaming of something is the example of empty intentional act in contrast to see that thing practically is intuitive in character and can be regarded as the fulfilled intentional act. Husserl thus provides an example of having an ice-cream in order to explain the concept of categorical intuition.

According to Husserl,

...if I long for an ice-cream cone and then actually eat ice-cream ... instead of just devouring the ice cream, I stop suddenly and say, "This scoop of ice-cream is vanilla." Instead of just wallowing, so to speak, in the visual, olfactory, and gustatory perception of this melting mass, I register something that I find in it. This is a categorial intuition (Sokolowski, 1982, p. 129).

Husserl writes, "Immediate "seeing," is not merely sensuous experiential seeing, but seeing in the universal sense as an originally presentive consciousness of any kind whatever, is the ultimate source of all rational assertions" (Smith & Smith, 1994, p. 88). Here Sokolowski (1982) writes, according to Husserl, "It might be objected that the vanilla was there in the ice-cream all along, but in fact it was not presented in focus until it was articulated. This is a difference in presencing, and it must be philosophically respected" (p. 130). Thus, it can be said that in every act there always exists certain non-sensible states of affairs which fulfils the act as a whole and which can be regarded as categorial intuition.

In this regard by following Lohmar (2005) it can be said that categorial intuition is something more than simple perception. While categorial intuition is founded in other acts; perception is not founded in any other acts. Thus, Husserl writes, "In categorial intuition we intend objects which cannot be intended in the simple founding acts, like "being red," "being a book" " (As cited in Lohmar, 2005, p. 116). Where traditional empiricism defines intuition in connection to sense perception, phenomenology defines it as "any fulfilling act whatever," i.e., any act in which "something appears as 'actual,' as 'self-given'" (Husserl, 1970, p. 785). Husserl here talks about *Evidenz*. But, evidence not like in a sense of inference. But, this is like self-presence of the thing itself, its "self-giveness" according to its own type.

Sokolowski, says that when we say "the flower is red" we find that the flower being red. The 'is' response or shows something in the flower but we cannot perceive sensually that "isness" of the flower as like we could perceive the colour or shape of the flower. The being of that flower cannot be regarded either as a predicate of the flower or as a

psychological activity. This concept of being advanced by Husserl influenced Heidegger a lot to formulate his own philosophy in a great detail. Husserl moreover maintains that categorial intuition is like a genus under which various intentional acts resides (Sokolowski, 1982).

The concept of categorial intuition can be well understood by an another concept of Husserl, which he regarded as the *hyletic data* or the *sensations*. It means to feel or to undergo by a particular experience. But Husserlian view regarding sensation is different from the traditional sense-data theory in a very particular way. Unlike the traditional sense-data theory Husserl regarded the *hyletic data* as *Erlebnisse* which means *lived experiences* (Shim, 2011). Thus, the hyletic data are regarded as sensory qualia or the “pre-empirical sensory datum” (Shim, 2011, p. 203) as they are the *Erlebnisse* of sensory experiences. Husserl regarded this *hyletic data* as *phenomenal qualia*. While in the sense-data theory the objects are perceived only indirectly after sense data in case of hylectic data or sensation it is different as hyletic data can never be perceived. They do not appear objectively but can only be lived through, e.g. the sensation of colour. (Shim, 2011)

Thus, categorial intuition can be regarded as the greatest discovery of Husserl’s phenomenology which other philosophers like Kant and Frege could not brought about in their philosophy and where Husserl was supported by his later philosophers like Martin Heidegger, Maurice Merleau Ponty and others. It is very necessary to mention here that Frege criticizes Kant for adapting the concept of sensible intuition in order to conceive the a priori knowledge of mathematics or physics. According to Frege, “truth could only be accessed by a faculty of receptive spontaneity” (Guillermo & Haddock, 2006, p. 398). Frege always argues for the analyticity of truth therefore, he rejected Kantian notion of sensible intuition and kept Husserlian concept of categorial intuition at the same place. Finally, it could be stated that categorial intuition plays a very crucial role in order to develop Husserlian transcendental phenomenology. But, at this juncture the most important point is that whether Husserlian transcendental phenomenology could be compared with other philosophical thoughts of the transcendental tradition. In order to establish Husserl’s position this needs to be addressed very clearly.

### 3.7. Transcendentalism: Some Clarifications:

Kockelmans writes “Husserl thought that he had already found the right approach to a transcendental philosophy under the influence of Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason*” (Kockelmans, 1994, P. 45). In this regard Kockelmans (1994) mentions about Husserl’s own realization at that period of time noted in his own diary dated 25<sup>th</sup> September, 1906 where Husserl writes,

...In the first place there is the general problem which is to be solved if I wish to call myself a philosopher, I mean a critique of reason, a critique of logical, practical, and valuing reason. If, in general lines at least, I cannot clear up the important questions about meaning, essence, method, and other fundamental viewpoints of a *Critique of Pure Reason*, and I should not be able to project, determine and provide a foundation for my ideas regarding these problem, it will be impossible for me to live truly as a philosopher (As cited in p. 44).

Thus, along with the Kantian transcendentalism Husserl was greatly influenced by the transcendental philosophy of Neo-Kantians. In this regard Luft (2010) points out, “Husserl acknowledged after his transcendental turn, it was his discussions with representatives of the transcendental tradition – i.e., the Neo-Kantians – that aided him in developing a full-fledged *transcendental phenomenology*” (p. 59). But, the necessary point should be made here is that though Husserl can be said as influenced by the transcendental philosophical thoughts of Kant and the Neo-Kantians but in many respects Husserl deviated himself from both the trends, which needs some clarifications here.

#### 3.7.1. Kant and Husserl on Transcendentalism:

Husserl mainly rejects Kant’s basic idea of transcendental idealism i.e. the distinction between the thing-in-itself and appearance. According to Kant, we can know things as they appear to us or as they are given to us but not how they really are. Hence, we can know only the appearance of things but not the thing as they are or the things-in-themselves. Husserl on the other hand regarded his phenomenology as transcendental because

he tried to ground all the experiences on subjectivity, which is meaning giving and meaning constituting. He regarded the distinction between thing-in-itself and appearance as mythical. According to Kant, intuition is the product of sense perception. The most distinctive feature of Kant's notion of intuition is that he relates intuition to sensibility and intellect. On the other hand Husserl maintains that intuition grasps the whole essence which is non-sensuous. According to Kant, intuition can be explained as follows:

...In whatever manner and by whatever means a mode of knowledge may relate to objects, *intuition* is that that through which it in immediate relation to them, and to which all thought as a means is directed. But intuition takes place only in so far as the object is given to us. This again is only possible, to man at least, in so far as the mind is affected in a certain way. The capacity (receptivity) for receiving representations through the mode in which we are affected by objects is entitled *sensibility* (Kant, 1929, p. 65).

Here comes the limitation of Kant because he always talks about judgmental or intellectual consciousness which used to constitute meaning all the time. This led him to separate intuition from intellect. On the other Husserl has not dichotomized the two realms as intuition can reach also to the level of intellect and the *noumena* at the same time. Here Husserl mainly emphasized the limitation of sensuous perception. Sense perception can give us only one aspect of the truth and therefore Husserl extends the horizon and talked about categorial intuition.

According to Husserl, Kant's failure lies on the fact that he could not try to establish any correlation between being-in-itself and consciousness as such. As Sebastian Luft rightly points out, according to Husserl's interpretation of Kant, Kant could not be able to think of developing the reduction kind of notion and therefore his philosophy could not grasp the idea of subjectivity-as-such, but he limited his thought to human subject only (Luft, 2010). While, for Husserl the move toward epoché and reduction could only provide one with the true scientific philosophy.

### **3.7.2. Husserl and Neo-Kantianism with Special Emphasis on Paul Natorp:**

Neo-Kantianism or the *critical philosophy* is basically regarded as the epistemological movement of Kantian philosophy. But, many has pointed out that alongwith its epistemological foundation, Neo-Kantianism also has a cultural philosophical nature

which has not received the due attention. In this regard Windelband writes, “For the leading figures of neo-Kantianism this dictum means that the return to Kant is not a mere reproduction of his historical position; to understand Kant means to further the development of philosophy with the help of Kant” (Banham, Schulting, Hems, 2012, p. 300). Neo-Kantians mainly considers Kant’s concept of Transcendental Deduction of categories. Neo-Kantians believes on Kantian interpretation of reasoning capacity or the deciding tendency of human behaviours (ibid). Unlike the German Idealists Neo-Kantians are not involved to speculate the metaphysical interpretation in the form of *noumena* given by Kant in his critical philosophy (ibid). They firmly believed in the theory of validity which is closely related with being. According to them, being depends upon validity and ontology depends upon epistemology. Neo-Kantians primarily stress their attention to the study of ‘pure subject’. According to Neo-Kantians, “This subject, in the sense of the whole of the principles of validity (a priori structures, values, etc.), is understood as the foundation of all that can be valid and hence as the ground for the possibility of objectivity” (ibid, p. 300-301) Thus, Neo-Kantians mainly try to overcome the objective worldviews which objectifies the position of a subject like naturalism, psychologism, materialism, empiricism, positivism, historicism, nihilism, etc. (ibid). In this regard it is very evident to mention here that like the Neo-Kantians Phenomenology also tries to overcome these positions mentioned earlier. The primary objective of both the traditions was to reject the psychological explanations of philosophy (Holzhey, 2010). Among the others Paul Natorp (1854-1924) was the only philosopher of the *Marburg school* of Neo-Kantianism who made a very detail analysis of the phenomenological movement led by Husserl (ibid). Among all the influential opponents of Husserl Natorp had a very close connection with him, who was a very remarkable critic as well as an observer of Husserl’s philosophical developments (Luft, 2010). According to Sebastian Luft, Natorp played a very crucial role in the development of Husserl’s reduction and his later genetic phenomenology. According to Luft, the intention of both the thinkers was the same unlike their way of theorizing. Both of them made an attempt “to analyze subjectivity in its most original concreteness” (Luft, 2010, p. 61). Natorp wanted to safeguard the *subjectivity* or *the life of the subject* by eliminating the objectifying tendency of positive sciences (Luft, 2010, Moran, 2000). He was developing a kind of philosophical psychology which tries to recapture the life of a subject. In this regard Spiegelberg (1972) writes, “This means that the data of psychology could be secured only by the opposite method, that of subjectification (*Subjektivierung*), which required a peculiar “reconstruction” starting from

the objective data; mere description of the immediate data would not do” (p. 200). Thus, Luft maintains that Husserl also had the same intention while he developed his concepts like *going back to the things themselves; life-world* etc. (Luft, 2010). Natorp’s conception of *transcendental psychology* rejects the thematization of the subjectivity which the traditional psychology does. In the process of thematization the subject lost its subjectivity as in thematization the subject is taken as a *corp* rather than a *living being* and thus it establishes the facts about subjectivity (ibid). Thus, Natorp was seeking for a method which can safeguard subjectivity which is not objective but reconstructive. The method Natorp adopted was “*reconstruction* of subjectivity by going back, regressively, from its objectifications” (Luft, 2010, p. 65). This method proceeds teleologically and also causally; although Natorp is against of determining subjectivity by causally. Thus, we can see that the methods used by both Husserl and Natorp are same as both are regressive in kinds. But, Husserl was strictly in opposition of the causal explanation in order to attain subjectivity. According to him, natural sciences depend on the causal explanations in order to establish their positions and it is only one way of explaining things of this world and thereby Husserl puts causality within the domain of the *naturalistic attitude* which needs to be removed first according to his methods for phenomenology. Moreover, with the discovery of *transcendental reduction* Husserl went a step further which enables one to have direct access on the life of a subject, which Natorp failed to realize (Luft, 2010). Finally, it can also be stated that the most prominent point of departure between Phenomenology and Neo-Kantianism is the concept of intuition. When phenomenology goes for the strong emphasis of intuition in the form of categorial intuition the Neo-Kantians stressed upon the concept of thought. They attempted to replace the moment of intuition with the determinate thoughts in cognition. While intuition received a positive interpretation in Kant, Neo-Kantians did not accept the same at the same time (Holzhey, 2010).

Despite bearing some close resemblance to kinds of Neo-Kantian forms of transcendental idealism as we have seen in Husserl’s admiration for Natorp and others phenomenology still differs at its core. As for Kant and Neo-Kantians too objectivity of epistemic knowledge depends on abstraction and independence for the subject and it is given to us only in the cognition that we have of it. In Husserl, objectivity is not complete abstract for subjective contents so that one ends up with mathematical certainty of formal objects. In Husserl it is to be finally elucidated by the intuitive light of consciousness. Thus, from the discussion made so far it can be said that though Husserl has got influenced by many

philosophers in developing the methods for his phenomenology in order to establish his transcendental phenomenology but his transcendental philosophy cannot be regarded as the replica of the traditional transcendental tradition.

### 3.8. Husserl against Idealism:

It can be said that though Husserl has adopted the label of transcendental idealism later on in his life but his idealism is completely different from the rests. Although Husserl had great appreciation for Berkeley, and also regarded himself as an *idealist* in the later phase of his developments, his intention was neither to disparage the position of the world nor to doubt it like the other traditional idealist philosophers (Moran, 2000). His main aim was to see the sense of this world, the sense in which everyone accepts this world as an existing world (ibid). It is evident that Husserl described his position as *transcendental idealist* only after the publication of *Ideas I* in 1913. He clearly used the term only from the year of 1915 and also referred it as *transcendental phenomenological idealism*, which according to him is idealism but in a new sense.

According to Husserl,

...The essence of transcendental idealism for Husserl was the a priori correlation between objectivity and subjectivity...Transcendental phenomenology, as he explains in his 1931 Foreword to Boyce-Gibson's translation of *Ideas I*, was to be an ultimate science that encompasses 'the universal horizon of the problem of philosophy'. Transcendentalism emerges to overcome objectivism in knowledge (Moran & Cohen, 2012, p, 330).

According to Husserl, transcendental philosophy is the philosophy of subjectivity, which is self-reflexive, a priori meaning constituting but not mundane as *epoché* brackets the whole natural world along with us, the human beings where the natural world is regarded as its intentional co-relate (Moran, 2000; Smith, 2007). Husserl's transcendental phenomenology can be regarded as the direct turn toward *new scholasticism*, a turn from Kantian and neo-Kantian kind of critical realism. This is because Husserl now turned his attention from the *subject* to *things-in-themselves* (Moran, 2005). As per Roman Ingarden according to Husserl, every kind of knowledge is resulted out of a co-relation between noetic and noematic contents. Therefore, the main difference between the transcendental idealism of Husserl and Kant is that "while the later's concept of transcendental subjectivity is a formal principle

arrived at by way of an argument, the former is a concrete field of *Evidenz*, of intentional correlation and syntheses of meaning” (Crowell, 2006, p. 22). Thus, we have seen how the *idealism* developed by Husserl is different from others in a very important way.

### 3.9. Husserl and the Internalism-Externalism Debate:

Many philosophers criticized Husserl sometime as Internalist or as Externalist. Externalism denies the self-contained nature of mind and argues that mind is essentially tied with the world. Likewise phenomenology also studies the facts about the external world but it does not concentrate on the world like a scientist does. As Zahavi writes, phenomenology is engaged in a reflective exploration of the structures and conditions of worldly significance and appearance. Unlike the scientific world which deals with the world of appearances phenomenological world deals with the pre-scientific world which transcends every kind of appearances and experiential and theoretical evidences which Husserl called as life-world and will be discussed in the subsequent chapters. Therefore, the phenomenological analysis of the world differs from the externalists account. Moreover, like the externalists phenomenology does not accept mind and world as two distinct entities. Unlike the Kantian view according to which mind and world (phenomenal world) are bound to each other Husserl gives a different interpretation of the same.

Zahavi writes;

...mind and world are not distinct entities; rather they are bound constitutively together. To put it differently, phenomenologists would typically argue that the relation between mind and world is an internal relation, a relation constitutive of its relata, and not an external one of causality. We might call this form of externalism phenomenological externalism (Zahavi, 2008, p. 361).

As a result, philosophers like Taylor Carman, Pierre Keller regarded Husserlian phenomenology as a kind of Internalism. According to Carman, Husserl through his *reduction* moved back toward consciousness from the external world (Carman, 2003). They believe reduction as a way of going back to the individual’s internal psychological state. Thus, he interpreted Husserl as an Internalist and regarded reduction as the way leading to the process of internalism. They argued that like the internalist philosophers Husserl also inclined

toward representationalism. As per Follesdal (1969) and Dreyfus (1982) noematic *Sinn* contains within the noema and through noema only mind can grasp the external objects. According to them, the abstract nature of noematic *Sinn* or the noema is an ideal means and which is always inner and has not any direct connection with the external world. But, it is already discussed earlier how through the reduction Husserl arrived at his transcendental philosophy where the object is transcendental and is reflected and constituted. Husserl has not denied the existence of the external world like Descartes. As to quote Ricoeur,

...As it appears to a consciousness, one can say that the object transcends that consciousness and likewise that the object is in that consciousness; but it is there specifically by virtue of being intentional and not by virtue of being a really inherent part of consciousness (Ricoeur, 1967, p. 8).

Thus by following Ricoeur it can be said that object is not an inherent part of consciousness as explained by the representationists. Husserl completely denied the theory of representation and regarded it as non-sensical. According to him, consciousness cannot contain the pictures/representations of the external objects. Therefore, it can be said that the method of reduction lead us toward that experience which is given intuitively, but not the representation of our mind. Thus, Husserl's phenomenology does not fit into any camp like Internalism or Externalism rather it gives an alternative option.

### **3.10. Concluding Remarks and Basic Findings of the Chapter:**

Thus, the chapter showed how the phenomenological methods revealed a new dimension of subjectivity by unveiling a deeper aspect of meaning. This is the transcendental subjectivity which could not be compared with the philosophy of traditional idealism nor does it prove any similarity with Kantian idealism. This is completely a new domain of subjectivity by taking noema as its correlate and which completely took away the individual aspect from the operation by providing a wider horizon of possibility. Husserlian phenomenology thus finally unveils the embodied nature of subjectivity and its co-relation with the 'others' in a life-world which will be discussed in the next chapter.

**Chapter-IV**  
**Phenomenological Quest for the Inter-subjective Dimensions of Transcendental Subjectivity:**

**4.1. Introduction:**

It has been discussed so far how Husserlian phenomenology entered into the domain of transcendental philosophy with the application of his phenomenological methods. As explained earlier, Husserl's main intention was to uncover the mysterious realm of consciousness, to reveal consciousness in its purity. In doing that Husserl was basically influenced by the advocators of transcendental tradition like Kant, Natorp, etc. But, finally Husserl came out with his own transcendental philosophy with the help of transcendental phenomenological reduction which brackets the reflecting human subject practicing the *epoché* in the real world. Thus, *epoché* takes us back to a position which can be regarded as the 'absolute beginning' or to speak in Husserl's language to the transcendental consciousness or ego, which is transcendently purified. Husserlian formulations in his *Cartesian Meditations* showed his motifs where he regarded transcendental-phenomenological Ego, as the realm of transcendental-phenomenological self-experience (Husserl, 1982). As Moran writes,

the realm of transcendental or pure consciousness was a realm of 'absolute being' (absolute Sein) over and against which everything objective has to be considered merely relative being. Husserl had asserted this very boldly in *Ideas I*, repeated it in the *Cartesian Meditations* and never abandoned it (Moran, 2012, p. 229).

Thus, Husserl has never discarded his thought that transcendental subjectivity is the sphere of absolute being in his next breakthrough i.e. the *Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*. He emphasizes that transcendental subjectivity/ego is the sphere which can be considered as the unity of all the transcendently purified experiences. According to Husserl, reduction takes us back to the transcendental Ego which can be regarded as the *absolute beginning*.

Moran (2012) writes:

Husserl considers the domain of transcendental subjectivity not just to be a set of formal conditions for knowledge (as in Kant), categorial frameworks and formal rules for organizing experience, but to be a domain of *life*, of *living* (*Leben*), of genuine experience (*Erfahrung*), a domain that has never before been examined in philosophy (p. 219).

This is a field of transcendental experience where through direct intuition one gathers the first person lived experience in an unlimited extent by *bracketing* the *natural attitude*. According to Husserl, this is the subjectivity which also constitutes the spatial objects. Therefore, Husserl was busy to give a shape to his idea that the constituting transcendental subjectivity is embodied, social which means intersubjectively associated with others, historical and over and above from the world of objective material sciences, who dwells in the *life-world* (Crowell, 2013).

Thus, in the constitution or the exploration of the objects simultaneously there also continues a self-constitution or self-exploration. Here, Husserl talks about a reciprocal co-dependency between the constitution of the spatial object on the one hand and the constitution of the body on the other. As Husserl points out it is not that, the body is given to us at first and to investigate the world later. Body is revealed to us in the process of exploration of the world and therefore it can be said that “the world is given to us as bodily investigated” (Zahavi, 2003, p, 105). Thus, it can be said that to perceive a physical object one must possess bodily self-awareness and at the same time it is also true that in relating something or to itself as Other, body appears to itself. So, it would be interesting to see now how Husserl would explain his concept of embodiment in his transcendental phenomenology where, the constituting transcendental subject is embodied always already present in this world. This leads us to explain how the subjectivity which is transcendental is embodied in nature in Husserlian phenomenology

#### **4.2. Transcendental Subjectivity and its Embodiment as Conceived by Edmund Husserl:**

Over and over again it is believed that the phenomenological exploration of the body or the embodied subjectivity had been started only with Jean-Paul Sartre's *Being*

*and Nothingness* (1943) and Merleau-Ponty's *Phenomenology of Perception*. (1945) But, a closer analysis will disclose the fact that there is a very strong continuity between Husserl and the later phenomenologists regarding the same (Zahavi, 1994). Though Husserl is not a philosopher of the body but of consciousness, but his phenomenology of the body confirms body as the hidden source through which the perceptual world unveils its presence and meanings to consciousness. As Welton (1999) writes, "envisions what no other philosophy had previously seen" (p. 39). Husserl's analysis of the body can be regarded as the outcome of his systematic analysis of the transcendental phenomenology reflected in his lecture course *Ding und Raum* delivered in 1907 where he also did an extensive analysis of the role of perception in this regard (Zahavi, 1994). Husserl in his *Ideas II* explains the roll of body as follows:

It appears as a freely moving organ (or system of such organs) by means of which the subject experiences the external world. Furthermore the Body appears as a bearer of sensations ... a thing "inserted" between the rest of the material world and the "subjective" sphere, as a centre around which the rest of the spatial world is arranged, and as being in causal relationship with the real external world (Husserl, 1989, § 42, p. 161).

Husserl explains that whatever appears in the world appears through space and time and is given in its totality but always from a limited perspective (Husserl, 19839, § 42). Therefore, it can be stated that each and every appearance of the world which is perspectival in nature is always the appearance of something and for someone (Zahavi, 2003). There is a point from where objects appear at a certain distance or from a certain angle. While on the one way there is not a single or a pure point at the same time there is *no view from nowhere*. This obvious point can be regarded as the embodied point of view which is spatial. Therefore, all the occurrences in the world presuppose that the subject who is experiencing is itself given in a particular space. Thus, the subject is now embodied too as it possesses a spatial location (Zahavi, 2003). Like the same way the spatial perceptual object which is given horizontally in front of an *embodied subject* who always presents at 'here' in relation to which the object is familiarized. Thus as Zahavi (2003) points out according to Husserl, "the body is a condition of the possibility for the perception of and interaction with spatial objects, and that every worldly experience is mediated by and made possible by our embodiment" (p, 99).

Husserl writes:

Cultural objects in the broader sense – from tools to works of art – are not just material bodies; they also include aesthetical, spiritual, practical, and axiological, “significations.” But these require a material vector. The same is true for *animalia*, including man. *Res extensa* is the material foundation of the life-world on which spiritual significations and value predicates are superimposed, making things part of the life-world (Husserl, 1970a, p. 72-73).

So, embodiment is that aspect which makes things and entities part of this world and which makes one familiar with the world in which both subject and object can be individuated. As conceived by Carman (1999) according to Husserl, “since embodiment is what makes possible the vary ascription of thoughts and sensations to subjects” (p, 206). But, Husserl does not stop here by simply analyzing body as the centre of orientation. Furthermore, Husserl started to examine the mobility of the body and also body as a constituting element of perceptual reality. In doing that Husserl first concentrated on the importance of the body movements like movements of the eyes, the touch of the hands etc. Husserl gives emphasis upon the role played by the movement of the body in order to experience the spatial objects. For him, the experiences of the perceptual objects are accompanied by the position and the movement of the body, which he regarded as the *kinaesthetic experiences* (Zahavi, 1994, 2003). Husserl maintains that objects are never given in its totality but always from a restricted profile. So, it can be stated that objects always transcend its actual appearances. Therefore, Husserl maintains that to experience the object from various perspectives leads to the presupposition of a movement either of one’s own or that of the object. So to speak, there must be a continuity between the movements of the two and the experience of this continuity of movement is made possible by the *kinaesthetic experience*. To illustrate Husserl’s point there can be offered an example of seeing a house where the actually given profile of the house is correlated with the body position of the one who perceives the house in front. At the same time the momentarily absent profiles of the house is thus correlated with one’s capacity of possible movements or the kinaesthetic horizon. Now, if one moves toward the back side of the same house then the back profile of the house could be perceived, which becomes present through a specific body movement. Therefore, there exists an intentional if-then relation where the bodily movements of both

(subject and object) the parts play the ultimate role. Therefore, Husserl made the point clear that if the subject would be a disembodied one then it would be impossible to sense the house as a house. This presupposes an embodied subject who is now coped up with its environment. There exists a conditional relation between the body and the world which is not causal of course and where body shows its own gestures at every passing moment according to the demand of its environment. At the same time Husserl here considered the role played by the sensory modalities that signifies the engagement of the body with the world which Husserl calls as “synaesthesia” (Crowell, 2013).

Thus, it has been discussed how body plays its constitutive role as being the organ of experience of any subject in every kind of perception. So, till now body has been understood as the subjects’ organ. But a clarification is much needed in this part regarding the relationship between the subjectivity and the body. This is the point where Husserl brings his analysis of the *lived body* (Leib) which means body as subject and the *physical body* (Körper) or body as object (Zahavi, 1999). While on the one way body is constituted as a thing in the world at the same time body also plays the role of constituting subject under the surveillance of transcendental subjectivity (Crowell, 2003). But, the crucial question here is that why Husserl brought two different concepts of the same body as Lived and physical? Husserl’s description of the body as lived and physical can be explained as following.

#### **4.2.1. Body as Leib and Körper in Husserlian Phenomenology:**

In order to address Husserl’s investigation of the lived body i.e. *Leib* and the physical body i.e. *Körper* it will be helpful to go back to the analysis given by Descartes regarding the constitution of the things in the nature. According to him, “When thought of as extended in time and space, material in composition, and governed by rigid laws of causality, things bow and finally assume a posture that allows us to become the true “lords and masters of nature” ” (Welton, 1999, p. 40). As per the explanation given by Descartes the essences of things can be reduced to measurable or mathematizable spatio-temporal extension or to say to their geometrical constitutions. This explanation also covers body as one of the things among the rest which brought body under the rules in medicine or to take body as a *corpse* (Welton, 1999). But, can we consider physical characterization as one and the only legitimate way to present things or an event in front of us?

In this regard Welton (1999) writes,

When look at a blooming rose or hear the plaint of an Indian funeral song, do I see electromagnetic waves 650 nanometres in length or listen to compression waves between 27 and 1000 cycles per second? Do I not rather see a blooming rose and sometimes a velvet red alive with passion? Do I not rather hear a funeral song, and perhaps a wail trembling with lost love? (p, 40).

Husserl regarded these kinds of experiences as lived experience (Erlebnis) which is neither a sensorial event nor a perceptual one but the finding of one's own self which put forwards the body as lived (Welton, 1999). In this sense physical body is not simply the point or that centre because of which all things are situated. The body is not only the physical body which authenticates the material objects around us but also essentially the lived-body which is capable of free movement, grasping, repelling, penetrating etc. Therefore, Husserl in his phenomenology tried to bracket the physical body or body as *körper* (Crowell, 2013). This is the body which is an object in the world and also an object for other disciplines like Psychology or Biology which takes body from third-person perspective (Luft, 2003). If body is considered only as physical (*körper*) then that would definitely lack all depth, thickness and paths regarding the constitution of the space of the perceived things. As Husserl emphasized, body is not like a "fixed eye" like mathematical results which gives similar results under similar circumstances (Welton, 1999).

After bracketing the physical body, transcendental subjectivity with its first person perspective continues to have a unique kind of embodiment. This embodiment as referred by Husserl becomes the *subject* in constituting the other objects, not literally but, only meaningfully. Interestingly enough in constituting the objects it also constitutes itself (Husserl, 1989). This is the same *subject* which was an object when it was viewed from the third person perspective in the natural attitude (Luft, 2003). To explain Husserl's enquiry of the lived body and the physical body it would be helpful to go back to his own analysis given in *Ideas II*. In his *Ideas II*, Husserl gives the example of touching one's own hand with the other hand. In that case the touching hand will experience various appearances of the touched hand as objective properties (Husserl, 1989, §36). The most crucial point here is that although

like the objective properties body has extension, softness, smoothness etc. because of the localization of the kinaesthetic and tactile sensation on the body it is different from the ordinary objects (Carman, 1999; Zahavi, 2003; Zahavi, 1999). Therefore, here the touched hand is not like an object of the world but an experienced organ too as the touched hand could also feel the touch here in itself. Husserl writes, “Touching refers here to a physical event. Even two lifeless things can touch one another, but the touching of the Body provides sensations on it or in it” (Husserl, 1989, p.147). Husserl termed this as ‘bodily intentionality’ which means the immediate sense of one’s own embodied agency. Husserl contrasts this experience by giving an example of touching a table. If one touches the top of a table then s/he will experience various appearances belonging to the table. As Husserl puts,

My hand is lying on the table. I experience the table as something solid, cold, and smooth. Moving my hand over the table, I get an experience of it and its thingly determinations. At the same time, I can at any moment pay attention to my hand and find on it touch-sensations, sensations of smoothness and coldness, etc... Lifting a thing, I experience its weight, but at the same time I have weight-sensations localized in my Body (ibid, p. 146).

Thus, the touching of a table is different from touching one’s own hand. So, in case of touching one’s own hand the relationship between touching and touched is reversible as touching can be touched and touched can be touching here. Husserl regarded this as having the *double-sensation* of the body which provides the experience of having the double nature of the body as he says, “for we have then two sensations, and each is apprehendable or experienceable in a double way” (ibid, p. 147). Having this double-sensation of the body is the most unique aspect of the transcendental subjectivity. According to Husserl, subsequently after this the *Körper* body gets constituted by the original embodiment. As Husserl continues, “a natural object that “belongs” to me by means of a self-enworlding, or “mundanization,” in which I come to understand myself as an animal, a human being, and so on” (Crowell, 2013, p. 54).

In this regard Welton (1999) writes,

In the very process of touching the lived-body something new enters: the object touched also becomes the object touching. It is this unique structure of touching while being touched, of being touched while touching that makes the lived-body palpable to itself and comes to constitute it as an object. Thus, there is a circuit running not only between the world and the lived-body but also between the lived-body and itself (p. 46).

Thus, the constitution of the physical body cannot be understood as the constitution of the other material objects of the world. Rather it must be understood as the *self-objectivation* of the *lived body* performed by a subject who is already *embodied*. In this regard the point could be mentioned here is that Husserl gives preference to tactual realm over visual realm and says that while eyes cannot see itself seeing body can feel itself feeling and that is possible only because of the localization of the tactile sensation in the parts of the body.

Husserl in this connection brings an analysis of the difference between the visual and the tactual realm which can be found in his *Ideas II* § 37 in order to show the importance of tactile sensation over the visual one. Therefore, Welton (1999) writes, “Husserl’s argument is that a subject that had only vision would never know the body as lived-body” (p, 50). Tactile sensations have a location in the lived-body and therefore, the body can feel itself feeling but the same is not true in case of seeing through eyes. As Husserl writes, I can perfectly see my eyes in the mirror but I cannot see my eye seeing/seeing of my eyes, it is not like the reversible relation like touching and touched. The same is the case with hearing also (Carman, 1999).

Here, the most important feature that the lived body has is its subject-subject status. And because of having this subject-subject status of the lived body the existence of the other body can be understood as an embodied subject of this world. As conceived by Zahavi, (2003) according to Husserl, “when my left hand touches my right hand, I experience myself in a way that anticipates the way in which I would experience an Other and an Other would experience me” (P, 113). This led Husserl to explain how Other is also equally important for the constitutive activity.

### 4.3. The Constitution of the Other in Husserlian Phenomenology:

While talking about *other subjects* the most persistent question comes is that how do we know or understand the *others*? Do we know the others through perception or inference? In recent decades various discussions took place on the same issue. Among all other theories the theory of mind debate has grabbed the attention of many. The theory of mind debate basically includes two theories; they are the *theory-theory* of mind and the *simulation theory* of mind. According to the TT theory “mental states are theoretical entities that we attribute to others on the basis of a folk-psychological theory of mind” (Zahavi 2014, p. 100). Simulation theory on the other hand goes against the theory-theory approach and gives preference upon using one’s own mind while knowing the minds of the others. But, the situation has changed a bit and since the mid of 1990s people have added a new theory in the debate known as hybrid approach by incorporating elements from TT and ST. In this regard the names of Alvin Goldman, Shaun Nichols and Stephen Stich could be referred as the defenders of this approach (Zahavi 2014). These approaches can be regarded as the contemporary approaches to know the minds of the others. Apart from these in order to refer the classical approach of the issue one could take the name of John Stuart Mill (1806-1867) who talks about the analogical argument which is inferential in nature (Gallagher, 2015). According to this approach, one could have direct access to one’s own mind only. Analogical approach gives preference upon the bodily behaviours of the Other through which one could analogically know the mind of the Other. As Gallagher (2015) writes,

There is an analogy between the way I experience my own minded body and what I observe in the actions of the other’s body. On the basis of that analogy I infer that the other’s body reflects the presence of another mind (p. 128).

Thus, in the argument from analogy from some known or observed public behaviours one can infer the hidden mental states of the others. Interestingly enough both Gallagher & Zahavi (2012) maintains the fact that the argument from analogy shares certain similarities with both the contemporary theories of mind i.e. TT and ST. One version of the simulation theory argues that one could know directly and immediately the contents of her/his own mind only.

This means that it is not possible to have the direct access to the minds of the others. The same is the case with the argument from analogy where the others could be known by analogy only. On the other hand in the argument from analogy one could have access to the minds of the others through inference where from some known behaviours one could infer the hidden mental cause. From this explanation it could be said that the argument from analogy resembles with the theory-theory of mind as well.

Thus, the point should be made here is that though there could be found various approaches to know the other minds but there were many philosophers who thoroughly criticized these approaches. Among the others the phenomenologist philosophers like Max Scheler, Edith Stein, Edmund Husserl, Merleau-Ponty to name a few criticized the same and forwarded their own versions to know the Others. In this regard it could be mentioned here that Phenomenology criticizes the argument from analogy and there could be found a very massive criticism of the same in Max Scheler's (1874-1928) work called *Wasen und Formen der Sympathie* originally published in 1912. According to Scheler, our encounter and acquaintance with others is not inferential in nature (Scheler 1973). As Scheler states, the process of knowing the other is not a two-stage process where at first one perceives the behaviour and then only comes to know about the psychological meaning. Other cannot be divided into mere body and mind as other or human being is a unified whole (Scheler 1973). Moreover, he maintains that the argument from analogy is based on certain presuppositions. As according to Scheler, in the analogical argument after we got convinced by the fact that we are observing the minded creatures in front of us but we are not sure how to interpret the expressive phenomena then only we employ the analogical line of thinking (Gurwitsch 1979). Moreover, the analogical argument presupposes the fact that one's mental self-experience is given first to recognize the others. In third, it can be said that in analogical argument one could infer only the minds of the other by perceiving the bodily behaviour of the other. Scheler has criticized all these arguments and maintains that "the argument from analogy underestimates the difficulties involved in self-experience and overestimates those involved in the experience of others" (Scheler 1954, p. 251) The very important point should be mentioned here is that though there could be found various approaches to know the minds of the others one very significant among them is the study of *empathy* which has been received a very upsurge of interest in the recent years specifically among the phenomenologist philosophers. So, it is necessary to know what actually empathy is.

#### 4.3.1. The Role of Empathy in Knowing the Other:

The concept of *empathy* has a philosophical origin but initially it was adopted by the psychologists. Empathy does not have a long history. The philosopher Robert Vischer in the year 1873 first used the German term *Einfühlung* in the domain of Aesthetics. But, it was Theodor Lipps, who first introduced the term in order to designate the others as minded creatures. Later on Edward Titchener, the American psychologist translated *Einfühlung* as 'empathy' (Zahavi, 2014). It was Lipps who was against of the analogical inference while talking about *empathy*. According to him, *empathy* means self-objectification. By this he meant that "To feel empathy is to experience a part of one's own psychological life as belonging to or in an external object; it is to penetrate and suffuse that object with one's own life" (As quoted in Zahavi, 2014, p. 104). Lipps gives emphasis upon both the external behaviour of the other and the self-experience of one's own self. Again to refer Zahavi (2004)

when I see a joyful face, I will reproduce the expression of joy, this will evoke a feeling of joy in me, and this felt joy, which is co-given with the currently perceived facial expression, will then be attributed to the other, thereby allowing for a form of interpersonal understanding (As cited in p. 105)

This will necessarily entail the fact that Lipps account of empathy never allows one to experience something new in others, because as Lipps maintains without the self-experience one cannot empathically experience or understand the minds of the others. But, Lipps accounts of empathy have faced lots of criticisms as Wittgenstein writes, "Do you look into yourself in order to recognize the fury in his face?" (Wittgenstein 1980, § 927). The psychologists like Goldman, Iacoboni, Gallese etc. also have adopted similar models like Lipps regarding the notion of empathy. But, one cannot conclude the discussion of empathy without discussing the accounts of the phenomenologists. There could be found various significant and substantial analysis of the empathy among the philosophers like Husserl, Merleau Ponty, Stein, Scheler etc. By criticizing Lipps account of empathy which talks about imitation and projection, Scheler defends the view that the emotion of the other necessarily differs from the way I will experience the same. According to him, it cannot be the case that one could experience only those experiences of the others which s/he had already gone

through. According to Scheler, empathy has the capacity of self-transcendence which may lead one toward a new level of experience which is beyond of our own actual experience.

According to Scheler,

we certainly believe ourselves to be directly acquainted with another person's joy in his laughter, with his sorrow and pain in his tears, with his shame in his blushing, with his entreaty in his outstretched hands, with his love in his look of affection, with his rage in the gnashing of his teeth, with his threats in the clenching of his fist, and with the tenor of his thoughts in the sound of his words (Scheler 1973, p. 254).

But, as Scheler pointed out this cannot be regarded as behaviourism rather he stated that

There is more to the mind than its behavioural manifestation, but we should recognise that behaviour is already soaked with the meaning of the mind and that the expressive relation holding between "inner" mental states and "external" bodily behaviour is stronger than that of a mere contingent causal connection (Zahavi, 2005, p. 152).

To speak briefly the experiences of the other could be known through a kind of *intuition or inner experience* which he regarded as an act through which the psychical could be grasped regardless of self and other. By making this point Scheler made a confusion regarding the difference between the self-experience and the other-experience. Though Scheler talks about the intuitive accessibility of other experiences at the same time he also agreed to the fact that there are certain limitations in that but at the same time Scheler himself argues:

an immediate flow of experiences *undifferentiated as between mine and thine*, which actually contains both our own and others' experiences intermingled and without distinction from one another. Within this flow there is a gradual formation of ever more stable vortices, which slowly attract further elements of the stream into their orbits and thereby became successively and very gradually identified with distinct individuals (Scheler, 2008, p. 246).

But, the view of Scheler regarding empathy has been strongly criticised by other phenomenologist philosophers like Husserl and Stein. According to them, it is not possible to know the otherness of the other. Among the others it was Husserl who has been very much preoccupied with the issue of empathy and therefore, his analysis of empathy is not restricted only within a few selected publications like *Ideas II* or *Cartesian Meditations*. His matured writings on empathy can be found in his research manuscripts contained in *Husserliana* 13-15 covering the period from 1905-1937 and published in three volumes on phenomenology of intersubjectivity. Husserl delivered his lecture on empathy in his last winter semester lecture course in 1928-29.

In this regard by following Husserl it could be maintained that it is not possible to access the givenness of the other from a third person perspective. As Zahavi (2005) writes, “to claim that I would have a real experience of the other only if I experienced her feelings or thoughts in the same way as she herself does, is nonsensical” (p. 155). As according to Husserl, having the actual experience of the other does not imply that one can have access the other in the same way s/he could access her/his ownself. In that case there would remain no distinction between the self and the other. This inaccessibility of the otherness of the other makes him/her an other (Husserl, 1989). As for Husserl, the experiences of the other are not available through inner consciousness. If the first-personal givenness of the other has been interpreted from the third-person point of view then that would be like interpreting the other as an object. This is an approach adopted by *argument from analogy* and other theories of mind, where other is interpreted from the third-person point of view.

The similar view can also be found in the analysis given by Thomas Nagel in his classic article “What Is It Like to Be a Bat” published in 1970. Nagel like Husserl maintains the point that it is impossible for someone to understand *what it is like for a bat to be a bat* (Nagel, 1974). But the crucial point here is that though there could be found similarities in both the explanations regarding the otherness of the other, Nagel constructs this analogy to show the limits of the subjectivity. As for Nagel it is not possible to escape from the limits of one’s own subjectivity (Krznic, 2014). Moreover, Nagel’s analysis is based upon the empirical perspective, while Husserl’s explanation is transcendental in nature. As according to Nagel, one can only imagine the behaviour of the *bat* but it is not possible to

understand *what it is like to be a bat* (ibid). On the other hand, by following Husserl it can be said that imagining the behaviour of the bat means viewing the bat from the third-person perspective. In that case the bat would become an object for a subject. So, it could be said that Nagel has completely closed off all the possibilities to know the others. But the same is not true for Husserl as according to him, one could experience the givenness of the other through *empathy* which is a first personal access. By following Husserl, Edith Stein, who was a student and assistant of Husserl gives a very sharp analysis of empathy. According to Stein, empathy is the direct experience or having the intuitive experience of another 'I' (Stein, 1989). This doesn't imply of knowing the other as other but having the immediate experience of the other by living through the other's experience (Stein, 1989). Thus in this regard Smith (2007) writes,

in empathy my present consciousness presents reproductively what the other "I" experiences in her own case, but from a certain interpersonal distance. Thus, I "re-live," as it were, the other's experience, but from a certain distance, as I know the other is distinct from myself. In this way the "other I"'s experience is "constituted" empathically as if I were living through that form of experience within my own stream of consciousness (p. 230).

This process of empathy or knowing the other could be understood from Husserlian analysis of the concept of "lived body" which possesses double-sensation which is also referred as having the subject-subject status of the "lived body". This is regarded as the first personal aspect of viewing one's own body and also that of another. Thus, in cases like touching-touched and seeing in the mirror 'one' experiences the 'other' by the same way the 'other' experiences the 'one' (Moran, 2010; Zahavi, 2014). It is not impossible to grasp the feelings, beliefs, values, and experiences of the other people. Human beings could walk together as they are not so different from each other. There is the possibility of overcoming the barriers among them through empathy. Gandhi was not an untouchable (Dalit) by birth. But, he had grasped the reality of their lives as because; he spent several years as a peasant farmer and cleaned toilets with his own hands (Krznicaric, 2014).

Thus, from the above analysis it can be said that empathy is that in which one could have a direct and experiential understanding of the other. Through empathy Husserl is

not simply trying to explain one's awareness of the other as for him empathy is neither an unanalyzable simple fact nor primordial in nature as Scheler emphasized (Smith 2003). As per Smith (2003), "the task Husserl sets himself is to explain how empathy is possible as an intentional achievement" (p. 213).

It is important to note here that both Husserl and Stein distinguished empathy with perception and agreed to the fact that unlike perception in empathy one cannot have the object i.e. the original empathized experience of the other in front of everyone (Husserl, 1989). Empathy according to Husserl, as formulated in *Ideas II* is: "Empathy is not a mediate experience in the sense that the other would be experienced as a psychophysical annex to his corporeal body, but is instead an immediate experience of the other" (ibid, p. 384-385). In perceiving an object one could have the access of the absent or appresented profiles of the object. This is because in perceiving an object one transcends the intuitively given profile of the object and targets the whole object itself. Thus, the perception of the object transcends the intuitive givenness of the object and includes both the present and the absent profiles of the object (ibid). Without the absent profile one cannot have the access of the total object as both the presented and the appresented profiles are neither separated from each other nor united through inference. According to Husserl, the same is the case with the experience of the others also but in a particular way. Husserl here in this context introduced a very key concept in order to know the other which he regarded as "coupling" or "pairing". So, now it is necessary to know what coupling or pairing is according to Husserl.

#### **4.3.2. Coupling or Pairing in Husserl's Phenomenology:**

According to Husserl, while the other's body enters into one's own perceptual field the other could be perceived as an animate organism. This is because one could see very passively the other's body as like one's own without giving a second thought. Therefore, Husserl gives emphasis upon the role of *apperception* in knowing the other. Husserl made his position very clear by saying that knowing the other always involves *apperception*, where *apperception* is neither an inference nor an act of thinking.

Husserl writes in his *Cartesian Meditations*:

in case there presents itself, as outstanding in my primordial sphere, a body “similar” to mine that is to say, a body with determinations such that it must enter into a phenomenal pairing with mine it seems clear without more ado that, with the transfer of sense, this body must forthwith appropriate from mine the sense: animate organism (Husserl, 1982, p.113).

Here, the lived body plays a fundamental role in framing the sociality and objectivity in Husserl’s phenomenology. According to Husserl:

Pairing is a primal form of that passive synthesis which we designate as “association”, in contrast to passive synthesis of “identification”. In a pairing association the characteristic feature is that, in the most primitive case, two data are given intuitionally, and with prominence, in the unity of a consciousness and that, on this basis essentially, already in pure passivity (regardless therefore of whether they are noticed or unnoticed)\_\_, as data appearing with mutual distinctness, they *found phenomenologically a unity of similarity* and thus are always constituted precisely as a pair. If there are more than two such data, then a phenomenally unitary group, a plurality, becomes constituted” (ibid, p. 112).

Husserl named this other ego as *alter ego* and made the point very clear that “ego and alter ego are always and necessarily given in an original “pairing” ” (ibid). In this regard Husserl gives an example of learning the function of a pair of scissors by a child, who after learning the function whenever sees a pair of scissors will immediately apprehend the functionality of that pair without performing any inference and giving a second thought. In other words the child apperceived the second pair of scissors (Husserl, 1982). According to Husserl, there exists a passive association between the two incidents. Like the same way Husserl maintains that, “when I encounter another, my self-experience will serve as a reservoir of meaning that is transferred onto the other in a purely passive manner. As a result of this, a phenomenal unity is established” (Zahavi, 2014, p. 133). We are apprehended as a pair, as being alike and as belonging together, while still being separate and different (As cited in ibid).

Here by transfer Husserl meant a reciprocal transfer which occurs simultaneously between the self and the other. Husserl regarded this as *mutual transfer of sense* between self and the other (Husserl, 1982). In this regard M. C. Dillon talks about Merleau Ponty's indebtedness to Husserl in developing his own ontological notion under the heading of "transfer of corporeal schema" (Dillon, 1997). This transformation as Husserl emphasized is not like imaginative transformation which might occur in imagination. Apart from certain exceptional occurrences the other could be empathically understood immediately without any imaginative depiction (Zahavi, 2014). Husserl here talks about the analogical *apperception* which involves the re-presentation of one's own self-experience. As it can be maintained from Husserl's own language that primordially subjectivity is present to oneself through its own self-experience and then only carried over to the other through *apperception*. (Husserl, 1977; Husserl, 1997) But, the point Husserl maintained above is conditioned by an argument that there should be a perceived similarity between the body of the other and the body of the self. Thus, according to Husserl, one's own self-experience is characterized by the important interplay between the *ipseity* (selfhood) and *alterity* (otherness) and also must be in place if empathy is to be possible (Husserl, 1977).

In this regard Husserl maintains that other is not an intentional object to experience as the relation between self and other is subject-subject relation. Though one experiences the other but this experiencing does not mean of having the access of the first personal givenness of the other's experience. Thus, it can be said that there exists an irregularity in this subject-subject relation as well which opens the door toward *intersubjectivity* in Husserl's phenomenology. At this juncture the most crucial point is that the objectivity and the transcendence of this world are constituted intersubjectively. Therefore, a clarification is much needed regarding an analysis of the transcendental intersubjectivity and how the objectivity of the world is constituted under its supervision.

#### **4.4. Transcendental Intersubjectivity and the Constitution of the World in Husserlian Phenomenology:**

The very frequent question might occur at this point is that why the self alone cannot experience the objective world without the other? In order to address this issue from

Husserl's point of view it can be said that objects of this world cannot merely be reduced to one's own intentional object only while others equally could intentionally experience them.

The intersubjective experienciability of the object guarantees its real transcendence, so my experience (constitution) of transcendent objects is necessarily mediated by my experience of its givenness for another transcendent subject, that is, by my experience of a foreign world-directed subject. (It is exactly for this reason that Other's *transcendence* is so vital (Zahavi 2003, p. 115-116).

If other is a mirror copy of the self then both self and other would experience the same thing without any distinction. Thus, there exists a co-relation between the self and the other; an intersubjective relation which also influences the self-constitution of the transcendental subjectivity. This intersubjective relation is common to all as self cannot exist independently without the other. According to Husserl, this is the intersubjective relation of the self and the other which constitutes the objectivity and the transcendence of the world and which he called as *Transcendental Intersubjectivity* or the community of subjects. For Husserl, the transcendental subjects come to communicate with one another and co-operate together in order to fulfil the common purpose to form a common world for all.

Husserl writes in his *Crisis*

...as the world valid as existing for us and to which we, together, belong, the world as world for all, pregiven with this ontic meaning. Constantly functioning in wakeful life, we also function together, in the manifold ways of considering, together, objects pregiven to us in common, thinking together, valuing, planning, acting together (Husserl, 1970a, p. 109 part III A § 28).

Husserl in his *Crisis* explains this as "we-subjectivity" and ascertains the failure of traditional psychological approach in this regard (Husserl, 1970a). This is the world which according to Husserl is always correlated with the constituting subjectivity or intersubjectivity (Moran, 2012). So, now it is necessary to understand and explore what Husserl meant by the concept of the world and how the world has been constituted under the surveillance of transcendental subjectivity or intersubjectivity in Husserl's phenomenology.

#### 4.5. Husserl's Concept of the World:

It is evident that the emergence of the concept of *world* is a major component of Husserl's turn toward transcendental phenomenology. His idea of the *world* occupies a central position in his work and also in the whole phenomenological tradition. Sebastian Luft regarded Husserl's concept of the *world* as the most primary theme of his late phenomenology (Luft, 2011). Husserl's concept of the world is formulated as the universal horizon of meaning at its final juncture which subsequently framed the final structure of Husserl's phenomenology (ibid). Interestingly enough, Husserl unlike his previous works despite his analysis of the *ego* in his *Crisis* he began his discussion from the experience of the *world*. Here, Husserl says that our experience of the world is such that it is pregiven and *always already there*, experienced in an ongoing life in a very simple and straightforward manner (Moran, 2012, p. 220). Therefore, Husserl begins the discussion of transcendental phenomenology in his *Crisis* with the exposition of the natural interpretation of the world in connection with the *natural attitude*. According to Husserl, the interpretation given by the natural sciences regarding the world lies under the concept of natural attitude where the world is an outcome of mere objectification (Moran, 2012).

Husserl writes in his *Crisis*:

As such we now consistently make the world our subject of investigation, i.e., as the ground of all our interests and life-projects, among which the theoretical projects of the objective sciences make up only a particular group. But the latter is now to be in no way privileged as it was when it motivated our inquiries earlier. In this manner, then, let our subject now be not the world simply, but the world exclusively as it is constantly pregiven to us in the alteration of its manners of givenness (Husserl, 1970a, p. 154, §43).

Therefore, in his *Crisis*, Husserl tries to defend the approach of the modern sciences by exposing the philosophical inadequacy of it. Husserl was not against of any scientific discoveries excluding the self-sufficient tendency of modern science generated by the objectivistic nature of sciences which creates an intellectual crisis in the present world.

Husserl regarded this crisis as the crisis of *meaning*. In the process of discovering innovative advancements new scientific truths and objectivities have been created which completely sent away the subjective aspect from the world which causes degradation of the values.

Science has progressed at a fantastic pace in modern times, but its progress has unleashed an intellectual crisis because science seems to have detached itself from the 'soil' from which it had originally sprung and from which alone it can receive a meaning (Pivčević, 2014, p. 86).

Husserl regarded this pre-logical world as the *life-world* and considered it as the universal horizon of meaning. Husserl introduced this concept of life-world in his *Crisis*. For him, it is "the intuitive surrounding world of life, pre-given as existing for all in common" (Husserl 1970a, p. 121, §33). Here the experience of the world is reconstructed and built up by itself as a pre-given world under the genetic structure and developed for an experiencing consciousness.

It is pre-given to us all quite naturally, as persons within the horizon of our fellow men, i.e., in every actual connection with others, as "the" world common to us all... ..The life-world was always there for mankind before science, then, just as it continues its manner of being in the epoch of science (ibid, p. 122-123 §33).

According to him, the life-world is the transcendently transformed phenomenon under the surveillance of the transcendent intersubjectivity. In this regard Husserl writes:

This is not a "view," an "interpretation" bestowed upon the world. Every view about . . . , every opinion about "the" world, has its ground in the pre-given world. It is from this very ground that I have freed myself through the epoché; I stand above the world, which has now become for me, in a quite peculiar sense, a phenomenon (Husserl, 1970a, p. 152, §41).

By talking about the pre-giveness of the life-world Husserl goes back from the experienced living present to its genesis, from givenness to its pre-giveness (Luft, 2011). As like

possibility of the external perception is conditioned by the presence of the body similarly, pre-givenness is the condition of possibility of the present givenness (ibid). As each and every experience of the world has its origin likewise givenness of the world logically presupposes the pre-givenness of the world. In this regard Husserl's main concern was to overcome the naïveté regarding this pre-givenness of the world and to address the questions concerning the *being of the world*, which was also accepted by Heidegger. But, Husserl always talks about this *being* in connection with subjectivity which made his philosophy transcendental in nature. In this regard Moran (2012) writes,

Husserl insist that the 'interest' of the phenomenologist cannot be aimed at the *ready-made world*- a term picked up by Hilary Putnam- but rather at explicating the nature of our intentional life as 'accomplishing life' to which we are simply 'blind' in the natural attitude (p. 60).

So, now it is necessary to explore what is that naïveté or what Husserl tried to overcome in his phenomenology of the life-world.

#### **4.5.1. The Crisis of the Meaning of Science and Emergence of the Life-World in Husserl's Phenomenology:**

Husserl in his search for the life-world criticized the spirit of the modern sciences in order to ascertain the concept of the life-world which is immediately given, pre-suppositionless and unmeasured by inductively characterised sciences. But, in criticizing the same, Husserl's attitude toward science cannot be regarded as antagonistic. Husserl did not criticize the scientific discoveries which can be understood from the role he played as a mediator between two traditions of philosophy i.e. analytic and continental (Welton, 2003). The Analytic philosophical tradition which is a scientifically oriented thinking is said to be reflected in Husserl's work, who was a mathematician of his time. As Welton (2003) writes, "Similar to the positivism of his day, Husserl's thought integrates the search for a "natural concept of the world"—which for him culminates in his later theory of the life-world—with the attempt to provide a foundation for the sciences" (p. 33). Therefore, it can be stated that Husserl's phenomenology is not against sciences but the objectivistic attitude of the positive sciences. According to Husserl, in the process of making new advancements science has

failed to reflect on their own foundation and limitations which made them consider as self-sufficient.

To quote Zahavi (2003)

The fundamental problems pertaining to the very (metaphysical) framework within which these sciences operate have been lost from sight, as have questions like ‘What is truth?’, ‘What is knowledge?’, ‘What is reality?’, ‘What is a good and meaningful life?’, and the like....This is why Husserl accuses sciences of having gone bankrupt ethically as well as philosophically (p. 125-126).

In the process of discovering all the anthropocentric elements science is getting de-humanised day by day (Pivčević, 2014). It is confusing to determine what kind of role sciences play in the world and therefore, the value of such disciplines have been overrated and as a result natural sciences are accepted to be the only answer to all the problems (ibid). “Science is built up from the lifeworld experience of human subjects on the basis of acts of abstraction, idealization, reflection, formalization, and so on. The most basic, founding experiences are the everyday life-world activities, practices, and perceptions of people” (Tieszen, 2005, p. 104). This is because of the result of the *scientific revolution* since the time of the *renaissance*, a revolution of adopting the quantitative methods in order to describe the worldly situations, to explain each and every phenomenon of the world in terms of impersonal scientific formulas (Pagès, 2009; Pivčević, 2014; Flynn, 2011; Zahavi, 2013). This crisis in the European sciences according to Husserl is because of the tendency of mathematizing nature of the phenomena into mere facts.

In this regard Pagès (2009) writes:

as a result of the influence of the natural sciences, the life of the spirit is objectified, or the psychic is reduced to its physical properties, then humanity is alienated from itself, because its destiny and being is no longer in its hands. It loses all freedom and responsibility (p. 69).

Therefore, Husserl's transcendental phenomenology in a way can be regarded as an important approach to salvage the European civilization for the crisis of the sciences that also attributed the loss of human face in science and technology that finally culminated in the World War-II. This development or the mathematization of nature according to Husserl goes back to Galileo, who represents this entire venture. This needs little clarification in this regard.

#### **4.5.2. Husserlian interpretation of the New Trend in Sciences for Experiment and Certainty: Galileo Galilei and the Idealization of Nature:**

Husserl in his *Crisis* begins the discussion of modern scientific technological revolution which he recognized as Galilean legacy with the following lines:

FOR PLATONISM, the real had a more or less perfect methexis in the ideal. This afforded ancient geometry possibilities of a primitive application to reality. [But] through Galileo's *mathematization of nature*, nature itself is idealized under the guidance of the new mathematics; nature itself becomes—to express it in a modern way—a mathematical manifold [*Mannigfaltigkeit*] (Husserl, 1970a, p. 23, § 9).

Husserl credited Galileo (1564-1642) as the prosecutor of the scientific revolution because of his introduction of the modern experimental science and also for creating the a priori discipline later known as mathematical physics (Moran & Cohen, 2012)<sup>5</sup>. Husserl discusses about Galileo not only in his *Crisis* but Galileo occupied a prominent space in his various writings. The most important point should be noted here is that Husserl basically attempted to show the Greek origin of science which he considered as the historical roots and thus tried to reactivate the origin of geometry. As a result Husserl tried to give a very meditative and creative re-reading of Galilean achievements. But, one should not expect for a detail and accurate analysis of science from Husserl as Husserl was not a trained historian of sciences (Moran, 2012). Therefore, Husserl's main concern was to understand the meaning of Galileo's *mathematization of nature* which gave birth to the modern sciences.

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<sup>5</sup> Galileo by refuting the *geocentric model* specifically by refuting the Aristotelian physics defended and popularised *Copernican Heliocentric system*. In the early 17th century, he employed practical experiments to validate physical theories, which could be regarded as the key idea in the modern scientific method. Galileo's formulation of the law of inertia became the first law in Newton's laws of motion (Moran & Cohen, 2012).

Husserl alongwith the advocators of scientific revolution of that time like Pierre Duhem, Ernst Cassirer, Alexandre Koyré and Jacob Klein recognized Galileo as the precursor of modern science and modern philosophy. Husserl links both Galileo and Descartes as the forerunner of modern science and philosophy. Descartes by admiring Galilean *heliocentric cosmology* regarded Galilean scientific discoveries as the foundation of his own philosophy (Gaukroger, 1995). But, later on Descartes misinterpreted the sense of the *Ego* with the substantial self, detached from the world and as a result Husserl wrote how scientific minded philosophers forgot the life-world in philosophising their theories. Therefore, Husserl portrays Galileo as the founder of modern philosophy as well.

In this regard Carr (1987) writes:

Husserl traces the origin of modern philosophical problems to the rise of modern science, whose decisive feature is its mathematical character. It is primarily to Galileo that we owe the transformation of the study of nature into a mathematical science, and as soon as this science ‘begins to move toward successful realization, the idea of philosophy in general ... is transformed’. In order to understand the origin of the modern idea of philosophy, we must turn first to what made it possible: Galileo’s ‘mathematization of nature’ (Carr, p. 85).

So, now it is necessary to explain what does *mathematization of nature* mean according to Husserl. *Mathematization of nature* for Husserl is that which attempts to transform the intuitive world into a mathematical manifold and considers the world as a manifold of measurable shapes (Garrison, 1986) Galileo’s main objective was to overcome the subjective description of the world and to attain exactness and rational objectivity about the world which is intersubjectively supported (ibid). Thus, in the process of establishing the scientific objectivism the subjective standpoint along with all its human implications has been set aside (Pivčević, 2014). With the discovery of the a priori discipline like mathematical physics Galileo presented the physical science under the framework of mathematics through *abstraction* (Sinha, 1969). In this regard (Borràs, 2011) maintains that Galileo without questioning the origin of geometry grounded his discoveries on geometry. While on the one hand he tries to liberate science from mythical-religious principles but at the same time his

physics failed to question the primacy and foundation of the geometrical ideals and as a result the modern science grounded its ideals on mathematics under which both nature and human being are idealized. This leads the modern science to accept the whole world under the geometrical formulations and the world including everything under it become a geometrical design. So, the world of science is not the world as it is but only the impersonal formulas and the geometrical ideals gathered after the translation of the experience of the world (Pivčević, 2014). Thus, the aspects of experience which are measurable are taken to be objectively real in Galilean modern science and those which are not treated as subjective and therefore, secondary according to Galileo. “‘To be,’ for Galilean science means ‘to be measurable’” (Garrison, 1986, p. 332). Here an opposition can be found between Galilean applications of geometry with Aristotelian uses of the geometrical *space*. This is important to note here that not only Husserl but very prominent Galilean scholar Alexandre Koyré, who was also a historian of science, had underlined this opposition. According to Koyré (1943)

Aristotelian physics does not admit the right, nor even the possibility, of identifying the concrete world-space of its well-ordered and finite Cosmos with the “space” of geometry, any more than it admits the possibility of isolating a given body from its physical (and cosmical) environment (p. 335).

Moran (2012) forwarded the evidence of Husserlian influence upon Koyré and writes that Koyré himself admitted to Ludwig Landgrebe in 1937 about the influence of Husserl’s Galilean interpretation upon him. Koyré maintains that as a result of the application of geometrical space in science, modern science started emphasizing abstract and ideal space as the *real* space of human experience. Unlike the Aristotelian physics Galileo maintains the necessity of a priority of physics. For him the truths of physics should not be probable but necessary truths and therefore, he talked about the essential application of mathematics in physics. Thus, Koyré maintains that mathematics can be regarded as the grammar of modern science, which gives a priory foundation to modern experimental science (Moran, 2012). Thus, according to Koyré, Galileo not only overcame Aristotle but also went beyond Copernicus and Kepler.

Thus it has been seen so far how Galilean science is characterized by the geometrical idealization of nature. Now in the next phase Husserl talked about the *symbolic*

idealization of nature by the use of the algebraic formalization. In this regard Husserl writes in his *Crisis*:

Mathematics and mathematical science, as a garb of ideas, or the garb of symbols of the symbolic mathematical theories, encompass everything which, for scientists and the educated generally, *represents* the life-world, *dresses it up* as “objectively actual and true” nature (Husserl, 1970a, p. 51, § 9).

Husserl in his *Crisis* disclosed the outcomes of the application of modern symbolic intelligibility of numbers. Husserl throughout his writings never abandoned the intuitive character of an act and as a result his opposition can be noticed with Frege and others in his discovery of *pure logic*. The same is the issue in case of mathematics also. As Burt Hopkins points out though Husserl has not carried out any historical research in his *Crisis* on the origin of numbers but he influenced Jacob Klein indirectly in order to continue his research on the same issue. Klein, in his *Greek Mathematical Thought and the Origin of Algebra* for the first time tried to show the nature and historical (Greek) origin of modern symbolic mathematics (Hartimo, 2011). Hopkins maintains that both Husserl and Klein influenced each other in order to continue their own projects. Hopkins (2011) writes:

One would need only to show how the method and content of Husserl’s path-breaking investigations influenced or otherwise provided the context for Klein’s own research. However, Klein’s work on the historical origination of the meaning of mathematical physics actually preceded Husserl’s work on the same issue by a number of years (p. 16).

The intention of both Husserl and Klein was the same as they tried to show how the modern science lost its meaning and foundation and how the symbolic mathematical representation of nature changed the meaning of the life-world. Klein in his thought provoking writing on the *Greek Mathematical Thought and the Origin of Algebra* reveals the ‘symbolic unreality’ of modern mathematics. As according to him, in Greek mathematical thinking a number is always regarded as a collection of definite and countable units of a specific kind (Hopkins, 2011). But, in modern mathematics since the time of Franciscus Viète (1540-1603) a number is considered as a symbolic representation which is defined in a symbolic calculus by its

relationship with other numbers (Cosgrove, 2008). Viewing from the phenomenological point of view according to Husserl, symbolic numbers are ideal entities which raise questions of intuitive fulfilment. Cosgrove (2008) writes:

Mathematical physics consequently is led to construct a symbolic realm of meaning, transcending the life-world. Indeed, in some mysterious way, nature seems to make an appearance “in person” through this symbolic realm, the latter accessible only to a mathematical-symbolic form of eidetic intuition and in principle hidden from sensuous experience in the life-world (“Conclusion,” para. 4)

Thus, whether there is geometrical idealization or symbolic idealization the modern mathematical physics is based on the general principle of ‘scientific objectivism’. As a result of this idealization a gradual elimination of the anthropocentric element took place within the natural sciences which has crusted the relation between man and science. Scientific knowledge is regarded as the true knowledge which also has been accepted by many philosophers and as a result the standpoint of subjectivity is totally ignored as misleading. Husserl therefore, tries to re-address these issues by focusing his attention on the truths of the life-world (Pivčević, 2014). Thus, now it is necessary to explore Husserlian concept of the life-world in detail.

#### **4.6. Husserl’s Discovery of the Life-World: From Private to Public:**

Kant by denying the possibility of dream world as private world establishes the authenticity of the public world which is a shared world and where one lives with the others. According to Kant, the legitimacy of the dream world is subject to cancellation because the public world rejects it (Barua, 1993). The dream world is at least a matter of rejection or is a meaningful talk for one only because there exists the public world. As Barua (1993) writes, “If the sceptic says that our world is a dream, then Kant’s reply would be two-fold: First, a dream which everybody dreams is no dream. Secondly, we imagine another world only on condition that we actually know this world” (p. 24). Thus, in Kant a shift can be seen from the private to public. Like Kant, Wittgenstein also gives importance upon public world over the private through his analogy of “the private language argument”. Wittgenstein gives the example of

pain in order to establish his position. According to Wittgenstein, pain is a private sensation but the language which describes the pain cannot be a private one. Therefore, he says that the name of a sensation is always intersubjective and shared. As nobody could have others pain, but only could construe it. The meaning of the sensation of one's pain presupposes some sort of external verification for the correct application of it. Therefore, one's individual sensation always needs public verification. In this regard Lascaratou (2007) says "only our ordinary language can serve the purpose of publicly expressing and legitimizing pain" (p. 22). Thus, the shift can be seen from private to public, which is shared and intersubjective, which Husserl in his later philosophy is named as the 'Life-world'.

Thus, it could be seen how Husserl through his phenomenology proceeds toward the life-world, which is intersubjective and a shared public world. Life-world includes both the natural as well as the cultural world which comprises mountains, sky, sea, planets, plants, animals, rivers, human beings, artifacts, art objects, religious objects, language, symbolic systems etc. According to Husserl, though one cannot escape from the sophistications provided by the modern technological developments, no matter how technologically advanced the human beings are, but, every human being is conditioned by the social, economical and cultural necessities and therefore, always lives in a life-world without any exception. Thus, Husserl's student Ludwig Landgrebe writes, "It is essentially impossible to find men in any "pre-worldly" state, because to be human, to be aware of oneself as a man and to exist as a human self, is precisely to live on the basis of a world" (Landgrebe, 1940, p. 53). Husserl in this regard maintains that while at the present time life-world is defined by the scientific developments at the same time the life-world restrains the scientific world within it. In this regard Husserl writes:

Now the scientific world—[the subject matter of] systematic theory—and what is contained in it as existing in scientific truth (in natural science, in the universal theory, [this is] its nature, nature which counts as the substrate of the propositions, the formal ones), like all other worlds [determined by particular] ends, itself "belongs" to the life-world, just as all men and all human communities generally, and their human ends both individual and communal, with all their corresponding working structures, belong to it (Husserl, 1970a, p. 380-381).

In this regard Husserl admonishes the scientifically minded philosophers for forgetting this life-world. According to him, though modern science is helping us to understand our nature in a better way but at the same time it also has a tendency to conceal the life-world from us. In objectifying the experiential dimension into the formalized language of science, in order to construct new formulas and models the modern science overlooks the historical presuppositions of scientific discoveries (Pivacik 2014). Moreover, it has a propensity to forget the world in which we all live and work together, the historical basis of scientific constructions. According to Husserl, to understand the meaning of science or to make sense of science we need to concentrate on the non-scientific presuppositions which are to be found in the life-world (ibid). This can be regarded the key to Husserl's discovery of *The Crisis of the European Sciences and the Phenomenological Philosophy*. According to him, we failed to understand the relationship between science and our everyday experience in the life-world which brings the *Crisis of the Sciences* (Flynn, 2011). As the problem does not lie in the fact that scientific discoveries are misleading but, we are failed to justify their validity in relation to the life-world. As according to Husserl,

The life-world was there for us before science, and even now human beings do not always have scientific interests. We have the intuited, everyday world that is prior to theory, and then the various theories that are built up from this basis. Science thus presupposes the lifeworld as its starting point and cannot therefore replace this world or substitute something else for it (Tieszen, 2005, p. 104).

Therefore, Husserl in his later philosophy understands life-world as that world which includes all the horizon of experience. By criticizing Kant's view regarding the world that the world is not experienceable in itself Husserl regarded the life-world as the horizon of all experiences and where lies a 'world-consciousness'. This is the world which can be experienced directly and immediately as lived as *one* and is present out there. Husserl characterizes this life-world as the world of immediate or the lived experience. For him, in the lived moment there cannot be any presupposition of experience. In this regard (Flynn, 2011) by following Husserl gives an example where he talks about crossing a road while a car runs a red light. In that moment as Flynn says one would instinctively run from the

crosswalk to the sidewalk to avoid getting hit. In this situation as Flynn says nobody will think or enquire about the real existence of the car, but will try to get rid of the situation and will act accordingly. Moreover, the experience of the life-world includes the value objects and the practical objects, but not the objects of the natural sciences.<sup>6</sup> Thus, there could be found Husserl's distinction between the scientific understandings of platinum with perceptually experienced object of the life-world like "a heavy lump of hard, cold metal in the hand" (Moran, 2012, p. 191). Husserl writes in his *Crisis*:

Prescientifically, the world is already a spatiotemporal world; to be sure, in regard to this spatiotemporality there is no question of ideal mathematical points, of "pure" straight lines or planes, no question at all of mathematically infinitesimal continuity or of the "exactness" belonging to the sense of the geometrical a priori. The bodies familiar to us in the life-world are actual bodies, but not bodies in the sense of physics. The same thing is true of causality and of spatiotemporal infinity. [These] categorial features of the life-world have the same names but are not concerned, so to speak, with the theoretical idealizations and the hypothetical substructions of the geometrician and the physicist (Husserl, 1970a, p. 139-140).

Husserl's main objective in his *Crisis* was to uncover the roots of the *mathesis universalis* or of the modern sciences, to uncover the first layer of consciousness, which is pure and prior to any kind of theorization (Dastur, 1983). Living in the life-world, according to Husserl means "straightforwardly living toward whatever objects are given, thus toward the world-horizon, in normal, unbroken constancy" (Husserl, 1970a, p. 144). As Welton (2005) writes,

The human being that is "accepted" by the world receives this world as a gift. It is true that there is no gift without a donation and a donator, no given world without encountering other human persons and their works. But it is also true that works of art, for example, that disclose the world give more than an artist could ever give; the given world has a meaning that goes beyond what was given to it by a person or even by the infinite community of all human beings (p. 34).

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<sup>6</sup> For example in those situations as explained by Flynn one never concentrates upon the car like who made the car, what technicality has been used in making the car, but instead experiences the car as an value object.

By criticizing the discovery of Descartes, Husserl maintains that Descartes has misinterpreted the ego-pole and regarded that ego as material self and could not discover the transcendental ego-pole correlated with the world. Therefore, Descartes could not go further and kept the external world under the veil of doubt. But, while Husserl started his phenomenology through his methods he reached to a point which he regarded as the *absolute ego* pole or the *transcendental subjectivity* (Pivcevic, 2014). The most important point here is that according to Husserl, it is not the fact that only the specific cultural objects or artefacts are fundamentally entangled with the subjectivity. Rather as Husserl maintains that the world as a whole is entwined with the life or the subjectivity which gives birth to the *life-world* as a whole. This is the lived and shared world experienced in an ongoing life of the transcendental subjectivity or intersubjectivity. Thus, Husserl regarded that this transcendental intersubjectivity collectively constitute this world, a world not only for the humans but also for the other sentient beings. But this constitution is not a one way process. In the process of constituting the world the self also constitutes itself as in every passing moment the phenomena unveils various mysterious realms which keeps the self constituting in a continuous way. This can be regarded as the characterizing feature of Husserlian phenomenology where alongwith the others and the world the self also constitutes itself. According to Husserl as marked by Staiti (2014)

There is no such thing as pre-existing world and a life that happens to live in it or a pure life that creatively spins the world out of itself, as it were. Rather, transcendental life is at bottom nothing but this world-in-the-making (*it geht auf in it*), and the world is nothing but this life-world (p. 250).

In this regard it can be stated that Husserl is convincing enough to offer full responsibility to human being in order to nurture and to take care of the world for its future generation. Husserl's *universal world* or the *all-world* is an attempt to unite the plurality of the home-worlds into one *universal world* which can be regarded as a philosophical telos of humanity. This world cannot be ruled by technological rationality which is fixed and one-dimensional. "The constitution of the world therefore, according to Husserl belongs to a pure Ego that, while constituting the world, "enworlds" itself to become a human person" (Bernet, 2005, p. 35). Husserl gives much more emphasis upon the *being-in-the-world* of the human person where the two are essentially intertwined with each-other. Thus, for Husserl, philosophy

could make a valuable rational contribution, in order to constitute this world by guiding “the march of history toward its telos of a world” (ibid).

#### **4.7. Concluding Remarks and Basic Findings of the Chapter:**

From the above discussions a clear indication is made how Husserlian phenomenology keeps room for transcendental intersubjectivity that constitutes the world, not of objects as such but its meaningful dimension. Interestingly enough, the subjectivity that constitutes its objectivity also constitutes itself in the process. Thus, transcendental subjectivity in Husserl has gained an additional depth in order to regulate and formulate the meaning dimension of phenomena, encompassing the world, embodiment and intersubjectivity that is essentially tied with its subjectivity. This added dimension in transcendental subjectivity differs from Kantian domain of transcendental subjectivity, because in Husserl even the subject remains vulnerable by keeping room for being constituted. It goes on to constitute the world which is pre-given and pre-logical which Husserl named as the *life-world*.

On the basis of this constitution Husserl’s phenomenology has been divided into two parts i.e. the static and the genetic phenomenology. While static phenomenology concentrates upon the constitution of the objects like how the objects appear into the consciousness or how objects are constituted in consciousness, genetic phenomenology on the other hand explores the history of this constitution (Kortooms, 2002). Thus, genetic phenomenology presupposes the basic concept that the “ego” is not an empty pole of identity, but it has its own history (ibid). This leads us to the next chapter that will unveil the value dimension of transcendental subjectively under genetic phenomenology.

## Chapter-V

### Genetic Phenomenology and the Hidden depth of the Person: Phenomenology as Ethical Life in Husserl:

#### 5.1. Introduction

In Husserlian exploration of subjectivity toward its last phase there could be seen an exploration of genesis of the transcendental subjectivity which divides Husserlian phenomenology into two parts i.e. static and genetic phenomenology. While static phenomenology is concerned about the constitution of the objective world genetic phenomenology goes to explore the universal genesis of the “ego”, *reflective* in nature. In this background the chapter proceeds to study the historicity and temporality of the transcendental subjectivity by centering round culturally uprooted tradition. The chapter further explores the ethical responsibility of the human person, who is also a transcendently purified subjectivity by showing the alienated aspects of the life-world. Further it tries to see certain similarities between Husserl and Freud in terms of their purpose to safeguard the life in the world in general.

Husserl associated the analysis of genetic phenomenology with Psychology in his “Logical Investigations”. Husserl develops his notion of genetic phenomenology from 1917 onwards. Since the time Husserl associated himself with the analysis of psychological enquiry he equated genesis with existential psychology. But, at the same time he was also convinced by the fact that genesis carries the significant character of experience. Since, the time of *Bernau manuscripts* of 1917-1918<sup>7</sup> Husserl made a shift and started to emphasize a new and real idea of genetic phenomenology.

In this new sense Husserl left the earlier notion of genetic phenomenology where he emphasized it as an experience of causal and psychological explanation and regarded it as an “apriori grasp of the motivational connection of transcendental consciousness” (As cited in Liangkang, 2010, p. 194). Husserl continues the same in *Cartesian Meditations* as well. However, in *Cartesian Meditations* Husserl established an internal relationship between Genesis and Time which will be discussed subsequently. In a manuscript written in 1921 Husserl equates genetic phenomenology with constitutive

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<sup>7</sup> *Bernau manuscripts* are considered as the re-elaboration and re-thinking of the problems which Husserl dealt with after the year of 1905.

phenomenology. But, by constitution Husserl does not mean the constitution of objects, which is a direct form of constitution but only of the “ego” which is *reflective* in nature (Liangkang, 2010). This is the point which differentiates static phenomenology from genetic phenomenology. Husserl himself maintains in his *Cartesian Meditations* that within the static phenomenology descriptions fall under the *natural history* ordered in a systematic manner, concerning a particularity in type (Husserl, 1982). But, Husserl gradually came to recognize the fact that “Questions of universal genesis and the genetic structure of the ego in his universality, so far as that structure is more than temporal formation, are still far away; and, indeed, they belong to a higher level” (ibid, p. 76-77). Thus, there could be seen a change in Husserlian line of thinking which has become more prominent with his analysis of “history” in the study of “genesis”. Husserl in his fourth Meditation gives stress upon the universal genesis of the “ego” and writes, “The ego constitutes himself for himself in, so to speak, the unity of a “history” ” (ibid, p. 75). Husserl has defined the idea of *history* in his *Crisis*. According to him, “history is from the start nothing other than the vital movement of the co-existence and the interweaving of original formations and sedimentations of meaning” (Husserl, 1970a, p. 371). Thus, Husserl did not explore history literally but he only explored the depth dimension of it and regarded that as “historicity” which he developed in the later phase of his phenomenological enquiry. Now, it is necessary to explore what does Husserl meant by “historicity”.

## **5.2. Historicity in Husserl’s Analysis:**

Husserl in 1923 in his lectures on ‘First Philosophy’ discussed about history where he separated history and systematic philosophy and placed the history of philosophy as an introduction to the systematic aspect. But, at the same time Husserl here did not form history as an integral part of the *things-in-themselves*. He started doing that with the *Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology* published in 1936. In his *Crisis* Husserl gives utmost importance to history and started to emphasize it very seriously and thematized it in a different way which can be regarded as a new approach of Husserl’s phenomenology (Stroker, 1997). Dermot Moran here gives credit to Fink who according to him, influenced Husserl to recognize the contribution of Hegel in order to understand the history of consciousness (Moran, 2012).

Husserl in his *Crisis* emphasizes the fact that we are historical beings; this is particularly true for the philosophers as according to him,

We as philosophers are heirs of the past in respect to the goals which the word “philosophy” indicates, in terms of concepts, problems, and methods. What is clearly necessary (what else could be of help here?) is that we *reflect back*, in a thorough *historical* and *critical* fashion, in order to provide, *before all decisions*, for a radical self-understanding: we must inquire back into what was originally and always sought in philosophy, what was continually sought by all the philosophers and philosophies that have communicated with one another historically (Husserl, 1970a, p. 17-18).

Thus, with the introduction of history in phenomenology, various new questions have been raised like what will be the status of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology or whether history brings a new path in Husserl’s phenomenology by taking a break from the earlier one. The most important point at this juncture is to analyse what Husserl meant while he talks about “history” in his phenomenology. The question in this regard is what does one mean by the *history of the experience of the world*? And whose history is this? By *history* Husserl here is not talking about the ‘factual history’ or ‘external history’ of the experience of an individual or a group/community of people (Crowell, 2009). Rather Husserl here talks about the ‘inner history’ or ‘historicity’ disclosed by transcendental reduction which he regarded as the ‘transcendental historicity’ (ibid). Historicity according to Husserl is therefore referred to as “interested in the laws of genesis of consciousness, insofar as it, whether as individual or group-consciousness, lives into a world and forms (“constitutes”) this world through its passive and active intentionalities” (Luft 2011, p. 114). Moreover, Husserl says:

history is the domain of habit, the sedimented, tradition, the intersubjective, the social, the communal, -- life lived according to settled norms and values. Human activities cohere together into traditions and shape specific cultures with their own particular way of developing and unfolding (which Husserl usually calls ‘historicity’) (Moran, 2012 p.142).

In this regard it is necessary to mention here that Husserl while talking about “history” he was aware of the importance of intersubjectivity. The crucial point here is that though Husserl talks about “history” in his *Cartesian Meditations* but, history as Husserl analyzed in his *Cartesian Meditations* is different from the understanding of history in the *Crisis*, where history means the “history” of *transcendental intersubjectivity*. Husserl maintains that,

The historical world is, to be sure, first pre-given as a social historical world. But it is historical only through the inner historicity of the individuals, who are individuals in their inner historicity, together with that of other communalized persons (As cited in Husserl, 1970a, p. 372).

Thus, if history according to Husserl has to be the history of *transcendental intersubjectivity* then methodically it must have to overcome the transcendental reduction. So, now it is necessary to analyse how in Husserl's phenomenology the relation between history and transcendental phenomenology could be understood.

According to Husserl, the world cannot be constituted other than a historically structured transcendental community of subjects. Therefore, Husserl before the publication of *Crisis* in an unpublished manuscript in 1932 says that "the world thus bears within itself an essential historicity *prior* to the question of factual history ...." (As cited in Ströker 1997, p. 221). Thus, historicity according to Husserl could not be understood as factual history but, as a *formation of transcendental historicity* and this can be obtained through phenomenology by questioning back from the pre-given world. For Husserl, "history is from the start nothing other than the vital movement of the co-existence and the interweaving of original formations and sedimentations of meaning" (Husserl, 1970a, p. 371). By *transcendental historicity* Husserl means an a priori condition that makes historical living possible. By a priori condition Husserl talks about various sedimented layers like cultural, historical, genetic etc. which constitutes a meaningful background by making life possible historically (Moran, 2012). By *historicity*, Husserl means here the historical orientation, trajectories, horizons of pasts and destinies in history of the human communities or socialities (ibid). *Historicity* for Husserl is not sense constitution but sense sedimentation. It means how human groups have been constituted and lives out across various interchanges and transmissions of the generations. According to Husserl, each and every community or groups whether social or cultural has its own historicity or structural way of evolving its history and its relation to the future (ibid). Therefore, Husserl in his *Crisis* talks about European civilization and the richness of its heritage.

But, the most crucial point here is that the analysis of historicity is not possible without talking about temporality. As it is a fact that each and every *historicity* has its own

stages of development. As history takes place in time e.g. in 'era', 'epoch' etc. historicity too develops along with a temporal horizon. But, at the same time it should also be noted that by temporality Husserl here is not talking about the objective time or clock time. So, what temporality is that is necessary to understand here and how both historicity and temporality complement each other and shapes tradition that is also another topic to discuss further.

### **5.3. Temporal Horizon in Husserl's Late Phenomenology:**

The intersubjective analysis Husserl made in his *Cartesian Meditations* can be regarded as purely static in nature. The reason of the same can be explained by following Ströker (1997) as follows:

Husserl investigates intersubjectivity according to the model of communication and mutual relationship between two egos only, he allows them to appear only through mutual sense perception as bodily beings in exclusively spatial encounters, whereas the temporal dimension is not taken into account at all.... Husserl does not take into consideration those horizons in which it is already founded, namely, the horizons of temporally structured consciousness and the "fusion" (*Verschmelzung*) of *genetically* constituted horizons of the egos in their transcendental community (p. 218).

Husserl's most well known thesis is that consciousness is not static. Consciousness not only could encompass the present moment but also what has already been occurred and about to occur (Zahavi, 2010). Thus, the most obvious question in this regard is that how consciousness could encompass both which is no longer and not yet present. Husserl in his 1905 lectures talks about the unification of the succession of various phases of time through experience. Therefore, it can be said that in Husserl the stream of consciousness always comprises a collection of experiences unified over time. But, the crucial point here is that what does the term 'temporality' mean in Husserl's phenomenology. It is important to note here that in phenomenology 'temporality' cannot be measured by atomic clock because; here time does not refer to any objective or cosmic time (Husserl, 1991). Temporality or as Husserl mentioned the "inner time consciousness" refers here a stream of consciousness which is a unified whole (ibid). To explain this unification an example can be given of seeing

a house. To get the total experience of a house one needs to move around the house. Thus, in moving around the house one perceives various profiles of the house at various moments. But, these various profiles like the front, back, side of the house do not appear as disjointed profiles. So, the total experience of the house is not restricted with only one profile of the house but is a unification of the whole house. Thus, there could be seen a synthesis among various experiences in case of seeing a house. This synthesis according to Husserl is temporal in nature (ibid). Thus, the experience of the house as a house would be impossible if it is restricted only with the experience of a given “now point”. In this regard Husserl said that temporality can be explained as ‘duration-block’ (Husserl, 1991). By ‘duration-block’ Husserl means the temporal field of the stream of consciousness which comprises all three temporal modes of past, present and future. Thus, by following Husserl it can be said that

when I experience a melody, I don't simply experience a knife edge presentation of one note, which is then completely washed away and replaced with the next knife-edge presentation of the next note. Rather, consciousness retains the sense of the first note as I hear the second note a hearing that is also enriched by an anticipation of the next note (Gallagher & Zahavi, 2012, p. 84).

In this connection Husserl talks about the presence of the non-temporal content in the experience of the temporal objects and accordingly he employs three technical terms to explain this temporal structure of consciousness. They are (i) Primal impression (ii) retentive aspect and (iii) protentive aspect. By primal impression Husserl here refers to the ‘now-point’ of an object. But the point should be noted here is that primal impression could never be occurred in isolation and could not provide the perception of a temporal object alone. It must essentially be accompanied by a retentive aspect which gives the consciousness of the just-past moment of the object by providing the past directed temporal context to the primal impression. And finally, protentive aspect is that which gives future oriented temporal context to the primal impression (Husserl, 1997).

To quote Gallagher & Zahavi (2008)

If we listen to a conversation, it is the retentional aspect which keeps the intentional sense of the words of a sentence available even after the auditory signals are no longer there. Furthermore, when I utter a sentence, I have some anticipatory sense of where the sentence is going, or at the very least, that the sentence is heading to some kind of ending. This sense of knowing where the sentence (the thought) is heading, even if not completely definite, seems essential to the experience I have of speaking in a meaningful way. It is the protentional aspect of consciousness which provides us with this intentional anticipation of something about to happen (p. 77).

To explain clearly Husserl maintains that the just-past moment does not remain present in consciousness physically; rather it is retained in consciousness as just-past only. According to Husserl, the crucial point is that retention provides us with the *intuition* of the just-past sense of the object (Husserl, 1991). And therefore, consciousness retains the just-past moment only as a part of an intentional structure. To speak briefly,

the retentional consciousness, in contrast to phantasy and recollection, is indeed not an act of representation [*Vergegenwärtigung*], but nevertheless is a modified consciousness of a (former) original present. The retentional consciousness of the past is therefore neither a reproductive representation of the past like recollection, nor a simple making-present [*Gegenwärtigung*] of the present like the original perception, but is the modified perception of a past (Bernet, 2010, p. 4-5).

Along with this while Husserl talks about protention he talks about the element of surprise in protention (Thompson & Zahavi, 2007; Gallagher & Zahavi, 2012). For example, if someone is singing a song and picked up a wrong note immediately the person who is listening to that song could understand that and that might also create disappointment to the listener (Gallagher & Zahavi, 2012). Similarly, if someone speaks an incomplete sentence immediately the listener could feel the incompleteness of the sentence (ibid). Therefore, it can be stated that each and every kind of lived experience is a unified whole of the threefold

structure of temporal elements i.e. *protention-primal impression-retention* consequently. The most crucial point should be noted here by quoting Dan Zahavi is that “The primal impression, retention, protention are not related to each other as present, past, and future. Rather it is their conjunction which makes possible the senses of present, past, and future” (Zahavi, 2010, p. 323). Husserl, in his later writing regarded this horizon as inner time-consciousness where experiences are constituted pre-reflectively.

Thus, it can be stated here that the inner time-consciousness is the pre-reflective self-manifestation of experiences. The stream of consciousness is given pre-reflectively without having any other influences and therefore it is called as self-luminous. But, the most vital point should be mentioned here by referring back to the *Bernau Manuscripts* is that “In order to acquire a constitutive signification, the pre-intentional hyletic originary stream thus needs to undergo a thorough modification which consists in a subsequent performance of an egoic act of reflection on it” (Bernet, 2010, p. 9). By modification Husserl means here the perception of an intentional object which is given pre-reflectively needs to undergo a subjective act of reflection in order to thematize the experience (Zahavi, 2012). So, by following this it can be said that reflection occurs after the givenness of our experiences as objects. But, the crucial question is how our experiences could become the objects of the same subjects because, the experiences that one have are part of the same subjective experiences. This may further carry infinite regress and as a result Husserl himself rejected the idea in his various writings (Bernet, 2010; Zahavi, 2012). To quote Zahavi (2012);

To sum up, I do not think the account offered by Husserl in the *Bernau Manuscripts* is systematically satisfactory. However, as I have already indicated, I also believe that it is a view that Husserl himself, for the most part, rejected. This is so not only in *Logische Untersuchungen* and *Einleitung in die Logik und Erkenntnistheorie*, but also in *Zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins* (p. 333-334).

Thus, against the notion of Bernau Manuscripts the inner time-consciousness could be regarded as that flow or unity of consciousness comprising the structure of protention-primal

impression-retention which is pre-reflective, given in the first-personal attitude or occurs in the innermost part of experience.

In this regard it could be mentioned here that many scholars tried to equate Husserlian concept of temporality with William James's (1842-1910) concept of "specious present". Scholars like Aron Gurwitsch (1943), Errol Harris (1988), John Brough (1970) to name a few tried to associate both the positions very frequently (Gallagher, 1998). But analysis showed that though Husserl read James's chapter on "The Perception of Time" where James talks about "specious present" but Husserlian temporality is very much different from Jamesian concept of "specious present". As according to James the immediate past is only the part of the experience of the "specious present" as "specious present" demands only the momentary act of consciousness (Hoy, 2009; Gallagher, 1998). Therefore, it could be said that for James memory is not the necessary condition for temporality. On the other hand, Husserl has not made any distinction between immediate past and remembered past like James and has not concentrated on objective time. Therefore it could be said that "Husserl's phenomenological task is thus to describe duration, which is a particular kind of intentional experience, different from James's specious present" (Hoy, 2009, p. 50). Alongwith William James Henri Bergson (1859-1941) has also been associated with Husserl in many respects. Indeed Husserl himself at a conference organized by Alexandre Koyré at the Göttingen Circle in 1911, reported to have said that "We are the true Bergsonians" (Spiegelberg, 1965, p. 399). This needs little clarification here.

### **5.3.1. Husserl and Bergson on Temporality:**

Though Bergson was not a true phenomenologist but Bergsonian approach of temporality has various similarities with Husserlian concept of temporality. Bergson was born in the same year Husserl born in 1859. It is evident that most of the prominent figures of phenomenology like Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau Ponty discussed about Bergson in their respective works. Although there could be found similarities among them the most crucial difference between them arises with the issue of the experience of an object. In both Husserl and Bergson experience of an object involves the actualization of the indeterminate elements of a manifold. "For Bergson and Husserl, then, one of the basic laws of experience is the 'explication' or actualization of the indeterminate elements of a manifold – the synthesis of

indeterminate elements into a concrete object of experience” (Winkler, 2006, p. 97). This is because the object always contains a manifold of distinct appearances which finally unveils the actual object which also can be regarded as the unity of a perceived object. In this regard Husserl talks about the tactual and visual form of an object i.e. the form and the matter of an object (Ibid). Interestingly enough, form and matter of an object cannot be perceived at one go. To perceive an object it must be given from some orientation. Therefore, an object might have changing spatial orientations as it is not possible to perceive an object only from one particular point of view. So, the object will be something more than even if there exists infinite numbers of spatial orientations (Ibid). Thus, Husserl maintains that the perception of the spatial object is not quantifiable. On the other hand, according to Bergson, it is “intuition” which is primordially connected with things and therefore, it has direct access to the interior of things without mediated by any other sign or symbol (Hoy, 2009). Bergson gives higher position to intuition and distinguishes it from intelligence, logic and instinct. According to Bergson, there are two approaches to know a thing i.e. relatively, which is perspectival or absolutely, by going directly into the thing and grasping it as a whole (Kreps, 2015). While analysis provides with the relative knowledge of the thing, intuition gives the knowledge of the absolute (ibid). For Bergson, It is an empirical process which focused upon the immediate sensory experience of a real object.

Bergson relates intelligence to the ordinary mode by which he claims objects are conceived. Intelligence makes the circuit of the object, observing its various facets and relating them to one another through a more or less conscious geometry. Intuition, he says on the other hand, takes us inside the object, into its interior reality; it moves us beyond the opposition of thesis and antithesis characteristic of the Kantian antimonies (Hoy, 2009, p. 51).

For Bergson, as intuition grasps the interior reality of an object therefore, consciousness does not have any role in the constitution of an object. According to Bergson, constitution is the task of analytical intelligence. But, in case of Husserl, constitution is that act through which an object is given in consciousness.

Jean-Paul-Sartre and Jacques Taminiaux by criticizing Bergson's approach affirmed that

Bergson was not of the opinion that consciousness must have a correlate, or, to speak like Husserl, that a consciousness is always consciousness of something. Consciousness, for Bergson, seems to be a kind of quality, a character simply given; very nearly a sort of substantial form of reality (As cited in Dupont, 2014, p. 53).

For Bergson intuition provides the direct awareness of one's own consciousness, one's own inner life or the interior awareness of objects. Thus, he regarded this flowing of one's personality or awareness over time as *duration* or *durée* (Fitz, 2001). As both Bergson and Husserl talks about manifold but, in case of Bergson there does not exist any principle in order to transcend the manifold as for him *duration* is a *creative* and *changing* manifold. So, how could there exist any transcending element in order to stop this *creative* and *changing* process of *duration*. But, in case of Husserl there is a transcending element which he affirmed as *prescriptive* or sometimes he called it as *ideal unity* or *telos*. . "Reflection on experience can tell us that what is intended in a manifold of changing perspectives is the "*consciousness of the same object*"." (Winkler, 2006, p. 99). The object might be perceived from different orientations at different points of time but the object would be the same and consciousness would also be of the same object. Thus, "the *whole of conscious life is unified synthetically*. . . The *fundamental form* of this universal synthesis...is the all-embracing *consciousness of internal time*" (Husserl, 1982, p. 42-43). For Husserl it is the 'time' only which combines the consciousness with consciousness into a stream of experience.<sup>8</sup> But, according to Bergson, time is that which goes beyond the human condition and could be known through intuition only and regarded it as "*the direct vision of the mind by the mind*" (Bergson, 1946, p. 29). Thus, whatever both Husserl and Bergson said about temporality, it would be incomplete unless we discuss the concept of *memory* employed by both the philosophers. It is memory only which brings life to consciousness either in form of recollection or retention.

Memory, according to Bergson, is pure recollection, while for Husserl it is retention. Memory is that factor which continues the identity of a thing or a self. According to Husserl, there are two kinds of memory they are the "primary memory" or "retention" and "secondary memory" or "recollection" which contains the usual sense of the terms

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<sup>8</sup> By the consciousness with consciousness Husserl meant the consciousness of a manifold at different point of time.

“memory”. In order to understand Husserlian concept of retention Kreps (2015) in his book explained it very clearly and says that according to Husserl, while the point “A” occurs at a “now” point of time that can be regarded as a present perception. But, this “now” point is not an eternal point of time, it does not endure forever. So, when a new “now” point like “B” appears, the earlier “A” point does not fade away, it just runs off to the past. So, now though “A” is not fully present, it is still given to the consciousness but as a past present. Now, at point “C” both “A” and “B” would still retain in consciousness but in a peripheral manner while, the point “A” would be given in a more peripheral manner than “B”. But the point should be noted here is that both “A” and “B” are still given in consciousness. Thus, this process would continue so forth. This can be regarded as the retention of the retention which is the condition of temporal progression (Ibid). Again, by talking about secondary memory Husserl said that it is possible only on the basis of retention.

Here a particular former “now” is given again, but not as past, but as being present again. This true memory, or recollection, is a synthetic act. Husserl calls memory an act of representation, for the past is literally re-presented, made present again. It is a bringing together of a present act (the recollection with) a past act (the former seeing or hearing). However, it is not a complete merging of the two acts; otherwise there would be no distinction between the remembering and what is remembered (Buckley, 1992, p. 86).

Thus, Husserl maintains that in an act of true memory though everything is not always recalled but they always retained by keeping the scope of recollection. Paul Ricoeur notes, “because what runs off from it ‘still’ belongs to it; beginning is beginning to continue” (Ricoeur, 1988, p. 30). Thus, it seems that Husserl explains his phenomenology of temporality diachronically while on the other hand Bergson explores it synchronically (Hoy, 2009). Like Husserl, Bergson also denies the objective clock time and goes for a temporal flow by talking about the inner time graspable through intuition. But, while Husserl explains temporal flow as a continuous process on the other hand Bergson explains how the past is present in the present experience not as present but precisely as past (ibid). According to Bergsonian exploration, past is meaningful only in light of the present. Thus, duration in Bergson involves past, present and future as co-existing elements but not as successive moments. In this regard Merleau Ponty regarded Bergsonian account of duration as an attempt of assembling past, present and future in order to express the “oneness” of time at

any given moment (ibid). Merleau Ponty by criticizing Bergsonian account of duration stated that “Bergson’s snowball account, in its preoccupation with forcing everything to accumulate in the present, does not sufficiently explain how we distinguish whether a given moment is a past, present, or future moment” (ibid, p. 121). Thus, Merleau Ponty said that Bergsonian account of time could not establish the independence of the past. As for him, viewing the past from the eyes of the present makes the past dependent on the present.

Thus, by concluding the discussion it could be said that though there could be found various similarities in Husserl and Bergson regarding phenomenology of temporality but it is also true that in Bergson it is not possible to leveling up the past, present and the future. In Bergson one could remember the past with the help of the present and same is the issue with the future as well. But, for Husserl, remembering does not involve only recollecting the past events like information. Alongwith remembering Husserl also talks about re-living the past at present moment. For him, the memory of the past is not fixed but can be re-lived in the present moment which could also render various new horizons. Therefore, Husserl talks about the element of forgetting. As according to him, if there is no forgetting then it would be like computer memory or storehouse of information. Thus, by following Husserl it could be said that memory of the past does not involve simply remembering of certain past events only but it also involves sense of joy, lost, guilt etc. of those past events which now sometimes either I would like to rectify or re-live. Therefore, Husserl has never emphasized upon fixed time expressed by certain phrases like “Once upon a time”, “at one time” etc. Thus, in explaining the concept of temporality Husserl stated that consciousness is like a stream or unity where experiences flows like waves which cannot be viewed like the wagons in the same train. According to him, temporality is a continuous flow where everything takes place including historical events. And thus, by taking various elements from different generations, diverse cultural backgrounds, historical trajectories traditions take shape.

Finally, from the above discussion of *historicity* and *temporality* it could be stated that both are interconnected in Husserl’s phenomenology. Therefore, Husserl talks about the *historical time* and its division into *historical eras*.

he centres these around the “now” of my life and its experience, with its horizons of the past and future, and then calls for a “parallel” way of looking at the life of society in its historically concrete unities, such as marriage, family, tribe, people, nation. It is only through the continuous life of such unities, from generation to generation, that tradition takes shape, and it is tradition that “fills” historical time as the present and the past (Ströker, 1997, p. 233).

Therefore, Husserl’s concept of *historicity* and *temporality* could be understood from broader perspective only which contributes in the formation of tradition and finally the Life-World. Now, it is important to discuss what Husserl meant by the tradition and how it contributes to form the Life-World.

#### **5.4. Husserl on Tradition and Culture:**

In his *Crisis* Husserl explicitly explains the negative outcomes of the theoretical crisis over natural and human sciences which results in a very serious spiritual as well as intellectual crisis of the western culture as a whole. According to him, the tremendous success of the modern, exact sciences ended up in an overly naive reception of an *objectivistic* approach which ignores very serious issues related to human values. Crisis as Husserl conceived,

is viewed as the critical point when Reason's two antagonistic approaches - objectivism and transcendentalism - clash or, to use more existential terms, when the loss of meaning entailed by the oblivion of origins and the seizure of meaning required by authentic rationalism, whose task it is to re-ignite the elemental forces, come into collision (Million, 1991, p. 67).

This is a crisis which brings failure to the teleological design of the nature by creating a detachment from the origin. Husserl regarded this origin as the historical reflection of the self. By historical reflection Husserl meant of tracing the origin back to the past events emerged in a culturally relative tradition (Hopkins, 2010). Therefore, Husserl asserts that, “It is in the midst of an endless world of traditions that human existence moves on. The cultural

world, as a whole and in all its pageants, rises from Tradition” (As cited in Million 1991, p. 68). “Thus phenomenology turns into a meditation on the traditional substantiality of cultural advances, in so far as this traditional substantiality is the very embodiment of their being historical” (Million 1991, p. 68).

Thus, Husserl talks about tradition, community, and culture in his philosophy and emphasizes for a normal community where each and every individual member of the society experiences other members as equal. Husserl gives various examples of such communities which include primitive cultures on the one way and the practical communities on the other. By primitive culture, Husserl meant the cultures of the Europe, China and India and by practical he talks about certain communities like scientists, artists, and religious believers. These according to him, are the normal communities as their members shared common and practical realities. Husserl described that the experiences shared by the members of a community is reciprocal and therefore he asserts that:

*A human community, in which each [human being] experiences every other as a with-subject of the same world of experience in the sense that each has, in his or her own experience, direct or indirect access to all the realities of this world, is a normal community. Each [member] of such a community experiences the others and himself as normal. In this sense, the folk of “primitive people” is normal in relation to their world, the one pre-given to them and accommodated in reciprocal acquisition of experiences (As cited in Heinämaa 2013, p. 92).*

To understand this community feeling Husserl refers here the example of European culture or humanity and speaks of Europe as a “spiritual shape” (Hopkins, 2010). But, by referring Europe Husserl here does not talk about Europe as it is understood geographically. He discusses this especially in his *Vienna Lecture* and *Crisis*. According to Husserl, European culture is that which gives birth to the western philosophy and the sciences emerged from Philosophy. For him, Europe refers to “the unity of a spiritual life, activity, creation, with all its ends, interests, cares and endeavours, with its products of purposeful activity, institutions, organizations” (Husserl, 1970a, p. 273; vi 319). Husserl traces the origin of this spiritual Europe to the Ancient Greece in the seventh and sixth centuries B.C.E. (Hopkins, 2010).

According to Husserl, with the Greeks there has been emerged a new attitude toward the surrounding world, which can be regarded as the *theoretical attitude* (Hopkins, 2010; Moran & Cohen 2012; Moran, 2012; et. all). “The theoretical attitude is that of the impartial, disinterested, ‘non-participating spectator or what he came to refer to in short as the *transcendental attitude*, or simply *theoria*” (Moran, 2012, p. 46). As per Husserl’s understanding this theoretical attitude is the true philosophical attitude and a breakthrough from the normal ‘natural attitude’ (ibid). According to Husserl, Philosophy as a rigorous science depends upon self-conscious reflection and clarification. It begins its task with ‘self-experience’ and ‘self-knowledge’ and therefore, can be regarded as a paradigm of grounded knowledge (ibid). This is why Husserl regarded Philosophy as the harbinger of the very essence of the European rationality and especially Greek philosophy for its revolutionary innovative attitude and for providing re-orientation of the ideas of *abstraction* and *infinity*. Theoretical attitude has a communal sense, an universal life-interest where men come closer to one another in order to work interpersonally and strives to bring about *theoria* and only *theoria* and finally a new Truth.

With the appearance of Greek philosophy and its first formulation, through consistent idealization, of the new sense of infinity, there is accomplished in this respect a thoroughgoing transformation (*Umwandlung*) which finally draws all ideas of finitude and with them all spiritual culture and its [concept of] mankind into its sphere (Husserl, 1970a, p. 279).

Thus, according to Husserl, the positive attitude which European culture had received from Greeks lost its meaning because of the process of theorization and mathematization tendency of modern objective sciences. The modern objective sciences without referring back to its origin started to interpret each and every sphere of life according to their convenience. But, technological advancements without “spiritual” developments could lead toward massive disasters like the destructions of Hiroshima and rain forests (Buckley, 1992). Thus, the crisis occurred and the world had witnessed the devastating experience of the First World-War. The war as claimed by Pierra Trotignon generated a radical break of Europe from its twenty-five centuries old cultural and rational heritage which had been guiding Europe from its very origin (ibid). Thus, it can be said that crisis occurs when there is a tendency of forgetting the root or origin. European culture which tends to forget its Greek origin could be referred as an

example of forgetting our life-world which can be regarded the main reason behind all kinds of intellectual as well as ethical crisis of today's world. So, this is the time to discuss that lost sense of meaning of the life in the life-world by following Husserl.

### **5.5. Loss of the Meaning of Life in the Life-World:**

Life-world as already explained is the primordial foundation of everything existed today. The modern scientific world also refers back to the pre-scientific life-world from where it originally sprung from. Husserl regarded this life-world as “the ground of all praxis” (Husserl, 1970a, §37). This is the world, where ‘We’ live in accordance with our body and personal way of living without having any geometrical shape or mathematical design inside the brain (ibid). It is the pre-given world where living means free living without having any prejudices alongwith other human beings, societies, states, countries, cultures etc. Here, life is essentially celebrated in all the happy moments, where relations are very precious and where people equally feel pain in all the gloomy days. This is the world of each and every inanimate and animate creatures. In this regard one can refer here the concept of home-world and alien-world which are merged into one and the only life-world. In this regard J.N. Mohanty writes,

In the home nothing is foreign. The home has the character of thoroughgoing normality. The foreign, *der Fremde*, is what is not ‘home’. But, the *Fremde* one can get to know and so make familiar and therewith, under suitable conditions, an extension of the ‘home’ (Mohanty 2002, p. 91, 92).

Thus, it could be said that as like the otherness of the other cannot be known similarly, the foreign could not totally be translated into the home-world. But at the same time the idioms of the foreign-world could be translated into the home-world and therefore, as Mohanty writes we can find out the elements of our home-world in the foreign-world and sometimes home seems to be foreign for someone else (Mohanty 2002).

A home-world is constituted by family, tribe, society, culture etc. This is the truth which is not tradition-bound but a true conscious feeling which Husserl refers as the feeling of one's own homeland. In this regard alongwith European culture Husserl also

mentioned about other cultures like India, China and the feelings of their own respective homelands (Luft, 2002). Thus, the feeling of one's own homeland is always the same no matter what cultural background s/he represents.

If I am born a sailor's child then part of my development has taken place on the ship. But the ship would not be characterized as a ship for me in relation to the earth – as long as no unity would be produced between the ship and the earth—the ship would itself be my “earth,” my homeland. But my parents are not then primordially at home on the ship; they still have the old home, another primordial homeland (Ponty, 2002, p. 126).

Thus, Husserl pointed out that every primordial individual has a primordial home with primordial territory their own respective homelands like, France, Germany, India, China etc. Husserl had a belief that though each culture is alien to other culture but, at the same time they can merge into one another and also could learn from each other (Luft, 2002). Though Husserl talks about European consciousness of their homeland, which is unique to their spiritual form but according to him, the consciousness of homeland is always the same and can never be alien to anyone of us. And this is that true feeling which helps the various worlds to merge into one life-world (ibid). Husserl regarded this world as “life-world” which is both a personal and an intersubjective world. Being a personal world it carries the historicity of each individual and being an intersubjective world it is accessible to all. The “alienworld” also can only be understood on the background of this life-world. Husserl, in his phenomenology thus talks about the life-world as one-world, which he regarded as the horizon of all horizons.<sup>9</sup> This is the life-world which is the original point of living, a shared world, where all of our homes belong. Husserl maintains that we all live in the life-world sharing a common bond with others that remains disclosure of the essential intersubjective nature of human subjectivity.

But, in the framework of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, we found ourselves inhabiting in a world which is drastically changed and revised by the objective sciences and particularly by

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<sup>9</sup> At many point of time the question arises what is the difference between worldview and the life-world. While worldview has particular goals or interests which includes science and philosophy or to acquire knowledge but, on the other life-world is not restricted only with any goal or purpose. (Moran, 2015) It is not a world toward- -- which one could express any attitude. In short it could be said that worldview is that which emerges from life-world.

the enhanced technological systems. **Technology has changed every aspect of our life; our environment, our relationship with others, the mode of governance; control etc.** As a result of this we tend to forget the world of our usual correspondence and in some way the touch of the life-world has got departed from us and gradually virtual space is becoming the form of our life. There emerges a growing tendency of forgetting this life-world where we originally belong. Today's world of our ordinary experience is a world of formed objects obeying universal laws as discovered by sciences, which is different from the world which provides us the foundational experiences of our life. To understand this lost sense of the life-world now the study is going to undertake certain examples in the following section. At the very beginning the study will discuss the issue of *genetically modified food* and its various aspects in a very brief way. Secondly, the study will show the issue of the virtual world and its impact on our life-world.

#### **5.5.1. Genetically Modified Food and its Impact on the Life-World:**

There is a close partnership between food and humanity. On the one way the plants keep humans alive and on the other we keep them alive. There is a mutual nourishment between plants and human being. As we grow together, travel together and at one point of time we die together. The food plants are not there only for the sake of giving us the food but they constitute the identity of human community or cultural heritage. They are the essential bearer of community feeling or identity. "When we eat tomato sauce we think Italian, and when we eat water chestnuts, Chinese. One of the great threats of genetically engineered food is the disruption and destruction of these essential connections between culture and food, people and plants" (Teitel & Wilson, 2001, p. 92). So, the question needs to re-address what intension it fulfils and for whom. Though there are various potential benefits of genetically modified foods but study shows that bringing such types of foods into the market are very costly as it requires sophisticated agricultural engineering technologies which raise the prices of seeds to very high level. Thus, it becomes very difficult for the third-world countries and also for the small farmers to buy those seeds and also to develop their own biotechnology as it requires a huge amount of capital. Now, if the poor countries and the small farmers go for farming non-GM or traditional foods then that would bring loss to their business. As the

demand of the non-GM foods are very less in the global market.<sup>10</sup> Alongwith the others the most important issue with genetically modified food is the issue of patents on the food plants which give power to the giant corporations, governments or universities to have control over the food plants (Teitel & Wilson, 2001). Thus, the patents take away the heritage of various distant peoples or tribes in the form of food plants which they got from their ancestors. As a result, sometimes they might face the risk of infringement if they do not follow the instructions of the patent holders (Ibid). So, it has been seen how genetically modified foods have become the obstacle in the production of the traditional foods where bringing the crops into the home was a common heritage of humankind and where the plants were the identity of our cuisine, culture and religion. Now, instead of harvesting these traditional food plants the farmers would prefer to produce those crops which bring more market value than the traditional foods. Moreover, genetically modified food could not maintain the sustainability in agriculture (Stein, 2008). This can be regarded as one of the important example of deviating ourselves from the life-world where we all belong.

#### **5.5.2. Virtual World and its Impact on the Life-World:**

It has been seen that virtual environment has introduced an entirely new mode of being that transcends the usual human limitations of being in the world causing us to re-think the question of what does it mean to be 'human' in the sense of a 'being in the world', and how having bodies affects that being? Now, the users of digital representations act in a virtual world that provides us with the possibility to perceive stimulus beyond the physical boundaries. It can be stated that technology is giving us a signal of a post human future without having the traditional limitations of time, space and quantity on the availability and openness of information and communication. Resultantly, people started to spend more times in the virtual world. To quote Wankel & Malleck (2010) "The virtual interactive worlds of *Second Life*, with 15,464,773 residents as of October 13, 2008 according to [www.secondlife.com](http://www.secondlife.com), and *World of Warcraft*, with 10,000,000 subscribers as of January

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<sup>10</sup> <http://connectusfund.org/27-big-advantages-and-disadvantages-of-genetically-modified-foods>

2008 according to [www.blizzard.com](http://www.blizzard.com), boast populations larger than Sweden” (p. 2). In this regard we can refer the case of *Second Life*, which is a virtual world, where people can own land with their virtual currency called *Linden Dollar* which can be obtained through real currency as well and vice-versa. Moreover, virtually people could undertake jobs in that world and also could manufacture products and goods in order to earn money (ibid).

Virtual world which is also referred as a *computer based simulated environment* (Bartle, 2003) can now be accepted as a replica of the real world. To understand this point the example of “video game” can be mentioned here. Video games can be regarded as the most popular mode of entertainment in today’s world. It is the most well-liked medium of entertainment for childrens as well as for the adults. But, if noticed it could be seen that most of the video games are violent in nature (Berger, 2002). These games are designed in such a way that the players always need to harm or kill the opponents by using weapons or guns. Therefore, these games could attract the childrens very easily and playing of these violent video games may increase the aggressions or emotions of the players which is really very harmful for the childrens. Though the wars and enemies of these games are not real but still they might affect the childrens as they cannot differentiate the virtual world from the real world. As a result in their real life also they start behaving like a game player. In this regard Berger (2002) maintains that certain video games may create personality problems. Excessive playing of these games might isolate a person from the others. In this regard Lahti (2003) by referring Ted Friedman says that computer games make us to think like a computer. In playing the video games the body of the player dwells in the physical world at the same time the mind of the same player inhabits in the virtual world. It is the mind only which interacts with the other minds within the virtual world. The reason behind this fact can be explained in the words of Veerapen (2011) who writes:

To an outside observer, the inworld activity consists of a person sitting, seemingly immobile and inactive, and staring at a computer screen while losing awareness of the physical surroundings....by starring at and focusing strongly on a highly active onscreen world, s/he bridges a connection between the mind and the virtual world. As a result, the user seems to be absent, lost in a different world on the other side of the computer screen while the body remains, empty of its essence or mind, in this physical place” (p 83).

Thus, excessive playing of these games may isolate the person from the real world or from the others. Moreover, this may also create certain psychological disorders like Communication disorder, Language disorder, Social anxiety disorder etc.

Moreover, in the virtual world one can do anything with his/her body or identity. In video games also one can leave her/his body, can exchange their looks with others, and can change their skin, hair and everything. They can delete undesired characters and can increase or decrease the power of their oppositions and in case of the female players they can change their figures in order to look more attractive and appealing (Lahti, 2003). Thus, the players of the virtual world develop a tendency of deleting, recreating and exchanging their body parts and their identity as well. Thus, virtually a person may become a complete different person. The players of these games become accustomed to all these practices and these kinds of practices within the virtual world leave lots of inklings to the real world and as a result in the real world also they start seeking for an ideal look, figure, colour etc. Finally, they become unable to bridge the gap between the virtual and the real world. Therefore, these types of behaviour may create certain serious psychological problem like split personality.

Similarly, here we can also discuss about communication, which can be regarded as a shared experience based on our day-to-day incidents. The role of communication could be understood from the method used by the great philosopher Socrates known as the *Socratic Method* where he concentrates upon the dialogue forwarded through questioning. In Socrates' dialogue there can be seen a social role played by communication, where not only the self but the others are equally involved in question solving. Communication makes human being more perspectival and broader in a way. By following G.W.F. Hegel's philosophy communication can be defined as the combination of thesis, antithesis and synthesis. In our day-to-day communication we discover different perspectives and horizons of things and events in question which helps one to survive in various situations arises in various times. But, it seems that technology has challenged this wider horizon of thinking and as a result the dialogue has been lost and there could be seen homogeneity in each and every aspect of our life. We are in a virtual world where we communicate with others through mobile phones, internet etc. and which has become a part of our identity. Mobile phone can be regarded as the post modern identity which is not only for talking but it serves various other purposes like banking, facebook, talking etc. But, if noticed it will be

clear that through mobile phones we project our individual world only, as in mobile phones more than we talk we listen to others. Thus, the mobile talk has transformed our communication to yes/no kind of talk. While company like Nokia sells their mobiles with the guidelines that *the more you talk more you human* or *connecting people* but these kinds of guidelines can only be regarded as connection but not as communication because, it is limited to some particular group of *me like people*. The same is the case with the internet generated social networking sites like Facebook, Twitter, MySpace, LinkedIn etc.

Thus, from the above discussion it could be said that Husserl is not against technology but, he would prefer technology to be adopted in a human way than allowing it to de-humanize us. By following Husserlian phenomenology one may try to understand the question ‘what it is to be a human subjectivity’ in the context of the virtualization of the life-world. It can be said that Husserl recognizes the need for a concrete description of embodied and embedded subjectivity that still remains within the transcendental register. The concept of personhood thus, intended to provide this description by demonstrating how the embodied, intersubjective, and axiological dimensions of experience are integrated in the pre-reflective domain of the life-world.

Husserl maintains that we all live in the world sharing a common bond with others that remains disclosure of the essential intersubjective nature of human subjectivity. A human being is an embodied entity, who lives in this shared world with others. According to Mohanty, we live in a society, all the time we encounter some relations with others. As Natanson writes, ego is always “clothed with the garments of society” (Natanson, 1970, p. 17). Mohanty said that a person encounters itself in the society always in connection with others. Human being does not live in an abstract isolated objective world but rather in a society, from where one receives new experiences all the time and one always has to face new challenges (Mohanty, 2000). This changing everydayness may reshape one’s identity in the horizon of one’s lifetime. Husserlian phenomenology does not dispute the possibility of gaining a ‘view from nowhere’, understood as the a-perspectival, theoretical, ‘objective’ understanding of things provided one remains explorer of re-storing the lost sense of meaning and significance buried in the sedimented layers of the life-world. Thus, Husserl through his transcendental phenomenology particularly by introducing the concept of the life-world tried to heal the situation created by the crisis of the sciences which led to the World War II. The

devastating aftermath of the First World War had shaken all aspects of human life, its existence in the world and relations with the others. While on the one way the War influenced Husserl's personal life at the same time he also suffered a profound philosophical and professional discouragement and as a result he was unwelcomed in his own land. It was such a situation of crisis where humanity lost its meaning, its belongingness, its interconnectedness or empathy. Husserl therefore, talks about the elevation of humanity, which he wrote in the Japanese journal *The Kaizo* written between 1922 and 1924 and advocated the *ethical renewal* of the humanity. So, now, it is necessary to discuss what Husserl meant by this *ethical renewal* in his phenomenology and how he tried to overcome this crisis situation in his phenomenological study.

#### **5.6. The Ethical Renewal or Phenomenology as Ethical Life in Husserl's Phenomenology:**

Husserl wrote about the ethical renewal especially in five articles which he wrote for one Japanese journal *The Kaizo*. The destructive effects of the war left Husserl absolutely shattered. Alongwith all other cruelties he had also faced the economic hardship in his life because of the crisis situation. As Buckley (1992) writes he conveyed this in a letter written to Canadian Winthrop Bell in 1922 where he writes about his tribulation for getting down the amount of his earnings to one-tenth of his old salary. He also mentioned about his need for money and his approval to write some articles for the Japanese journal *The Kaizo* (ibid). The War changed the life in Europe to a great extent not only socially, politically or economically but also psychologically, culturally and morally. This crisis cannot be regarded only an epistemological crisis but over and above it is an ethical crisis.

The loss of the self-reflective attitude of philosophy, which has plunged philosophy into an epistemological crisis, and which, ultimately, has led to a loss of confidence in science, is an ethical crisis as well that requires an ethical response. The loss of the ideal of presuppositionlessness is not a mere epistemological problem; it is, above all, an ethical one (Borràs, 2010, p. 14-15).

Husserl in the first article of the *Kaizo* "Renewal: Its Problem and Method" basically talks about the loss of faith in science and thereby in Europe's own meaningfulness. And therefore,

Husserl talks about the need for a complete renewal or re-birth of the ideal of science and most importantly of philosophy which will recuperate the autonomy, the notion of presuppositionlessness, or the attitude of self-reflection (ibid). According to Husserl, this re-birth or renewal of faith depends upon Philosophy. Thus, Husserl assigned that responsibility to all the human beings as members of humanity in order to form a better human world or human culture. As this is a renewal of the faith in ideals therefore, Husserl here seeks for *ethical renewal* but not for *moral*. Thus, by renewal Husserl asks for that scientific ideal which is rigorous in nature, which is unconditional, presuppositionless devoid of any dogmatism. And living without prejudice and presuppositions signifies of living an ethical life which Husserl termed as living in the life-world. By rigorous science Husserl emphasizes that science which includes the human condition or the human spirit in action. And then he gave the responsibility to human being to shape a better humanity. So, it can be stated that, “Husserl goes on to describe this ought as the responsibility to start searching for the scientific paths that no other science up to now has managed to prepare, beginning with preliminary methodological considerations” (ibid, p. 17).

This new science which Husserl is emphasizing also includes a teleological motive within its sphere. This is the ‘telos’ which keeps scope for an authentic humanity. It is teleological because it needs to search for its own endeavours, its own ideal from within rather than certain presupposed external norms imposed from outside. This is the ‘telos’ which no other science had prepared before, a science with human spirit. But, at the same time it should also be mentioned here that by talking about human spirit Husserl never tried to restrict it only within the subjective sphere like the Cartesian ‘Cogito’ or Kantian ‘Reason’. This is the science which is equally scientific rather than subjective; Husserl therefore, talks about phenomenological methods or techniques in order to remove all kinds of prejudices. By doing this he tried to elevate science toward that direction which will also keep room for value aspects. Therefore, he gives the responsibility to human being who according to him, should not be a fixed ‘I’ like ‘cogito’ but, always should keep the scope for the phenomena to disclose which always shows new horizons in the subsequent period. For Husserl, this process would definitely merge the gape among Ethics, Aesthetic and Science in near future. Thus, Husserl here talks about an absolute ethical demand in renewing the humanity for future generation. Husserl describes everything regarding this ethical value in his lectures on *Ethics and Value Theory*. Ethics here is not understood as normative morality

and cannot be reduced or identified with any normative morality because; Husserl does not talk about any ideal or path which is external or presupposed.

To say that the inquiry itself demands justification signifies that every step of the inquiry must be free from presuppositions and, therefore, can only be justified if it is intuitively given and, thus, meaningful according to the fundamental law of evidence. This already intimates a demand for freedom from prejudice, from dogmatism, a demand for meaningfulness that only the principle of intuitive evidence can satisfy (Ibid, p. 3).

In this regard there could be seen an opposition between Husserl and the other philosophers like David Hume, Jeremy Bentham, J. S. Mill, Immanuel Kant etc. According to Humean sentimental ethics, judgments are made by expressing sympathy for others which is psychological in nature. Therefore, according to Husserl the sentimental ethics unable to uncover the objectivity of moral values (Melle, 2002). Secondly, utilitarian or consequentialist ethics forwarded by Jeremy Bentham and J. S. Mill gives importance to the greatest good and thereby promotes a technique for calculating pleasure and pain. But, for Husserl in doing that or in calculating the amount of pleasure and pain it fails to consider the subjective aspect into its sphere (ibid). Then, more particularly Husserl criticised Kantian ethics which promotes practical reason at its best. As according to Husserl, morality of an action is more than the potential exercise of reason. For him, *love* or *compassion* plays a crucial role in the foundation of ethics. In this regard he also admits the role of empathy and calls for a 'categorical imperative' i.e. "do the better", but at a different level by grounding it on the material principle of *love* (Smith, 2007). "This principle presupposes the "constitution" of others as other subjects, fellow persons in our intersubjective world. For Husserl, recall, the region of Culture or Geist, the intersubjective or social world, is the domain of community and therewith of morality" (ibid, p. 379). It shows one important way of restoring the human dimension of sciences by re-storing the lost foundation of the life-world which keeps room for intersubjective interaction at pre-logical level. Love for oneself and love for others can play a crucial role in this regard.

According to Husserl, the main reason of the demolition of the European humanity is the inability of sciences to inquire into the origin of their inquiry or for failing to

understand the ethical need of the society. Thus, Husserl with his phenomenology tries to unveil the most primordial or inner dimension of life through which according to him as (Borràs) 2010 writes:

humankind aims to understand the meaning of its own existence requires, above all else, the recovery of the autonomous and philosophical character of the inquiry itself; it requires a new rigorous science without which the spiritual life of subjectivity would never be unveiled. In other words, the uncovering of the spiritual and transcendental life of subjectivity can only be undertaken within a radical and self-reflective epistemological inquiry that is rooted in an ethical demand for self-responsibility and that, therefore, is teleological in nature. *Phenomenology is ethical life* (p. 18).

Thus, Husserl talks about human person who implies a unity, fullness or concreteness alongwith all the actualities and potentialities. S/he is not different from a mundane person but the same human being viewed from the phenomenological lens of the rigorous scientific ideals (Luft, 2005). Living without prejudices and presuppositions signifies living an ethical life. Husserl termed this living as living in the life-world.

In this regard an important reference could be made here who similarly like Husserl, tried to overcome the traumatic situation of crisis through his practices. Like Husserl Sigmund Freud, who was Husserl's contemporary also tried to heal the human fraternity through his psycho-analysis. Husserl while on the one way tried to overcome this crisis situation through epistemological and ethical renewal of humanity, Freud on the other tried to heal the worries of the people through his psycho-analysis. Both Edmund Husserl and Sigmund Freud were contemporaries, born in the same region of Europe, Moravia, which then belonged to Habsurg Empire. Husserl was born in 1859 and died in 1938 while Freud lived between 1856 to 1939. Both were Jew though Husserl was later converted to Protestantism. Freud's *Interpretation of Dreams* was published in 1900 at a time when Husserl published his *Logical Investigations*. Both Husserl and Freud attended the lectures given by Brentano but neither of them had much to say about one another. Despite having profound disciplinary differences both Husserl and Freud worked for the same cause or for the betterment of the life of human being in this world. Interestingly enough alongwith the

practical aspects they also share certain theoretical similarities among themselves. Thus, to understand their similarities first it is necessary to have an idea about psycho-analysis as advocated by Sigmund Freud.

### **5.7. Phenomenology and Psycho-Analysis: Husserl and Freud:**

Psycho-analysis, popularized by Freud is a kind of a conversation that takes place between a professional psychiatric and a patient in order to helping, understanding and resolving the dilemma of those persons who are in trouble. The major responsibility of a psychotherapist is to create a therapeutic environment where the patient would get the opportunity to open up. While healing in its proper sense means both curing and caring but, with the development of modern medical profession and scientific medicine curing becomes the task of doctors and caring becomes the responsibility of the nurses. But, psycho-analysis could be regarded as the alignment of both treatment and nursing or curing and caring (Aron & Starr, 2013).

As the doctor came to see himself as a member of a new elite- a scientific, progressive, and highly educated profession- he diagnosed, prescribed, and treated using modern medical interventions and instrumentation, becoming uninterested in wasting his time simply providing care or support (ibid,p.5).

This is the common issue now-a-days not only restricted within medical practices but in all the spheres of our lives. There is no one to listen to the stories of that person who is in trouble. In a sense our life has become too mechanical and individualistic without having any scope for empathy and thus gradually we lost our primordial world where we used to live together sharing a common bond. But, in psycho-analysis the patient is allowed to speak his/her stories in front of the psychiatric in order to heal the patient. The patient is allowed to share his/her pain, agony, trouble which caused the psychological disorder in the patient. Thus, psycho-analysis could be regarded as a very effective way of healing the traumatic people who witnessed the devastating experience of the World-War.

Among all other schools and viewpoints it could be said that Freud had showed interest in meaning, intersubjectivity and empathy though he did not mention about it

anywhere. These aspects thus bring him closer to phenomenology. As a model of mental functioning, psycho-analysis tries to understand human development, motivation, and behaviour. As a form of treatment, Freudian psycho-analysis tries to develop an interaction with the patient while the patient is at the unconscious level. It focuses on to capture the genesis of the patient's feelings by re-directing it and by doing that it tries to resolve the psychological problems by offering the therapeutic solution to it. Husserl while gives emphasis upon 'empathy' in order to know the 'suffering' of the other people the same is desirable for psycho-analysis too. Because, like phenomenology psycho-analysis also prefers interpretation over clarification as it continues its treatment by focusing upon the experience of the patient shared with the psychotherapist. In doing that the role of unconscious has become very prominent in psycho-analysis as it could play an important role to a person's behaviour. In psycho-analysis patients are strongly encouraged to remember the memories which they tend to forget. This can be regarded as the re-organization of the meaning field of the patient's lost experiences. This re-organization of meaning provided intelligibility to the suffering of the patient which "transforms, in a therapeutically significant way, the experience of pain" (Rajan, 1991, p. 115). As to quote Barua & Das (2014)

The aim of psychoanalysis is thus not primarily to remove the suffering, but rather to enable it to be re-understood in a more meaningful, and hence bearable, manner. For what "man cannot bear is not suffering as such but meaningless suffering" (Para no. 15).

Thus, all these observations establish the fact that unconscious is the sphere of meaning and intention for psycho-analysis. Freud always tried to show the vulnerability and the fragility of the conscious and the rational identity of human being.

In this regard Minsky (1996) comments:

Consciousness –what we call identity –is always unstable, always at risk of sabotage from the unacceptable feelings of loss and desire which we have to repress into our unconscious in order to conform to the demands of culture.

Our inner psychical or unconscious reality and the external world are always fundamentally in conflict (p. 21).

In this regard it is necessary to maintain that Freudian approach regarding unconscious has been criticised from its inception. And therefore, Freud and his successors had never tried to explore any fruitful analysis between Philosophy and psycho-analysis. As for them Philosophy would necessarily reduce unconscious to consciousness by denying the existence of unconscious (Bernet, 2002). Despite this there are many thinkers who tried to demonstrate a fruitful conversation between Philosophy and psycho-analysis. Among them the phenomenologists are the prominent figures to do that. While some of them are the phenomenologically inspired psycho-analysts like Otto Ludwig Binswanger (1852-1929), Medard Boss (1903-1990) etc. others are psycho-analytically inspired phenomenologists like Scheler, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Ricoeur, Derrida etc (ibid). But, almost everyone of them has been criticised Freudian understanding of unconscious in support of Heideggerian psychotherapy (ibid).

Interestingly enough, the unconscious part was not left unexplored within the meaningful domain of phenomenological exploration. Husserl in his Cartesian Meditations explored the phenomenological description of implicit hidden intentional acts or meanings in order to make accessible the unconscious part of experience to the phenomenological description (Barua & Das, 2014). Freud also emphasized the same by making the unconscious conscious but without negating the origin in the Unconscious (Bernet, 2002). Like Freudian psychoanalysis “Husserlian phenomenology also began with a critic of reflective consciousness and introduced the theme... pre-reflected and unreflected. ... The unconscious which is involved in the phenomenological method’s theme of the un-reflected domain that, interestingly enough, ‘capable of becoming conscious’...” (Ricoeur, 1974, p. 102). Apart from this there could also be found a shared commonality between the two.

As Owen (2006) pointed out;

What Freud and Husserl share is an attention to intentionality, the different forms of mental processes. Intentionalities cannot be directly perceived in others. Yet a great deal of psychological life is about understanding, correctly

or incorrectly, the intentionalities and conscious mental objects of others (p. 12).

In this regard Paul Ricoeur maintains that if phenomenology finally ends up with a kind of subjectivity that is basically intentional in nature, psycho-analysis also brings to light an intentional and sense achieving experience. Ricoeur comments:

On the one hand, [Psychoanalysis] aims to expose the sense of psychic phenomena and therefore proceeds hermeneutically or phenomenologically, respectively. Yet, on the other hand, it strives to explain these phenomena through recourse to the economics of psychic forces and their conflicts, following the ideals of the natural sciences (Lohmar & Brudzińska, 2012, p. x).

Apart from this as Karlsson (2010) pointed out both phenomenology and psycho-analysis seeks for a premeditated break from natural attitude by keeping the scope for openness to meaning as it emerges.

In phenomenology, the epoché or bracketing of the natural attitude in order to reach back to “the thing itself” allows for an unbiased reflective stance towards the epistemic subject, whereas in psychoanalysis the process of free-flowing attentiveness allows for opening up the field of the concealed (Barua & Das, 2014, para no. 19).

Thus, psycho-analysis is an art and a science of healing human suffering aiming at gaining increased self knowledge and insight enabling individual to evolve new pattern of behaviour which are more supportive for this present development. Besides it aims at well integrated individual. Both Freud and Husserl shared an attention to intentionality, the different forms of mental processes. And this makes it possible for us to explore a possible reciprocal relationship between psycho-analysis and phenomenology. In the realm of psycho-analysis too the unconscious is a realm of meaning and intentionality. According to both these traditions our knowledge is perpetually bound up with consciousness. We can come to know

even the unconscious only by making it conscious. It is this reduction to the level of signification that allows us the possibility of a dialogue between these two realms.

Finally, it could be said that though there are various points of commonalities between the two but their differences are also very prominent as for Freud there is a causal mechanism which forcefully transforms unconscious to conscious. But, in case of Husserl there is not any kind of mechanism to transform unconscious to conscious. Here in case of Husserl, the pre-conscious automatically becomes conscious according to the demand of the phenomena or in order to re-live the past one could go back to the level of unconscious.

Thus, by discussing the possible dialogue between Husserlian phenomenology and Freudian psycho-analysis the study tried to bring out the nuanced and unexplored dimension of Husserlian phenomenology and its foundation on lived dimension of intersubjectiveness in the life-world. This, on the one hand shows that in Husserl too reason keeps room for life and its experience as in Freud it is showed with the mystery of unconscious. Unlike the Platonic cave that still keeps room for two separate worlds of light and shadow, Husserl widens the scope of reason by inseparably linking it to the lived dimension of the life-world.

#### **5.8. Basic Findings of the Chapter:**

The chapter thoroughly explores the Husserlian concept of subjectivity by taking into consideration both historicity and temporality. This led Husserlian subjectivity toward a culture or tradition bound primordial world where human being lives together. But, as Husserl mentioned the objectifying nature of natural sciences changed the living in the life-world which Husserl regarded as the ethical crisis of humanity. He thus, talks about ethical renewal of the ideals which can help the human fraternity to overcome this crisis. The chapter also made an attempt to show how technological achievements made us de-humanized by alienating us from the life-world. Moreover, an attempt is also made to study the points of similarities between phenomenology and psycho-analysis by bringing Husserl and Freud together in terms of their intention to heal the traumatic people in the post-war situation.

## Chapter-VI

### Conclusion

The present study makes an attempt to explore Husserlian probe for subjectivity from different perspectives. By giving a background of the pre-phenomenological phase of the problem of the subjectivity the study proceeds to the second chapter that further explores Husserlian quest for subjectivity gradation wise. In its early phase of his philosophical and phenomenological development Husserl explores his account of pure logic, the meaning of an intentional act i.e. the act of thinking and the object of knowledge. Husserl, while on the one hand criticized psychologism on the other he criticized objectivism by bringing the concept of intentionality in logic and finally by going against the positions of the logicians like Frege, Boole etc. Unlike Frege, Husserl entered into an experiential dimension of subjectivity by keeping room for intuition even within the domain of logic and critical inquiry. Husserlian quest for the *logical person*, i.e. the thinker per excellence, keeps room for the necessary co-relation between the subject pole and the object pole of experience where the object is always a meant and intended object in relation to someone and where one essentially lead to the other. According to Husserl, in the process of attaining knowledge the contribution of both subjectivity and objectivity are equally important. It is a process where objectivity is constituted by the subject for sure but in constituting the objectivity the constituting subject also constitutes itself and thus there is no special privilege that is allotted only to the subject but not to the object as such. In the Husserlian framework subjectivity or selfhood differs from the Cartesian Cogito or from the Kantian projection of a rational 'I' which is static and certain as the knower in its apriori dimension. Closer to Hegelian notion of a historical subject Husserl keeps room for phenomenological domain that always keeps scope for the knower agent to re-construct itself in its future orientation. Thus, in order to purify consciousness gradation wise the ego or the subject pole is also to be bracketed at a later phase of transcendental phenomenology. This new turn toward transcendental phenomenology has been explored in the third chapter of the study with the help of the methods for phenomenology.

The previous chapter has already shown that Husserlian exploration of logic and reason keeps room for intuitive dimension in it that leads to a co relation between the subject pole and the object pole, between the noesis and the noema that the constructed meant

object, the noema is essentially tied with its meaning giving subjective pole of experience by keeping objects as its noematic co-relates. As already explained, this move toward subjectivity or consciousness cannot be regarded as a move toward Cartesian cogito simply because of the fact that within Husserl's phenomenology the subject or consciousness doesn't refer a particular human subject or a rational animal with his critical mindset to resolve problems which even a computer or a machine can very well do better than a human, but subject here is identified with vast domain of transcendental consciousness as such. In order to carry out this Husserl applied his methods for phenomenology which leads to a gradual bracketing of the sense of 'I' from the entire exploration. Husserl referred this higher level of consciousness as transcendental subjectivity and accepted the importance of categorial intuition in this regard.

Thus, Husserlian transcendental phenomenology finally reveals the mysterious domain of life and its intersubjective co-relates in his search for the life-world which has been discussed in the forth chapter of the study. This does not mean that transcendental subjectivity is something disembodied or unworldly. According to Husserl, all the occurrences of the world presuppose a subject who experiences everything and who is given in a particular space. Thus, Husserlian transcendental subjectivity is necessarily embodied and embedded engaged in a relational experience between subjective and objective dimensions of meaning thereby keeping room for allowing things and entities to remain real part of this world. This consciousness centric transcendental subject is not the creator of things nor it is the sole reality as like the solitary and windowless monad. This subjectivity is essentially connected with others by forming an intersubjective world which he referred as the life-world which is primordial, pre-logical, and intersubjectively shared world. Thus, Husserl talks about an intersubjective world where both the self and the other equally experience the objects of the world. This intersubjective co-relation between the self and the other also constitutes the objectivity or the world. Husserl named this constituting co-operated subjectivity as *transcendental intersubjectivity* which again constitutes the world by constituting itself. In this regard Husserl brackets the modern scientific world resulting from the objectifying tendency of natural sciences in order to develop his concept of the life-world. According to Husserl, the constitution of the world belongs to the Pure Ego or transcendental subjectivity which constitutes the meaning of the world in the form of the life-world. This constitutive phenomenology in Husserl which has been discussed so far in terms of the division into two parts i.e. the static and the genetic phenomenology. While the static

phenomenology deals with the constitution of the objects on the other hand genetic phenomenology goes on to explore the history of this constitution by exploring the historicity and the temporality aspects of the subjectivity. This led Husserl to explore into the hidden depth or the layers of the transcendental subjectivity which the fifth chapter investigates in the present study.

In his effort at digging out the layers of subjectivity Husserl first went on to explore the historicity and temporality of transcendental subjectivity which has been explored in the fifth chapter of the study. By bracketing the factual history and objective time he explored the meaningful dimension of life constituted by various sedimented factors like cultural, social etc. within a temporal horizon which makes the historical living possible. These sedimented layers of meaning which constitute the meaningfulness of the life-world add significance to various traditions or communities. Husserl here referred to certain primitive communities like Europe, India, and China etc. But, the primordial nature of these communities had been destroyed because of the Crisis led by the natural sciences. In this regard he particularly discussed about the European tradition and its legacy. Here Husserl shows his dissatisfaction by talking about the objectifying nature of modern sciences which destroyed the legacy of European humanity. Therefore, Husserl was in support of the ethical renewal of the European humanity where living means an ethical living without any prejudice and presuppositions which Husserl termed as living in the life-world.

Thus, it has been shown how Husserlian phenomenology finally demands for an ethical upliftment of the individuals through phenomenology. Interestingly enough though he wished for an ethical elevation of individuals Husserl never assigned any norm or rule to serve his purpose. Therefore, his ethical demands cannot be equated with the traditional ethical theories which asked for various external norms, laws and many more. But, ethics in Husserlian phenomenology took a very different shape which includes a telos within it. A telos for an authentic humanity by searching for its own endeavours and own ideals from within rather than asking from any external presupposed norms or ideals. Very importantly, in doing that he always grounded his search on scientific analysis by bringing his phenomenological methods into the picture. Thus, he placed the responsibility on the human being, who now is a phenomenologically purified Ego, who is a unity along with all the horizons of possibilities and actualities living in a life-world without any prejudices.

Further an attempt is also made in the study to show how Husserlian phenomenology of the life-world can help us to lead a life in present times where technology has overpowered our being in the world. In order to explore that dimension certain examples of technological advancements have been analysed which tremendously influenced our life both positively and negatively. While Husserlian exploration would never suggest one to go against any technological developments but it would definitely ask us to adopt technology from a human way by preventing it from de-humanizing us. Throughout his life Husserl has been seen celebrating the meaningfulness or the value of *Life*, which is precious, ceremonial and holy as well. This aspect brought him closer to one of the most famous psychoanalyst, Sigmund Freud, who also tried to heal the traumatic life of the people through his psychoanalysis by unveiling deeper aspects of their life. Both Husserl and Freud tried to overcome the crisis period with the help of their respective resolutions. While Husserlian exploration gives us an epistemological as well as ethical solution to the vacuum created by the loss of the life-world, Freud provides us with a therapeutic solution to the same problem. Most importantly, whatever their solutions were, both of them tried to safeguard the value and the meaningfulness of the life in the world. Though an attempt is made here to explore this dimension of a possible dialogue between these two great contemporary thinkers of their time, who are usually found to be talking about two opposite domains of life, one with focus on consciousness the other on the unconscious dimension of the same, the chapter finds some similarity between the two. The chapter makes a brief reference to this aspect of a possible philosophical dialogue between Freud and Husserl, there remains much more scope to develop this further in the future studies.

Thus, it is seen that Husserl's involvement with consciousness always has been criticised by various philosophers at different points of time. So, now it is necessary to find out some of those criticisms made by different philosophers and finally a way to overcome those criticisms by following Husserlian deportment. To start with his early philosophy, critics have often identified themselves with Frege's criticism that Husserl took recourse to psychologism to establish the concept of Pure Logic. Wilhelm Maximilian Wundt (1832-1920), the father of experimental psychology, attacked Husserl's formulation of Pure Logic. Wundt in this regard criticised Husserl's concept of pure logic and rejected Husserlian notion of ideal meaning by emphasising the impossibility of invariant nature of meaning (Mohanty, 1999). In response from Husserlian perspective it can be stated here that Husserl's

formulation of meaning as ideal could not be compared with Platonic concept of ideal meaning which is beyond space and time. By emphasising upon the ideal meaning Husserl tried to safeguard the objectivity of meaning which he regarded as apriori or independent of mind like the truths of mathematics (Smith & McIntyre, 1984). Frege made a very influential criticism against Husserl as a psychologistic logician because of his involvement with consciousness which has been explained already in a very detailed manner. Paul Gerhard Natorp (1854-1924) also criticised Husserlian position by saying that though Husserl has separated logic from psychology but he could not be able to remove psychological exploration from his phenomenological developments and thereby he again related the both. Natorp's main problem with Husserl was, "why is it that the deepest investigation into the constitution of objectivity cannot avoid taking subjectivity into consideration" (Natorp, 1977, p. 66). In this same line of thinking there could be found various criticisms against Husserlian phenomenology.

Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) who happened to be one of the closest student of Husserl deviated himself from his teacher and formulated his own ontological phenomenology. In 1927, Heidegger dedicated his masterpiece "Being and Time" to Husserl by expressing his thought in a footnote as follows;

[i]f the following investigation has taken a few steps forward in disclosing the 'things themselves,' the author must first of all thank E. Husserl, who, by providing his own incisive personal guidance and by freely turning over his unpublished investigations, familiarised the author with the most diverse areas of phenomenological research during his student years in Freiburg (As cited in Crowell, 2013, p. 58).

Interestingly enough, Heidegger from the year of 1923 started to criticise Husserl from various perspectives. In 1923, he wrote to Karl Löwith that "I am now convinced that Husserl was never a philosopher, not even for one second in his life" (Husserl, 1997, p. 17). Again at the time of dedicating 'Being and Time' to Husserl he wrote to Karl Jaspers that "if the treatise has been written 'against' anyone, then it has been written against Husserl" (Husserl, 1997, p. 22).

Heidegger in his Marburg lectures criticised Husserlian position like the following:

Husserl brought the problem out of these straits with his concept of intentional consciousness in the fifth of the *Logical Investigations* (volume 2). He prepares a new stage, insofar as he shows that intentionality determines the essence of consciousness completely, the essence of reason as such. With his doctrine of the immanent intentionality of the cogitationes he establishes at the same time the connection with the basic questions of modern philosophy since Descartes. But just as in Brentano the concept of the soul itself is left untouched, so also in Husserl, in his idealistic epistemology, the question about the entity constituted as consciousness is posed no further. The insight into intentionality does not go far enough to see that grasping this structure as the essential structure of Dasein must thereby revolutionize the whole concept of humanity. Only then does its central philosophical significance become clear (Hickerson, 2009, p. 576).

Heidegger regarded Husserl to be mired in the traditional metaphysical boundary and admitted a very profound Cartesian influence upon Husserl. Heidegger, who mainly emphasised upon interpreting and unfolding human experiences in the world criticised Husserlian concept of bracketing and accepted the importance of prior understanding as an essential part of Dasein's being in the world (Reiners, 2012). As for Heidegger, Husserl's reduction leads back toward "an idealized absolute subject", (Dahlstrom, 1994, p. 214) an isolated ego not human like but God like. To quote Heidegger, "The transcendental ego is divorced from the empirical or mundane ego; human consciousness is split into two separate realms, one anonymous, lifeless, and neutral, the other, personalized, full-of-life, and interested" (Heidegger, 1982, p. 275-276). According to Heidegger, Husserl has separated consciousness from the world in the name of "transcendental ego" detached from the world which led Husserl toward solipsism. Again, Husserl according to Heidegger concentrated mainly upon the theoretical perspectives of everything including the *being* of the world. According to many critics of Husserl including Follesdal, Dreyfus etc. it was Heidegger only who for the first time with the help of Dilthey's hermeneutic theory transformed Husserl's theoretical methods into his own existential hermeneutics. As per the view of Dreyfus, Husserl has "never worked out a theory of action" (Dreyfus, 1991, p. 55). As for the critics, Husserl was not aware of the practical activities of human beings as an important part of their

relation to the world. Heidegger, by criticising “intentionality” as a version of theoretical attitude maintained that intentionality took the aspect of life from lived experiences (MacDonald, 2006). Husserl for Heidegger,

failed to raise the question of the *being* of human being, that being for which intentionality is the unique structure. Having begun his quest with an approval of the Cartesian *point d'appui*, Husserl became stuck fast with an imponderable sum for the theoretically defined *cogito*. Husserl's methodical centre is the isolated ego, *solus ipse*, and, despite repeated efforts, he is unable to extricate his thought from this complete isolation. This severe and ineradicable limitation prevents Husserl from recognizing the pre-givenness of other egos in the surround world, the historical embeddedness of every human being, and the pre-objective features of objects as available for humans' bodily comportment. (ibid, p. 107, 108).

Similarly, Jean-Paul- Sartre (1905-1980), the key figure of phenomenological existentialism had also attacked Husserlian phenomenology from many angles. He mainly criticised Husserl's formulation of transcendental ego and regarded him as a victim of metaphysical prejudices. Sartre completely denied the existence of any transcendental ego and regarded it as inconsistent with the unity of consciousness. According to him, there is a unity in consciousness. The transcendental ego interrupts that unity by violating the freedom of consciousness. For him, “Consciousness is a spontaneity, an irruption, a blazing Roman candle,” (Natanson, 1973, p. 154) Sartre by going against the constitutive phenomenology of Husserl developed his ontological exploration of consciousness “whose essence it is to be essenceless” (ibid). Moreover, Sartre also criticises Husserlian formulation of the concept of the other. Unlike Husserl, Sartre believed that the other cannot be described from an epistemological point of view. If the other is identified from the perspective of the self then there would not be any reciprocity between the self and the other. In that sense other would become only a static, unconscious object without having any freedom (Sebastian, 2005).

French philosopher Emmanuel Levinas (1906-1995) has also criticised Husserlian position of other by accusing him of reducing the other to the self. According to Levinas, Husserl in his Cartesian Meditations by making the other an alter ego essentially

reduces the infinite alterity of the other to the same. Levinas mainly criticised the consciousness aspect in Husserl which could be understood from the following declaration;

Husserl's assertion here demonstrates that the notion of existence remains for him tightly bound to the notion of theory, to the notion of knowledge, despite all the elements in his system which seem to lead us to a richer notion of existence than mere presence of an object to a contemplative consciousness (Levinas, 1995, p. 134).

Among all the criticisms made by Husserl's contemporaries it was Jacques Derrida (1930-2004) who took a different approach to criticise Husserlian phenomenology. According to him, though phenomenology accommodates the metaphysics of presence as for Husserl all experiences are always given within the form of the living present. On the other hand Derrida gives a very different interpretation of the essence of metaphysics (Boos, 2008). By accepting the fact that meaning is never present he gives priority to the unmediated self-givenness of the presence (McKenna & Evans, 1995). By claiming Husserlian phenomenology as *logocentric* Derrida in his *Speech and Phenomena* criticizes Husserlian acceptance of the concept of Being as presence. According to Derrida, "phenomenology, despite its commitment to presuppositionless thinking, maintains certain metaphysical "prejudices" and thereby brings us to a point beyond phenomenology" (Boos, 2008, p. 9). In this regard Derrida equates Husserl with Descartes to show how both give the privileged position to the certainty and indubitability of the acts of consciousness. As for Derrida,

Husserl accepts this view of the cogito and adds that the stream of *cogitationes* or acts of consciousness are always immediately certain just in the manner they are given. The acts themselves have a certainty and indubitability which distinguishes them from transcendent objects. In this respect, Husserl accepts the notion of self-presence, the principle of self consciousness, as absolute (ibid, p. 10).

Moreover, Derrida had also criticised Husserl's defence of European values as "Eurocentrism". But there could be found various responses against Derrida's accusation over Husserlian phenomenology.

Thus, it has been seen how Husserlian phenomenology has been criticised by various philosophers at various point of time. The fundamental criticism which Husserlian phenomenology encountered centred round his connectedness with consciousness. Husserl has been accused of following the same line like Cartesian philosophy. But, the discussion made in the study shows that Husserlian consciousness which he understood as “transcendental ego” could never be understood as an isolated ego detached from this world. As Husserl essentially made the point clear by saying that transcendental ego which he also referred to as transcendental subjectivity is essentially embodied and as bodily human being it possesses that level of consciousness. Like Descartes, Husserl never tried to negate the world but only tried to purify the consciousness with the help of phenomenological methods by putting prejudices out of play. It is evident to mention here that as per the scholarly observations made by many, this aspect of essential association of the subjectivity to the world took Husserl away from the Sankara’s Advaita Vedantic position found in Indian Philosophy which accepts the existence of the world as the creation of Māyā or illusion (Gupta, 2004). Husserl essentially mentioned in his *Ideas I* that “this world is there for me not only as a world of mere things, but also with the same immediacy as a world of objects with values, a world of goods, a practical world” (Husserl, 1982, p. 53).

By defending the accusation of solipsism over Husserl it can be said that unlike the psychical ego, Husserl regarded transcendental ego as the unifying pole of all conscious experiences, which he referred to as intersubjective dimension of the ego. This intersubjective aspect opens the door toward a shared world where everyone lives freely. Moreover, against the criticism made on the question of practicality in Husserl by following Hart (1990) it can be said that “the theme which preoccupied [Husserl] until the end of his life [was] the problem of the conative or striving nature of the primal presenting or living present” (p. 215). Moreover, it has also been seen in Husserl’s phenomenology that

behind all perception of objects there is the striving of the total intention, a universal or general will for which, or under which, the world is disclosed as a universal field of practice with its goals, values and preferences. There is a founding pre-directedness through which consciousness orients itself, a most basic sense of will or heart that founds and "goes in advance" of the acts that constitute objects. Only if Heidegger chose to ignore these lectures could he

have felt justified in levelling the charge he made against Husserl (MacDonald, 2006, p. 113).

In this regard Dahlstrom (1994) asks;

How fair is Heidegger's criticism? On the one hand, despite his enthusiasm for Husserl's intentional analysis of knowing, Heidegger's criticism effectively discounts the essential role Husserl accords the mere, or even empty, intending of things in the constitution of primary significance of 'truth' and 'being'. Yet this fundamental feature of Husserl's analysis belies the reproach that he crudely equates being with sheer presence. Heidegger's critical exposition of Husserl's phenomenology is, moreover, highly selective, ignoring several other nuances and details of its analyses and development. On the other hand... there are certainly grounds for Heidegger's contention that the basic structure of objectifying acts or, more specifically, an ontology of presence dominates the horizon against which accounts are given of truth, being, and intentionality (p. 239).

Again, it has also been criticised against Husserl that he reduced the other to the self. But, in defence of Husserl it can be said that Husserl always emphasises upon the subject-subject relation between the self and the other by giving respect to the otherness of the other. In this regard Derrida in his "Violence and Metaphysics" writes that Husserl "is concerned with describing how the other as other, in its irreducible alterity, is presented to me" (Derrida, 1978, p. 122). Moreover, he maintains how Husserl *respects* alterity and takes great pains to respect, in its significance, the alterity of the other (Derrida, 1978).

Against Derrida's criticism of Husserl by following Marion it can be said that Derrida gives a very narrow understanding of the presence. As for Marion, "Derrida fundamentally misunderstands Husserl's "presence" to mean simply that which is "able to be grasped by intuition". Derrida neglects to see the differences between "presence" and "givenness," and falsely equates the two terms" (Alvis, 2016, p. 226). As for Marion as well Husserlian thesis should not be accepted as "presence" but it should be emphasised as "given". Experiences are given in consciousness in a particular way which the intuition or the categorial intuition grasps as a form of lived experiences. Moreover, regarding Derrida's criticism against Eurocentrism it can be said that by referring to European humanity Husserl

never tried to restrict himself within a geographical or political framework. Rather he wanted to bring out the intellectual and spiritual achievements of Europe. Its commitment to the rational life as first discovered in the ancient Greek Philosophy (Moran, 2012).

However, from the criticisms raised by various philosophers it can be said that many of them could not understand what Husserl was aiming at in his phenomenology and thereby criticised him. In this regard there could be mentioned the name of Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961) who regarded Husserl as perpetual beginner and gives credit to Husserl whom he never met, in his brilliant and complex essay 'The Philosopher and His Shadow' written in 1959 for Husserl's centenary and published in 1960 in *Signs* and also in his conversation with Jean Paul Weber published in 31<sup>st</sup> December 1960 in *Le Monde*. Though there were certain points where Merleau-Ponty never accepted Husserlian position but it was Merleau-Ponty only who for the first time went to study Husserl's unpublished manuscripts at the Husserl-archives in Leuven. From these records we can find out Merleau-Ponty's ambiguous relationship with Husserl as described by Moran (2013) in his chapter *The Phenomenology of Embodiment: Intertwining and Reflexivity*, where he writes, "he denies he ever separated from phenomenology and has always been particularly struck by the different tone that Husserl's descriptions took when he talked about the body" (p, 287).

It is necessary to mention here that like Husserl who always emphasises upon the life of human being throughout his phenomenological journey the same trend could be found also within the analytical tradition which needs to be explored in order to justify Husserlian position from foreign perspective as well.

It is evident that Bertrand Russell (1872-1970) intended to devise logical calculus as an ideal language to replace everyday language by accusing the later as defective, ambiguous and vague. In seeking for accuracy and exactness Russell as well as Frege went to establish a model of language which does not keep any room for individual intervention in linguistic concepts. "Meaning when divorced from our particularity is derived from more fundamental meaning structures, that is, from facts that, as Russell puts it, simply "are what they are" (Barua, 2008, p. 1). Thus, the theoretical aspect completely took away the human dimension from language under the influence of Russell or Frege. If language speaks only about facts then it would be like seeing one's own house as a beautiful picture of a house like an outsider but not like a home where s/he lives throughout his/her life (Barua, 2008). Because, factual information would not reveal the depth of life, it would only provide the

picture of the house as a house and not more than that. Hegi Kenaan expressed this feeling as “You feel imprisoned and yet you see no walls around you” (Kenaan, 2005, p. 6). By following Kenaan it could also be said that Ludwig Wittgenstein, (1889-1951) another prominent philosopher from analytic tradition had also the same feeling when he said to show the “fly the way out of the fly-bottle” (ibid). As for Wittgenstein, language is essentially connected to the diverse forms of the life of human beings living in a society like human activities, behaviours, relations, practical affairs, personal as well as public activities, relations with others as well as with the world.

language itself is rooted in those very intimate idiosyncratic moments of our personal life when, if at all, we learn how to “read the face through that sad smile” and how to have a glimpse of the “you who speaks to me in and through what you speak” (Barua, 2008, p. 1).

Language could not only provide one to see “that you are happy” or “that you are in pain” but, it also allows “to see you happy” or “to see you in pain” (Kenaan, 2005). With Wittgenstein this trend continues and there could be seen a very massive turn in the linguistic philosophy of J. L. Austin (1911-1960) who emphasised upon the possibility of freedom in language with his theory of “speech act” where an utterance has performative function. Austin with his locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary acts goes beyond the Anglo-American tradition of language which keeps room for human intervention and also an intersubjective openness in the domain of language. In this regard Mitchell (1995) says, “Speaker and hearer, by contrast, adopt a performative attitude in which they encounter one another as members of the intersubjectively shared lifeworld of their linguistic community” (p. 29).

Austin is committed to a conception of intelligibility that is essentially public, average and general despite a general shift away from the model of fact depiction. Illocutionary acts are conventional acts of shared meaning. Shared performatory acts between speakers and hearers stem from interaction between structurally identical linguistic agents, between members of a linguistic community for whom sharing a Life-World means having an equivalent standing within a uniform, homogeneous domain of intelligibility (As cited in Barua, 2008, p. 2).

Finally, to sum up the discussion it can be said that there are various stages of developments in Husserl's phenomenology. Although Husserl himself modified his own ideals at certain stages, but throughout his life he never abandoned the basic aphorism of celebrating the life of human being from a very meaningful perspective. Therefore, his involvement with consciousness has always been criticized by various philosophers at different points of time. Husserl, by widening the scope of reason, inseparably linked it with the lived dimension of the intersubjectiveness in the life-world which remains the disclosure of new horizons of possibilities in its future orientation.

So, it could be said that from Adorno, Derrida, Foucault, Gadamer, Habermas, to Heidegger, Jaspers, Levinas, Merleau Ponty, Ricoeur, Sartre, to name a few all the influential figures of Continental philosophy need to address Husserl to start their writings either by criticising or by supporting Husserl. Husserl's position in the history of Continental Philosophy can be traced by the following quotation given by Lester Embree:

Continental philosophy is like a tree in which the thought of Edmund Husserl is the trunk and the philosophical positions of the major Continental philosophers are branches. This image can accommodate the recognition of big branches that, at least for a while, grow as thick as the trunk and even have their own branches, as happened in the case of Martin Heidegger and Hans-Georg Gadamer. But metaphors often have limitations. This one works only if it is disregarded that the branches of trees remain in substance the same as the trunk and draw their nutrients exclusively from it, whereas 'branching off' in philosophy often entails turning to new sources of inspiration, and the forgetting of origins (Embree, 2003, p. 7).

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